But the German method of approaching the problem has never been to ask

sympathy and co-operation, but to picture us as a degenerate race from

whom anything might be gained by playing upon our imagined weakness and

cowardice. A nation which attends quietly to its own sober business

must, according to their mediaeval notions, be a nation of decadent

poltroons. If we fight our battles by means of free volunteers instead

of enforced conscripts then the military spirit must be dead among us.

Perhaps, even in this short campaign, they have added this delusion also

to the dust-bin of their many errors. But such was their absurd

self-deception about the most virile of European races. Did we propose

disarmament, then it was not humanitarianism but cowardice that prompted

us, and their answer was to enlarge their programme. Did we suggest a

navy-building holiday, it was but a cloak for our weakness and an

incitement that they should redouble their efforts. Our decay had become

a part of their national faith. At first the wish may have been the

father to the thought, but soon under the reiterated assertions of their

crazy professors the proposition became indisputable. Bernhardi in his

book upon the next war cannot conceal the contempt in which he has

learned to hold us. Neibuhr long ago had prophesied the coming fall of

Britain, and every year was believed to bring it nearer and to make it

more certain. To these jaundiced eyes all seemed yellow, when the

yellowness lay only in themselves. Our army, our navy, our colonies, all

were equally rotten. "Old England, old, indeed, and corrupt, rotten

through and through." One blow and the vast sham would fly to pieces,

and from those pieces the victor could choose his reward. Listen to

Prof. Treitschke, a man who, above all others, has been the evil genius

of his country, and has done most to push it toward this abyss: "A thing

that is wholly a sham," he cried, in allusion to our empire, "cannot, in

this universe of ours, endure forever. It may endure for a day, but its

doom is certain." Were ever words more true when applied to the narrow

bureaucracy and swaggering Junkerdom of Prussia, the most artificial and

ossified sham that ever our days have seen? See which will crack first,

our democracy or this, now that both have been plunged into the furnace

together. The day of God's testing has come, and we shall see which can

best abide it.

*The Blame Not England's.*

I have tried to show that we are in no way to blame for the hostility

which has grown up between us. So far as it had any solid cause at all

it has arisen from fixed factors, which could no more be changed by us

than the geographical position which has laid us right across their exit

to the oceans of the world. That this deeply rooted national sentiment,

which forever regarded us as the Carthage to which they were destined to

play the part of Rome, would, sooner or later, have brought about war

between us, is, in my opinion, beyond all doubt. But it was planned to

come at the moment which was least favorable for Britain. "Even English

attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us to the real situation,"

says Bernhardi. "We may, at most, use them to delay the necessary and

inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of

success." A more shameless sentence was never penned, and one stands

marveling which is the more grotesque--the cynicism of the sentiment or

the folly which gave such a warning to the victim. For be it remembered

that Bernhardi's words are to be taken very seriously, for they are not

the ravings of some Pan-German monomaniac, but the considered views of

the foremost military writer of Germany, one who is in touch with those

inner circles whose opinions are the springs of national policy. "Our

last and greatest reckoning is to be with Great Britain," said the

bitter Treitschke. Sooner or later the shock was to come. Germany sat

brooding over the chessboard of the world waiting for the opening which

should assure a winning game.

* * * * *

It was clear that she should take her enemies separately rather than

together. If Britain were attacked it was almost certain that France and

Russia would stand by her side. But if, on the contrary, the quarrel

could be made with these two powers, and especially with Russia, in the

first instance, then it was by no means so certain that Great Britain

would be drawn into the struggle. Public opinion has to be strongly

moved before our country can fight, and public opinion under a Liberal

Government might well be divided upon the subject of Russia. Therefore,

if the quarrel could be so arranged as to seem to be entirely one

between Teuton and Slav there was a good chance that Britain would

remain undecided until the swift German sword had done its work. Then,

with the grim acquiescence of our deserted allies, the still bloody

sword would be turned upon ourselves, and that great final reckoning

would have come.

