STABILITY OF CULTURE
An isolated community that remains subject to the same environmental
conditions, and without selective mating, becomes, after a number of
generations, stable in bodily form. As long as there are no stimuli
that modify the social structure and mental life the culture will
also be fairly permanent. Primitive, isolated tribes appear to us and
to themselves as stable, because under undisturbed conditions the
processes of change of culture are slow.
In the very earliest times of mankind culture must have changed almost
imperceptibly. The history of man, of a being that made tools, goes
back maybe 150,000 years, more or less. The tools belonging to this
period are found buried in the soil. They are stone implements of
simple form. For a period of no less than 30,000 years the forms did
not change. When we observe such permanence among animals we explain it
as an expression of instinct. Objectively the toolmaking of man of this
period seems like an instinctive trait {132} similar to the instincts
of ants and bees. The repetition of the same act without change,
generation after generation, gives the impression of a biologically
determined instinct. Still, we do not know that such a view would be
correct, because we cannot tell in how far each generation learned
from its predecessors. Animals like birds and mammals, act not only
instinctively; they also learn by example and imitation. It seems
likely that conditions were the same in early man.
The importance of the process of learning becomes more and more evident
the nearer we approach the present period. The tools become more
differentiated. Not all localities show the same forms, and it seems
likely that if we could examine the behavior of man in periods one
thousand years apart that changes would be discovered.
At the end of the ice age the differentiation in the forms of
manufactured objects had come to be as great as that found nowadays
among primitive tribes. There is no reason why we should assume the
life of the people who lived towards the end of the ice age, the
Magdalenians, to have been in any respect simpler than that of the
modern Eskimo.
With the beginning of the present geological period the
differentiation of local groups and of activities in each group was
considerable. Changes {133} which in the beginning required tens of
thousands of years, later thousands of years, occurred now in centuries
and brought about constantly increasing multiplicity of forms.
With the approach of the historic period the degree of stability
of culture decreased still further and in modern times changes are
proceeding with great rapidity, not only in material products of our
civilization but also in forms of thought.
Since earliest times the rapidity of change has grown at an
ever-increasing rate.
The rate of change in culture is by no means uniform. We may observe
in many instances periods of comparative stability followed by others
of rapid modifications. The great Teutonic migrations at the close of
antiquity brought about fundamental changes in culture and speech.
They were followed by periods of consolidation. The Arab conquest
of North Africa destroyed an old civilization and new forms took
its place. Assimilation of culture may also be observed among many
primitive tribes, and, although we do not know the rate of change,
there is often strong internal evidence of a rapid adjustment to
a new level. In language the alternation between periods of rapid
change and comparative stability may often be observed. The transition
from Anglo-Saxon and Norman to English was rapid. The development of
English since that time has {134} been rather slow. Similar periods of
disturbance have occurred in the development of modern Persian.
The most striking example is presented by the influence of European
civilization upon primitive cultures. When they do not completely
disappear a new adjustment is reached with great rapidity. Examples are
the Indians of Mexico and Peru, or still more strikingly, the Negroes
of the United States during and since the time of slavery. In all these
cases outer influences broke the continuity of development.
Notwithstanding the rapid changes in many aspects of our modern life we
may observe in other respects a marked stability. Conflicts between the
inertia of conservative tradition and the radicalism of rapid change
are characteristic of our civilization.
We are wont to measure the ability of a race by its cultural
achievements which imply rapid changes. Those races among whom the
later changes have been most rapid appear, therefore, as most highly
developed.
For these reasons it is important to study the conditions that make for
stability and for change; and to know whether changes are organically
or culturally determined.
Behavior that is organically determined is called instinctive. When
the infant cries and smiles, {135} when later on it walks, its actions
are instinctive in this sense. Breathing, chewing, retiring from a
sudden assault against the senses, approach towards desired objects are
presumably organically determined. They do not need to be learned. Most
of these actions are indispensable for the maintenance of life. Some,
while useful, may be modified or even suppressed with impunity. Thus we
may change our gait or learn to overcome the reaction to fear. It is
difficult to do so, but not impossible. We can never account for the
reasons of this class of impulses that prompt us to act. The stimulus
is there and we react at once.
