Secrecy of Japanese Strategy--The Geographical
Position--Kuropatkin's Essential Weakness--Rain Stops
Carnage--Oku Rolls up the Russians--Field-Marshal
Oyama--Keller's Failure--10th Regiment Ambushed--Desperate
Courage against Overwhelming Odds--Kuroki again on the
Offensive--Capture of Niuchwang--The Bloodiest Fight so
Far--The Death of Count Keller--Kuropatkin's Heavy
Loss--Concentration at Liao-yang--Kuropatkin's Urgent
Motives--Oyama's Great Resources--Twelve Days' Battle--The
Great Armies in Touch--Frightful Scene of Carnage--Costly but
Indecisive.
[Sidenote: Secrecy of Japanese Strategy]
The signal defeat of the Russian army under General Stackelberg at
Telissu on the 15th June cleared the way for an advance northwards by
General Oku's army. It was one of the consequences of the secrecy which
attended the Japanese strategy from first to last that until this
moment General Oku's real objective was not guessed either by foreign
observers or even by the Russians themselves. The general impression
was, naturally, that the Second Army was destined for the tremendous
task of storming Port Arthur, but a much larger conception of the
campaign was present to the minds of the strategists at Tokio. Fresh
troops in large numbers were poured into the Liao-tung Peninsula, and
these, under the command of General Nogi were concentrated round Port
Arthur, while the main body of the Second Army was pushed northwards to
act in co-operation with the First Army of General Kuroki and the Third
Army commanded by General Nodzu, which, it will be remembered, had by
this time landed at Takushan and was being gradually directed upon
Haicheng. As soon, therefore, as his forces had been restored after
their tremendous exertions at Telissu, General Oku set out with all
possible rapidity along the line of railway towards Kaiping. And now
Kuroki's long wait at Feng-hwang-cheng came to an end. It had, however,
been well utilized. Not only had it enabled the conqueror of the Yalu
to concentrate an army of upwards of 100,000 men, but in the interval
his engineers had been employed in constructing defences, of a
semi-permanent character, which, in the event of a subsequent retreat
being rendered necessary, would make the position almost impregnable
against Russian attack. But on the 23rd June General Kuroki broke camp,
and, leaving behind him only a rear guard, took the first step in that
great series of operations which, as they advanced northwards, stained
the fertile plains of Southern Manchuria with the blood of Japanese and
Muscovite alike and culminated around Liao-yang and Mukden in the most
terrific and sanguinary conflicts experienced in the annals of war
since the great struggle between the Northern and Southern States.
[Sidenote: Geographical Position]
The key to the valley of the Liao River, it will be remembered, lies in
the three passes of Motienling, Taling, and Fenshuiling; and these were
all held in force by the Russians. The first of them stands on the main
road leading from Feng-hwang-cheng to Liao-yang; the second (which must
not be confused with the pass of the same name situated north of the
Taitse River at about 60 miles to the east of Liao-yang) commands the
road between Feng-hwang-cheng and Haicheng; and the third is on the
road from Siuyen to Tashichao and is about 20 miles southeast from the
latter place. The situation of the most important posts along the
railway from Mukden to Kaiping has already been indicated, but for the
sake of clearness it may be repeated that Liao-yang, where General
Kuropatkin had concentrated his main army, stands about 40 miles south
of Mukden; that 30 miles further south again is situated Haicheng; and
that an interval of 30 miles more separates that town from Kaiping, or
Kaichau, as it is sometimes called, Tashichao lying half-way between.
[Sidenote: Kuropatkin's Essential Weakness]
General Nodzu's troops were now for the first time brought into action,
and operated in unison with General Kuroki's army in the attack upon
the passes. A combination of most skilful movements made them masters
of these important defiles within a few days of one another. In each
case the tactics were the same. A frontal attack was pushed forward by
one division, while strong bodies were sent round both to the right and
left, and, securing ground from which they could enfilade the Russian
trenches, rendered the position untenable by the defending force.
