the Euphrates valley, but these were covered with a facing of enamelled
tiles, disposed as a skirting or a frieze, on which figured those
wonderful processions of archers, and the lions which now adorn the
Louvre, while the pilasters at the angles, the columns, pillars,
window-frames, and staircases were of fine white limestone or of hard
bluish-grey marble.
[Illustration: 262.jpg ONE OF THE CAPITALS FROM SUSA]
Drawn by Boudier, from a photograph taken in the Louvre by
Faucher-Gudin.
[Illustration: 262b.jpg FREIZE OF ARCHERS AT SUZA]
[Illustration: 263.jpg GENERAL RUINS OF PERSIPOLIS]
The doorways are high and narrow; the moulding which frames them
is formed of three Ionic fillets, each projecting beyond the other,
surmounted by a coved Egyptian lintel springing from a row of alternate
eggs and disks. The framing of the doors is bare, but the embrasures are
covered with bas-reliefs representing various scenes in which the king
is portrayed fulfilling his royal functions--engaged in struggles with
evil genii which have the form of lions or fabulous animals, occupied in
hunting, granting audiences, or making an entrance in state, shaded by
an umbrella which is borne by a eunuch behind him. The columns employed
in this style of architecture constitute its most original feature.
The base of them usually consists of two mouldings, resting either on
a square pedestal or on a cylindrical drum, widening out below into a
bell-like curve, and sometimes ornamented with several rows of inverted
leaves. The shafts, which have forty-eight perpendicular ribs cut on
their outer surface, are perhaps rather tall in proportion to their
thickness. They terminate in a group of large leaves, an evident
imitation of the Egyptian palm-leaf capital, from which spring a sort of
rectangular fluted die or abacus, flanked on either side with four rows
of volutes curved in opposite directions, generally two at the base and
two at the summit. The heads and shoulders of two bulls, placed back to
back, project above the volutes, and take the place of the usual abacus
of the capital. The dimensions of these columns, their gracefulness, and
the distance at which they were placed from one another, prove that they
supported not a stone architrave, but enormous beams of wood, which
were inserted between the napes of the bulls necks, and upon which the
joists of the roof were superimposed. The palace of Persepolis, built by
Darius after he had crushed the revolts which took place at the outset
of his reign, was situated at the foot of a chain of rugged mountains
which skirt the plain on its eastern side, and was raised on an
irregularly shaped platform or terrace, which was terminated by a wall
of enormous polygonal blocks of masonry. The terrace was reached by
a double flight of steps, the lateral walls of which are covered
with bas-reliefs, representing processions of satellites, slaves, and
tributaries, hunting scenes, fantastic episodes of battle, and lions
fighting with and devouring bulls. The area of the raised platform was
not of uniform level, and was laid out in gardens, in the midst of which
rose the pavilions that served as dwelling-places. The reception-rooms
were placed near the top of the flight of steps, and the more important
of them had been built under the two preceding kings. Those nearest to
the edge of the platform were the propylæ of Xerxes--gigantic entrances
whose gateways were guarded on either side by winged bulls of Assyrian
type; beyond these was the _apadana_, or hall of honour, where the
sovereign presided in state at the ordinary court ceremonies. To the
east of the _apadana_, and almost in the centre of the raised terrace,
rose the Hall of a Hundred Columns, erected by Darius, and used only
on special occasions. Artaxerxes I. seems to have had a particular
affection for Susa. It had found favour with his predecessors, and they
had so frequently resided there, even after the building of Persepolis,
that it had continued to be regarded as the real capital of the empire
by other nations, whereas the Persian sovereigns themselves had sought
to make it rather an impregnable retreat than a luxurious residence.
Artaxerxes built there an _apadana_ on a vaster scale than any hitherto
designed.
[Illustration: 267.jpg THE PROPYLAEA OF XERXES I. AT PERSEPOLIS]
Drawn by Boudier, from the heliogravure of Marcel Dieulafoy.
It comprised three colonnades, which, taken together, formed a rectangle
measuring 300 feet by 250 feet on the two sides, the area being
approximately that of the courtyard of the Louvre. The central
colonnade, which was the largest of the three, was enclosed by walls on
three sides, but was open to the south. Immense festoons of drapery hung
from the wooden entablature, and curtains, suspended from rods between
the first row of columns, afforded protection from the sun and from the
curiosity of the vulgar.
[Illustration: 268.jpg BAS-RELIEF OF THE STAIRCASE LEADING TO THE
APADANA OF XERXES]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from Marcel Dieulafoy.
At the hour appointed for the ceremonies, the great king took his seat
in solitary grandeur on the gilded throne of the Achæmenids; at the
extreme end of the colonnade his eunuchs, nobles, and guards ranged
themselves in silence on either side, each in the place which etiquette
assigned to him. Meanwhile the foreign ambassadors who had been honoured
by an invitation to the audience--Greeks from Thebes, Sparta, or Athens;
Sakae from the regions of the north; Indians, Arabs, nomad chiefs from
mysterious Ethiopia-ascended in procession the flights of steps which
led from the town to the palace, bearing the presents destined for its
royal master.
[Illustration: 269.jpg THE KING ON HIS THRONE]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from Plandin and Coste.
Having reached the terrace, the curtains of the _apadana_ were suddenly
parted, and in the distance, through a vista of columns, they perceived
a motionless figure, resplendent with gold and purple, before whom
they fell prostrate with their faces to the earth. The heralds were
the bearers of their greetings, and brought back to them a gracious or
haughty reply, as the case may be. When they rose from the ground, the
curtains had closed, the kingly vision was eclipsed, and the escort
which had accompanied them into the palace conducted them back to the
town, dazzled with the momentary glimpse of the spectacle vouchsafed to
them.
[Illustration: 270.jpg A VIEW OF THE APADANA OF SUSA, RESTORED]
Drawn by Boudier, from the restoration by Marcel Dieulafoy.
The Achæemenian monarchs were not regarded as gods or as sons of gods,
like the Egyptian Pharaohs, and the Persian religion forbade their
ever becoming so, but the person of the king was hedged round with such
ceremonial respect as in other Oriental nations was paid only to the
gods: this was but natural, for was he not a despot, who with a word
or gesture could abase the noblest of his subjects, and determine the
well-being or misery of his people? His dress differed from that of his
nobles only by the purple dye of its material and the richness of the
gold embroideries with which it was adorned, but he was distinguished
from all others by the peculiar felt cap, or _kidaris_, which he wore,
and the blue-and-white band which encircled it like a crown; the king
is never represented without his long sceptre with pommelled handle,
whether he be sitting or standing, and wherever he went he was attended
by his umbrella- and fan-bearers. The prescriptions of court etiquette
were such as to convince his subjects and persuade himself that he was
sprung from a nobler race than that of any of his magnates, and that he
was outside the pale of ordinary humanity. The greater part of his
time was passed in privacy, where he was attended only by the eunuchs
appointed to receive his orders; and these orders, once issued, were
irrevocable, as was also the kings word, however much he might desire
to recall a promise once made. His meals were, as a rule, served to him
alone; he might not walk on foot beyond the precincts of the palace, and
he never showed himself in public except on horseback or in his chariot,
surrounded by his servants and his guards. The male members of the royal
family and those belonging to the six noble houses enjoyed the privilege
of approaching the king at any hour of the day or night, provided he was
not in the company of one of his wives. These privileged persons formed
his council, which he convoked on important occasions, but all ordinary
business was transacted by means of the scribes and inferior officials,
on whom devolved the charge of the various departments of the
government. A vigorous ruler, such as Darius had proved himself,
certainly trusted no one but himself to read the reports sent in by the
satraps, the secretaries, and the generals, or to dictate the answers
required by each; but Xerxes and Artaxerxes delegated the heaviest part
of such business to their ministers, and they themselves only fulfilled
such state functions as it was impossible to shirk--the public
administration of justice, receptions of ambassadors or victorious
generals, distributions of awards, annual sacrifices, and state
banquets: they were even obliged, in accordance with an ancient and
inviolable tradition, once a year to set aside their usual sober habits
and drink to excess on the day of the feast of Mithra. Occasionally they
would break through their normal routine of life to conduct in person
some expedition of small importance, directed against one of the
semi-independent tribes of Iran, such as the Cadusians, but their
most glorious and frequent exploits were confined to the chase. They
delighted to hunt the bull, the wild boar, the deer, the wild ass, and
the hare, as the Pharaohs or Assyrian kings of old had done; and they
would track the lion to his lair and engage him single-handed; in fact,
they held a strict monopoly in such conflicts, a law which punished with
death any huntsman who had the impertinence to interpose between the
monarch and his prey being only abolished by Artaxerxes. A crowd of
menials, slaves, great nobles, and priests filled the palace; grooms,
stool-bearers, umbrella- and fan-carriers, _havasses_, Immortals,
bakers, perfumers, soldiers, and artisans formed a retinue so numerous
as to require a thousand bullocks, asses, and stags to be butchered
every day for its maintenance; and when the king made a journey in full
state, this enormous train looked like an army on the march. The women
of the royal harem lived in seclusion in a separate wing of the palace,
or in isolated buildings erected in the centre of the gardens. The
legitimate wives of the sovereign were selected from the ladies of
the royal house, the sisters or cousins of the king, and from the six
princely Persian families; but their number were never very large,
usually three or four at most.*
* Cambyses had had three wives, including his two sisters
Atossa and Roxana. Darius had four wives--two daughters of
Cyrus, Atossa and Artystônê, Parmys daughter of Srnerdis,
and a daughter of Otanes.
