CHAPTER III. CHARACTER, MANNERS AND CUSTOMS, DRESS, ETC., OF THE PEOPLE.

“I lifted up mine eyes, and saw, and, behold, there stood before the

river a ram which had two horns: and the two horns were high; but one

was higher than the other, and the higher came up last.”--Dan. viii. 3.

The ethnic identity of the Persian people with the Medes, and the

inclusion of both nations in that remarkable division of the human

race which is known to ethnologers as the Ipanic or Arian, have been

maintained in a former volume. To the arguments there adduced it seems

unnecessary to add anything in this place, since at the present day

neither of the two positions appears to be controverted. It is admitted

generally, not only that the Persians were of the same stock with the

Medes, but that they formed, together with the Medes and a few

other tribes and peoples of less celebrity, a special branch of the

Indo-European family--a branch to which the name of Arian may be

assigned, not merely for convenience sake, but on grounds of actual

tradition and history. Undistinguished in the earlier annals of their

race, the Medes and Persians became towards the eighth or seventh

century before our era, its leading and most important tribes. Closely

united together, with the superiority now inclining to one, now to the

other, they claimed and exercised a lordship over all the other members

of the stock, and not only over them, but over various alien races

also. They had qualities which raised them above their fellows, and a

civilization, which was not, perhaps, very advanced, but was still not

wholly contemptible. Such details as could be collected, either from

ancient authors, or from the extant remains, of the character, mode of

life, customs, etc., of the Medes, have already found a place in this

work.

The greater part of what was there said will apply also to the Persians.

The information, however, which we possess, with respect to this latter

people, is so much more copious than that which has come down to us with

regard to the Medes, that, without repeating anything from the former

place, our materials will probably enable us to give to the present

chapter considerable dimensions.

The woodcuts of the preceding volume will have made the reader

sufficiently familiar with the physiognomy of the Persians, or, at any

rate, with the representation of it which has come down to us upon the

Persian monuments. It may be remarked that the type of face and head is

uniform upon all of them, and offers a remarkable contrast to the type

assigned to themselves by the Assyrians, from whom the Arians evidently

adopted the general idea of bas-reliefs, as well as their general mode

of treating subjects upon them. The novelty of the physiognomy is

a strong argument in favor of its truthfulness; and this is further

confirmed by the evidence which we have, that the Persian artists aimed

at representing the varieties of the human race, and succeeded fairly

in rendering them. Varieties of, physiognomy are represented upon the

bas-reliefs with much care, and sometimes with remarkable success, as

the annexed head of a negro, taken from one of the royal tombs, will

sufficiently indicate. [PLATE XXIX., Fig.1.]

[Illustration: PLATE XXIX.]

According to Herodotus, the skulls of the Persians were extraordinarily

thin and weak--a phenomenon for which he accounted by the national habit

of always covering the head. There does not seem to be in reality any

ground for supposing that such a practice would at all tend to produce

such a result. If, therefore, we regard the fact of thinness as

established, we can only view it as an original feature in the physical

type of the race. Such a feature would imply, on the supposition that

the heads were of the ordinary size, a large brain-cavity, and so

an unusual volume of brain, which is generally a concomitant of high

intellectual power.

The Persians seem, certainly, to have been quick and lively,

keen-witted, capable of repartee, ingenious, and, for Orientals,

far-sighted. They had fancy and imagination, a relish for poetry and

art, and they were not without a certain power of political combination.

But we cannot justly ascribe to them any high degree of intellectual

excellence. The religious ideas which they held in common with the Medes

were, indeed, of a more elevated character than is usual with races not

enlightened by special revelation; but these ideas were the common stock

of the Iranic peoples, and were inherited by the Persians from a remote

ancestry, not excogitated by themselves. Their taste for art, though

marked, was neither pure nor high. We shall have to consider, in a

future chapter, the architecture and mimetic art of the people to weigh

their merits in these respects, and, at the same time, to note their

deficiencies.

Without anticipating the exact verdict then to be pronounced, we may say

at once that there is nothing in the remains of the Persian architecture

and sculpture that have come down to us indicative of any remarkable

artistic genius; nothing that even places them on a par with the best

works of the kind produced by Orientals. Again, if the great work of

Firdausi represents to us, as it probably does, the true spirit of the

ancient poetry of the Persians, we must conclude that, in the highest

department of art, their efforts were but of moderate merit. A tone of

exaggeration, an imagination exuberant and unrestrained, a preference

for glitter over solid excellence, a love of far-fetched conceits,

characterize the Shahnameh; and, though we may fairly ascribe something

of this to the idiosyncrasy of the poet, still, after we have made all

due allowance upon this score, the conviction presses upon us that there

was a childish and grotesque character in the great mass of the old

Persian poetry, which marks it as the creation of moderate rather than

of high intellectual power, and prevents us from regarding it with the

respect with which we view the labors of the Greeks and Romans, or,

again, of the Hebrews, in this department. A want of seriousness, a

want of reality, and, again, a want of depth, characterize the poetry

of Iran, whose bards do not touch the chords which rouse what is noblest

and highest in our nature. They give us sparkle, prettiness, quaint and

ingenious fancies, grotesque marvels, an inflated kind of human heroism;

but they have none of the higher excellencies of the poetic art, none of

the divine fire which renders the true poet, and the true prophet, one.

Among moral qualities, we must assign to the Persians as their most

marked characteristics, at any rate in the earlier times, courage,

energy, and a regard for truth. The valor of their troops in the great

combats of Platsea and Thermopylae extorted the admiration of their

enemies, who have left on record their belief that, “in boldness and

warlike spirit, the Persians were not a whit behind the Greeks,”

and that their defeat was “wholly owing to the inferiority of their

equipment and training.” Without proper shields, with little defensive

armor, wielding only short swords and lances that were scarcely more

than javelins, they dashed themselves upon the serried ranks of the

Spartans, seizing the huge spear-shafts of these latter with their

hands, striving to break them, and to force a way in. No conduct could

have been braver than this, which the modern historian well compares

with brilliant actions of the Romans and the Swiss. The Persians

thoroughly deserved to be termed (as they are termed by AEschylus), a

“valiant-minded people;” they had boldness, elan, dash, and considerable

tenacity and stubbornness; no nation of Asia or Africa was able to stand

against them; if they found their masters in the Greeks, it was owing,

as the Greeks themselves tell us, to the superiority of Hellenic arms,

equipment, and, above all, of Hellenic discipline, which together

rendered the most desperate valor unavailing, when it lacked the support

of scientific organization and united simultaneous movement.