* * * * *

Such was the plan, and fortune favored it. A brutal murder had, not for

the first time, put Servia into a position where a State may be blamed

for the sins of individuals. An ultimatum was launched so phrased that

it was impossible for any State to accept it as it stood and yet remain

an independent State. At the first sign of argument or remonstrance the

Austrian Army marched upon Belgrade. Russia, which had been already

humiliated in 1908 by the forcible annexation of Bosnia, could not

possibly submit a second time to the Caudine Forks. She laid her hand

upon her sword hilt. Germany sprang to the side of her ally. France

ranged herself with Russia. Like a thunderclap the war of the nations

had begun.

* * * * *

So far all had worked well for German plans. Those of the British public

who were familiar with the past and could look into the future might be

well aware that our interests were firmly bound with those of France,

and that if our faggots were not tied together they would assuredly be

snapped each in its turn. But the unsavory assassination which had been

so cleverly chosen as the starting point of the war bulked large in the

eyes of our people, and, setting self-interest to one side, the greater

part of the public might well have hesitated to enter into a quarrel

where the cause seemed remote and the issues ill-defined. What was it to

us if a Slav or a Teuton collected the harbor due of Saloniki! So the

question might have presented itself to the average man who in the long

run is the ruler of this country and the autocrat of its destinies. In

spite of all the wisdom of our statesmen, it is doubtful if on such a

quarrel we could have gained that national momentum which might carry us

to victory. But at that very moment Germany took a step which removed

the last doubt from the most cautious of us and left us in a position

where we must either draw our sword or stand forever dishonored and

humiliated before the world. The action demanded of us was such a

compound of cowardice and treachery that we ask ourselves in dismay what

can we ever have done that could make others for one instant imagine us

to be capable of so dastardly a course. Yet that it was really supposed

that we could do it, and that it was not merely put forward as an excuse

for drawing us into war, is shown by the anger and consternation of the

Kaiser and his Chancellor when we drew back from what the British Prime

Minister had described as "an infamous proposal." One has only to read

our Ambassador's description of his interview with the German Chancellor

after our decision was announced, "so evidently overcome by the news of

our action," to see that through some extraordinary mental aberration

the German rulers did actually believe that a vital treaty with

Britain's signature upon it could be regarded by this country as a mere

"scrap of paper."

*The Treaty of 1839.*

What was this treaty which it was proposed so lightly to set aside? It

was the guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium signed in 1839 (confirmed

verbally and in writing by Bismarck in 1870) by Prussia, France, and

Britain, each of whom pledged their word to observe and to enforce it.

On the strength of it Belgium had relied for her security amid her

formidable neighbors. On the strength of it also France had lavished all

her defenses upon her eastern frontier, and left her northern exposed to

attack. Britain had guaranteed the treaty, and Britain could be relied

upon. Now, on the first occasion of testing the value of her word it was

supposed that she would regard the treaty as a worthless scrap of paper,

and stand by unmoved while the little State which had trusted her was

flooded by the armies of the invader. It was unthinkable, and yet the

wisest brains of Germany seem to have persuaded themselves that we had

sunk to such depths of cowardly indolence that even this might go

through. Surely they also have been hypnotized by those foolish dreams

of Britain's degeneration, from which they will have so terrible an

awakening.

* * * * *

As a matter of fact the General Staff had got ahead of the diplomatists,

and the German columns were already over the border while the point was

being debated at Berlin. There was no retreat from the position which

had been taken up. "It is to us a vital matter of strategy and is beyond

argument," said the German soldier. "It is to us a vital matter of honor

and, is beyond argument," answered the British statesman. The die was

cast. No compromise was possible. Would Britain keep her word or would

she not? That was the sole question at issue. And what answer save one

could any Briton give to it? "I do not believe," said our Prime

Minister, "that any nation ever entered into a great controversy with a

clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting, not for

aggression, not for the maintenance of its own selfish interest, but in

defense of principles the maintenance of which is vital to the

civilization of the world." So he spoke, and history will indorse his

words, for we surely have our quarrel just.

