been less apparent than muddle-headednes. Of British policy, Shaw says
that since the Continent generally regards us as hypocritical, we must
be hypocritical. He omits to say that the Continent generally, and
Germany in particular, regards our policy and our diplomacy as extremely
able and clear-sighted. The unscrupulous cleverness of Britain is one of
Germany's main themes.
These are minor samples of Mr. Shaw's caprices. In discussing the origin
of the war Mr. Shaw's aim is to prove that all the great powers are
equally to blame. He goes far back and accuses Great Britain of
producing the first page of Bernhardian literature in the anonymous
pamphlet "The Battle of Dorking." He admits in another passage that the
note of this pamphlet was mainly defensive. He is constantly thus making
intrenchments for himself in case of forced retirement, and there is in
his article almost nothing unjust against Great Britain that is not
ingeniously contradicted or mitigated elsewhere.
*Great Britain's War Literature.*
Beginning with "The Battle of Dorking" and ending with H.G. Well's "War
in the Air," one of the most disturbing and effective warnings against
militarism ever written, he sees simply that Great Britain has produced
threatening and provocative militarist literature comparable to
Germany's. No grounds exist for such a contention. There are militarists
in all countries, but there are infinitely more in Germany than in any
other country. The fact is notorious. The fact is also notorious that
the most powerful, not the most numerous, party in Germany wanted the
war. It would be as futile to try to prove that Ireland did not want
home rule as that Germany did not want war. As for a war literature,
bibliographical statistics show, I believe, that in the last ten years
Germany has published seven thousand books or pamphlets about war. No
one but a German or a Shaw, in a particularly mischievous mood, would
seek to show that Great Britain is responsible for the war fever. It
simply is not so.
Mr. Shaw urges that we all armed together. Of course we did. When one
nation publicly turns bellicose the rest must copy her preparations. If
Great Britain could live this century over again she would do over again
what she actually did, because common sense would not permit her to do
otherwise. The admitted fact that some Britons are militarists does not
in the slightest degree impair the rightness or sagacity of our policy.
If one member of a family happens to go to the bad and turn burglar,
therein is no reason why the family mansion should not be insured
against burglary.
Mr. Shaw proceeds to what he calls the diplomatic history of the war.
His notion of historical veracity may be judged from his description of
the Austrian ultimatum to Servia as an escapade of a dotard. He puts the
whole blame of it on Franz Josef, and yet he must know quite well that
Germany has admitted even to her own subjects that Austria asked
Germany's opinion about her policy and obtained Germany's approval
before delivering the ultimatum. [Official German pamphlet "Reasons for
the War with Russia," August, 1914.] There is no word in Mr. Shaw's
diplomatic history of the repeated efforts toward peace made by Great
Britain and scotched by Germany. On the contrary, with astounding
audacity and disingenuousness, he tries to make it appear that
suggestions for peace were offered by Germany and rejected by Great
Britain. Once more it simply was not so.
*Defense of Sir Edward Grey.*
Mr. Shaw's paraphrase of Document 17 in the British diplomatic
dispatches is a staggering travesty. So far as I can see it bears no
relation to the original. Further, he not only deplores that a liberal
government should have an imperialist Foreign Secretary, but he accuses
Sir Edward Grey of sacrificing his country's welfare to the interests of
his party and committing a political crime in order not to incur the
wrath of The Daily News and The Manchester Guardian. This is totally
inexcusable. Let me not be misunderstood. I am not a liberal. I am an
out-and-out radical. I foresee a cleavage in the Liberal Party, and when
that cleavage comes I shall be on the extreme left wing. I entirely
agree with Mr. Shaw's denunciation of secret diplomacy and undemocratic
control of foreign policy. By every social tradition I should be in
opposition to Sir Edward Grey, but I think Grey was the best Foreign
Secretary that the Liberal Party could have chosen and that he worked
well on the only possible plane, the plane of practicality. I am quite
sure he is an honest man, and I strongly resent, as Englishmen of all
opinions will resent, any imputation to the contrary.
As for the undemocratic control of foreign policy, a strong point about
our policy on the eve of the war is that it was dictated by public
opinion. [See Grey's dispatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, No.