The energy of the Persians during the earlier years of their ascendancy

is no less remarkable than their courage. AEschylus speaks of a

mysterious fate which forced them to engage continually in a long series

of wars, to take delight in combats of horse, and in the siege and

overthrow of cities. Herodotus, in a tone that is not very different,

makes Xerxes, soon after his accession, represent himself as bound by

the examples of his forefathers to engage his country in some great

enterprise, and not suffer the military spirit of his people to decay

through want of employment. We shall find, when we come to consider the

history of the Empire, that, for eighty years, under four sovereigns,

the course indicated by these two writers was in fact pursued--that

war followed on war, expedition on expedition--the active energy of

sovereign and people carrying them on, without rest or pause, in a

career of conquest that has few parallels in the history of Oriental

nations. In the subsequent period, this spirit is less marked; but,

at all times, a certain vigor and activity has characterized the race,

distinguishing it in a very marked way from the dreamy and listless

Hindus upon the one hand, and the apathetic Turks upon the other.

The Persian love of truth was a favorite theme with the Greeks, who

were, perhaps, the warmer in their praises from a latent consciousness

of their own deficiency in the virtue. According to Herodotus, the

attention of educators was specially directed to the point, and each

young Persian was taught by his preceptors three main things:--“To

ride, to draw the bow, and to speak the truth.” We find that, in the

Zendavesta, and more especially in its earliest and purest portions,

truth is strenuously inculcated. Ahura-Mazda himself is “true,”

“the father of all truth,” and his worshippers are bound to conform

themselves to his image. Darius, in his inscriptions, protests

frequently against “lies,” which he seems to regard as the embodiment

of all evil. A love of finesse and intrigue is congenital to Orientals;

and, in the later period of their sway, the Persians appear to have

yielded to this natural inclination, and to have used freely in their

struggle with the Greeks the weapons of cunning and deception; but,

in the earlier period, a different spirit prevailed; lying was then

regarded as the most disgraceful act of which a man could possibly be

guilty truth was both admired and practised; Persian kings, entrapped

into a promise, stood to it firmly, however much they might wish it

recalled; foreign powers had never to complain that the terms of a

treaty were departed from; the Persians thus form an honorable exception

to the ordinary Asiatic character, and for general truthfulness and a

faithful performance of their engagements compare favorably with the

Greeks and Romans.

The Persian, if we may trust Herodotus, was careful to avoid debt.

He had a keen sense of the difficulty with which a debtor escapes

subterfuge and equivocation--forms, slightly disguised, of lying. To buy

and sell wares in a market place, to chaffer and haggle over prices,

was distasteful to him, as apt to involve falsity and unfairness. He

was free and open in speech, bold in act, generous, warm-hearted,

hospitable. His chief faults were an addiction to self-indulgence and

luxury, a passionate abandon to the feeling of the hour, whatever that

might happen to be; and a tameness and subservience in all his relations

towards his prince, which seem to moderns almost incompatible with real

self-respect and manliness.

The luxury of the Persians will be considered when we treat of

their manners. In illustration of the two other weak points of their

character, it may be observed that, in joy and in sorrow, they were

alike immoderate; in the one transported beyond all reasonable bounds,

and exhibiting their transports with entire unreserve and openness;

in the other proportionately depressed, and quite unrestrained in

the expression of their anxiety or misery. AEschylus’ tragedy of the

“Persae” is, in this respect, true to nature, and represents with

accuracy the real habits of the nation. The Persian was a stranger

to the dignified reserve which has commonly been affected by the more

civilized among Western nations. He laughed and wept, shouted and

shrieked, with the unrestraint of a child, who is not ashamed to lay

bare his inmost feelings to the eyes of those about him. Lively and

excitable, he loved to give vent to every passion that stirred his

heart, and cared not how many witnessed his lamentations or his

rejoicings.

The feeling of the Persian towards his king is one of which moderns can

with difficulty form a conception. In Persia the monarch was so much the

State, that patriotism itself was, as it were, swallowed up in loyalty;

and an absolute unquestioning submission, not only to the deliberate

will, but to the merest caprice of the sovereign, was, by habit and

education, so engrained into the nature of the people that a contrary

spirit scarcely ever manifested itself. In war the safety of the

sovereign was the first thought, and the principal care of all.

The tales told of the self-devotion of individuals to secure the

preservation of the monarch may not be true, but they indicate

faithfully the actual tone of men’s sentiments about the value of the

royal person. If the king suffered, all was lost; if the king escaped,

the greatest calamities seemed light, and could be endured with

patience. Uncomplaining acquiescence in all the decisions of the

monarch--cheerful submission to his will, whatever it might chance to

be--characterized the conduct of the Persians in time of peace. It

was here that their loyalty degenerated into parasitical tameness,

and became a defect instead of a virtue. The voice of remonstrance, of

rebuke, of warning, was unheard at the Court; and tyranny was allowed to

indulge unchecked in the wildest caprices and extravagances. The

father, whose innocent son was shot before his eyes by the king in pure

wantonness, instead of raising an indignant protest against the

crime, felicitated him on the excellence of his archery. Unfortunates,

bastinadoed by the royal orders, declared themselves delighted, because

his majesty had condescended to recollect them. A tone of sycophancy

and servility was thus engendered, which, sapping self-respect, tended

fatally to lower and corrupt the entire character of the people.

In considering the manners and customs of the Persians, it will be

convenient to follow the order already observed in treating of Assyria

and Media--that is to say, to treat, in the first instance, of their

warlike, and subsequently of their peaceful usages. On the latter the

monuments throw considerable light; on the former, the information which

they supply is comparatively scanty.

The Persians, like the Medes, regarded chariots with disfavor, and

composed their armies almost entirely of foot and horse. The ordinary

dress of the foot-man was, in the earlier times, a tunic with long

sleeves, made of leather, and fitting rather tightly to the frame, which

it covered from the neck to the knee. Under this was worn a pair of

trousers, also of leather, and tolerably tight-fitting, especially at

the ankles, where they met a sort of high shoe, or low boot. The head

was protected by a loose round cap, apparently of felt, which projected

a little in front, and rose considerably above the top of the head.