On the ground of this experience we are inclined to consider every
type of behavior that is marked by an immediate, involuntary reaction
as instinctive. This is an error, for habits imposed upon us during
infancy and childhood have the same characteristics.
Most of our actions are culturally determined.
We must eat in order to live. Arctic man is compelled by necessity to
live on a meat diet; the Hindu lives on vegetal food by choice.
That we walk on our legs is organically conditioned. How we walk, our
particular gait, depends upon the forms of our shoes, the cut of our
clothing, the way we carry loads, the conformation of the ground we
tread. Peculiar forms of motion {136} may be, in part, physiologically
determined, but many are due to imitation. They are repeated so often
that they become automatic. They come to be the way in which we move
“naturally.” The response is as easy and as ready as an instinctive
action, and a change from the acquired habit to a new one is equally
difficult. When thoroughly established the mental effect of an
automatic action is the same as that of an instinctive reaction.
In all these cases the _faculty_ of developing a certain motor habit is
organically determined. The particular _form_ of movement is automatic,
acquired by constant, habitual use.
This distinction is particularly clear in the use of language. The
_faculty_ of speech is organically determined and should be called,
therefore, instinctive. However, _what_ we speak is determined solely
by our environment. We acquire one language or another, according to
what we hear spoken around us. We become accustomed to very definite
movements of lips, tongue and the whole group of articulating organs.
When we speak, we are wholly unconscious of any of these movements
and equally of the structure of the language we speak. We resent
deviations in pronunciation and in structure. We find it exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to acquire as adults complete mastery of
new articulations and new structures such as are required in learning a
foreign language. {137} Our linguistic habits are not instinctive. They
are automatic.
Our thoughts and our speech are accompanied by muscular
movements,--some people would even say they _are_ our thoughts. The
kinds of movements are not by any means the same everywhere. The
mobility of the Italian contrasts strikingly with the restraint of the
Englishman.
The human faculty of using tools is organically determined. It is
instinctive. This, however, does not mean that the kind of tool
developed is prescribed by instinct. Even the slightest knowledge of
the development of tools proves that the special forms characteristic
of each area and period depend upon tradition and are in no way
organically determined. The choice of material depends partly upon
environment, partly upon the state of inventions. We use steel and
other artificially made materials; the African iron, others stone, bone
or shell. The forms of the working parts of the implements depend upon
the tasks they are to perform, those of the handles upon our motor
habits.
The same is ordinarily true of our likes and dislikes. We are
organically capable of producing and enjoying music. What kind of music
we enjoy depends for most of us solely upon habit. Our harmonies,
rhythms and melodies are not of the same kind as those enjoyed by the
Siamese and {138} a mutual understanding, if it can be attained at all,
can be reached solely by long training.
Whatever is acquired in infancy and childhood by unvarying habits
becomes automatic.
All this implies that a culture replete with automatically established
actions is stable. Every individual behaves according to the setting
of the culture in which he lives. When the uniformity of automatic
reaction is broken, the stability of culture will be weakened or lost.
Conformity and stability are inseparably connected. Nonconformity
breaks the force of tradition.
We are thus led to an investigation of the conditions that make for
conformity or nonconformity.
Conformity to instinctive activities is enforced by our organic
structure; conformity to automatic actions by habit. The infant learns
to speak by imitation. During the first few years of life the movement
of larynx, tongue, roof of the mouth and lips are gradually controlled
and executed with great accuracy and rapidity. If the child is removed
to a new environment in which another language is spoken, before the
movements of articulation have become stable, and as long as a certain
effort in speech is still required, the movements required by the new
language are acquired with perfect ease. For the adult a change from
one language to another is much more difficult. {139} The demands of
everyday life compel him to use speech, and the articulating organs
follow the automatic, fixed habits of his childhood. By imitation
certain modifications occur, but a complete break with the early habits
is extremely difficult, for many well-nigh impossible, and probably in
no case quite perfect.