General surprise was felt at the ineffective stand made here by General
Kuropatkin's troops, especially as they had spent at least three months
in building entrenchments, protected by wire entanglements and all the
accessories of modern scientific warfare. The fact was, however, that
the essential weakness of Kuropatkin's army in point of numbers
compared with its opponents was now made disastrously apparent, and in
spite of the natural and artificial strength of these passes, he could
not prevent the superior force which the Japanese invariably contrived
to bring against him at any given point from turning his flanks. Both
the Taling Pass and the Motienling Pass, at the latter of which General
Count Keller, who had superseded General Sassulitch in his command,
directed the Russian operations, fell an easy prey to Kuroki's
manoeuvres; but at Fenshuiling General Nodzu met with fierce
opposition. The defile was defended by fourteen battalions of infantry
and three regiments of cavalry, supported by thirty guns, and a severe
engagement took place, lasting for six hours. It was apparent that the
strength of the Russian entrenchments was such that a direct attack
would involve an enormous sacrifice of life; but after brilliant
tactics, carried out during the night of the 26th June and the early
morning of the 27th, the Japanese outflanked their enemy and drove them
back in full retreat down the road to Simucheng, leaving ninety dead
upon the field and losing eighty-eight prisoners, including six
officers. On the same day a force of three battalions with sixteen guns
made a desperate effort to recapture the position, but they were hurled
back with heavy loss, and the pass remained irrevocably in the hands of
the Japanese.
[Sidenote: Rain Stops the Carnage]
At this stage in the advance further progress was delayed for a few
days by an agency which at frequent intervals during the campaign rose
superior to the fiercest energy on the part of either combatant. The
weather, which renders war in Manchuria practically impossible in
winter, succeeds in giving it an intermittent character even in summer,
and now heavy rains brought the operations to a temporary standstill.
The Japanese who were on the high ground overlooking the valleys did
not suffer so much from the torrential downpour, but the Russians in
the plains had to bear its full force, and all movements by any arm of
the service were rendered impossible by a sea of mud. By the 4th of
July, however, the rains had stopped, and on that day a sharp fight
took place at Motien-ling. During a dense fog at dawn, two battalions
of the Russians attacked the Japanese outposts and endeavored to force
the position. But Kuroki's soldiers were not to be surprised, and
reinforcements were hurried up with all speed. Severe hand-to-hand
fighting took place; but, finally, after three onslaughts by the
Russians, the Japanese hurled them back in rout and pursued them for a
distance of four miles to the westward.
[Illustration: AFTER FIVE MONTHS.
Following the railway northwards Oku came into touch with the
retreating Russians on June 15, and inflicted upon them a crushing
defeat at the battle of Telissu. His advance was not again opposed
until he reached Kaiping, which he captured after some fighting on July
9. Meanwhile the armies under Kuroki and Nodzu had been advancing
steadily, and the Mo-tien and Fen-shui Passes, commanding the roads to
Liaoyang and Haicheng, were captured simultaneously. During this month
the siege of Port Arthur began on land.
The shaded portion shows the Japanese advance.]
[Sidenote: Oku Rolls up Russians]
Two days later General Oku took up the running for the Japanese, and
started to roll up the Russian forces from the south. Moving out from
Erh-tau-ho-tse, which is 12 miles south of Kaiping, he marched upon
that town along the road westwards of the railway, driving the enemy's
outposts before him. By noon on the 9th he had forced the Russians, who
were under General Zarubaieff, Commander of the Fourth Siberian Army
Corps, back upon their main position at Kaiping itself, and here it
appeared that General Kuropatkin had ordered a stand to be made.