Round the waist was worn a double girdle or belt, from which depended a

short sword. [PLATE XXVIII Fig. 4.]

The offensive arms of the foot-man were, a sword, a spear, and a bow.

The sword, which was called by the Persians _akinaces_, appears to

have been a short, straight weapon, suited for stabbing rather than for

cutting, and, in fact, not very much better than a dagger. [PLATE XXIX.,

Fig. 2.] It was carried in a sheath, and was worn suspended from the

girdle on the right side. From the Persepolitan sculptures it would

seem not to have hung freely, but to have been attached to the right

thigh by a thong which passed round the knee. The handle was short,

and generally unprotected by a guard; but, in some specimens, we see a

simple cross-bar between the hilt and the blade.

The spear carried by the Persian foot-man was also short, or, at any

rate, much shorter than the Greek. To judge by the representations of

guardsmen on the Persepolitan sculptures, it was from six to six and a

half or seven feet in length. The Grecian spear was sometimes as much as

twenty-one feet. The Persian weapon had a short head, which appears to

have been flattish, and which was strengthened by a bar or ridge down

the middle. The shaft, which was of cornel wood, tapered gradually from

bottom to top, and was ornamented at its lower extremity with a ball,

sometimes carved in the shape of an apple or a pomegranate. [PLATE

XXIX., Fig. 3.]

The Persian bow, according to Herodotus and Xenophon, was of unusual

size. According to the sculptures, it was rather short, certainly not

exceeding four feet. It seems to have been carried strung, either on the

left shoulder, with the arm passed through it, or in a bow-case slung at

the left side. It was considerably bent in the middle, and had the ends

slightly turned back. [PLATE XXX., Fig. 1.] The arrows, which were of

reed, tipped with metal, and feathered, were carried in a quiver, which

hung at the back near the left shoulder. To judge from the sculptures,

their length must have been about two feet and a half. The arrow-heads,

which were either of bronze or iron, seem to have been of various

shapes, the most common closely resembling the arrow-heads of the

Assyrians. [PLATE XXX., Fig. 3.]

[Illustration: PLATE XXX.]

Other offensive weapons carried occasionally by the Persian foot-men

were, a battle-axe, a sling, and a knife. The battle-axe, which appears

in the sculptures only in one or two instances, is declared to have been

a common Persian weapon by Xenophon, who, upon such a point, would seem

to be trustworthy. The use of the sling by the Persian light-armed is

quite certain. It is mentioned by Curtius and Strabo, no less than by

Xenophon; and the last-named writer speaks with full knowledge on the

subject, for he witnessed the effect of the weapon in the hands of

Persian slingers during his return with the Ten Thousand. The only

missiles which the Persian slingers threw were stones; they did not,

like the Rhodians, make use of small lumps of lead.

The knife seems also to have been a Persian weapon. Its blade appears to

have been slightly curved, like that of a pruning-hook. It was worn in a

sheath, and was probably thrust into the belt or girdle like the similar

weapon, half knife, half dagger, of a modern Persian.

The ordinary defence of the Persian against the weapons of his enemy was

a shield of wicker-work, which covered him almost from head to foot,

and which probably differed little from the wattled shield of the

Assyrians. [PLATE XXX., Fig. 2.] This he commonly planted on the ground,

supporting it, perhaps, with a crutch, while he shot his arrows from

behind it. Occasionally, he added to this defence the protection of a

coat of mail, composed either of scale armor, or of quilted linen, like

the corselets of the Egyptians. Armor of the former kind was almost

impenetrable, since the scales were of metal--iron, bronze, or sometimes

gold--and overlapped one another like those of a fish.

The Persian cavalry was armed, in the early times of the monarchy,

almost exactly in the same manner as their infantry. Afterwards, however

a considerable change seems to have been made. In the time of the

younger Cyrus cavalry soldiers were very fully protected. They wore

helmets on their heads, coats of mail about their bodies, and greaves

on their legs. Their chief offensive arms seem, then, to have been the

short sword, the javelin, and the knife. It is probable that they were

without shields, being sufficiently defended by their armor, which (as

we have seen) was almost complete.

The javelin of the horseman, which was his special weapon, was a short

strong spear or pike, with a shaft of cornel-wood, and an iron point. It

was common for him to carry two such weapons, one of which he used as

a missile, while he retained the other in order to employ it in

hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. It was a stout manageable weapon,

and though no match for the longer and equally strong spear of

the Macedonian cavalry, was preferred by Xenophon to the long weak

reed-lance commonly carried by horse-soldiers in his day.

It was the practice of the later Persians to protect with armor, not

only the horseman, but the horse. They selected for the service large

and powerful animals, chiefly of the Nisaean breed, and cased them

almost wholly in mail. The head was guarded by a frontlet, and the neck

and chest by a breast-piece; the sides and flanks had their own special

covering and cuisses defended the thighs. These defences were not

merely, like those of the later Assyrian heavy cavalry, of felt or

leather, but consisted, like the cuirasses worn by the riders, of some

such material covered with metal scales. The weight which the horse had

to sustain was thus very great, and the movements of the cavalry force

were, in consequence, slow and hesitating. Flight was difficult; and, in

a retreat, the weaker animals were apt to sink under their burdens, and

to be trampled to death by the stronger ones.

There can be no doubt that, besides these heavy horsemen, the Persians

employed, even in the latest times, and much more in the earlier,

a light and agile cavalry force. Such were the troops which, under

Tissaphernes, harassed the Ten Thousand during their retreat; and such,

it may be conjectured, was really at all times the great body of their

cavalry. The education of the Persian, as we shall see hereafter, was

directed to the formation of those habits of quickness and agility in

the mounting and managing of horses, which have a military value only

as furnishing a good training for the light-cavalry service; and the

tendency of the race has at all times been, not to those forms of

military organization which are efficient by means of solidity and

strength, but to those lighter, more varied, and more elastic branches

which compensate for a want of solidity by increased activity,

readiness, and ease of movement.

Though the Persians did not set any great store by chariots, as an arm

of the military service, they nevertheless made occasional use of them.