The concubines, on the other hand, were chosen from all classes of
society, and were counted by hundreds.
[Illustration: 273.jpg PROCESSIONAL DISPLAY OF TRIBUTE BROUGHT TO THE
KING OF PERSIA]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from plates in Flandin and Coste.
They sang or played on musical instruments at the state banquets of the
court, they accompanied their master to the battle-field or the chase,
and probably performed the various inferior domestic duties in the
interior of the harem, such as spinning, weaving, making perfumes, and
attending to the confectionery and cooking. Each of the kings wives
had her own separate suite of apartments and special attendants, and
occupied a much higher position than a mere concubine; but only one was
actually queen and had the right to wear the crown, and this position
belonged of right to a princess of Achæ-menian race. Thus Atossa,
daughter of Cyrus, was queen successively to Cambyses, Gaumâta, and
Darius; Amestris to Xerxes; and Damaspia to Artaxerxes. Besides the
influence naturally exerted by the queen over the mind of her husband,
she often acquired boundless authority in the empire, in spite of her
secluded life.*
* Thus Atossa induced Darius to designate Xerxes as his
heir-apparent.
Her power was still further increased when she became a widow, if the
new king happened to be one of her own sons. In such circumstances she
retained the external attributes of royalty, sitting at the royal
table whenever the king deigned to dine in the womens apartments, and
everywhere taking precedence of the young queen; she was attended by her
own body of eunuchs, of whom, as well as of her private revenues,
she had absolute control. Those whom the queen-mother took under her
protection escaped punishment, even though they richly deserved it,
but the object of her hatred was doomed to perish in the end, either by
poison treacherously administered, or by some horrible form of torture,
being impaled, suffocated in ashes, tortured in the trough, or flayed
alive. Artaxerxes reigned for forty-two years, spending his time between
the pleasures of the chase and the harem; no serious trouble disturbed
his repose after his suppression of the revolt under Megabyzos, but on
his death in 424 B.C. there was a renewal of the intrigues and ambitious
passions which had stained with bloodshed the opening years of his
reign. The legitimate heir, Xerxes II., was assassinated, after a reign
of forty-five days, by Secudianus (Sogdianus), one of his illegitimate
brothers, and the _cortège_ which was escorting the bodies of his
parents conveyed his also to the royal burying-place at Persepolis.
Meanwhile Secudianus became suspicious of another of his brothers,
named Ochus, whom Artaxerxes had caused to marry Parysatis, one of the
daughters of Xerxes, and whom he had set over the important province of
Hyrcania. Ochus received repeated summonses to appear in his brothers
presence to pay him homage, and at last obeyed the mandate, but arrived
at the head of an army. The Persian nobility rose at his approach, and
one by one the chief persons of the state declared themselves in his
favour: first Arbarius, commander of the cavalry; then Arxanes, the
satrap of Egypt; and lastly, the eunuch Artoxares, the ruler of
Armenia. These three all combined in urging Ochus to assume the _Edaris_
publicly, which he, with feigned reluctance, consented to do, and
proceeded, at the suggestion of Parysatis, to open negotiations with
Secudianus, offering to divide the regal power with him. Secudianus
accepted the offer, against the advice of his minister Menostanes, and
gave himself up into the hands of the rebels. He was immediately seized
and cast into the ashes, where he perished miserably, after a reign of
six months and fifteen days.
On ascending the throne, Ochus assumed the name of Darius. His
confidential advisers were three eunuchs, who ruled the empire in his
name--Artoxares, who had taken such a prominent part in the campaign
which won him the crown, Artibarzanes, and Athôos; but the guiding
spirit of his government was, in reality, his wife, the detestable
Parysatis. She had already borne him two children before she became
queen; a daughter, Amestris, and a son, Arsaces, who afterwards became
king under the name of Artaxerxes. Soon after the accession of her
husband, she bore him a second son, whom she named Cyrus, in memory
of the founder of the empire, and a daughter, Artostê; several other
children were born subsequently, making thirteen in all, but these all
died in childhood, except one named Oxendras. Violent, false, jealous,
and passionately fond of the exercise of power, Parysatis hesitated at
no crime to rid herself of those who thwarted her schemes, even though
they might be members of her own family; and, not content with putting
them out of the way, she delighted in making them taste her hatred to
the full, by subjecting them to the most skilfully graduated refinements
of torture; she deservedly left behind her the reputation of being one
of the most cruel of all the cruel queens, whose memory was a terror not
only to the harems of Persia, but to the whole of the Eastern world.
The numerous revolts which broke out soon after her husbands accession,
furnished occasions for the revelation of her perfidious cleverness.
All the malcontents of the reign of Artaxerxes, those who had
been implicated in the murder of Xerxes II., or who had sided with
Secudianus, had rallied round a younger brother of Darius, named
Arsites, and one of them, Artyphios, son of Megabyzos, took the field in
Asia Minor. Being supported by a large contingent of Greek mercenaries,
he won two successive victories at the opening of the campaign, but was
subsequently defeated, though his forces still remained formidable. But
Persian gold accomplished what Persian bravery had failed to achieve,
and prevailed over the mercenaries so successfully that all deserted him
with the exception of three Milesians.
[Illustration: 276.jpg Darius II.]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from one of the coins in the
_Cabinet des Médailles._
Artyphios and Arsites, thus discouraged, committed the imprudence of
capitulating on condition of receiving a promise that their lives should
be spared, and that they should be well treated; but Parysatis persuaded
her husband to break his plighted word, and they perished in the ashes.
Their miserable fate did not discourage the satrap of Lydia, Pissuthnes,
who was of Achæmenian race: he entered the lists in 418 B.C., with the
help of the Athenians. The relations between the Persian empire and
Greece had continued fairly satisfactory since the peace of 449
B.C., and the few outbreaks which had taken place had not led to any
widespread disturbance. The Athenians, absorbed in their quarrel with
Sparta, preferred to close their eyes to all side issues, lest the
Persians should declare war against them, and the satraps of Asia Minor,
fully alive to the situation, did not hesitate to take advantage of any
pretext for recovering a part of the territory they coveted: it was thus
that they had seized Colophon about 430 B.C., and so secured once more a
port on the Ægean. Darius despatched to oppose Pissuthnes a man of noble
birth, named Tissaphernes, giving him plenary power throughout the whole
of the peninsula, and Tissaphernes endeavoured to obtain by treachery
the success he would with difficulty have won on the field of battle: he
corrupted by his darics Lycon, the commander of the Athenian contingent,
and Pissuthnes, suddenly abandoned by his best auxiliaries, was forced
to surrender at discretion. He also was suffocated in the ashes, and
Darius bestowed his office on Tissaphernes.
But the punishment of Pissuthnes did not put an end to the troubles:
his son Amorges roused Caria to revolt, and with the title of king
maintained his independence for some years longer. While these incidents
were taking place, the news of the disasters in Sicily reached the East:
as soon as it was known in Susa that Athens had lost at Syracuse the
best part of her fleet and the choicest of her citizens, the moment was
deemed favourable to violate the treaty and regain control of the whole
of Asia Minor. Two noteworthy men were at that time set over the
western satrapies, Tissaphernes ruling at Sardes, and Tiribazus over
Hellespontine Phrygia. These satraps opened negotiations with Sparta
at the beginning of 412 B.C., and concluded a treaty with her at
Miletus itself, by the terms of which the Peloponnesians recognised the
suzerainty of Darius over all the territory once held by his ancestors
in Asia, including the cities since incorporated into the Athenian
league. They hoped shortly to be strong enough to snatch from him what
they now ceded, and to set free once more the Greeks whom they thus
condemned to servitude after half a century of independence, but their
expectations were frustrated. The towns along the coast fell one after
another into the power of Tissaphernes, Amorges was taken prisoner in
lassos, and at the beginning of 411 B.C. there remained to the Athenians
in Ionia and Caria merely the two ports of Halicarnassus and Notium, and
the three islands of Cos, Samos, and Lesbos: from that time the power of
the great king increased from year to year, and weighed heavily on the
destinies of Greece. Meanwhile Darius II. was growing old, and intrigues
with regard to the succession were set on foot. Two of his sons put
forward claims to the throne: Arsaces had seniority in his favour, but
had been born when his father was still a mere satrap; Cyrus, on the
contrary, had been born in the purple, and his mother Parysatis
was passionately devoted to him.* Thanks to her manouvres, he was
practically created viceroy of Asia Minor in 407 B.C., with such
abundant resources of men and money at his disposal, that he was
virtually an independent sovereign. While he was consolidating his
power in the west, his mother endeavoured to secure his accession to the
throne by intriguing at the court of the aged king; if her plans failed,
Cyrus was prepared to risk everything by an appeal to arms.
* Cyrus was certainly not more than seventeen years old in
407 B.C., evening admitting that he was born immediately
after his fathers accession in 424-3 B.C.
[Illustration: 279.jpg CYRUS THE YOUNGER]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from one of the coins in the
_Cabinet des Médailles_.