* * * * *

So much for the events which have led us to war. Now for a moment let us

glance at what we may have to hope for, what we may have to fear, and,

above all, what we must each of us do that we win through to a lasting

peace.

What have we to gain if we win? That we have nothing material to gain,

no colonies which we covet, no possessions of any sort that we desire,

is the final proof that the war has not been provoked by us. No nation

would deliberately go out of its way to wage so hazardous and costly a

struggle when there is no prize for victory. But one enormous indirect

benefit we will gain if we can make Germany a peaceful and harmless

State. We will surely break her naval power and take such steps that it

shall not be a menace to us any more. It was this naval power, with its

rapid increase and the need that we should ever, as Mr. Churchill has so

well expressed it, be ready at our average moment to meet an attack at

their chosen moment--it was this which has piled up our war estimates

during the last ten years until they have bowed us down. With such

enormous sums spent upon ships and guns, great masses of capital were

diverted from the ordinary channels of trade, while an even more serious

result was that our programmes of social reform had to be curtailed from

want of the money which could finance them. Let the menace of that

lurking fleet be withdrawn--the nightmare of those thousand hammers

working day and night in forging engines for our destruction--and our

estimates will once again be those of a civilized Christian country,

while our vast capital will be turned from measures of self-protection

to those of self-improvement. Should our victory be complete, there is

little which Germany can yield to us save the removal of that shadow

which has darkened us so long. But our children and our children's

children will never, if we do our work well now, look across the North

Sea with the sombre thoughts which have so long been ours, while their

lives will be brightened and elevated by money which we, in our darker

days, have had to spend upon our ships and our guns.

Consider, on the other hand, what we should suffer if we were to lose.

All the troubles of the last ten years would be with us still, but in a

greatly exaggerated form. A larger and stronger Germany would dominate

Europe and would overshadow our lives. Her coast line would be

increased, her ports would face our own, her coaling stations would be

in every sea, and her great army, greater then than ever, would be

within striking distance of our shores. To avoid sinking forever into

the condition of a dependant, we should be compelled to have recourse to

rigid compulsory service, and our diminished revenues would be all

turned to the needs of self-defense. Such would be the miserable

condition in which we should hand on to our children that free and

glorious empire which we inherited in all the fullness of its richness

and its splendor from those strong fathers who have built it up. What

peace of mind, what self-respect could be left for us in the remainder

of our lives! The weight of dishonor would lie always upon our hearts.

And yet this will be surely our fate and our future if we do not nerve

our souls and brace our arms for victory. No regrets will avail, no

excuses will help, no after-thoughts can profit us. It is now--now--even

in these weeks and months that are passing that the final reckoning is

being taken, and when once the sum is made up no further effort can

change it. What are our lives or our labors, our fortunes or even our

families, when compared with the life or death of the great mother of us

all? We are but the leaves of the tree. What matter if we flutter down

today or tomorrow, so long as the great trunk stands and the burrowing

roots are firm. Happy the man who can die with the thought that in this

greatest crisis of all he has served his country to the uttermost, but

who would bear the thoughts of him who lives on with the memory that he

had shirked his duty and failed his country at the moment of her need?

There is a settled and assured future if we win. There is darkness and

trouble if we lose. But if we take a broader sweep and trace the

meanings of this contest as they affect others than ourselves, then ever

greater, more glorious are the issues for which we fight. For the whole

world stands at a turning point of its history, and one or other of two

opposite principles, the rule of the soldier or the rule of the citizen,

must now prevail. In this sense we fight for the masses of the German

people, as some day they will understand, to free them from that

formidable military caste which has used and abused them, spending their

bodies in an unjust war and poisoning their minds by every device which

could inflame them against those who wish nothing save to live at peace

with them. We fight for the strong, deep Germany of old, the Germany of

music and of philosophy, against this monstrous modern aberration the

Germany of blood and of iron, the Germany from which, instead of the old

things of beauty, there come to us only the rant of scolding professors

with their final reckonings, their Weltpolitik, and their Godless

theories of the Superman who stands above morality and to whom all

humanity shall be subservient. Instead of the world-inspiring phrases of

a Goethe or a Schiller, what are the words in the last decade which have

been quoted across the sea? Are they not always the ever-recurring words

of wrath from one ill-balanced man? "Strike them with the mailed fist."