Not only were their kings and princes, when they commanded their troops

in person, accustomed to direct their movements, both on the march and

even inaction, from the elevation of a war-chariot, but now and then, in

great battles, a considerable force of them was brought into the field,

and important consequences were expected from their employment. The

wheels of the war-chariots were armed with scythes; and these, when the

chariot was set in motion, were regarded as calculated to inflict great

damage on the ranks of opponents. Such hopes seem, however, to have

been generally disappointed. As every chariot was drawn by at least

two horses, and contained at least two persons--the charioteer and the

warrior--a large mark was offered by each to the missiles of the light

troops who were commonly stationed to receive them; and, as practically

it was found that a single wound to either horse or man threw the whole

equipage into confusion, the charge of a scythed chariot was commonly

checked before it reached the line of battle of the enemy. Where this

was not the case, the danger was escaped by opening the ranks and

letting the chariots pass through them to the rear, a good account being

speedily given of any adventurer who thus isolated himself from the

support of his own party.

The Persian war-chariot was, probably, somewhat loftier than the

Assyrian. The wheels appear to have been from, three to four feet in

diameter; and the body rose above them to a height from the ground of

nearly five feet. The person of the warrior was thus protected up to his

middle by the curved board which enclosed the chariot on three sides.

The axle-tree is said to have been broad, since breadth afforded a

security against being overturned, and the whole construction to have

been strong and solid. The wheels had twelve spokes, which radiated from

a nave of unusual size. The felloes were narrower than the Assyrian, but

were still composed, like them, of two or three distinct layers of wood.

The tires were probably of metal, and were indented like the edge of a

saw. [PLATE XXXI., Fig. 1.]

[Illustration: PLATE XXXI.]

No great ornamentation of the chariot appears to have been attempted.

The body was occasionally patterned with a chequer-work, which maybe

compared with a style common in Assyria, and the spokes of the wheels

were sometimes of great elegance, but the general character of the

workmanship was massive and plain. The pole was short, and terminated

with a simple curve. From the evidence of the monuments it would seem

that chariots were drawn by two horses only; but the classical writers

assure us that the ordinary practice was to have teams of four. The

harness used was exceedingly simple, consisting of a yoke, a belly-band,

a narrow collar, a head-stall, a bit, and reins. When the charioteer

left his seat, the reins could be attached to a loop or bar which

projected from the front of the chariot-board.

Chariots were constructed to contain two, or perhaps, in some instances,

three persons. These consisted of the warrior, his charioteer, who stood

beside him, and an attendant, whose place was behind, and whose business

it was to open and shut the chariot doors. The charioteer wore a visor

and a coat of mail, exposing nothing to the enemy but his eyes.

The later Persians made use also of elephants in battle, but to a very

small extent, and without any results worth mentioning.

The chief points of Persian tactics were the following. The army was

organized into three distinct services--those of the chariots, the

horse, and the foot. In drawing up the line of battle, it was usual,

where chariots were employed, to place them in the front rank, in front

of the rest of the army. Behind the chariots were stationed the horse

and the foot; the former generally massed upon the wings; the latter

placed in the middle, drawn up according to nations, in a number of

oblong squares, which touched, or nearly touched, one another. The

bravest and best armed troops were placed in front; the ranks towards

the rear being occupied by those of inferior quality. The depth of the

ranks was usually very great, since Oriental troops cannot be trusted to

maintain a firm front unless they are strongly supported from behind.

No attempt, however, seems to have been made at forming a second line of

battle in the rear of the first, nor does there even seem to have been

any organized system of reserves. When the battle began, the chariots

were first launched against the enemy, whose ranks it was hoped they

would confuse, or, at any rate, disturb. After this the main line

advanced to the attack, but without any inclination to come at once to

close quarters. Planting their shields firmly on the ground in front of

them, the Persian heavy-armed shot flight after flight of arrows against

their foe, while the slingers and other light-armed in the rear sent

clouds of missiles over the heads of their friends into the adverse

ranks beyond them. It was usually the enemy which brought this phase of

the battle to an end, by pressing onward and closing with the Persian

main line in a hand:to-hand combat. Here the struggle was commonly

brief--a very few minutes often decided the engagement. If the Persian

line of battle was forced or broken, all was immediately regarded as

lost--flight and rout followed. The cavalry, from its position on

the wings, might attempt, by desperate charges on the flanks of the

advancing foe, to stay his progress, and restore the fortune of the

day, but such efforts were usually unavailing. Its line of battle

once broken, a Persian army lost heart; its commander commonly set the

example of flight, and there was a general rush of all arms from the

battle-field.

For success the Persians trusted mainly to their numbers, which enabled

them, in some cases, to renew an attack time after time with fresh

troops, in others to outflank and surround their adversary. Their best

troops were undoubtedly their cavalry, both heavy and light. The heavy,

armed in the old times with bows, and in the later with the javelins,

highly distinguished itself on many important occasions. The weight of

its charge must have been great; its offensive weapons were good; and

its armor made it almost invulnerable to ordinary weapons. The

light cavalry was celebrated for the quickness and dexterity of its

manoeuvres. It had the loose organization of modern Bashi-Bazouks or

Cossacks; it hung in clouds on the enemy--assailed, retreated, rallied,

re-advanced--fled, and even in flight was formidable, since each rider

was trained to discharge his arrows backwards with a sure aim.

against the pursuing foe. The famous skill of the Parthians in their

horse-combats was inherited from their Persian predecessors, who seem to

have invented the practice which the later people carried to perfection.

Though mainly depending for success on their numbers, the Persians did

not wholly despise the use of contrivance and stratagem. At Arbela,

Darius Codomannus had spiked balls strewn over the ground where he

expected the Greek cavalry to make its attacks. [PLATE XXX., Fig. 5];

and, at Sardis, Cyrus obtained his victory over the Lydian horse

by frightening them with the grotesque and unfamiliar camel. Other

instances will readily occur to the reader, whereby it appears that the

art of war was studied, and ingenuity allowed its due place in military

matters, by this people, who showed a fair share of Oriental subtlety in

the devices which they employed against their enemies.