The same is true in regard to the movements of the body. In childhood
we acquire certain ways of handling our bodies. If these movements have
become automatic it is almost impossible to change to another style,
because all the muscles are attuned to act in a fixed way. To change
one’s gait, to acquire a new style of handwriting, to change the play
of the muscles of the face in response to emotion is a task that can
never be accomplished satisfactorily.
What is true of the handling of the body is equally true of mental
processes. When we have learned to think in definite ways it is
exceedingly difficult to break away and to follow new paths. For a
person who has never been accustomed as a young child to restrain
responses to emotions, such as weeping or laughing, a transition to
the restraints cultivated among us will be difficult. The teachings
of earliest childhood remain for most people the dogma of adult life,
the truth of which is never doubted. Recently the importance of the
impressions of earliest childhood have {140} been emphasized again by
psychoanalysts. Whatever happens during the first five years of life
sets the pace for the reactions of the individual. Habits established
in this period become automatic and will resist strongly any pressure
requiring change.
It would be saying too much to claim that these habits are alone
responsible for the reactions of the individual. His bodily
organization certainly plays a part. This appears most clearly in
the case of pathological individuals or of those unusually gifted in
one way or another; but the whole population consists of individuals
varying greatly in bodily form and function, and since the same forms
and faculties occur in many groups, the group differences must be due
to habits that determine behavior in adult life. Automatic habits are
one of the most important sources of conservatism.
A few examples may illustrate the conditions that fix our habits.
The tools of tribes of different periods or localities have definite
forms so that an expert can readily determine the provenience of each
object. In most cases the form is an expression of the manner of using
the tool. A hand adze with a long handle, or one held close to the
cutting blade; a draw knife or one used for cutting away from the
body; a pestle and a grinding stone are adjusted to the kind of motion
characteristic {141} of the tribe. For a person who is accustomed to
cut with a drawing knife, a knife handle not fitted for this movement
is unhandy.
The movements determined by the forms of handles are sometimes very
special and a change to another form of handle is correspondingly
difficult. A good example of this is the throwing board of the Eskimo.
The board serves to give a greater impetus to a lance or a dart than
the one that can be given by the hand. It is, as it were, an extension
of the hand. The one end is held in the hand. On the surface is a
groove in which the lance rests so that its butt end is supported at
the other end. When the arm swings forward in the motion of throwing,
the lance rests against the far end of the board, which, on account of
its greater distance from the shoulder, moves more swiftly and thus
gives greater impetus to the weapon. The accuracy with which the lance
is thrown depends upon the intimate familiarity of the hand with the
board, for the slightest variation in its position modifies the flight
of the weapon. The forms of the throwing board differ considerably
from tribe to tribe. In Labrador and in the region farther north it is
broad and heavy, with grip holds for thumb and fingers. In Alaska it
is slender with a grip arranged in quite a different manner. A hand
accustomed to the wide board {142} would require considerable time to
learn the use of the narrower one. An implement of the same kind occurs
in Australia, but its form is fundamentally different. I presume an
Australian who would try to use an Eskimo throwing board would fail to
hit his game.
The same is true of our modern tools. The movements of the body are
adjusted to the handle of the tool. The handle was not changed until
machinery was introduced. The handle of the plane looks as though it
were adapted to the hand. Its form has developed so as to facilitate
the movements which we use. If we should use a different kind of
movement for planing the form of the handle would have to be different,
too; but the use of the handle that has been developed fixes the
habitual movements that we acquire.
Our posture may serve as another example. We sit on chairs. We like
to have our backs supported and our feet on the floor. The Indians do
not find this comfortable at all. They sit on the ground. Some stretch
their legs forward, others sideways. Many squat down, bending the lower
legs backward and sitting on the ground between the feet. For most
adults, among ourselves, this position is impossible.
The form of furniture depends upon our habitual posture. Some people
sleep on the back, others on the side. When sleeping on the side it is
convenient {143} to support the head with a pillow. People who sleep on
the back find it convenient to support the neck by a narrow rest while
the shoulders rest on the ground and the head is suspended. The neck
rest cannot be used when it is customary to sleep on the side. Chairs,
beds, tables and many kinds of household utensils are thus determined
by our motor habits. They have developed as an expression of these
habits, but their use compels every succeeding generation to follow
the same habits. Thus they tend to stabilize them and to make them
automatic.