He realised that the Greeks would prove powerful auxiliaries in such
a contingency; and as soon as he had set up his court at Sardes, he
planned how best to conciliate their favour, or at least to win over
those whose support was likely to be most valuable. Athens, as a
maritime power, was not in a position to support him in an enterprise
which especially required the co-operation of a considerable force of
heavily armed infantry. He therefore deliberately espoused the cause
of the Peloponnesians, and the support he gave them was not without its
influence on the issue of the struggle: the terrible day of Ægos Potamos
was a day of triumph for him as much as for the Lacedaemonians (405
B.C.).
His intimacy with Lysander, however, his constant enlistments of
mercenary troops, and his secret dealings with the neighbouring
provinces, had already aroused suspicion, and the satraps placed under
his orders, especially Tissaphernes, accused him to the king of treason.
Darius summoned him to Susa to explain his conduct (405 B.C.), and he
arrived just in time to be present at his fathers death (404), but
too late to obtain his designation as heir to the throne through the
intervention of his mother, Parysatis; Arsaces inherited the crown, and
assumed the name of Artaxerxes.
[Illustration: 280.jpg ARTAXERXES MNEMON]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from a coin in the Cabinet des
Médailles. This coin, which was struck at Mallos, in
Cilicia, bears as a counter-mark the figure of a bull and
the name of the city of Issus.
Cyrus entered the temple of Pasargadae surreptitiously during the
coronation ceremony, with the intention of killing his brother at the
foot of the altar; but Tissaphernes, warned by one of the priests,
denounced him, and he would have been put to death on the spot, had not
his mother thrown her arms around him and prevented the executioner from
fulfilling his office. Having with difficulty obtained pardon and been
sent back to his province, he collected thirty thousand Greeks and a
hundred thousand native troops, and, hastily leaving Sardes (401 B.C.),
he crossed Asia Minor, Northern Syria, and Mesopotamia, encountered the
royal army at Cunaxa, to the north of Babylon, and rashly met his end
at the very moment of victory. He was a brave, active, and generous
prince, endowed with all the virtues requisite to make a good Oriental
monarch, and he had, moreover, learnt, through contact with the Greeks,
to recognise the weak points of his own nation, and was fully determined
to remedy them: his death, perhaps, was an irreparable misfortune for
his country. Had he survived and supplanted the feeble Artaxerxes, it is
quite possible that he might have confirmed and strengthened the power
of Persia, or, at least, temporarily have arrested its decline. Having
lost their leader, his Asiatic followers at once dispersed; but the
mercenaries did not lose heart, and, crossing Asia and Armenia, gained
at length the shores of the Black Sea. Up to that time the Greeks had
looked upon Persia as a compact state, which they were sufficiently
powerful to conquer by sea and hold in check by land, but which
they could not, without imprudence, venture to attack within its own
frontiers. The experience of the Ten Thousand was a proof to them that
a handful of men, deprived of their proper generals, without guides,
money, or provisions, might successfully oppose the overwhelming forces
of the great king, and escape from his clutches without any serious
difficulty. National discords prevented them from at once utilising
the experience they thus acquired, but the lesson was not lost upon
the court of Susa. The success of Lysander had been ensured by Persian
subsidies, and now Sparta hesitated to fulfil the conditions of the
treaty of Miletus; the Lacedæmonians demanded liberty once more for the
former allies of Athens, fostered the war in Asia in order to enforce
their claims, and their king Agesilaus, penetrating to the very heart of
Phrygia, would have pressed still further forward in the tracks of the
Ten Thousand, had not an opportune diversion been created in his rear by
the bribery of the Persians. Athens once more flew to arms: her fleet,
in conjunction with the Phoenicians, took possession of Cythera; the
Long Walls were rebuilt at the expense of the great king, and Sparta,
recalled by these reverses to a realisation of her position, wisely
abandoned her inclination for distant enterprises. Asia Minor was
reconquered, and Persia passed from the position of a national enemy
to that of the friend and arbiter of Greece; but she did so by force of
circumstances only, and not from having merited in any way the supremacy
she attained. Her military energy, indeed, was far from being exhausted;
but poor Artaxerxes, bewildered by the rivalries between his mother and
his wives, did not know how to make the most of the immense resources
still at his disposal, and he met with repeated checks as soon as he
came face to face with a nation and leaders who refused to stoop to
treachery. He had no sooner recovered possession of the Ægean littoral
than Egypt was snatched from his grasp by a new Pharaoh who had arisen
in the Nile valley. The peace had not been seriously disturbed in Egypt
during the forty years which had elapsed since the defeat of Inarus.
Satrap had peaceably succeeded satrap in the fortress of Memphis;
the exhaustion of Libya had pre-vented any movement on the part of
Thannyras; the aged Amyrtæus had passed from the scene, and his son,
Pausiris, bent his neck submissively to the Persian yoke. More than
once, however, unexpected outbursts had shown that the fires of
rebellion were still smouldering. A Psammetichus, who reigned about 445
B.C. in a corner of the Delta, had dared to send corn and presents to
the Athenians, then at war with Artaxerxes I., and the second year of
Darius II. had been troubled by a sanguinary sedition, which, however,
was easily suppressed by the governor then in power; finally, about
410 B.C., a king of Egypt had, not without some show of evidence,
laid himself open to the charge of sending a piratical expedition into
Phoenician waters, an Arab king having contributed to the enterprise.*
* The revolt mentioned by Ctesias has nothing to do with the
insurrection of the satrap of Egypt which is here referred
to, the date of which is furnished by the Syncellus.
It was easy to see, moreover, from periodical revolts--such as that of
Megabyzos in Syria, those of Artyphios and Arsites, of Pissuthnes and
Amorges in Asia Minor--with what impunity the wrath of the great king
could be defied: it was not to be wondered at, therefore, that, about
405 B.C., an enemy should appear in the heart of the Delta in the person
of a grandson and namesake of Amyrtæus. He did not at first rouse the
whole country to revolt, for Egyptian troops were still numbered in the
army of Artaxerxes at the battle of Cunaxa in 401 B.C.; but he succeeded
in establishing a regular native government, and struggled so resolutely
against the foreign domination that the historians of the sacred
colleges inscribed his name on the list of the Pharaohs. He is there
made to represent a whole dynasty, the XXVIIIth which lasted six years,
coincident with the six years of his reign. It was due to a Mendesian
dynasty, however, whose founder was Nephorites, that Egypt obtained its
entire freedom, and was raised once more to the rank of a nation. This
dynasty from the very outset adopted the policy which had proved so
successful in the case of the Saites three centuries previously, and
employed it with similar success. Egypt had always been in the position
of a besieged fortress, which needed, for its complete security, that
its first lines of defence should be well in advance of its citadel: she
must either possess Syria or win her as an ally, if she desired to be
protected against all chance of sudden invasion. Nephorites and his
successors, therefore, formed alliances beyond the isthmus, and even on
the other side of the Mediterranean, with Cyprus, Caria, and Greece, in
one case to purchase support, and in another to re-establish the ancient
supremacy exercised by the Theban Pharaohs.*
* This is, at any rate, the idea given of him by Egyptian
tradition in the time of the Ptolemies, as results from a
passage in the _Demotic Rhapsody_, where his reign is
mentioned.
Every revolt against the Persians, every quarrel among the satraps,
helped forward their cause, since they compelled the great king to
suspend his attacks against Egypt altogether or to prosecute them at
wide intervals: the Egyptians therefore fomented such quarrels, or even,
at need, provoked them, and played their game so well that for a long
time they had to oppose only a fraction of the Persian forces. Like the
Saite Pharaohs before them, they were aware how little reliance could
be placed on native troops, and they recruited their armies at great
expense from the European Greeks. This occurred at the time when
mercenary forces were taking the place of native levies throughout
Hellas, and war was developing into a lucrative trade for those who
understood how to conduct it: adventurers, greedy for booty, flocked
to the standards of the generals who enjoyed the best reputation for
kindness or ability, and the generals themselves sold their services
to the highest bidder. The Persian kings took large advantage of this
arrangement to procure troops: the Pharaohs imitated their example, and
in the years which followed, the most experienced captains, Iphicrates,
Chabrias, and Timotheus, passed from one camp to another, as often
against the will as with the consent of their fatherland. The power of
Sparta was at her zenith when Nephorites ascended the throne, and she
was just preparing for her expedition to Phrygia. The Pharaoh concluded
an alliance with the Lacedomonians, and in 396 B.C. sent to Agesilaus
a fleet laden with arms, corn, and supplies, which, however, was
intercepted by Conon, who was at that moment cruising in the direction
of Rhodes in command of the Persian squadron. This misadventure and the
abrupt retreat of the Spartans from Asia Minor cooled the good will of
the Egyptian king towards his allies. Thinking that they had abandoned
him, and that he was threatened with an imminent attack on the shore
of the Delta, he assembled, probably at Pelusium, the forces he had
apparently intended for a distant enterprise.