123.] Germany could have preserved peace by a single gesture addressed
to Franz Josef. She did not want peace. Mr. Shaw said Sir Edward Grey
ought to have shouted out at the start that if Germany fought we should
fight. Sir Edward Grey had no authority to do so, and it would have been
foolish to do so. Mr. Shaw also says Germany ought to have turned her
whole army against Russia and left the western frontier to the care of
the world's public opinion in spite of the military alliance by which
France was bound to Russia. We have here an example of his aptitude for
practical politics.
*Was Belgium a Mere Excuse?*
Let us now come to Belgium. Mr. Shaw protests needlessly that he holds
no brief for small States as such, and he most vehemently denies that we
are bound to knight errantry on their behalf. His objection to small
States is that they are either incorrigibly bellicose or standing
temptations to big powers. Outside the Balkans no small State is
bellicose. All are eminently pacific. That they are a standing
temptation to thieves is surely no reason for their destruction. If it
is a reason Mr. Shaw ought to throw his watch down the drain.
Mr. Shaw states that Belgium was a mere excuse for our going to war.
That there was a vast deal more in the pre-war diplomacy than appears in
the printed dispatches, or in any dispatches, I am as convinced as Mr.
Shaw is, but I am equally convinced that so far as we are concerned
there was nothing in diplomacy, however secret, to contradict our public
attitude. The chief item not superficially apparent is that the
diplomats knew all along that Germany wanted war and was doing all she
could to obtain war on terms most favorable to herself. That our own
interest coincided with our duty to Belgium did not by any means render
our duty a mere excuse for action. If a burglar is making his way upward
in the house where Mr. Shaw lives and Mr. Shaw comes down and collars
him in the flat of a defenseless invalid below and hands him over to the
police Mr. Shaw would not expect the police to say, "You are a
hypocrite; you only seized the burglar because you feared he would come
to you next." I stick to the burglar simile, because a burglar is just
what Germany is.
*The "Infamous Proposal" Phrase.*
Mr. Shaw characterizes Mr. Asquith's phrase, "Germany's infamous
proposal," as the "obvious barrister's claptrap." Once more this is
totally inexcusable. I do not always see eye to eye with Mr. Asquith, I
agree with Mr. Shaw that he has more than once sinned against democratic
principles, but what has that to do with the point? My general
impression of Mr. Asquith and general impression of this country is that
Mr. Asquith, in addition to being a pretty good Liberal, is an honest
man. His memorable speech containing the "infamous proposal" phrase was
most positively a genuine emotional expression of his conviction and of
the conviction of the whole country, and Mr. Shaw, a finished master of
barrister's claptrap when he likes, has been merely scurrilous about it.
Germany's proposal was infamous. Supposing that we had taken the Belgium
point at Mr. Shaw's valuation of it, the "nonsense about Belgium," as he
calls it, and refrained from war, what would have been the result? The
result would have been that today we could not have looked one another
in the face as we passed down the street.
But Mr. Shaw is not content with arguing that the Belgium point was a
mere excuse for us. He goes further and continually implies that there
was no Belgium point. Every time he mentions the original treaty that
established Belgian neutrality he puts after it in brackets, [date
1839,] an obvious barrister's device, sarcastically to discredit the
treaty because of its age. He omits to say that the chief clause in the
treaty contains the word "perpetually." What is worse, he infers that by
the mere process of years, as Belgium gradually made herself, civilized
herself, enriched herself, and increased her stake in the world, her
moral right to independence and freedom instead of being strengthened
was somehow mysteriously weakened. The theory is monstrous, but if he
does not mean that he means nothing.
Further, he says that in 1870 Gladstone could not depend on the treaty
of 1839 and resorted to a special temporary treaty not now in force, and
that, therefore, technically the validity of the 1839 treaty is
extremely doubtful. This twisting of facts throws a really sinister
light upon the later developments of Mr. Shaw as a controversialist. The
treaty of 1870 was, indeed, temporary, except in so far as it confirmed
the treaty of 1839. Article 3 of the treaty of 1870 says it shall be
binding on the contracting parties during the continuance of the war and
for twelve months after, and then proceeds "and on the expiration of
that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the
high contracting parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as
heretofore on the quintuple treaty of 1839," (textual.)