The difficulty of changing forms dependent upon well-established
motor habits is well illustrated by the permanence of the keyboard
of the piano, which withstands all efforts at improvement; or by the
complexity of forms and inadequacy of the number of symbols of our
alphabet, which is hardly realized by most of those who write and read.
The most automatic activity of man is his speech and it is well worth
while to inquire in how far habitual speech influences our actions and,
either through our actions or directly, our thought. The problem might
also be so formulated that we ask in how far does language control
action and thought, and in how far does our behavior control language.
Some aspects of this question have been touched upon before (p. 55).
{144}
Language is so constituted that when new cultural needs arise it will
supply the forms that express them. There is a large number of words in
our vocabulary that have arisen with new inventions and new ideas that
would be unintelligible to our ancestors who lived two hundred years
ago. On the other hand, words no longer needed have disappeared.
What is true of words is equally true of forms. Many primitive
languages are very definite in expressing ideas. Locality, time
and modality of any statement are denoted accurately. An Indian of
Vancouver Island does not say “the man is dead,” he would say “this
man who has passed away lies dead on the floor of this house.” He does
not, according to the form of his language, express the idea “the man
is dead” in generalized form. It might seem that this is a defect
in his language, that he cannot form a generalized statement. As a
matter of fact he has no need of generalized statements. He speaks to
his fellow-men about the specific events of everyday life. He does
not speak about abstract goodness, he speaks about the goodness of
a certain person and he has no call to use the abstract term. The
question is what happens when his culture changes and generalized terms
are needed. The history of our own language shows clearly what does
happen. We do not mind forcing the language into new molds and {145}
creating the forms that we require. If the philosopher develops a new
idea he forces the language to yield devices that will adequately
express his ideas and if these take root the language follows the
lead thus given. A careful examination of primitive languages shows
that these possibilities are always inherent in their structure. When
missionaries train natives to translate the Bible and the Book of
Prayer they compel them to do violence to the current forms; and it
can always be done. In this sense we may say that culture determines
language.
Most instructive in this respect are those parts of the vocabulary that
express systems of classification; most notably in the numerical system
and in the terminology of relationship.
All counting is based on a grouping of units. We group by tens and
do so automatically. Some languages group by fives and combine four
fives,--that is the fingers and toes,--in one higher unit. In English
their terminology would be one, two, three, four, five; one, two,
three, four, five on the other hand; one, two, three, four, five on the
one foot; one, two, three, four, five on the other foot; and finally,
for our twenty, a man. If I want to say in such a language 973, I have
to group my units not in 9 times 10 times 10 (900) plus 7 times 10 (70)
plus 3, but in 2 times 20 times 20 (800) plus three on the other hand
(=8) times 20 (160) plus three {146} on the one foot (=13). In other
words we cannot count 973 units as 900 + 70 + 3. In the other language
973 are counted as 2 × 400 plus (5 + 3) times 20 plus (10 + 3). Every
number is divided in groups of units, multiples of twenty, of 400,
8,000 and so on. To acquire this new classification automatically is an
exceedingly difficult process.
Our terms of relationship are based on a few simple principles:
generation, sex, direct descent or agnatic line. My uncle is a person
of the first ascendant generation, male, agnatic line. Among other
people the principles may be quite different. For instance, the
difference between direct and agnatic line may be disregarded, while
the terms may differ according to the sex of the speaker. Thus a male
calls his mother and all females of the ascendant generation by one
term, and also his sons and nephews by a single term. The concept and
emotional significance of our term mother cannot persist in such a
terminology. The adjustment to the new concepts that make impossible
the customary automatic emotional reaction to terms of relationship
will also be exceedingly difficult.
In another way language sways the forms of our thought. Every language
has its own way of classifying sense experience and inner life, and
thought is, to a certain extent, swayed by the associations {147}
between words. To us activities like breaking, tearing, folding may
call forth the ideas of the kind of things that we break, tear or fold.
In other languages the terms express with such vigor the way in which
these actions are done, by pressure, by pulling, with the hand; or the
stiffness, hardness, form, pliability of the object that the flow of
ideas is determined in this fashion.