Matters took longer to come to a crisis than he had expected. The
retreat of Agesilaus had not pacified the Ægean satrapies; after the
disturbance created by Cyrus the Younger, the greater number of the
native tribes--Mysians, Pisidians, people of Pontus and Paphlagonia--had
shaken off the Persian yoke, and it was a matter of no small difficulty
to reduce them once more to subjection. Their incessant turbulence gave
Egypt time to breathe and to organise new combinations. Cyprus entered
readily into her designs. Since the subjugation of that island in 445
B.C., the Greek cities had suffered terrible oppression at the hands of
the great king. Artaxerxes I., despairing of reducing them to obedience,
depended exclusively for support on the Phoenician inhabitants of the
island, who, through his favour, regained so much vigour that in the
space of less than two generations they had recovered most of the ground
lost during the preceding centuries: Semitic rulers replaced the Achaean
tyrants at Salamis, and in most of the other cities, and Citium became
what it had been before the rise of Salamis, the principal commercial
centre in the island. Evagoras, a descendant of the ancient kings,
endeavoured to retrieve the Grecian cause: after driving out of Salamis
Abdemon, its Tyrian ruler, he took possession of all the other towns
except Citium and Amathus. This is not the place to recount the
brilliant part played by Evagoras, in conjunction with Conon, during the
campaigns against the Spartans in the Peloponnesian war. The activity he
then displayed and the ambitious designs he revealed soon drew upon him
the dislike of the Persian governors and their sovereign; and from
391 B.C. he was at open war with Persia. He would have been unable,
single-handed, to maintain the struggle for any length of time, but
Egypt and Greece were at his back, ready to support him with money or
arms. Hakoris had succeeded Nephorites I. in 393 B.C.,* and had repulsed
an attack of Artaxerxes between 390 and 386.**
* The length of the reign of Nephorites I. is fixed at six
years by the lists of Manetho; the last-known date of his
reign is that of his fourth year, on a mummy-bandage
preserved in the Louvre.
** This war is alluded to by several ancient authors in
passages which have been brought together and explained by
Judeah; but unfortunately the detailed history of the
events is not known.
He was not unduly exalted by his success, and had immediately taken wise
precautions in view of a second invasion. After safeguarding his western
frontier by concluding a treaty with the Libyans of Barca, he entered
into an alliance with Evagoras and the Athenians.
[Illustration: 287.jpg HAKORIS]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from Lepsius.
He sent lavish gifts of corn to the Cypriots, as well as munitions of
war, ships, and money while Athens sent them several thousand men under
the command of Chabrias; not only did an expedition despatched
against them under Autophradates fail miserably, but Evagoras seized
successively Citium and Amathus, and, actually venturing across the sea,
took Tyre by assault and devastated Phoenicia and Cilicia. The princes
of Asia Minor were already preparing for revolt, and one of them,
Hecatomnus of Caria, had openly joined the allies, when Sparta suddenly
opened negotiations with Persia: Antalcidas presented himself at Susa
to pay homage before the throne of the great king. The treaty of Miletus
had brought the efforts of Athens to naught, and sold the Asiatic
Greeks to their oppressors: the peace obtained by Antalcidas effaced the
results of Salamis and Platsæ, and laid European Greece prostrate at
the feet of her previously vanquished foes. An order issuing from the
centre of Persia commanded the cities of Greece to suspend hostilities
and respect each others liberties; the issuing of such an order was
equivalent to treating them as vassals whose quarrels it is the function
of the suzerain to repress, but they nevertheless complied with the
command (387 B.C.), Artaxerxes, relieved from anxiety for the moment,
as to affairs on the Ægean, was now free to send his best generals into
the rebel countries, and such was the course his ministers recommended.
Evagoras was naturally the first to be attacked. Cyprus was, in fact, an
outpost of Egypt; commanding as she did the approach by sea, she was in
a position to cut the communications of any army, which, issuing from
Palestine, should march upon the Delta. Artaxerxes assembled three
hundred thousand foot-soldiers and three hundred triremes under the
command of Tiribazus, and directed the whole force against the island.
At first the Cypriot cruisers intercepted the convoys which were
bringing provisions for this large force, and by so doing reduced the
invaders to such straits that sedition broke out in their camp; but
Evagoras was defeated at sea off the promontory of Citium, and
his squadron destroyed. He was not in any way discouraged by this
misfortune, but leaving his son, Pnytagoras, to hold the barbarian
forces in check, he hastened to implore the help of the Pharaoh (385
B.C.). But Hakoris was too much occupied with securing his own immediate
safety to risk anything in so desperate an enterprise. Evagoras was
able to bring back merely an insufficient subsidy; he shut himself up
in Salamis, and there maintained the conflict for some years longer.
Meanwhile Hakoris, realising that the submission of Cyprus would oppose
his flank to attack, tried to effect a diversion in Asia Minor, and by
entering into alliance with the Pisidians, then in open insurrection, he
procured for it a respite, of which he himself took advantage to prepare
for the decisive struggle. The peace effected by Antalcidas had left
most of the mercenary soldiers of Greece without employment. Hakoris
hired twenty thousand of them, and the Phoenician admirals, still
occupied in blockading the ports of Cyprus, failed to intercept the
vessels which brought him these reinforcements. It was fortunate for
Egypt that they did so, for the Pharaoh died in 381 B.C., and his
successors, Psamuthis IL, Mutis, and Nephorites IL, each occupied the
throne for a very short time, and the whole country was in confusion for
rather more than two years (381-379 B.c.) during the settlement of the
succession.*
* Hakoris reigned thirteen years, from 393 to 381 B.C. The
reigns of the three succeeding kings occupied only two years
and four months between them, from the end of 381 to the
beginning of 378. Muthes or Mutis, who is not mentioned in
all the lists of Manetho, seems to have his counterpart in
the _Demotic Rhapsody_. Wiedemann has inverted the order
usually adopted, and proposed the following series:
Nephorites I., Muthes, Psamuthis, Hakoris, Nephorites II.
The discovery at Karnak of a small temple where Psamuthis
mentions Hakoris as his predecessor shows that on this point
at least Manetho was well informed.
The turbulent disposition of the great feudatory nobles, which had so
frequently brought trouble upon previous Pharaohs during the
Assyrian wars, was no less dangerous in this last century of Egyptian
independence; it caused the fall of the Mendesian dynasty in the very
face of the enemy, and the prince of Sebennytos, Nakht-har-habît,
Nectanebo I., was raised to the throne by the military faction.
According to a tradition current in Ptolemaic times, this sovereign was
a son of Nephorites I., who had been kept out of his heritage by the
jealousy of the gods; whatever his origin, the people had no cause
to repent of having accepted him as their king. He began his reign
by suppressing the slender subsidies which Evagoras had continued to
receive from his predecessors, and this measure, if not generous, was
at least politic. For Cyprus was now virtually in the power of the
Persians, and the blockade of a few thousand men in Salamis did not
draught away a sufficiently large proportion of their effective force to
be of any service to Egypt: the money which had hitherto been devoted to
the Cypriots was henceforth reserved for the direct defence of the Nile
valley. Evagoras obtained unexpectedly favourable conditions: Artaxerxes
conceded to him his title of king and the possession of his city (383
B.C.), and turned his whole attention to Nectanebo, the last of his
enemies who still held out.
Nectanebo had spared no pains in preparing effectively to receive his
foe. He chose as his coadjutor the Athenian Chabrias, whose capacity as
a general had been manifested by recent events, and the latter accepted
this office although he had received no instructions from his government
to do so, and had transformed the Delta into an entrenched camp. He had
fortified the most vulnerable points along the coast, had built towers
at each of the mouths of the river to guard the entrance, and had
selected the sites for his garrison fortresses so judiciously that they
were kept up long after his time to protect the country. Two of them are
mentioned by name: one, situated below Pelusium, called the Castle of
Chabrias; the other, not far from Lake Mareotis, which was known as his
township.*
* Both are mentioned by Strabo; the exact sites of these two
places are not yet identified. Diodorus Siculus, describing
the defensive preparations of Egypt, does not state
expressly that they were the work of Chabrias, but this fact
seems to result from a general consideration of the context.
[Illustration: 291.jpg PHARNABAZUS]
Drawn by faucher-Gudin, from a coin in the _Cabinet des
Médailles_.
The Persian generals endeavoured to make their means of attack
proportionate to the defences of the enemy. Acre was the only port in
Southern Syria large enough to form the rendezvous for a fleet, where it
might be secure from storms and surprises of the enemy. This was chosen
as the Persian headquarters, and formed the base of their operations.
During three years they there accumulated supplies of food and military
stores, Phoenician and Creek vessels, and both foreign and native
troops. The rivalries between the military commanders, Tithraustes,
Datâmes, and Abrocomas, and the intrigues of the court, had on several
occasions threatened the ruin of the enterprise, but Pharnabazus, who
from the outset had held supreme command, succeeded in ridding himself
of his rivals, and in the spring of 374 B.C. was at length ready for
the advance. The expedition consisted of two hundred thousand Asiatic
troops, and twenty thousand Greeks, three hundred triremes, two hundred
galleys of thirty oars, and numerous transports. Superiority of numbers
was on the side of the Persians, and that just at the moment when
Nectanebo lost his most experienced general. Artaxerxes had remonstrated
with the Athenians for permitting one of their generals to serve in
Egypt, in spite of their professed friendship for himself, and, besides
insisting on his recall, had requested for himself the services of the
celebrated Iphicrates. The Athenians complied with his demand, and while
summoning Chabrias to return to Athens, despatched Iphicrates to Syria,
where he was placed in command of the mercenary troops. Pharnabazus
ordered a general advance in May, 374 B.C.,* but when he arrived before
Pelusium, he perceived that he was not in a position to take the town
by storm; not only had the fortifications been doubled, but the banks of
the canals had been cut and the approaches inundated. Iphicrates advised
him not to persevere in attempting a regular siege: he contended that it
would be more profitable to detach an expeditionary force towards some
less well-protected point on the coast, and there to make a breach in
the system of defence which protected the enemies front.