Mr. Shaw's manifesto is lengthy and it will no doubt be reprinted in
book form. I repeat what I said in my first paragraph as to the major
part of it, but I assert that the objectionable part of the manifesto is
so objectionable in its flippancy, in its perversity, in its injustice,
and in its downright inexactitude as to amount to a scandal. Mr. Shaw
has failed to realize either his own importance or the importance and
very grave solemnity of the occasion. The present is no hour for that
disingenuous, dialectical bravura which might excusably relieve a
domestic altercation. Before reprinting Mr. Shaw should, I suggest;
seriously reconsider his position and rewrite.
*"Bennett States the German Case"*
By George Bernard Shaw.
Letter to The Daily News of London.
_To The Daily News, Sir:_
In justice to the enemy I am bound to admit that Mr. Bennett's case,
which is the German case, is a very strong one and that his ironic
comment on the case against Germany, "We have here an example of Mr.
Shaw's aptitude for practical politics," is a comment that the Kaiser
will probably make and that the average "practical man" will make, too.
Mr. Bennett, in saying that I am a simpleton to doubt that, if Germany
had not attacked France, France would have attacked her, shows a much
greater courage than he credits me with. That is Germany's contention,
and if valid is her justification for dashing at any enemy who, as Mr.
Bennett believes, was lying in wait to spring on her back when Russia
had her by the throat. If Mr. Bennett is right, and I am a simpleton,
there is nothing more to be said. The Imperial Chancellor's plea of "a
state of necessity" is proved up to the hilt.
I did not omit to say that Germany regards our policy and our diplomacy
as extremely able and clear-sighted. I expressly and elaborately pointed
that out. Mr. Bennett, being an Englishman, is so flattered by the
apparent compliment from those clever Germans that he insists it is
deserved. I, being an Irishman and, therefore, untouched by flattery,
see clearly that what the Germans mean by able and clear-sighted is
crafty, ruthless, unscrupulous, and directed to the deliberate and
intentional destruction of Germany by a masterly diplomatic combination
of Russia, France and Great Britain against her, and I defend the
English and Sir Edward Grey in particular on the ground, first, that the
British nation at large was wholly innocent of the combination, and,
second, that even among diplomatists, guilty as most of them
unquestionably were and openly as our Junkers--like the German
ones--clamored for war with Germany, there was more muddle than
Machiavelli about them, and that Sir Edward never completely grasped the
situation or found out what he really was doing and even had a
democratic horror of war.
*Shaw's Excuses Scorned.*
But Mr. Bennett will not have any of my excuses for his unhappy country.
He will have it that the Germans are right in admiring Sir Edward as a
modern Caesar Bogia, and that our militarist writers are "of first class
quality," as contrasted with the "intense mediocrity" of poor Gen.
Bernhardi.
If Mr. Bennett had stopped there the Kaiser would send him the Iron
Cross, but of course, like a true born Englishman, he goes on to deny
indignantly that England has produced a militarist literature comparable
to Germany and to affirm hotly that Mr. Asquith is an honest man whose
bad arguments are "a genuine emotional expression of his convictions and
that of the whole country," and that Sir Edward Grey is an honest man,
and that he (Mr. Bennett) "strongly resents as Englishmen of all
opinions will resent any imputation to the contrary"--just what I said
he would say and that he entirely agrees with my denunciation of secret
diplomacy and undemocratic control of foreign policy and that I am a
perverse and wayward harlequin, mischievous, unveracious, scurrilous,
monstrous, disingenuous, flippant, unjust, inexact, scandalous, and
objectionable, and that on all points to which he takes exception and a
good many more I am so magnificent, brilliant, and convincing that no
citizen could rise from perusing me without being illuminated.
That is just a little what I meant by saying that Englishmen are
muddle-headed, because they never have been forced by political
adversity to mistrust their tempers and depend on a carefully stated
case as Irishmen have been.