More important than this is the emotional tone of words. Particularly
those words that are symbols of groups of ideas to which we
automatically respond in definite ways have a fundamental value in
shaping our behavior. They function as a release for habitual actions.
In our modern civilizations the words patriotism, democracy or
autocracy, liberty are of this class. The real content of many of these
is not important; important is their emotional value. Liberty may be
nonexistent, the word-symbol will survive in all its power, although
the actual condition may be one of subjection. The name democracy will
induce people to accept autocracy as long as the symbol is kept intact.
The vague concepts expressed by these words are sufficient to excite
the strongest reactions that stabilize the cultural behavior of people,
even when the inner form of the culture undergoes considerable changes
that go unnoticed on account of the preservation of the symbol. {148}
Words are not the only symbols that influence behavior in this manner.
There are also many objective symbols, such as the national flags or
the cross, or fixed literary and musical forms that have attained the
value of symbols, like the formal prayers of various creeds, national
songs and anthems.
The conservative force of all of these rests on their emotional effect.
A study of the behavior of man shows that actions are on the whole more
stable than thoughts. The ease with which words change their meanings
while retaining their form which is produced by movements of the
articulating organs is one of the many examples that may be adduced.
More striking examples are found in a variety of cultural facts.
In North America similar rituals are performed over a wide area.
The general plan and most of the details are the same among many
tribes. They all do nearly the same things. On the other hand, the
significance of the ritual differs considerably among various tribes.
The so-called Sun Dance, which is alike in plan and the main features
of its execution, serves in one tribe as a prayer for success in war;
by another it is used as a pledge in prayers for recovery from serious
illness. It is also a means of preventing disease.
The decorative art of the Plains Indians is another {149} excellent
example. The designs used in painting and embroidery are largely
simple forms, such as straight lines, triangles and rectangles.
Their composition also is so much alike among many tribes that we
must necessarily assume the same origin for the forms. We look at
the designs as purely ornamental. To the Indian they have a meaning,
somewhat in the same way as we associate a meaning with the flag
and other national or religious emblems. The meanings, the thoughts
connected with the design are very variable. An isosceles triangle with
short straight lines descending from its base suggests to one tribe a
bear’s paw with its long claws; to another a tent with the plugs that
hold down the cover; to a third a mountain with springs at its foot;
to a fourth a rain cloud with descending rain. The meaning changes
according to the cultural interests of the people; the form which is
dependent upon their industrial activities does not change.
The same observation may be made in the tales of primitive
people. Identical tales are told over wide territories by people
of fundamentally different types of culture. The ideas that attach
themselves to a tale depend upon cultural interests. What is a sacred
myth in one tribe is told for amusement in another. If the interest of
the people centers in the stars we may have the tale as a star myth, if
they are interested in animals it may {150} explain conditions in the
animal world; if they have at heart ceremonial life the tale will deal
with ceremonies.
Secondary explanations are also common in our own civilization. We
speak of some of these as “survivals.” Many of the paraphernalia used
by European royalty or by the Church are survivals of early lines that
have changed their meaning.
Certain customs that have been transmitted to our times have undergone
fundamental changes in meaning. We are inclined to explain them now on
a utilitarian basis. It has been claimed that the Jews tabooed pork
because it was recognized that pork was injurious to health. Still we
know that the usage is parallel to food taboos that exist all over the
world and which are not founded on hygienic considerations.
An analogous change is developing in regard to Sunday. It is now
considered a day of rest for people to recuperate from the work of the
week. It originated as a holy day and is analogous to unlucky days,
or to days on which hostile tribes meet peacefully for the purpose of
barter.
Still more striking is the example of forbidden marriages. We say that
cousin marriages are dangerous to the offspring. When the parents are
of healthy stock there is no danger. The wide distribution of forbidden
or proscribed cousin {151} marriages and their general setting proves
that the source of the custom must be looked for in forms of social
organization and religious belief, and that by origin it has nothing to
do with hygienic considerations.
I think in most of these cases the action must be considered
as automatic. When an action is raised into consciousness our
rationalizing impulses require a satisfying explanation and this
follows the prevailing pattern of thought.