Upwards of 30,000 men, with numerous guns, were in the neighborhood at
the disposal of Zarubaieff and Oku prepared for a stout resistance. But
as a matter of fact the opposition offered to him turned out to be
comparatively feeble. After an artillery duel lasting for four hours
his troops advanced and seized the heights extending from Haishan-chai
on the west to Shwangtingshan on the east, from both of which eminences
they could command Kaiping. Reinforcements had been hurried up from the
Russian rear, but they were soon ordered northward again, and the whole
body evacuated the town under cover of heavy gun fire on the afternoon
of the same day. The cause of this ineffectual resistance on the part
of Zarubaieff was the advance of the Third Army of Japan from
Fenshuiling, which acted in co-ordination throughout with General Oku's
columns, and threatened to outflank the Russians. To avoid a great
disaster General Zarubaieff was compelled to retreat, and as a
consequence of this skilful manoeuvring, General Oku was enabled to
occupy the important position of Kaiping with a loss which was almost
negligible, another big step being thus gained in the progress
northwards.
[Sidenote: Field-Marshal Oyama]
On the very day which Oku began his advance on Kaiping there occurred
an event which brought strikingly before the world the fact that these
movements by the three Japanese generals were only part of one great
concerted plan, the vastness of which was not yet realized. This was
the departure from Tokio for the seat of war of Field-Marshal Marquis
Oyama, the master-mind selected by the Mikado for the supreme command
of all his armies in the field. A brief description of the career of
this great general, whose renown in Japan is second only to that of the
veteran Yamagata, will not be out of place here. Like so many of the
Japanese leaders who have distinguished themselves in the present war,
Oyama's first experience of fighting was gained in the old days of the
Sumatsu rebellion, in which he took part on the revolutionary side,
achieving considerable distinction for his gallantry. After peace had
placed the Mikado securely upon the throne of Japan, Oyama was sent to
Prussia as military attaché, and was present at Moltke's headquarters
at all the most important operations of the Franco-German War. There
he, no doubt, gained many of the valuable lessons which have since been
put in force both in the Chinese War ten years ago and in the present
campaign. After the Peace of Versailles he devoted himself to a close
study of the military organizations of France and Switzerland, and
returning to his own country in 1875 received an appointment on the
General Staff in Tokio. He was selected for the command of the First
Army on the outbreak of the war with China in 1894, and directed the
operations around Port Arthur, which culminated in the storming of that
powerful fortress. On the retirement of Marshal Yamagata from
ill-health, General Oyama was appointed to the chief command of all the
Japanese forces in the field, and carried the campaign to a successful
conclusion. After the signature of the Treaty of Peace the Mikado
recognized his great services by conferring upon him the baton of
Field-Marshal and appointing him Chief of the Staff. In the meanwhile,
General Oku was preparing for his further advance northwards, where the
next obstacle in his path was the Russian position at Tashichao. This
town had been converted into a place of great strength and was
garrisoned by at least 60,000 men with 105 guns. But before the
opposing forces could meet here a fresh attack of a much more
determined character than the last was made upon the Japanese army at
Motienling, the Russians, under the command of Kuropatkin's most
trusted lieutenant, General Count Keller, making a desperate attempt to
regain possession of that important defile. This was the first occasion
on which Kuropatkin's troops seriously assumed the offensive in the
course of the war, and the result was a conspicuous success once more
for the Japanese.
[Sidenote: Keller's Failure]
The Russian Commander-in-Chief entrusted two divisions to Count Keller
for the purpose of the attack, and that General made dispositions for a
frontal attack along the main road from Tawan, simultaneously, with
movements against both of the Japanese flanks. For the main operation
one division was employed, and the other was divided into two bodies,
the first marching from Anping upon Hsimatang, where the outposts on
Kuroki's right were stationed; and the second pushing forward from
Tienshuitien along the paths which lead through the hills to the south
of Motienling, where the Japanese left wing was posted. This scheme of
advance might have had some success if all the parts of the machine had
worked together with complete smoothness, but in the actual event the
movements of the several columns were badly co-ordinated, and they came
into action at different times.
[Illustration: FOOD FOR THE JAPANESE ARMY.]