*Showed Germany the Way.*
I did with great pains what nobody else had done. I showed what Germany
should have done, knowing that I had no right to reproach her for doing
what she did until I was prepared to show that a better way had been
open to her.
Bennett says, in effect, that nobody but a fool could suppose that my
way was practicable and proceeds to call Germany a burglar. That does
not get us much further. In fact, to me it seems a step backward. At all
events it is now up to Mr. Bennett to show us what practical alternative
Germany had except the one I described. If he cannot do that, can he
not, at least, fight for his side? We, who are mouthpieces of many
inarticulate citizens, who are fighting at home against the general
tumult of scare and rancor and silly cinematograph heroics for a sane
facing of facts and a stable settlement, are very few. We have to bring
the whole continent of war-struck lunatics to reason if we can.
What chance is there of our succeeding if we begin by attacking one
another because we do not like one another's style or confine ourselves
to one another's pet points? I invite Mr. Bennett to pay me some more
nice compliments and to reserve his fine old Staffordshire loathing for
my intellectual nimbleness until the war is over.--G. BERNARD SHAW.
[Illustration: G.K. CHESTERTON. _See Page 108_]
[Illustration: SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE. (_Photo by Arnold Genthe_) _See
Page 132_]
*Flaws in Shaw's Logic*
By Cunninghame Graham.
Letter to The Daily News of London.
_To the Editor of The Daily News:_
The controversy between men of peace as to the merits, demerits, causes,
and possible results of the great war is becoming almost as dangerous
and little less noisy than the real conflict now being waged in and
around Ypres. The only difference between the two conflicts is that the
combatants in Flanders only strive to kill the body. Those who fire
paper bullets aim at the annihilation of the soul.
Literature is a nice thing in its way. It both passes and gives us many
weary hours. It has its place. But I submit that at present it is mere
dancing on a tight rope. Whether the war could have been avoided or not
is without interest today. In fact, there is no controversy possible
after Maximilian Harden's pronouncement. In it he throws away the
scabbard and says boldly that Germany from the first was set on war.
Hence it becomes a work of supererogation to find excuses for her, and
hence, my old friend, Bernard Shaw, penned his long indictment of his
hereditary enemy, England, all in vain.
We are a dull-witted race. Although the Continent has dubbed us
"Perfidious Albion," it is hard for us to take in general ideas, and no
man clearly sees the possibilities of the development of the original
sin that lies dormant in him. Thus it becomes hard for us to understand
the reason why, if Germany tore up a treaty three months ago we are
certain to tear up another in three years' time.
All crystal gazing appeals but little to the average man on this side of
the St. George's channel. It may be that we shall tear up many treaties,
but the broad fact remains that hitherto we have torn up none.
The particular treaty that Germany tore up was signed by five powers in
1839, ratified again in 1870 by a special clause respected by King
Frederick William in his war against the French, was often referred to
in Parliament by Gladstone and by other Ministers, and was considered
binding on its signatories. Germany tore it up for her own ends, thus
showing that she was a stupid though learned people, for she at once at
the same time prejudiced her case to the whole world and made a military
mistake.
No human motives are without alloy, but at the same time honesty in our
case has proved the better policy. Germany, no doubt, would have granted
us almost anything for our assent to her march through Belgium. We
refused her offers, no doubt from mixed motives, for every Englishman is
not an orphan archangel, stupid, or dull or muddle-headed, or what not.
The balance of the world is with us, not, perhaps, because they love us
greatly, but because they see that we, perhaps by accident, have been
forced into the right course and that all smaller nationalities such as
Montenegro, Ireland, Poland, and the rest would disappear on our defeat.
CUNNINGHAME GRAHAM.
*Editorial Comment on Shaw*
From THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 5, 1914.
Mr. G. Bernard Shaw thinks that "the time has now come to pluck up
courage and begin to talk and write soberly about the war." Our readers
will find in THE TIMES Sunday Magazine this morning some of the fruits
of this auto-suggestion. They are very remarkable. While Mr. Shaw can
hardly be called a representative of any considerable class, the fact
that one prominent writer, always much read, can assume Mr. Shaw's
attitude and make public Mr. Shaw's comments throws a strong light on
the spirit of British society. It is true that he intimates that he ran
the risk of "prompt lynching" at one time, but that was probably the
suggestion of a certain timidity and vanity to which he pleads guilty.