"Leave such a name behind you as Attila and his Huns." "Turn your

weapons even upon your own flesh and blood at my command." These are the

messages which have come from this perversion of a nation's soul.

*A Mighty Despotism.*

But the matter lies deep. The Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs have used

their peoples as a great landowner might use the serfs upon his estate.

It was, and is, their openly expressed theory that they were in their

position by the grace of God, that they owed no reckoning to any man,

and that kingdom and folk were committed for better or worse to their

charge. Round this theory of the Dark Ages there gathered all the forces

of the many courts of the empire, all the nobility who make so huge a

class in Germanic countries, all the vast army to whom strict discipline

and obedience were the breath of life, all the office-holders of the

State, all the purveyors of warlike stores. These and their like were

the natural setting to such a central idea. Court influence largely

controlled the teaching at school and universities, and so the growing

twig could be bent. But all these forces together could not have upheld

so dangerous and unnatural a theory had it not been for the influence of

a servile press. How that press was managed, how the thoughts of the

people could be turned to the right or the left with the same precision

as a platoon of grenadiers, has been shown clearly enough in the memoirs

of Bismarck. Public opinion was poisoned at its very roots. The average

citizen lived in a false atmosphere where everything was distorted to

his vision. He saw his Kaiser, not as an essentially weak and impetuous

man with a dangerous entourage who were ever at his ear, but as Germany

personified, an angel with a flaming sword, beating back envious

assailants from the beloved Fatherland. He saw his neighbors not as

peaceful nations who had no possible desire to attack him, but on the

contrary lived in constant fear of him, but as a band, of envious and

truculent conspirators who could only be kept in order by the sudden

stamp of the jackboot and the menacing clatter of the sabre. He

insensibly imbibed the Nietzsche doctrine that the immorality of the

Superman may be as colossal as his strength and that the slave-evangel

of Christianity was superseded by a sterner law. Thus, when he saw acts

which his reason must have told him were indefensible he was still

narcotized by this conception of some new standard of right. He saw his

Kaiser at the time of a petty humiliation to Great Britain sending a

telegram of congratulation to the man who had inflicted this rebuff.

Could that be approved by reason? At a time when all Europe was

shuddering over the Armenian massacres he saw this same Kaiser paying a

complimentary visit to the Sultan whose hands were still wet with the

blood of murdered Christians. Could that be reconciled with what is

right? A little later he saw the Kaiser once again pushing himself into

Mediterranean politics, where no direct German interest lay, and

endeavoring to tangle up the French developments in Northern Africa by

provocative personal appearances at Morocco, and, later, by sending a

gunboat to intrude upon a scene of action which had already by the

Treaty of Algeciras been allotted to France. How could an honest German

whose mind was undebauched by a controlled press justify such an

interference as that? He is or should be aware that, in annexing Bosnia,

Austria was tearing up a treaty without the consent of the other

signatories, and that his own country was supporting and probably

inciting her ally to this public breach of faith. Could he honestly

think that this was right? And, finally, he must know, for his own

Chancellor has publicly proclaimed it, that the invasion of Belgium was

a breach of international right, and that Germany, or, rather, Prussia,

had perjured herself upon the day that the first of her soldiers passed

over the frontier. How can he explain all this to himself save on a

theory that might is right, that no moral law applies to the Superman,

and that so long as one hews one's way through, the rest can matter

little? To such a point of degradation have public morals been brought

by the infernal teachings of Prussian military philosophy, dating back

as far as Frederick II., but intensified by the exhortations of press

and professors during our own times. The mind of the average kindly

German citizen has been debauched and yet again debauched until it

needed just such a world crisis as this to startle him at last from his

obsession and to see his position and that of his country in its true

relation with humanity and progress.