[Sidenote: 10th Regiment Ambushed]
The frontal attack began at 3 a. m., when, under cover of a dense fog,
Keller's two leading battalions fell upon the Japanese outpost upon the
main road some distance to the west of the pass. Notwithstanding the
shock of the surprise and the formidable disparity of numbers, Kuroki's
troops held their ground with the utmost gallantry. The foremost files
of the 10th Siberian Regiment became engaged almost at once in a
hand-to-hand combat with a small body of about thirty or forty
Japanese. Several of the latter were bayonetted before they realized
that the enemy was upon them, but the survivors, taking refuge among
some Chinese cottages, made a desperate resistance with rifle and cold
steel. The din and the crack of musketry aroused some companies who
were bivouacking in the neighboring trenches, and they quickly rushed
to the support of their comrades. One company, taking up a position in
an adjacent temple, poured in a murderous fire upon the Russians, and
another stationed itself on a hill on the opposite side and joined in
the deadly fusillade. Thus the 10th Regiment, instead of successfully
surprising its foe, found itself in turn surprised in an ambush, and
after a hot engagement was compelled to retreat back upon its main
body. It was five o'clock before the Russians could bring up a
sufficient force to drive in the Japanese outposts, by which time the
gallant stand made by these few companies had enabled Kuroki's troops
entrenched at the Motien Pass itself to prepare fully for the onslaught
that awaited them. When Keller's soldiery, therefore, came within range
of the Japanese lines, they were met by a heavy fire both from infantry
and artillery. Two hours more elapsed before they were properly
disposed for the attack, and then, although they consisted of a whole
division of 12,000 men, and were opposed by a force of no more than
4,000, their tactics proved quite ineffective, and they could not
succeed in the slightest degree in shaking the hold upon the defile
which their enemy had gained.
The fire which was directed upon them from the Japanese lines was
especially galling upon their left wing, and here, shortly before
eleven o'clock, they began to give way, and ere long the whole force
fell back in retreat. Their active enemy then sprang forward to the
attack themselves and attempted to push the repulse home, but a strong
rear guard held them in check, and prevented the reverse from becoming
a rout. It afterwards became apparent that the reason for this retreat
on the part of Count Keller's main body was the complete failure of the
flanking movements which he had presumably intended to be conducted
simultaneously.
[Sidenote: Desperate Courage but Overwhelming Odds]
But the attack upon their outposts upon the main road at three in the
morning had put the whole Japanese army upon the _qui vive_, and both
on the right and the left flanks preparations were made to meet such a
manoeuvre as the Russian General had in view. On the left wing, as no
enemy had appeared in sight by five o'clock, a company of the Japanese
pushed forward towards Makumenza to wait for their approach. There it
fell in with a Russian battalion and engaged it at once in a hot
conflict. A second battalion came to the aid of the first, and for a
time the little force of Japanese was in danger of being annihilated,
but reinforcements quickly arrived, and though they were still
numerically weaker than the Russians, they drove them back with heavy
loss, and occupied the heights which commanded the approach from this
point, completing the confusion of the enemy by directing a galling
fire upon the main body which was now in full retreat along the road to
Tawan. On the right flank the struggle was more obstinate and
sanguinary. When the attack began at eight o'clock the Japanese were
greatly outnumbered, and for a time one company had to hold its own
against the onslaught of a whole battalion of the Russians, supported
by a troop of cavalry. In the deadly conflict which ensued, every one
of the Japanese officers fell upon the field, but notwithstanding their
terrible losses the little band fought on with desperate courage
against the overwhelming odds. The arrival of another Russian battalion
seemed to threaten their complete destruction, but, fortunately, before
long reinforcements were hurried up to the spot and the contest became
more even. After a severe conflict, lasting for eight and a half hours,
the Russians at length gave up the attempt to force the Japanese lines
as hopeless, and fell back broken and defeated.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING TERRITORY ADJACENT TO LIAOYANG.]
Thus at every point this attack, from which General Kuropatkin had
hoped for so much, failed completely, and the superiority of the
Japanese soldiery over their opponents was once more strikingly
manifested. Kuroki's casualties amounted to about 300 killed and
wounded, but the affair was much more expensive to the Russians,
General Keller putting his losses at over 1,000 men.