His safe and prosperous existence is really a striking evidence, on the
one hand, of British good nature, and, on the other, of the indifferent
estimate the British put on his influence.
Like Iago, Mr. Shaw is nothing if not critical, and in this crisis his
criticism is for the most part bitter, extreme, and in purpose
destructive. He particularly dislikes Sir Edward Grey and the Government
of which he is a leading spirit, and the class which the Government
represents. He singles out Sir Edward as the chief "Junker" and among
the chief "militarists" who brought about this war. Mr. Shaw's attacks
on the Foreign Secretary are savage, and, as often happens with savage
attacks--they are far from consistent. For example, Mr. Shaw paraphrases
at some length the interview between Sir Edward and the German
Ambassador, in which the latter made four different propositions to
secure the neutrality of Great Britain if Germany waged war on France,
all of which Sir Edward refused. Mr. Shaw sees in this only evidence of
determination to take arms against Germany in any case, carrying out a
long-cherished plan formed by the Government of which Sir Edward Grey
was, for this matter, the responsible member. He does not see--- though
it is so plain that a wayfaring man though a professional satirist
should not err therein--that what the Secretary intended to do--what, in
fact, he did do--was to refuse to put a price on British perfidy, to
accept any "bargain" offered to that end.
On the other hand, Mr. Shaw paraphrases at still greater length the
report of the interview in which the Russian Foreign Minister and the
French Ambassador at St. Petersburg tried to induce the British
Government to commit itself in advance to war against Germany. Mr. Shaw
thinks that thus the German "bluff" would have been called and war would
have been prevented, and he is confident that Mr. Winston Churchill
would have taken the Bismarck tone and dictated the result. He cannot
see--what is really the essential fact in both cases--that Sir Edward
Grey was striving in every honorable way to preserve peace, that his
Government refused to stand idle and see France crushed in the same
spirit that it refused to menace Germany until a definite and undeniable
cause of war arose.
That cause came with Germany's violation of its pledge to observe the
neutrality of Belgium, and England's response excites Mr. Shaw's most
furious contempt. He adopts with zest the judgment of the German
Chancellor. The pledge for all who signed it was but a scrap of paper,
of no more binding force than others that had gone their way to dusty
death in the diplomatic waste baskets. To observe the obligation it
imposed was hypocrisy. To fight in order to compel Germany to observe it
was crass militarism. Plainly, Mr. Shaw is a little difficult. The
Government under which he lives is either too bellicose or not bellicose
enough; too ready to help France if France is attacked or not ready
enough to bully Germany, and especially it is all wrong about Belgium
and its treaty, since treaties have several times been broken, and so on
through a bewildering circle of contradictory statements and notions.
Mr. Shaw finds little to choose between the groups of combatants. He
distinctly prides himself on his impartiality, not to say indifference.
On account of his Irish birth he claims something of the detachment of a
foreigner, but admits a touch of Irish malice in taking the conceit out
of the English. Add to this his professed many-sidedness as a dramatist
and playwright and we get as good an explanation as can be given of this
noted writer's attitude toward the tremendous struggle now waging. But
Mr. Shaw's assumption of even-handed scorn for every one concerned, of
"six of one and a half dozen of the other," does not hold out. He feels
profoundly that such fighting as Germany does, for such a purpose as
inspires Germany, must be met by force, and that England could not in
the long run, no matter by whom guided or governed, have shirked the
task laid upon her. That being the case, one wonders a little why it was
worth while to cover every one with ridicule and to present a picture of
Great Britain so essentially grotesque and distorted.
* * * * *
*Bernard Shaw on the End of the War.*
_From The New York Sun, Nov_. 15, 1914.
In the midst of a good deal of untimely gibing, George Bernard Shaw, as
reported in a London dispatch to The Sun of yesterday, says one or two
very wise and appropriate things about the end of the war and the times
to come after it. His warnings are a useful check to the current loose
talk of the fire-eaters and preachers of the gospel of vengeance.