It is doubtful whether we are to include among these devices the use of

military engines. On the one hand, we have several distinct statements

by the author of the “Cyrpoasdia,” to the effect that engines were well

known to the Persians; on the other, we remark an entire absence from

the works of other ancient writers of any notice that they actually

employed them, either in their battles or their sieges. The silence of

Scripture, of Herodotus, of the inscriptions, of Quintus Curtius, of

Arrian, may fairly be regarded as outweighing the unsupported authority

of the romance-writer, Xenophon; and though it would be rash to decide

that such things as siege-towers, battering rams, and balistce--all

of which are found to have been in constant use under the Assyrian and

Babylonian monarchies--were wholly discarded by, or unknown to,

their successors in the government of Asia, yet a wise criticism will

conclude, that they were, at any rate, unfamiliar to the Persians,

rarely and sparingly (if at all) employed by them, other methods

of accomplishing the ends whereto they served having more approved

themselves to this ingenious people. In ordinary sieges it would seem

that they trusted to the bank or mound, while sometimes they drove mines

under the walls, and sought in this way to effect a breach. Where the

place attacked was of great strength, they had recourse in general

either to stratagem or to blockade. Occasionally they employed the

destructive force of fire, and no doubt they often succeeded by the

common method of escalade. On the whole, it must certainly be said that

they were successful in their sieges, exhibiting in their conduct of

them courage, activity, and considerable fertility of resource.

A Persian army was usually, though not always, placed under a single

commander. This commander was the monarch, if he was present; if not, it

was a Persian, or a Mede, nominated by him. Under the commander-in-chief

were a number of general officers, heads of corps or divisions, of whom

we find, in one instance, as many as nine. Next in rank to these were

the chiefs of the various ethnic contingents composing the army, who

were, probably, in general the satraps of the different provinces. Thus

far appointments were held directly from the crown; but beyond this the

system was changed. The ethnic or satrapial commanders appointed the

officers next below themselves, the captains over a thousand, and (if

their contingent was large enough to admit it) the captains over ten

thousand; who, again, nominated their subordinates, commanders of a

hundred, and commanders of ten. Thus, in the main, a decimal scale

prevailed. The lowest rank of officers commanded each ten men, the next

lowest a hundred, the next to that a thousand, the next ten thousand.

The officer over ten thousand was sometimes a divisional chief;

sometimes he was subject to the commander of an ethnic contingent, who

was himself under the orders of the head of a division. Altogether there

were six ranks of officers, exclusive of the commander-in-chief.

The proper position of the commander-in-chief was considered to be the

centre of the line of battle. He was regarded as safer there than

he would have been on either wing; and it was seen that, from such a

position, his orders would be most rapidly conveyed to all parts of the

battlefield. It was not, however, thought to be honorable that he should

keep aloof from the fight, or avoid risking his own person. On the

contrary, he was expected to take an active part in the combat; and

therefore, though his place was not exactly in the very foremost ranks,

it was towards the front, and the result followed that he was often

exposed to imminent danger. The consequences of this arrangement

were frequently disastrous in the extreme, the death or flight of the

commander producing universal panic, stopping the further issue of any

general order, and thus paralyzing the whole army.

The numbers of a Persian army, though no doubt exaggerated by the

Greeks, must have been very great, amounting, probably, on occasions,

to more than a million of combatants. Troops were drawn from the entire

empire, and were marshalled in the field according to nations,

each tribe accoutred in its own fashion. Here were seen the gilded

breastplates and scarlet kilts of the Persians and Medes; there the

woollen shirt of the Arab, the leathern jerkin of the Berber, or the

cotton dress of the native of Hindustan. Swart savage Ethiops from the

Upper Nile, adorned with a war-paint of white and red, and scantily

clad with the skins of leopards or lions, fought in one place with huge

clubs, arrows tipped with stone, and spears terminating in the horn of

an antelope. In another, Scyths, with their loose spangled trousers and

their tall pointed caps, dealt death around from their unerring blows;

while near them Assyrians, helmeted, and wearing corselets of quilted

linen, wielded the tough spear, or the still more formidable iron mace.

Rude weapons, like cane bows, unfeathered arrows, and stakes hardened at

one end in the fire, were seen side by side with keen swords and

daggers of the best steel, the finished productions of the workshops

of Phoenicia and Greece. Here the bronze helmet was surmounted with

the ears and horns of an ox; there it was superseded by a fox-skin, a

leathern or wooden skull-cap, or a head-dress fashioned out of a horse’s

scalp. Besides horses and mules, elephants, camels, and wild asses,

diversified the scene, and rendered it still more strange and wonderful

to the eye of a European. One large body of cavalry was accustomed

to enter the field apparently unarmed; besides the dagger, which the

Oriental never lays aside, they had nothing but a long leathern thong.

They used this, however, just as the lasso is used by the natives of

Brazil, and the wretch at whom they aimed their deadly noose had small

chance of escape. The Persians, like the Assyrians, usually avoided

fighting during the winter, and marched out their armies against the

enemy in early spring. With the great hosts which they moved a fixed

order of march was most necessary; and we find evidence of so much

attention being paid to this point that confusion and disorder seem

scarcely ever to have arisen. When the march lay within their own

country, it was usual to send on the baggage and the sumpter-beasts in

advance, after which came about half the troops, moving slowly in a long

and continuous column along the appointed line of route. At this point

a considerable break occurred, in order that all might be clear for

the most important part of the army, which was now to follow. A guard,

consisting of a thousand horse and a thousand foot, picked men of the

Persian people, prepared the way for what was most holy in the eyes of

the nation--the emblems of their religion, and their king. The former

consisted of sacred horses and cars; perhaps, in the later times, of

silver altars also, bearing the perpetual and heaven-kindled fire,

which was a special object of Persian religious regard, and which the

superstition of the people viewed as a sort of palladium, sure to bring

the blessings of heaven upon their arms. Behind the sacred emblems

followed the Great King himself, mounted on a car drawn by Nissean

steeds, and perhaps protected on either side by a select band of his

relatives. Behind the royal chariot came a second guard, consisting,

like the first, of a thousand foot and a thousand horse. Then followed

ten thousand picked foot, probably the famous “Immortals;” then came

a body of ten thousand picked Persian horsemen. After these a space of

four hundred yards (nearly a quarter of a mile) was left vacant; then

marched, in a second continuous column, the remainder of the host.

On entering an enemy’s country, or drawing near a hostile force in their

own, certain alterations in these dispositions became necessary, and

were speedily effected. The baggage-train was withdrawn, and instead of

moving before the army, followed at some little distance in the rear.

Horsemen were thrown out in front, to feel for the enemy and notify his

arrival. Sometimes, if the host was large, a division of the troops

was made, and several _corps d’armee_ advanced against the foe

simultaneously by distinct routes. When this took place, the

commander-in-chief was careful to accompany the central force, so as to

find himself in his proper position if he was suddenly compelled to give

battle.