* As Kenrick justly observes, the Persian and Athenian
generals committed the same mistake which led to the defeat
of Saint Louis and the capture of his army in 1249 A.D., and
which Bonaparte avoided in his campaign of 1798. Anyhow, it
seems that the fault must be laid on Pharnabazus alone, and
that Iphicrates was entirely blameless.
Three thousand men were despatched with all secrecy to the mouth of the
Mendesian branch of the Nile, and there disembarked unexpectedly before
the forts which guarded the entrance. The garrison, having imprudently
made a sortie in face of the enemy, was put to rout, and pursued so
hotly that victors and vanquished entered pell-mell within the walls.
[Illustration: 293.jpg ARTAXERXES II.]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from a silver stater in the _Cabinet
des Médailles_.
After this success victory was certain, if the Persians pursued their
advantage promptly and pushed forward straight into the heart of the
Delta; the moment was the more propitious for such a movement, since
Nectanebo had drained Memphis of troops to protect his frontier.
Iphicrates, having obtained this information from one of the prisoners,
advised Pharnabazus to proceed up the Nile with the fleet, and take
the capital by storm before the enemy should have time to garrison it
afresh; the Persian general, however, considered the plan too hazardous,
and preferred to wait until the entire army should have joined him.
Iphicrates offered to risk the adventure with his body of auxiliary
troops only, but was suspected of harbouring some ambitious design, and
was refused permission to advance. Meanwhile these delays had given the
Egyptians time to recover from their first alarm; they boldly took
the offensive, surrounded the position held by Pharnabazus, and were
victorious in several skirmishes. Summer advanced, the Nile rose more
rapidly than usual, and soon the water encroached upon the land; the
invaders were obliged to beat a retreat before it, and fall back towards
Syria. Iphicrates, disgusted at the ineptitude and suspicion of his
Asiatic colleagues, returned secretly to Greece: the remains of the
army were soon after disbanded, and Egypt once more breathed freely.
The check received by the Persian arms, however, was not sufficiently
notorious to shake that species of supremacy which Artaxerxes had
exercised in Greece since the peace of 387. Sparta, Thebes, and Athens
vied with each other in obtaining an alliance with him as keenly as if
he had been successful before Pelusium. Antalcidas reappeared at Susa in
372 B.C. to procure a fresh act of intervention; Pelopidas and Ismenias,
in 367, begged for a rescript similar to that of Antalcidas; and finally
Athens sent a solemn embassy to entreat for a subsidy. It seemed as if
the great king had become a kind of supreme arbiter for Greece, and that
all the states hitherto leagued against him now came in turn to submit
their mutual differences for his decision. But this arbiter who thus
imposed his will on states beyond the borders of his empire was never
fully master within his own domains. Of gentle nature and pliant
disposition, inclined to clemency rather than to severity, and,
moreover, so lacking in judgment as a general that he had almost
succumbed to an attack by the Cadusians on the only occasion that he
had, in a whim of the moment, undertaken the command of an army in
person, Artaxerxes busied himself with greater zeal in religious reforms
than in military projects. He introduced the rites of Mithra and Anâhita
into the established religion of the state, but he had not the energy
necessary to curb the ambitions of his provincial governors. Asia Minor,
whose revolts followed closely on those of Egypt, rose in rebellion
against him immediately after the campaign on the Nile, Ariobarzanes
heading the rebellion in Phrygia, Datâmes and Aspis that in Cilicia and
Cappadocia, and both defying his power for several years. When at length
they succumbed through treachery, the satraps of the Mediterranean
district, from the Hellespont to the isthmus of Suez, formed a coalition
and simultaneously took the field: the break-up of the empire would have
been complete had not Persian darics been lavishly employed once more in
the affair. Meanwhile Nectanebo had died in 361,* and had been succeeded
by Tachôs.**
* The lists of Manetho assign ten or eighteen years to his
reign. A sarcophagus in Vienna bears the date of his
fifteenth year, and the great inscription of Edfu speaks of
gifts he made to the temple in this town in the eighteenth
year of his reign. The reading eighteen is therefore
preferable to the reading ten in the lists of Manetho; if
the very obscure text of the _Demotic Rhapsody_ really
applies the number nine or ten to the length of the reign,
this reckoning must be explained by some mystic calculations
of the priests of the Ptolemaic epoch.
** The name of this king, written by the Greeks Teôs or
Tachôs, in accordance with the pronunciation of different
Egyptian dialects, has been discovered in hieroglyphic
writing on the external wall of the temple of Khonsu at
Karnak.
The new Pharaoh deemed the occasion opportune to make a diversion
against Persia and to further secure his own safety: he therefore
offered his support to the satraps, who sent Eheomitres as a delegate
to discuss the terms of an offensive and defensive alliance. Having
inherited from Nectanebo a large fleet and a full treasury, Tachôs
entrusted to the ambassador 500 talents of silver, and gave him fifty
ships, with which he cruised along the coast of Asia Minor towards
Leukê. His accomplices were awaiting him there, rejoicing at the success
of his mission, but he himself had no confidence in the final issue of
the struggle, and merely sought how he might enter once more into favour
with the Persian court; he therefore secured his safety by betraying his
associates. He handed over the subsidies and the Egyptian squadron to
Orontes, the satrap of Daskylium, and then seizing the insurgent
chiefs sent them in chains to Susa. These acts of treachery changed
the complexion of affairs; the league suddenly dissolved after the
imprisonment of its leaders, and Arta-xerxes re-established his
authority over Asia Minor.
[Illustration: 296.jpg DATAMES III.]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from a coin in the _Cabinet des
Médailles_.
Egypt became once more the principal object of attack, and by the
irony of fate Pharaoh had himself contributed to enrich the coffers and
reinforce the fleet of his foes. In spite of this mischance, however,
circumstances were so much in his favour that he ventured to consider
whether it would not be more advantageous to forestall the foe by
attacking him, rather than passively to await an onslaught behind his
own lines. He had sought the friendship of Athens,* and, though it had
not been granted in explicit terms, the republic had, nevertheless,
permitted Ghabrias to resume his former post at his side.
* The memory of this embassy has been preserved for us by a
decree of the Athenian assembly, unfortunately much
mutilated, which has been assigned to various dates between
362 and 358 B.C. M. Paul Foucart has shown that the date of
the decree must be referred to one of three archon-ships--
the archonship of Callimedes, 360-59; that of Eucharistus,
359-8; or that of Cephisodotus, 358-7^ Without entering into
a discussion of the other evidence on the subject, it seems
to me probable that the embassy may be most conveniently
assigned to the archonship of Callimedes, towards the end of
360 B.C., at the moment when Chabrias had just arrived in
Egypt, and was certain to endeavour to secure the help of
Athens for the king he served.
Chabrias exhorted him to execute his project, and as he had not
sufficient money to defray the expenses of a long campaign outside his
own borders, the Athenian general instructed him how he might procure
the necessary funds. He suggested to him that, as the Egyptian priests
were wealthy, the sums of money annually assigned to them for the
sacrifices and maintenance of the temples would be better employed
in the service of the state, and counselled him to reduce or even to
suppress most of the sacerdotal colleges. The priests secured their own
safety by abandoning their personal property, and the king graciously
deigned to accept their gifts, and then declared to them that in future,
as long as the struggle against Persia continued, he should exact from
them nine-tenths of their sacred revenues. This tax would have sufficed
for all requirements if it had been possible to collect it in full, but
there is no doubt that very soon the priests must have discovered means
of avoiding part of the payment, for it was necessary to resort to other
expedients. Chabrias advised that the poll and house taxes should be
increased; that one obol should be exacted for each ardeb of corn
sold, and a tithe levied on the produce of all ship-building yards,
manufactories, and manual industries. Money now poured into the
treasury, but a difficulty arose which demanded immediate solution.
Egypt possessed very little specie, and the natives still employed
barter in the ordinary transactions of life, while the foreign
mercenaries refused to accept payment in kind or uncoined metal; they
demanded good money as the price of their services. Orders were issued
to the natives to hand over to the royal exchequer all the gold and
silver in their possession, whether wrought or in ingots, the state
guaranteeing gradual repayment through the nomarchs from the future
product of the poll-tax, and the bullion so obtained was converted into
specie for the payment of the auxiliary troops. These measures, though
winning some unpopularity for Tachôs, enabled him to raise eighty
thousand native troops and ten thousand Greeks, to equip a fleet of
two hundred vessels, and to engage the best generals of the period. His
eagerness to secure the latter, however, was injurious to his cause.
Having already engaged Chabrias and obtained the good will of Athens, he
desired also to gain the help of Agesilaus and the favourable opinion
of the Lacedaemonians. Though now eighty years old, Agesilaus was still
under the influence of cupidity and vanity; the promise of being placed
in supreme command enticed him, and he set sail with one thousand
hoplites. A disappointment awaited him at the moment of his
disembarkation: Tachôs gave him command of the mercenary troops only,
reserving for himself the general direction of operations, and placing
the whole fleet under the orders of Chabrias. The aged hero, having
vented his indignation by indulging a more than ordinary display of
Spartan rudeness, allowed himself to be appeased by abundant presents,
and assumed the post assigned to him. But soon after a more serious
subject of disagreement arose between him and his ally; Agesilaus was
disposed to think that Tachôs should remain quietly on the banks of the
Nile, and leave to his generals the task of conducting the campaign.