[Sidenote: Kuropatkin Again on the Offensive]
Immediately following upon this success, General Kuroki once again
assumed the offensive and captured the position of Hsihoyen,
practically the last stronghold occupied by the Russians on the high
ground overlooking the plains of the Liao River. This success was the
work of the Twelfth Division, that division which, it will be
remembered, decided the battle of the Yalu by its flank attack on
General Kashtalinsky's left. It now covered itself with fresh glory
under its skilful commander, General Nishi. The same tactics as had
been adopted in all these operations against the strongly entrenched
positions of the Russians were once more employed. The enemy were kept
busy with a frontal attack while a column marched around their right
flank and rendered their carefully prepared stronghold untenable. A
general advance was then made, and the Russians were driven back upon
Anping in complete rout with more than 1,000 casualties. The Japanese
killed and wounded amounted only to half that number.
On the 24th of July, Oku resumed his advance northwards and attacked
the powerful Russian position at Tashichao. The skilful handling of
Zarubaieff's large force of artillery made it impossible for the
Japanese to carry the trenches by daylight, but, waiting till
nightfall, they made a fresh onslaught under the beams of a full moon.
Point after point fell into their hands, and next morning General
Zarubaieff, feeling the hopelessness of continuing the defence,
especially in view of a fresh movement by General Nodzu's army which
threatened his left, decided to retreat. This unexpectedly easy victory
was gained by the Japanese at the expense of about 1,000 casualties;
but the Russians lost twice that number of men, and among the wounded
were two officers of high rank, Generals Kondratovitch and Skaloff. Two
days later a detachment of Oku's army entered Yinkow, the port of
Niuchwang--a highly important prize, for it provided the invaders with
a new and most valuable base for the advance from the south.
[Sidenote: Capture of Niuchwang]
On July 31st the advance was resumed all along the line of the extended
front of the Japanese, and each of the three armies was hotly engaged.
Oku's steady march along the line of the railway drove the retreating
enemy into Haicheng. On the right, at Tomucheng, a more sanguinary
battle took place between General Nodzu's army and two divisions of
Russian infantry, supported by seven batteries of artillery, under the
command of General Alexeieff. The Russians occupied a strongly
entrenched position on the hills to the north of Tomucheng, the work of
fortification having occupied several months. But the result was the
same here as in every quarter of the theatre of war. The two armies
were locked together in a deadly struggle for nearly the whole of a
scorching day, until the Japanese left wing, attacking with desperate
bravery, carried the heights opposite to them and threatened the rear
of the Russian centre. During the night, therefore, General Alexeieff
fell back, leaving more than 150 dead upon the field and abandoning six
guns, which fell into the hands of the enemy. The result of these
combined operations of the Second and Third Armies was that Haicheng
was occupied on August 3rd, and Niuchwang--which must be distinguished
from the port of the same name--also fell into Oku's grasp.
[Sidenote: The Bloodiest Fight so Far]
It was in the north, however, with the Japanese First Army that the
bloodiest fighting ensued, and that the Russians met with the most
signal defeat. On July 31st Kuroki's right wing held Kushulintzu, 4
miles to the west of Hsihoyen, and his centre occupied Yangtzuling, 6
miles to the west of Motienling, both places being situated about 25
miles from Liao-yang. Opposite to Kushulintzu the Russians, who held a
very strong position on the high ground, consisted of two divisions of
infantry with well-placed artillery. The attack began at dawn and
continued all day. The Japanese infantry advanced gradually across the
open valley undeterred by the murderous fire poured upon them from the
Russian batteries, and threw themselves recklessly upon the enemy's
redoubts. It was on the wings that the Russian defence was the weakest,
and here, by sunset, the impetuous onslaught of the Mikado's troops
carried all before it, nightfall finding them in possession of some of
the most important heights. But the strength of the Russian centre was
too great to be forced easily, and the Japanese therefore bivouacked on
the field, and waited till daybreak to resume the attack. With the
first rays of dawn they were ready once more for the fray, and again
the hills resounded with the roar of artillery. For several hours the
battle raged, the Russians making a most obstinate defence, but as the
Japanese captured height after height the enemy could stand their
ground no longer, and by noon they broke and fled westwards, leaving
several field guns behind in the victor's hands.