While the interpretation of single actions may thus undergo
considerable changes while the actions themselves persist, mental
life shows in other ways a remarkable degree of stability while the
material culture and actions related to it may become modified in many
ways. Wherever there is a strong, dominant trend of mind that pervades
the whole cultural life it may persist over long periods and survive
changes in mode of life.
This is most easily observed in one-sided cultures characterized by
a single controlling idea. Excellent examples are found among the
North American Indians. The tribes of the Plains are not only warlike,
but the standing of each individual is determined by his eminence
in warfare. His deeds of valor are the measure of his worth and the
thoughts of every man are forced in this direction. Public life is so
entirely swayed by an interest in war that nothing else counts for
{152} much. This attitude has held sway as long as Indian tribal life
continued unbroken and there is no reason to assume that it is of
recent origin.
On the North Pacific Coast the importance of hereditary social rank,
to be maintained by the display and lavish distribution of wealth,
determines the behavior of the individual. It is the ambition of every
person to obtain high social standing for himself, his family, or for
the chief of his family. Wealth is a necessary basis of social eminence
and the general tone of life is determined by these ideas. They have
even received a new impetus since European civilization has introduced
new methods of acquiring wealth, notwithstanding the disintegration of
the social fabric.
No less instructive is the fundamental rôle played by the idea of the
sacredness of persons of high rank, expressed particularly by the
taboo of their persons and of objects belonging to them, that prevails
practically all over Polynesia and that must be an ancient trait of
Polynesian culture.
European history also shows conclusively that fundamental viewpoints
once established are held tenaciously. Changes develop slowly and
against strong resistance. The relation of the individual to the Church
may serve as an example. The willing submission to Church authority
which {153} characterized European and American life in earlier
times; the unhesitating acceptance of traditional dogma is giving way
to individual independence, but the transition has been slow and is
still vigorously resisted by the earlier attitude. The ease with which
changes of denominational affiliation or complete break with the Church
are accepted were unthinkable for many centuries and are even now
resented by many.
The slow breaking up of feudalism and the gradual disappearance of the
privileges of royalty and nobility are other pertinent examples.
The history of rationalism is equally instructive. The endeavor to
understand all processes as the effects of known causes has led to
the development of modern science and has gradually expanded over
ever-widening fields. The rigid application of the method demands the
reduction of every phenomenon to its cause. A purpose, a teleological
viewpoint, and accident are excluded. It was probably one of the
greatest attractions of the Darwinian theory of natural selection that
it substituted for a purposive explanation of the origin of life forms
a purely causal one.
The strength of the rationalistic viewpoint is also manifested in the
attitude of psychoanalysis which refuses to accept any of our ordinary,
everyday actions as accidental, but demands an inner, causal connection
between all mental processes. {154}
It would be an error to assume that the universal application of
rationalism is the final form of thought, the ultimate result which our
organism is destined to reach. Opposition to its negation of purpose,
or its transformation of purpose into cause and to its disregard of
accident as influencing the individual phenomenon, is struggling for
recognition.
The stability of a general trend of mind is likely to be the greater,
the greater the uniformity of culture. In a complex culture, in which
diverse attitudes are found, the probability of change must be much
greater.
There is a negative effect of automatism, no less important than the
positive one which results in the ease of performance.
Any action that differs from those performed by us habitually strikes
us immediately as ridiculous or objectionable, according to the
emotional tone that accompanies it. Often deviations from automatic
actions are strongly resented. A dog taught to give his hind paw
instead of the front paw excites us to laughter. Formal dress worn at
times when the conventions do not allow it seems ridiculous. So does
the dress that was once fashionable but that has gone out of use. We
need only think of the hoop skirt of the middle of the last century
or of the bright colors of man’s dress and the impression they would
create to-day. We must {155} also realize the resistance that we
ourselves have to appearing in an inappropriate costume.
More serious are the resistances in matters that evoke stronger
emotional reactions. Table manners are a good example. Most of us are
exceedingly sensitive to a breach of good table manners. There are many
tribes and people that do not know the use of the fork and who dip
into the dish with their fingers. We feel this is disgusting because
we are accustomed to the use of fork and knife. We are accustomed to
eat quietly. Among some Indian tribes it is discourteous not to smack
one’s lips, the sign of enjoying one’s food. What is nauseating to us
is proper to them.