The ease with which mercenary leaders passed from one camp to the other,
according to the fancy of the moment, was not calculated to inspire the
Egyptian Pharaoh with confidence: he refused to comply with the wishes
of Agesilaus, and, entrusting the regency to one of his relatives,
proceeded to invade Syria. He found the Persians unprepared: they shut
themselves up in their strongholds, and the Pharaoh confided to his
cousin Nectanebo, son of the regent, the task of dislodging them. The
war dragged on for some time; discontent crept in among the native
levies, and brought treachery in its train. The fiscal measures which
had been adopted had exasperated the priests and the common people;
complaints, at first only muttered in fear, found bold expression as
soon as the expeditionary force had crossed the frontier.
[Illustration: 299.jpb NECTANEBO I]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from Lepsius.
The regent secretly encouraged the malcontents, and wrote to his son
warning him of what was going on, and advised him to seize the crown.
Nectanebo could easily have won over the Egyptian troops to his cause,
but their support would have proved useless as long as the Greeks did
not pronounce in his favour, and Chabrias refused to break his oaths.
Agesilaus, however, was not troubled by the same scruples. His vanity
had been sorely wounded by the Pharaoh: after being denied the position
which was, he fancied, his by right, his short stature, his ill-health,
and native coarseness had exposed him to the unseemly mockery of the
courtiers. Tachôs, considering his ability had been over-estimated,
applied to him, it is said, the fable of the mountain bringing forth a
mouse; to which he had replied, When opportunity offers, I will prove
to him that I am the lion. When Tachôs requested him to bring the
rebels to order, he answered ironically that he was there to help the
Egyptians, not to attack them; and before giving his support to either
of the rival claimants, he should consult the Ephors. The Ephors
enjoined him to act in accordance with the welfare of his country, and
he thereupon took the side of Nectanebo, despite the remonstrances of
Chabrias. Tachôs, deserted by his veterans, fled to Sidon, and thence to
Susa, where Artaxerxes received him hospitably and without reproaching
him (359 B.C.); but the news of his fall was not received on the banks
of the Nile with as much rejoicing as he had anticipated. The people had
no faith in any revolution in which the Greeks whom they detested took
the chief part, and the feudal lords refused to acknowledge a sovereign
whom they had not themselves chosen; they elected one of their
number--the prince of Mendes--to oppose Nectanebo. The latter was
obliged to abandon the possessions won by his predecessor, and return
with his army to Egypt: he there encountered the forces of his enemy,
which, though as yet undisciplined, were both numerous and courageous.
Agesilaus counselled an immediate attack before these troops had time to
become experienced in tactics, but he no longer stood well at court;
the prince of Mendes had endeavoured to corrupt him, and, though he had
shown unexpected loyalty, many, nevertheless, suspected his good
faith. Nectanebo set up his headquarters at Tanis, where he was shortly
blockaded by his adversary. It is well known how skilfully the Egyptians
handled the pick-axe, and how rapidly they could construct walls of
great strength; the circle of entrenchments was already near completion,
and provisions were beginning to fail, when Agesilaus received
permission to attempt a sortie. He broke through the besieging lines
under cover of the night, and some days later won a decisive victory
(359 B.C.). Nectanebo would now have gladly kept the Spartan general at
his side, for he was expecting a Persian attack; but Agesilaus, who had
had enough of Egypt and its intrigues, deserted his cause, and shortly
afterwards died of exhaustion on the coast near Cyrene. The anticipated
Persian invasion followed shortly after, but it was conducted without
energy or decision. Artaxerxes had entrusted the conduct of the
expedition to Tachôs, doubtless promising to reinstate him in his former
power as satrap or vassal king of Egypt, but Tachôs died before he could
even assume his post,* and the discords which rent the family of the
Persian king prevented the generals who replaced him from taking any
effective action.
* Ælian narrates, probably following Dinon, that Tachôs died
of dysentery due to over-indulgence at dinner.
The aged Artaxerxes had had, it was reported, one hundred and fifteen
sons by the different women in his harem, but only three of those by his
queen Statira were now living--Darius, Ariaspes, and Ochus. Darius,
the eldest of the three, had been formally recognised as
heir-apparent--perhaps at the time of the disastrous war against the
Cadusians* --but the younger brother, Ochus, who secretly aspired to
the throne, had managed to inspire him with anxiety with regard to
the succession, and incited him to put the aged king out of the way.
Contemporary historians, ill informed as to the intrigues in the
palace, whose effects they noted without any attempt to explore their
intricacies, invented several stories to account for the conduct of the
young prince. Some assigned as the reason of his conspiracy a romantic
love-affair. They said that Cyrus the Younger had had an Ionian mistress
named Aspasia, who, after the fatal battle of Cunaxa, had been taken
into the harem of the conqueror, and had captivated him by her beauty.
Darius conceived a violent passion for this damsel, and his father was
at first inclined to give her up to him, but afterwards, repenting of
his complaisance, consecrated her to the service of Mithra, a cult which
imposed on her the obligation of perpetual chastity. Darius, exasperated
by this treatment, began to contemplate measures of vengeance, but,
being betrayed by his brother Ochus, was put to death with his whole
family.**
* Pompeius Trogus asserts that such co-regencies were
contrary to Persian law; we have seen above that, on the
contrary, they were obligatory when the sovereign was
setting out on a campaign.
** This is the version of the story given by Dinon and
accepted by Pompoius Trogus. A chronological calculation
easily demonstrates its unlikelihood. It follows from the
evidence given by Justin himself that Artaxerxes died of
grief soon after the execution of his son; but, on the other
hand, that the battle of Cunaxa took place in 400 B.C.:
Aspasia must then have been fifty or sixty years old when
Darius fell in love with her.
By the removal of this first obstacle the crafty prince found himself
only one step nearer success, for his brother Ariaspes was acknowledged
as heir-apparent: Ochus therefore persuaded him that their father,
convinced of the complicity of Ariaspes in the plot imputed to Darius,
intended to put him to an ignominious death, and so worked upon him that
he committed suicide to escape the executioner. A bastard named Arsames,
who might possibly have aspired to the crown, was assassinated by Ochus.
This last blow was too much for Artaxerxes, and he died of grief after a
reign of forty-six years (358 B.C.).* Ochus, who immediately assumed the
name of Artaxerxes, began his reign by the customary massacre: he put to
death all the princes of the royal family,** and having thus rid
himself of all the rival claimants to the supreme power, he hastened on
preparations for the war with Egypt which had been interrupted by his
fathers death and his own accession.
* This is the length attributed by Plutarch to this reign,
and which is generally accepted. It was narrated in after-
days that the king kept the fact of his fathers death
hidden for ten months, but it is impossible to tell how much
truth there is in this statement, which was accepted by
Dinon.
** According to the author followed by Pompeius Trogus, the
princesses themselves were involved in this massacre. This
is certainly an exaggeration, for we shall shortly see that
Darius III., the last king of Persia, was accounted to be
the grandson of Darius II.; the massacre can only have
involved the direct heirs of Artaxerxes.
The necessity for restoring Persian dominion on the banks of the Nile
was then more urgent than at any previous time. During the half-century
which had elapsed since the recovery of her independence, Egypt had
been a perpetual source of serious embarrassment to the great king. The
contemporaries of Amyrtseus, whether Greeks or barbarians, had at first
thought that his revolt was nothing more than a local rising, like many
a previous one which had lasted but a short time and had been promptly
suppressed. But when it was perceived that the native dynasties had
taken a hold upon the country, and had carried on a successful contest
with Persia, in spite of the immense disproportion in their respective
resources; when not only the bravest soldiers of Asia, but the best
generals of Greece, had miserably failed in their attacks on the
frontier of the Delta, Phoenicia and Syria began to think whether what
was possible in Africa might not also be possible in Asia. From that
time forward, whenever a satrap or vassal prince meditated revolt, it
was to Egypt that he turned as a natural ally, and from Egypt he sought
the means to carry out his project; however needy the Pharaoh of that
day might be, he was always able to procure for such a suitor sufficient
money, munitions of war, ships, and men to enable him to make war
against the empire. The attempt made by Ochus failed, as all previous
attempts had done: the two adventurers who commanded the forces of
Nectanebo, the Athenian Diophantes and Lamius of Sparta, inflicted a
disastrous defeat on the imperial troops, and forced them to beat a
hasty retreat. This defeat was all the more serious in its consequences
because of the magnitude of the efforts which had been made: the king
himself was in command of the troops, and had been obliged to turn his
back precipitately on the foe. The Syrian provinces, which had been in
an unsettled condition ever since the invasion under Tachôs, flew to
arms; nine petty kings of Cyprus, including Evagoras II., nephew of the
famous prince of that name, refused to pay tribute, and Artabazus
roused Asia Minor to rebellion. The Phoenicians still hesitated; but
the insolence of their satrap, the rapacity of the generals who had
been repulsed from Egypt, and the lack of discipline in the Persian
army forced them to a decision. In a convention summoned at Tripoli, the
representatives of the Phoenician cities conferred on Tennes, King
of Sidon, the perilous honour of conducting the operations of the
confederate army, and his first act was to destroy the royal villa
in the Lebanon, and his next to burn the provisions which had been
accumulated in various ports in view of the Egyptian war (351-350 B.C.).
[Illustration: 305.jpg evagoras ii. of salamis]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from a coin in the _Cabinet des
Médailles_.