Night movements were seldom attempted by the Persians. They marched from

sunrise to sunset, halting, probably, during the midday heat. In their

most rapid marches they seldom accomplished more than from twenty to

twenty-five miles in the day; and when this rate was attempted for any

continuance, it was necessary to rest the men at intervals for as much

as three days at a time. The great drag upon rapidity of movement was

the baggage-train, which consisted ordinarily of a vast multitude of

camels, horses, asses, mules, oxen, etc., in part carrying burthens upon

their backs, in part harnessed to carts laden with provisions, tents,

and other necessaries. The train also frequently comprised a number of

litters, in which the wives or female companions of the chief men were

luxuriously conveyed, amid a crowd of eunuchs and attendants, and with

all the cumbrous paraphernalia of female wardrobes. Roads, it must be

remembered, did not exist; rivers were not bridged, except occasionally

by boats; the army marched on the natural ground along an established

line of route which no art had prepared for the passage of man or beast.

Portions of the route would often be soft and muddy; the carts and

litters would become immovable, their wheels sinking into the mire up

to the axles; all the efforts of the teams would be unavailing; it must

have been imperative to halt the main line, and employ the soldiers in

the release of the vehicles, which had to be lifted and carried forward

till the ground was sufficiently firm to bear them. When a river crossed

the line of route, a ford had to be sought, boats procured, or rafts

extemporized. The Persians were skilful in the passage of streams, to

which they became accustomed in their first campaigns under Cyrus; but

the march was necessarily retarded by these and similar obstacles, and

we cannot be surprised that the average rate of movement was slow.

As evening approached the Persians sought a suitable place for their

camp. An open plain was preferred for the purpose, and the vicinity of

water was a necessity. If an enemy was thought to be at hand, a ditch

was rapidly dug, and the earth thrown up inside; or if the soil was

sandy, sacks were filled with it, and the camp was protected with

sand-bags. Immediately within the rampart were placed the _gerrhophori_,

or Persians armed with large wicker shields. The rest of the soldiers

had severally their appointed places, the position assigned to the

commander-in-chief being the centre. All the army had tents, which were

pitched so as to face the east. The horses of the cavalry were tethered

and hobbled in front of the tents of their owners.

The Persians disliked encamping near to their enemy. They preferred an

interval of seven or eight miles, which they regarded as a considerable

security against a surprise. As their most important arm was the

cavalry, and as it was impossible for the cavalry to unfasten and

unhobble their steeds, to equip them properly, to arm themselves, and

then to mount in a short space of time, when darkness and confusion

reigned around, a night attack on the part of an enterprising enemy

would have been most perilous to a Persian army. Hence the precaution

which they observed against its occurrence--a precaution which was

seldom or never omitted where they felt any respect for their foe,

and which seems to have been effective, since we do not hear of their

suffering any disaster of the kind which they so greatly feared.

The Persians do not seem to have possessed any special corps of

pioneers. When the nature of the country was such as to require the

felling of timber or the removal of brushwood, the army was halted, and

the work was assigned to a certain number of the regular soldiers. For

the construction of bridges, however, in important places, and for

other works on a grand scale intended to facilitate an expedition,

preparations were made beforehand, the tasks being entrusted either to

skilled workmen, or to the crews of ships, if they were tolerably easy

of performance.

Commissariat arrangements were generally made by the Persians on a

large scale, and with the best possible results. An ample baggage-train

conveyed corn sufficient to supply the host during some months and in

cases where scarcity was apprehended, further precautions were taken.

Ships laden with corn accompanied the expedition as closely as possible,

and supplemented any deficiency that might arise from a failure on the

part of the land transport department. Sometimes, too, magazines were

established at convenient points along the intended line of march

previously to the setting forth of the army, and stores were thus

accumulated at places where it was probable they would be found of most

service.

Requisitions for supplies were also made upon the inhabitants of the

towns and villages through which lay the route of the army. Whenever the

host rested for a night at a place of any consequence, the inhabitants

seem to have been required to furnish sufficient bread for a meal

to each man, and, in addition, to provide a banquet for the king

(or general) and his suite, which was always very numerous. Such

requisitions, often intolerably burthensome to those upon whom they

were laid, must have tended greatly to relieve the strain upon their own

resources, which the sustentation of such enormous hosts as the Persian

kings were in the habit of moving, cannot have failed to produce in many

cases.

The effectiveness of these various arrangements for the provisioning of

troops upon a march was such that Persian armies were rarely, if ever,

in any difficulty with respect to their subsistence. Once only in

the entire course of their history do we hear of the Persian forces

suffering to any considerable extent from a want of supplies. According

to Herodotus, Cambyses, when he invaded Ethiopia, neglected the ordinary

precautions and brought his army into such straits that his men began to

eat each other. This caused the total failure of his expedition, and

the loss of a great proportion of the troops employed in it. There

is, however, reason to suspect that, even in this case, the loss and

difficulty which occurred have been much exaggerated.

The Persians readily gave quarter to the enemy who asked it, and

generally treated their prisoners of war with much kindness. Personages

of importance, as monarchs or princes, either preserved their titles

and their liberty, with even a certain nominal authority, or received

appanages in other parts of the Persian territory, or, finally, were

retained about the Court as friends and table-companions of the Great

King. Those of less rank were commonly given lands and houses in some

province remote from their own country, and thenceforth held the same

position as the great mass of the subject races. Exchanges of prisoners

do not seem to have been thought of. In a few cases, persons, whom we

should regard as prisoners of war, experienced some severities, but

probably only when they were viewed by the Persians, not as fair

enemies, but as rebels. Rebels were, of course, liable to any punishment

which the king might think it right to inflict upon them, and there were

occasions after a revolt when sentences of extreme rigor were passed

upon the persons considered to have been most in fault. According to

Herodotus, three thousand Babylonians were crucified by order of

Darius, to punish their revolt from him; and, though this is probably an

exaggeration, it is certain that sometimes, where an example was thought

to be required, the Persians put to death, not only the leader of a

rebellion, but a number of his chief adherents. Crucifixion, or, at

any rate, impalement of some sort, was in such cases the ordinary

punishment. Sometimes, before a rebel was executed, he was kept for a

while chained at the king’s door, in order that there might be no doubt

of his capture.

Among the minor punishments of rebellion were branding, and removal of

the rebels _en masse_ from their own country, to some remote locality.