Still more striking is our reaction to breaches of modesty. We have
ourselves witnessed a marked change in regard to what is considered
modest, what immodest. A comparative study shows that modesty is found
the world over, but that the ideas of what is modest and what immodest
vary incredibly. Thirty years ago woman’s dress of to-day would have
been immodest. South African Negroes greet a person of high rank by
turning the back and bowing away from him. Some South American Indians
consider it immodest to eat in view of other people. Whatever the form
of modest behavior may be, a breach of etiquette is always strongly
resented.
This is characteristic of all forms of automatic {156} behavior.
The performance of an automatic action is accompanied by the lowest
degree of consciousness. To witness an action contrary to our
automatic behavior excites at once intense attention and the strongest
resistances must be overcome if we are required to perform such an
action. Where motor habits are concerned the resistance is based on
the difficulty of acquiring new habits, which is the greater the older
we are, perhaps less on account of growing inadaptability than for
the reason that we are constantly required to act and have no time
to adjust ourselves to new ways. In trifling matters the resistance
may take the form of fear of ridicule, in more serious ones of social
criticism. But it is not only the fear of the outer world that
determines the resistance, it rests equally in our own unwillingness to
change, in our thorough disapprobation of the unconventional.
Intolerance is often, if not always, based on the strength of
automatic reactions and upon the feeling of intense displeasure felt in
acts opposed to our own automatism. The apparent fanaticism exhibited
in the persecution of heretics must be explained in this manner. At
a time when the dogma taught by the Church was imposed upon each
individual so intensely that it became an automatic part of his thought
and action, it was accompanied by a strong feeling of opposition, of
hostility {157} to any one who did not participate in this feeling.
The term fanaticism does not quite correctly express the attitude of
the Inquisition. Its psychological basis was rather the impossibility
of changing a habit of thought that had become automatic and the
consequent impossibility of following new lines of thought, which, for
this very reason, seemed antisocial; that is, criminal.
We have a similar spectacle in the present conflict between nationalism
and internationalism with their mutual intolerance.
Even in science a similar intolerance may be observed in the struggle
of opposing theories and in the difficulty of breaking down traditional
common viewpoints.
The example of medieval orthodoxy proves that the uniformity of
automatic reaction of the whole society is one of the strongest forces
making for stability. When all react in the same way it becomes
difficult for an individual to break away from the common habits.
This is strikingly illustrated by the contrast between the culture
of primitive tribes and our modern civilization. Our society is
not uniform. Among us even the best educated cannot participate in
our whole civilization. Among primitive tribes the differences in
occupations, interests and knowledge are comparatively slight. Every
individual is to a great extent familiar with all the {158} thoughts,
emotions and activities of the community. The uniformity of behavior is
similar to that expected among ourselves of a member of a social “set.”
A person who does not conform to the habits of thought and actions of
his “set” loses standing and must leave. In our modern civilization he
is likely to find another congenial “set,” to the habits of which he
can conform. In primitive society such sets are absent. With us the
presence of many groups of different standards of interest and behavior
is a stimulus for critical self-examination, for conflicts of group
interests and other forms of intimate contact are ever present. Among
primitive people this stimulus does not occur within the tribal unit.
For these reasons individual independence is attained with much greater
difficulty and tribal standards have much greater force.
Individual independence is the weaker the more markedly a culture
is dominated by a single idea that controls the actions of every
individual. We may illustrate this again by the example of the Indians
of the northwest coast of America and of those of the Plains. The
former are dominated by the desire to obtain social prominence by
the display of wealth and by occupying a position of high rank which
depends upon ancestry and conformity to the social requirements of
rank. The life of almost every individual is regulated by this {159}
thought. The desire for social prestige finds expression in amassing
riches, in squandering accumulated wealth, in lavish display, in
outdoing rivals of equal rank, in marrying so as to insure rank for
one’s children, more even than in a set of rich young people in our
cities who have inherited wealth and who lose caste unless they come
up to the social pace of their set. The uniformity of this background
and the intensity with which it is cultivated in the young do not
allow other forms to arise and keep the cultural outlook stable. Quite
similar observations may be made among the natives of New Guinea, among
whom display of wealth is also a dominating passion.