Ochus imagined at the outset that his generals would soon suppress these
rebellions, and, in fact, Idrieus, tyrant of Caria, supported by eight
thousand mercenaries under the Athenian Phocion, overcame the petty
tyrants of Cyprus without much difficulty; but in Asia Minor, Artabazus,
supported by Athens and Thebes, held at bay the generals sent to oppose
him, and Tennes won a signal victory in Syria. He turned for support
to Egypt, and Nectanebo, as might be expected, put Greek troops at his
disposal to the number of four thousand, commanded by one of his best
generals, Mentor of Ehodes: Belesys, the satrap of Syria, and Mazseus,
satrap of Cilicia, suffered a total defeat. Ochus, exasperated at their
want of success, called out every available soldier, three hundred
thousand Asiatics and ten thousand Greeks; the Sidonians, on their side,
dug a triple trench round their city, raised their ramparts, and set
fire to their ships, to demonstrate their intention of holding out
to the end. Unfortunately, their king, Tennes, was not a man of firm
resolution. Hitherto he had lived a life of self-indulgence, surrounded
by the women of his harem, whom he had purchased at great cost in Ionia
and Greece, and had made it the chief object of his ambition to surpass
in magnificence the most ostentatious princes of Cyprus, especially
Nicocles of Salamis, son of Evagoras. The approach of Ochus confused
his scanty wits; he endeavoured to wipe out his treachery towards his
suzerain by the betrayal of his own subjects. He secretly despatched
his confidential minister, a certain Thessalion, to the Persian camp,
promising to betray Sidon to the Persian king, and to act as his guide
into Egypt on condition of having his life preserved and his royal rank
guaranteed to him. Ochus had already agreed to these conditions, when
an impulse of vanity on his part nearly ruined the whole arrangement.
Thessalion, not unreasonably doubting the kings good faith, had
demanded that he should swear by his right hand to fulfil to the letter
all the clauses of the treaty; whereupon Ochus, whose dignity was
offended by this insistence, gave orders for the execution of the
ambassador. But as the latter was being dragged away, he cried out that
the king could do as he liked, but that if he disdained the help of
Tennes, he would fail in his attacks both upon Phonicia and Egypt. These
words produced a sudden reaction, and Thessalion obtained all that he
demanded. When the Persians had arrived within a few days march of
Sidon, Tennes proclaimed that a general assembly of the Phoenician
deputies was to be held, and under pretext of escorting the hundred
leading men of his city to the appointed place of meeting, led them into
the enemys camp, where they were promptly despatched by the javelins of
the soldiery. The Sidonians, deserted by their king, were determined
to carry on the struggle, in the expectation of receiving succour from
Egypt; but the Persian darics had already found their way into the hands
of the mercenary troops, and the general whom Nectanebo had lent them,
declared that his men considered the position desperate, and that he
should surrender the city at the first summons. The Sidonians thereupon
found themselves reduced to the necessity of imploring the mercy of the
conqueror, and five hundred of them set out to meet him as suppliants,
carrying olive branches in their hands. Bub Ochus was the most cruel
monarch who had ever reigned in Persia--the only one, perhaps, who was
really bloodthirsty by nature; he refused to listen to the entreaties of
the suppliants, and, like the preceding hundred delegates, they were all
slain. The remaining citizens, perceiving that they could not hope for
pardon, barricaded themselves in their houses, to which they set fire
with their own hands; forty thousand persons perished in the flames, and
so great was the luxury in the appointments of the private houses,
that large sums were paid for the right to dig for the gold and silver
ornaments buried in the ruins. The destruction of the city was almost as
complete as in the days of Esarhaddon. When Sidon had thus met her fate,
the Persians had no further reason for sparing its king, Tennes, and he
was delivered to the executioner; whereupon the other Phoenician kings,
terrified by his fate, opened their gates without a struggle.
Once more the treachery of a few traitors had disconcerted the plans of
the Pharaoh, and delivered the outposts of Egypt into the hands of the
enemy: but Ochus renewed his preparations with marvellous tenacity, and
resolved to neglect nothing which might contribute to his final success.
His victories had confirmed the cities of the empire in their loyalty,
and they vied with one another in endeavouring to win oblivion for their
former hesitation by their present zeal: What city, or what nation of
Asia did not send embassies to the sovereign? what wealth did they not
lavish on him, whether the natural products of the soil, or the rare and
precious productions of art? Did he not receive a quantity of tapestry
and woven hangings, some of purple, some of diverse colours, others of
pure white? many gilded pavilions, completely furnished, and containing
an abundant supply of linen and sumptuous beds? chased silver, wrought
gold, cups and bowls, enriched with precious stones, or valuable for the
perfection and richness of their work? He also received untold supplies
of barbarian and Grecian weapons, and still larger numbers of draught
cattle and of sacrificial victims, bushels of preserved fruits, bales
and sacks full of parchments or books, and all kinds of useful articles?
So great was the quantity of salted meats which poured in from all
sides, that from a distance the piles might readily be mistaken for
rows of hillocks or high mounds. The land-force was divided into three
corps, each under a barbarian and a Greek general. It advanced along
the sea coast, following the ancient route pursued by the armies of the
Pharaohs, and as it skirted the marshes of Sirbonis, some detachments,
having imprudently ventured over the treacherous soil, perished to a
man. When the main force arrived in safety before Pelusium, it found
Nectanebo awaiting it behind his ramparts and marshes. He had fewer men
than his adversary, his force numbering only six thousand Egyptians,
twenty thousand Libyans, and the same number of Greeks; but the
remembrance of the successes won by himself and his predecessors with
inferior numbers inspired him with confidence in the issue of the
struggle. His fleet could not have ventured to meet in battle the
combined squadrons of Cyprus and Phoenicia, but, on the other hand, he
had a sufficient number of flat-bottomed boats to prevent any adversary
from entering the mouths of the Nile. The weak points along his
Mediterranean seaboard and eastern frontier were covered by strongholds,
fortifications, and entrenched camps: in short, his plans were
sufficiently well laid to ensure success in a defensive war, if the
rash ardour of his Greek mercenaries had not defeated his plans. Five
thousand of these troops were in occupation of Pelusium, under command
of Philophrôn. Some companies of Thebans, who were serving under
Lacrates in the Persian army, crossed a deep canal which separated them
from the city, and provoked the garrison to risk an encounter in
the open field. Philophrôn, instead of treating their challenge with
indifference, accepted it, and engaged in a combat which lasted till
nightfall. On the following day, Lacrates, having drawn off the waters
of the canal and thrown a dyke across it, led his entire force up to the
glacis of the fortifications, dug some trenches, and brought up a
line of battering-rams. He would soon have effected a breach, but the
Egyptians understood how to use the spade as well as the lance, and
while the outer wall was crumbling, they improvised behind it a second
wall, crowned with wooden turrets. Nectanebo, who had come up with
thirty thousand native, five thousand Greek troops, and half the
Libyan contingent, observed the vicissitudes of the siege from a short
distance, and by his presence alone opposed the advance of the bulk
of the Persian army. Weeks passed by, the time of the inundation was
approaching, and it seemed as if this policy of delay would have its
accustomed success, when an unforeseen incident decided in a moment the
fate of Egypt. Among the officers of Ochus was a certain Nicostratus of
Argos, who on account of his prodigious strength was often compared to
Heracles, and who out of vanity dressed himself up in the traditional
costume of that hero, the lions skin and the club. Having imbibed,
doubtless, the ideas formerly propounded by Iphicrates, Nicostratus
forced some peasants, whose wives and children he had seized as
hostages, to act as his guides, and made his way up one of the canals
which traverse the marshes of Menzaleh: there he disembarked his men in
the rear of Nectanebo, and took up a very strong position on the
border of the cultivated land. This enterprise, undertaken with a very
insufficient force, was an extremely rash one; if the Egyptian generals
had contented themselves with harassing Nicostratus without venturing on
engaging him in a pitched battle, they would speedily have forced him to
re-embark or to lay down his arms. Unfortunately, however, five thousand
mercenaries, who formed the garrison of one of the neighbouring towns,
hastened to attack him under the command of Clinias of Cos, and suffered
a severe defeat. As a result, the gates of the town were thrown open
to the enemy, and if the Persians, encouraged by the success of this
forlorn hope, had followed it up boldly, Nectanebo would have run the
risk of being cut off from his troops which were around Pelusium, and of
being subsequently crushed. He thought it wiser to retreat towards the
apex of the Delta, but this very act of prudence exposed him to one of
those accidental misfortunes which are wont to occur in armies formed
of very diverse elements. While he was concentrating his reserves at
Memphis, the troops of the first line thought that, by leaving
them exposed to the assaults of the great king, he was deliberately
sacrificing them. Pelusium capitulated to Lacrates; Mentor of Ehodes
pushed forward and seized Bubastis, and the other cities in the eastern
portion of the Delta, fearing to bring upon themselves the fate
of Sidon, opened their gates to the Persians after a mere show of
resistance. The forces which had collected at Memphis thereupon
disbanded, and Nectanebo, ruined by these successive disasters,
collected his treasures and fled to Ethiopia. The successful issue of
the rash enterprise of Nicostratus had overthrown the empire of the
Pharaohs, and re-established the Persian empire in its integrity (342
B.C.).*
* The complete history of this war is related by Diodorus
Siculus, who generally follows the narrative of Theopompus.