In this latter case, they were merely treated in the same way as

ordinary prisoners of war. In the former, they probably became royal

slaves attached to the household of the monarch.

Though the Persians were not themselves a nautical people, they were

quite aware of the great importance of a navy, and spared no pains to

provide themselves with an efficient one. The conquests of Phoenicia,

Cyprus, Egypt, and the Greek islands were undertaken, it is probable,

mainly with this object; and these parts of the Empire were always

valued chiefly as possessing skilled seamen, vessels, and dockyards,

from which the Great King could draw an almost inexhaustible supply of

war-ships and transports. Persia at times had the complete command of

the Mediterranean Sea, and bore undisputed sway in the Levant during

almost the whole period of her existence as an empire.

The war-ship preferred by the best naval powers during the whole period

of the Persian rule was the trireme, or decked galley impelled by rowers

sitting in three tiers, or banks, one above another. This vessel, the

invention of the Corinthians, had been generally adopted by the nations

bordering on the Mediterranean in the interval between B.C. 700 and B.C.

525, when by the reduction of Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Egypt, the Persians

obtained the command of the sea. Notwithstanding the invention of

quadriremes by the Carthaginians before B.C. 400, and of quinqueremes by

Dionysius the Elder soon after, the trireme stood its ground, and from

first to last the Persian fleets were mainly composed of this class of

vessels.

The trireme was a vessel of a considerable size, and was capable of

accommodating two hundred and thirty persons. Of these, two hundred

constituted the crew, while the remaining thirty were men-at-arms,

corresponding to our own “marines.” By far the greater number of the

crew consisted of the rowers, who probably formed at least nine-tenths

of the whole, or one hundred and eighty out of the two hundred. The

rowers sat, not on benches running right across the vessel, but on small

seats attached to its side. They were arranged, as before stated, in

three tiers, not, however, directly one over the head of another, but

obliquely, each at once above and behind his fellow. Each rower had the

sole management of a single oar, which he worked through a hole pierced

in the side of the vessel. To prevent his oar from slipping he had a

leathern strap, which he twisted round it, and fastened to the thole,

probably by means of a button. The remainder of the crew comprised the

captain, the steersman, the petty officers, and the sailors proper, or

those whose office it was to trim the sails and look to the rigging.

The trireme of Persian times had, in all cases, a mast, and at least one

sail, which was of a square shape, hung across the mast by means of a

yard or spar, like the “square-sail” of a modern vessel. The rudder

was composed of two broad-bladed oars, one on either side of the stern,

united, however, by a cross-bar, and managed by a single steersman. The

central part of a trireme was always decked, and on this deck, which

was generally level with the bulwarks, stood and fought the men-at-arms,

whose business it was to engage the similar force of the enemy.

The weapon of the trireme, with which she was intended chiefly to

attack her foe, was the beak. [PLATE XXXI., Fig. 3.] This consisted of

a projection from the prow of the ship, either above or below the

water-line, strongly shod with a casting of iron, and terminating either

in the head of an animal, or in one or more sharp points. A trireme was

expected, like a modern “ram,” to use this implement against the sides

of her adversary’s vessels, so as to crush them in and cause the vessels

to sink. Driven by the full force of her oars, which impelled her almost

at the rate of a modern steamer, she was nearly certain, if she struck

her adversary full, to send ship and men to the bottom. She might

also, it is true, greatly damage herself; but, to preclude this, it was

customary to make the whole prow of a trirene exceedingly strong, and,

more particularly, to support it with beams at the side which tended to

prevent the timbers from starting.

Besides triremes, which constituted the bulk of the Persian navy, there

were contained in their fleet various other classes of vessels, as

triaconters, penteconters, cercuri, and others. Triaconters were long,

sharp-keeled ships, shaped very much like a trireme, rowed by thirty

rowers, who sat all upon a level, like the rowers in modern boats,

fifteen on either side of the vessel. [PLATE XXXI., Fig. 2.]

Penteconters were very similar, the only difference being in the number

of the oars and oarsmen. [PLATE XXXI., Fig. 4.] Both these classes of

vessels seem to have been frequently without sails. Cercuri were light

boats, very long and swift. They are said to have been invented by the

Cyprians, and were always peculiar to Asia.

The transports of the Persians were either for the conveyance of horses

or of food. Horse-transports were large clumsy vessels, constructed

expressly for the service whereon they were used, possessing probably a

special apparatus for the embarkation and disembarkation of the animals

which they were built to carry. Corn-transports seem to have been of a

somewhat lighter character. Probably, they varied very considerably in

their size and burthen, including huge and heavy merchantmen on the one

hand, and a much lighter and smaller craft on the other.

The Persians used their ships of war, not only for naval engagements,

but also for the conveyance of troops and the construction of bridges.

Accustomed to pass the great streams which intersect Western Asia

by bridges of boats, which were permanently established wherever an

unfordable river crossed any of the regular routes connecting the

provinces with the capital, the Persians, when they proceeded to carry

their arms from Asia into Europe, conceived the idea of bridging the

interval between the continents, which did not much exceed the width of

one of the Mesopotamian streams, by constructions similar in principle

and general character to those wherewith long use had made them familiar

in their own country. Ranging a number of vessels side by side, at no

great distance one from another, parallel with the course of the stream,

which ran down the straits, anchoring each vessel stem and stern to keep

it in place, and then laying upon these supports a long wooden platform,

they made a floating bridge of considerable strength, reaching from

the Asiatic to the European coast, on which not only men, but horses,

camels, chariots, and laden carts passed over safely from the one

continent to the other. Only, as the water which they had to cross was

not a river, but an arm of the real salt sea, and might, therefore, in

case of a storm, show a might and fury far beyond a river’s power, they

thought it necessary to employ, in lieu of boats, the strongest ships

which they possessed, namely, triremes and pentecon-ters, as best

capable of withstanding the force of an angry sea. Bridges of this

kind were intended sometimes for temporary, sometimes for permanent

constructions. In the latter case, great care and much engineering skill

was lavished on their erection. The shore cables, which united the ships

together, and sustained the actual bridge or platform, were made of most

carefully selected materials, and must have been of enormous strength;

the ships were placed in close proximity one to another; and by the

substitution of a double for a single line--of two bridges, in fact, for

one--the solidity of the work was very largely augmented. Yet, rare as

was the skill shown, solid and compact as were the causeways thus

thrown by human art over the sea, they were found inadequate to the end

desired. The great work of Xerxes, far the most elaborate of its class,

failed to withstand the fury of the elements for a single year; the

bridge, constructed in one autumn, was utterly swept away in the next;

and the army which had crossed into Europe by its aid had to embark as

it best could, and return on board ship to Asia.