*The Final Stakes.*

Thus I say, that for the German who stands outside the ruling classes,

our victory would bring a lasting relief, and some hope that in future

his destiny should be controlled by his own judgment and not by the

passions or interests of those against whom he has at present no appeal.

A system which has brought disaster to Germany and chaos to all Europe

can never, one would think, be resumed, and amid the debris of his

empire the German may pick up that precious jewel of personal freedom

which is above the splendor of foreign conquest. A Hapsburg or a

Hohenzollern may find his true place as the servant rather than the

master of a nation. But apart from Germany, look at the effects which

our victory must have over the whole wide world. Everywhere it will mean

the triumph of reasoned democracy, of public debate, of ordered freedom

in which every man is an active unit in the system of his own

Government, while our defeat would stand for a victory to a priviliged

class, the thrusting down of the civilian by the arrogance and

intolerance of militarism, and the subjection of all that is human and

progressive to all that is cruel, narrow, and reactionary. This is the

stake for which we play, and the world will lose or gain as well as we.

You may well come, you democratic oversea men of our blood, to rally

round us now, for all that you cherish, all that is bred in your very

bones, is that for which we fight. And you, lovers of freedom in every

land, we claim at least your prayers and your wishes, for if our sword

be broken you will be the poorer. But fear not, for our sword will not

be broken, nor shall it ever drop from our hands until this matter is

forever set in order. If every ally we have upon earth were to go down

in blood and ruin, still would we fight through to the appointed end.

Defeat shall not daunt us. Inconclusive victory shall not turn us from

our purpose. The grind of poverty and the weariness of hopes deferred

shall not blunt the edge of our resolve. With God's help we shall go to

the end, and when that goal is reached it is our prayer that a new era

shall come as our reward, an era in which, by common action of State

with State, mutual hatreds and strivings shall be appeased, land shall

no longer be estranged from land, and huge armies and fleets will be

nightmares of the past. Thus, as ever, the throes of evil may give birth

to good. Till then our task stands clear before us--a task that will ask

for all we have in strength and resolution. Have you who read this

played your part to the highest? If not, do it now, or stand forever

shamed.

*Conan Doyle on British Militarism*

Early last year, in the course of some comments which I made upon the

slighting remarks about our army by Gen. von Bernhardi, I observed: "It

may be noted that Gen. von Bernhardi has a poor opinion of our troops.

This need not trouble us. We are what we are, and words will not alter

it. From very early days our soldiers have left their mark upon

Continental warfare, and we have no reason to think that we have

declined from the manhood of our forefathers." Since then he has

returned to the attack.

With that curious power of coming after deep study to the absolutely

diametrically wrong conclusion which the German expert, political or

military, appears to possess, he says in his "War of Today": "The

English Army, trained more for purposes of show than for modern war,"

adding in the same sentence a sneer at our "inferior colonial levies."

He will have an opportunity of reconsidering his views presently upon

the fighting value of our oversea troops, and surely, so far as our own

are concerned, he must already be making some interesting notes for his

next edition, or, rather, for the learned volume upon "Germany and the

Last War," which will, no doubt, come from his pen. He is a man to whom

we might well raise a statue, for I am convinced that his frank

confession of German policy has been worth at least an army corps to

this country. We may address to him John Davidson's lines to his enemy:

Unwilling friend, let not your spite abate.

Spur us with scorn and strengthen us with hate.

There is another German gentleman who must be thinking rather furiously.

He is a certain Col. Gadke, who appeared officially at Aldershot some

years ago, was hospitably entertained, being shown all that he desired

to see, and on his return to Berlin published a most deprecatory

description of our forces. He found no good thing in them. I have some

recollection that Gen. French alluded in a public speech to this

critic's remarks, and expressed a modest hope that he and his men would

some day have the opportunity of showing how far they were deserved.

Well, he has had his opportunity, and Col. Gadke, like so many other

Germans, seems to have made a miscalculation.

*Germans Untried in War.*

New York Times Current History: The European War, Vol 1, No. 1 From the Beginning to March, 1915, With Index · 第 20 / 31 段