The chronology is still sufficiently uncertain to leave some
doubt as to the exact date of each event; I have followed
that arrangement which seems to accord best with the general
history of the period. The following table may be drawn up
of the last Egyptian dynasties as far as they can be
restored at present:--
[Illustration: 312.jpg TABLE OF THE LAST EGYPTIAN DYNASTIES]
Egypt had prospered under the strong rule of its last native Pharaohs.
Every one of them, from Amyrtous down to Nectanebo, had done his best
to efface all traces of the Persian invasions and restore to the country
the appearance which it had presented before the days of its servitude;
even kings like Psamutis and Tachôs, whose reign had been of the
briefest, had, like those who ruled for longer periods, constructed or
beautified the monuments of the country. The Thebaid was in this respect
a special field of their labours. The island of Philæ, exposed to the
ceaseless attacks of the Ethiopians, had been reduced to little more
than a pile of ruins.
[Illustration: 313.jpg SMALL TEMPLE OF NECTANEBO, AT THE SOUTHERN
EXTREMITY OF PHILAE]
Drawn by Boudier, from a photograph by Beato.
Nectanebo II. erected a magnificent gate there, afterwards incorporated
into the first pylon of the temple built by the Ptolemies, and one
at least of the buildings that still remain, the charming rectangular
kiosk, the pillars of which, with their Hathor capitals, rise above
the southern extremity of the island and mark the spot at which the
Ethiopian pilgrims first set foot on the sacred territory of the
bountiful Isis. Nectanebo I. restored the sanctuaries of Nekhabît at
El-Kab, and of Horus at Edfu, in which latter place he has left an
admirable naos which delights the modern traveller by its severe
proportions and simplicity of ornament, while Nectanebo II. repaired the
ancient temple of Mînu at Coptos; in short, without giving a detailed
list of what was accomplished by each of these later Pharaohs, it may be
said that there are few important sites in the valley of the Nile where
some striking evidence of their activity may not still be discovered
even after the lapse of so many centuries.
[Illustration: 314.jpg NAOS OF NECTANEBO IN THE TEMPLE AT EDFU]
Drawn by Boudier, from a photograph by Beato.
It will be sufficient to mention Thebes, Memphis, Sebennytos, Bubastis,
Pahabît, Patumu, and Tanis. Nor did the Theban oases, including that of
Amon himself, escape their zeal, for the few Europeans who have visited
them in modern times have observed their cartouches there.
[Illustration: 315.jpg GREAT GATE OF NECTANEBO AT KARNAK]
Drawn by Boudier, from a photograph by Beato.
Moreover, in spite of the brief space of time within which they were
carried out, the majority of these works betray no signs of haste
or slipshod execution; the craftsmen employed on them seem to have
preserved in their full integrity all the artistic traditions of earlier
times, and were capable of producing masterpieces which will bear
comparison with those of the golden age. The Eastern gate, erected at
Karnak in the time of Nectanebo II., is in no way inferior either in
purity of proportion or in the beauty of its carvings to what remains of
the gates of Amenôthes III.
[Illustration: 316.jpg fragment of a Naos of THE time of nectanebo II.
in the Bologna Museum]
Drawn by Boudier, from a photograph by Flinders Pétrie.
The sarcophagus of Nectanebo I. is carved and decorated with a
perfection of skill which had never been surpassed in any age, and
elsewhere, on all the monuments which bear the name of this monarch the
hieroglyphics have been designed and carved with as much care as though
each one of them had been a precious cameo.*
* The sarcophagus was for a long time preserved near the
mosque of Ibn-Tulun, and was credited with peculiar virtues
by the superstitious inhabitants of Cairo.
The basalt torso of Nectanebo II., which attracts so much admiration
in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris for accuracy of proportion and
delicacy of modelling, deserves to rank with the finest statues of the
ancient empire. The mens heads are veritable portraits, in which such
details as a peculiar conformation of the skull, prominent cheekbones,
deep-set eyes, sunken cheeks, or the modelling of the chin, have all
been observed and reproduced with a fidelity and keenness of observation
which we fail to find in such works of the earlier artists as have come
down to us. These later sculptors display the same regard for truth in
their treatment of animals, and their dog-headed divinities; their dogs,
lions, and sphinxes will safely bear comparison with the most lifelike
presentments of these creatures to be found among the remains of the
Memphite or Theban eras. Egypt was thus in the full tide of material
prosperity when it again fell under the Persian yoke, and might have
become a source of inexhaustible wealth to Ochus had he known how to
secure acceptance of his rule, as Darius, son of Hystaspes, had done in
the days of Amasis.
[Illustration: 317.jpg ONE OF THE LIONS IN THE VATICAN]
Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from a photograph by Flinders Pétrie.
The violence of his temperament, however, impelled him to a course of
pitiless oppression, and his favourite minister, the eunuch Bagoas,
seems to have done his best to stimulate his masters natural cruelty.
In the days when they felt themselves securely protected from his anger
by their Libyan and Greek troops, the fellahîn had freely indulged in
lampoons at the expense of their Persian suzerain; they had compared him
to Typhon on account of his barbarity, and had nicknamed him the Ass,
this animal being in their eyes a type of everything that is vile.
On his arrival at Memphis, Ochus gave orders that an ass should be
installed in the temple of Phtah, and have divine honours paid to it; he
next had the bull Apis slaughtered and served up at a set banquet which
he gave to his friends on taking possession of the White Wall. The
sacred goat of Mendes suffered the same fate as the Apis, and doubtless
none of the other sacred animals were spared. Bagoas looted the temples
in the most systematic way, despatched the sacred books to Persia, razed
the walls of the cities to the ground, and put every avowed partisan of
the native dynasty to the sword. After these punitive measures had been
carried out, Ochus disbanded his mercenaries and returned to Babylon,
leaving Pherendates in charge of the reconquered province.*
* It seems that a part of the atrocities committed by Ochus
and Bagoas soon came to be referred to the time of the
Impure and to that of Cambyses.
The downfall of Egypt struck terror into the rebellious satraps who were
in arms elsewhere. Artabazus, who had kept Asia Minor in a ferment ever
since the time of Artaxerxes II., gave up the struggle of his own accord
and took refuge in Macedonia. The petty kings of the cities on the
shores of the Hellespont and the Ægean submitted themselves in order to
regain favour, or if, like Hermias of Atarnasa, the friend of Aristotle,
they still resisted, they were taken prisoners and condemned to death.
The success of Ochus was a reality, but there was still much to be done
before things were restored to the footing they had occupied before the
crisis. We know enough of the course of events in the western provinces
to realise the pitch of weakness to which the imbecility of Darius II.
and his son Artaxerxes II. had reduced the empire of Darius and
Xerxes, but it is quite certain that the disastrous effects of their
misgovernment were not confined to the shores of the Mediterranean,
but were felt no less acutely in the eastern and central regions of the
empire. There, as on the Greek frontiers, the system built up at the
cost of so much ingenuity by Darius was gradually being broken down with
each year that passed, and the central government could no longer
make its power felt at the extremities of the empire save at irregular
intervals, when its mandates were not intercepted or nullified in
transmission. The functions of the Eyes and Ears of the king had
degenerated into a mere meaningless formality, and were, more often
than not, dispensed with altogether. The line of demarcation between
the military and civil power had been obliterated: not only had the
originally independent offices of satrap, general, and secretary ceased
to exist in each separate province, but, in many instances, the satrap,
after usurping the functions of his two colleagues, contrived to extend
his jurisdiction till it included several provinces, thus establishing
himself as a kind of viceroy. Absorbed in disputes among themselves, or
in conspiracies against the Achsemenian dynasty, these officials had no
time to look after the well-being of the districts under their control,
and the various tribes and cities took advantage of this to break the
ties of vassalage. To take Asia Minor alone, some of the petty kings
of Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and certain districts of Cappadocia or the
mountainous parts of Phrygia still paid their tribute intermittently,
and only when compelled to do so; others, however, such as the
Pisidians, Lycaonians, a part of the Lycians, and some races of Mount
Taurus, no longer dreamed of doing so. The three satrapies on the shores
of the Caspian, which a hundred years before had wedged themselves in
between that sea and the Euxine, were now dissolved, all trace of them
being lost in a confused medley of kingdoms and small states, some of
which were ready enough to acknowledge the supremacy of Persia, while
others, such as the Gordiseans, Taochi, Chalybes, Colchi, Mosynoki, and
Tibarenians, obeyed no rule but their own.
[Illustration: 321.jpg MAP OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE]
All along the Caspian, the Cadusians and Amardians, on either side of
the chain of mountains bordering the Iranian plateau, defied all the
efforts made to subdue them.* India and the Sakse had developed from
the condition of subjects into that of friendly allies, and the
savage hordes of Gedrosia and the Paropamisus refused to recognise any
authority at all.**
* They appear in the history of every epoch as the
irreconcilable foes of the great king, enemies against whom
even the most peacefully disposed sovereigns were compelled
to take the field in person.
** The Sakæ fought at Arbela, but only as allies of the
Persians. The Indians who are mentioned with them came from
the neighbourhood of Cabul; most of the races who had
formerly figured in Darius satrapy of India had become
independent by the time Alexander penetrated into the basin
of the Indus.
The whole empire needed to be reconquered and reorganised bit by bit if
it was to exercise that influence in the world to which its immense size
entitled it, and the question arose whether the elements of which it
consisted would lend themselves to any permanent reorganisation or
readjustment.