As the furnishing of the Persian fleet was left wholly to the subject

nations of the Empire, so was its manning intrusted to them almost

entirely. Phoenicians, Syrians, Egyptians, Cypriots, Cilicians, Lycians,

Pamphylians, Carians, Greeks, equipped in the several costumes of their

countries, served side by side in their respective contingents of ships,

thereby giving the fleet nearly the same motley appearance which

was presented by the army. In one respect alone did the navy exhibit

superior uniformity to their sister service--the _epibatae_, or

“marines,” who formed the whole fighting force of the fleet while it

kept the sea, was a nearly homogeneous body, consisting of three races

only (two of which were closely allied), namely, Persians, Medes, and

Sacse. Every ship had thirty such men on board; all, it is probable,

uniformly armed, and all animated by one and the same spirit. To this

force the Persians must have owed it mainly that their great fleets

were not mere congeries of mutually repellant atoms, but were capable of

acting against an enemy with a fair amount of combination and singleness

of purpose.

When a fleet accompanied a land army upon an expedition, it was usually

placed under the same commander. This commander, however, was not

expected to adventure himself on board much less to take the direction

of a sea-fight. He intrusted the fleet to an officer, or officers, whom

he nominated, and was content himself with the conduct of operations

ashore. Occasionally the land and sea forces were assigned to distinct

commanders of co-ordinate authority--an arrangement which led naturally,

to misunderstanding and quarrel.

The tactics of a Persian fleet seem to have been of the simplest

kind Confident in their numbers, until experience had taught them the

fallaciousness of such a ground of hope, they were chiefly anxious

that their enemy should not escape. To prevent this they endeavored to

surround the ships opposed to them, advancing their line in a crescent

form, so as to enclose their adversary’s wings, or even detaching

squadrons to cut off his retreat. They formed their line several ships

deep and when the hour of battle came, advanced directly at their best

speed against the enemy, endeavoring to run down his vessels by sheer

force, and never showing any acquaintance with or predilection for

manoeuvres of a skilful antagonist, who avoided or successfully

withstood this first onset, they were apt through their very numbers to

be thrown into disorder: the first line would become entangled with the

second, the second with the third, and inextricable confusion would be

the result. Confusion placed them at the mercy of their antagonist,

who, retaining complete command over his own vessels, was able to strike

theirs in vulnerable parts, and, in a short time, to cover the sea with

shattered and sinking wrecks. The loss to the Persians in men as well

as in material, was then sure to be very great; for their sailors seldom

knew how to swim, and were consequently drowned, even when the shore was

but a few yards distant.

When, from deficiency in their numbers, or distrust of their own

nautical skill in comparison with that of their enemy, the commanders of

a Persian fleet wished to avoid an engagement, a plan sometimes adopted

was to run the ships ashore upon a smooth soft beach, and, after drawing

them together, to surround them with such a rampart as could be hastily

made, and defend this rampart with the sailors. The crews of the Persian

vessels were always more or less completely armed, in order that, if

occasion arose, they might act as soldiers ashore, and were thus quite

capable of fighting effectively behind a rampart. They might count, too,

under such circumstances, upon assistance from such of their own land

forces as might happen to be in the neighborhood, who would be sure to

come with all speed to their aid, and might be expected to prove a sure

protection.

The subject nations who furnished the Persians with their fleet were,

in the earlier times, the Phoenicians, the Egyptians, the Cypriots, the

Cilicians, the Syrians of Palestine, the Pamphylians, the Lycians, the

Carians, and the Greeks of Asia Minor and the islands. The Greeks seem

to have furnished the largest number of ships; the Phoenicians, the

next largest; then the Egyptians; after them the Cypriots; then the

Cilicians; then the Carians; next the Lycians; while the Pamphylians

furnished the least. The best ships and the best sailors were the

Phoenicians, especially those of Sidon. In later times, ships were drawn

either from Phoenicia alone, or from Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Cyprus.

The limits assigned to the present work forbid the further prosecution

of this branch of our inquiry, and require us now to pass on from the

consideration of the Persian usages in war, to that of their manners

and customs, their habits and proceedings, in time of peace. And here

it will once more be convenient to follow a division of the subject with

which the reader is familiar, and to treat first of the public life of

the King and Court, and next of the private life of the people.

The Persian king held the same rank and position in the eyes of his

subjects which the great monarch of Western Asia, whoever he might be,

had always occupied from time immemorial. He was their lord and master,

absolute disposer of their lives, liberties, and property; the

sole fountain of law and right, incapable himself of doing wrong,

irresponsible irresistable--a sort of God upon earth; one whose favor

was happiness, at whose frown men trembled, before whom all bowed

themselves down with the lowest and humblest obeisance.

To a personage so exhalted, a state and pomp of the utmost magnificence

was befitting. The king’s ordinary dress in time of peace was the long

flowing “Median garment,” or _candys_--made in his case (it is probable)

of richest silk, which, with its ample folds, its wide hanging sleeves,

and its close fit about the neck and chest, gave dignity to almost any

figure, and excellently set off the noble presence of an Achaemenian

prince. The royal robe was either of purple throughout, or sometimes of

purple embroidered with gold. It descended below the ankles; resting on

the foot even when the monarch was seated. A broad girdle confined it at

the waist. Under it was worn a tunic, or shirt, which reached from the

neck to the knee, and had tight-fitting sleeves that covered the arm to

the wrist. The tunic was purple in color, like the _candys_, or robe,

but striped or mixed with white. The lower limbs were encased in

trousers of a crimson hue. On his feet the the king wore shoes like

those of the Medes, long and taper at the toe buttoned in front,

and reaching very high up the instep: their color was deep yellow or

saffron. [PLATE XXXII., Fig.1.]

[Illustration: PLATE XXXII.]

The Seven Great Monarchies Of The Ancient Eastern World, Vol 5: Persia The History, Geography, And Antiquities Of Chaldaea, Assyria, Babylon, Media, Persia, Parthia, And Sassanian or New Persian Empire; With Maps and Illustrations. · 第 3 / 10 章