Quite different is the background of life of the Indians of the Plains.
The desire to obtain honors by warlike deeds prompts thoughts and
actions of every one. Social position is intimately bound up with
success in war, and the desire for prominence is inculcated in the mind
of every child. The combination of these two tendencies determines
the mental status of the community and prevents the development of
different ideals.
Again different are conditions among the sedentary tribes of New
Mexico. According to Dr. Ruth L. Bunzel the chief desire of the Zuni
Indian is to conform to the general level of behavior and not to be
prominent. Prominence brings with it so many duties and enmities that
it is avoided. The {160} dominating interest in life is occupation with
ceremonialism and this combined with fear of outstanding responsibility
gives a steady tone to life.
In all these cases the uniformity of social habits and the lack of
examples of different types of behavior make deviations difficult and
place the individual who does not conform in an antisocial class, even
if his revolt is due to a superior mind and to strength of character.
In primitive society the general cultural outlook is in most cases
uniform and examples that are opposed to the usual behavior are of
rare occurrence. The participation of many in a uniform attitude has a
stabilizing effect.
When at times of great popular excitement the masses in civilized
society are swayed by a single idea, the independence of the individual
is lost in the same manner as it is in primitive society. We have
passed through a period of such dominant ideas during the World War
and it is probable that every European nation was affected in the same
manner. What seemed before the outbreak of hostilities as momentous
differences vanished and one thought animated every nation.
All this is quite different in a diversified culture, particularly
if the child is exposed to the influences of conflicting tendencies,
so that none has the opportunity to become automatically settled, to
become sufficiently firmly ingrained in {161} nature to evoke intense
resistance against different habits. When only one dominant attitude
exists, the rise of a critical attitude requires a strong, creative
mind. Where many exist and none has a marked, emotional appeal,
opportunity for critical choice is given.
The greater the differentiation of groups within the social unit, and
the closer the contact between them the less is it likely that any of
the traditional lines of behavior will be so firmly established that
they become entirely automatic. In a diversified culture the child
is exposed to so many conflicting tendencies that few only have the
opportunity to become so strongly ingrained in nature as to evoke
energetic resistance against different habits. A stratified society
consisting of classes with privileges and different viewpoints is,
therefore, more subject to change than a homogeneous society. This may
account for the intense conservatism of the Eskimo, whose culture has
changed very little over a long period. They are remote from contact
with foreign cultures, and their society is remarkably homogeneous, all
households being practically on the same level and all participating
fully in the tribal culture. In contrast to the permanence of their
culture there is evidence of comparatively rapid changes among the
Indians of British Columbia. They are exposed to contact with cultures
of distinct types; and on account of the {162} diversity of privileges
of individuals, families and societies their customs have been in a
state of flux.
These changes are facilitated in all those cases in which customs are
entrusted to the care of a few individuals. Among many tribes sacred
ceremonials are in the keeping of a few priests or of a single chief
or priest. Although they are supposed to preserve the ceremonial
faithfully in all its details, we have ample evidence showing that
owing to forgetfulness, to ambition, to the workings of a philosophic
or imaginative mind, or to the premature death of the keeper of the
secret, the forms may undergo rapid changes.
The influence of an individual upon culture depends not only upon
his strength but also upon the readiness of society to accept changes.
During the unstable conditions of cultural life produced by contact
between European and primitive civilizations many native prophets
have arisen who have with more or less success modified the religious
beliefs of the people. Their revelations, however, were reflexes of the
mixed culture. The new ideas created in society are not free, but are
determined by the culture in which they arise. The artist is hemmed in
by the peculiar style of the art and the technique of his environment;
the religious mind by current religious belief; the political leader
by established political forms. Only when these are {163} shaken by
the impact of foreign ideas or by violent changes of culture owing
to disturbing conditions is the opportunity given to the individual
to establish new lines of thought that may give a new direction to
cultural change.