[Illustration: AFTER SIX MONTHS.
Kuroki and Nodzu now called a halt to enable Oku to come into line with
them. The latter, working his way steadily northwards, drove the
Russians out of Tashichiao after three days' severe fighting. Newchwang
was occupied on July 25, and Nodzu, having advanced his forces to
Si-mu-cheng and driven out the Russians on July 30, the two generals
joined forces and marched on Haicheng, which they occupied on August 2.
A general assault was delivered on Port Arthur on July 26, and a few
days later the Japanese captured Wolf Hill, Green Hill, and Takushan.
The shaded portion shows the Japanese advance.]
[Sidenote: The Death of Count Keller]
At Yangtzuling the conflict was even more severe. The Russian force
here consisted of two and a half divisions, with four batteries of
artillery, and General Count Keller commanded in person. It was
destined to be that gallant but unfortunate officer's last fight, for
he fell mortally wounded in the course of the second day's operations.
The Japanese plan of attack was very much the same as in the case of
Kushulintzu. In spite of the tropical sun, whose rays beat upon their
heads without protection, their advance was irresistible, and throwing
themselves upon the enemy with a fierce _elan_, which carried all
before it, they captured some of the principal positions by the close
of the day. Here again, however, a numerous body of Russians held out
in the centre against the most desperate attacks, and the Japanese were
therefore compelled to bivouac on the field for the night and resume
the conflict on the succeeding day. The dawn opened with a terrific
artillery duel between the opposing batteries, and all the morning the
guns belched forth flame and death. It was in the course of this
tremendous bombardment that Count Keller met with his death. He was a
man of reckless courage, and he insisted on taking his stand to direct
the operations in a battery which was most heavily exposed to the fire
of Kuroki's guns. So fiercely did the shells fall all around that his
staff represented to him that he must be the object himself of the
enemy's cannonade, but he refused to retire to a less exposed position.
He had hardly dismounted from his horse when a shrapnel shell burst
within a few paces from him and hurled him to the ground. A sergeant
rushed up to him to raise him in his arms, but the general motioned him
away and expired a few moments afterwards. His wounds were of the most
terrible nature. Two fragments of shell struck him upon the head and
three others in the chest, and he had thirty-one shrapnel bullet wounds
in different parts of his body. The death of their commander threw the
Russians into final confusion, and they retreated in haste, leaving a
number of field guns in Kuroki's possession.
[Illustration: DEATH OF COUNT KELLER AT YANG-ZE-LING PASS.]
[Sidenote: Kuropatkin's Heavy Loss]
The loss of Count Keller was a particularly heavy blow to Kuropatkin,
for he was the most trusted of all his subordinates and was most deeply
in the confidence of the Commander-in-Chief. His experience, too, of
war was gained in the Russo-Turkish campaign, on the staff of the same
famous leader, Skobeleff, and he actually succeeded Kuropatkin as
Aide-de-Camp to that General when the present Commander-in-Chief was
wounded at the Shipka Pass in 1877. Besides the signal misfortune he
sustained by the death of this distinguished officer, General
Kuropatkin had to add to his already heavy casualty list a further loss
of 2,000 officers and men. It was an even more significant and
discouraging fact, however, that among the troops opposed to the
victorious Kuroki on this occasion were the most recent accessions to
the Russian army, the 10th and 17th Corps. These forces, which came
from European Russia and were greatly superior to the Siberian soldiery
both in physique and discipline, had been counted upon to do much to
stem the tide of disaster, but though they made a better appearance
than the troops which had been in action previously, all their prowess
was unavailing against the impetuous patriotism of the Japanese, who
had by this time proved themselves to be among the finest infantry in
the whole world.
[Sidenote: Concentration at Liaoyang]
It now became plain to Kuropatkin that the Japanese could not be
stopped before Liao-yang itself was reached. He therefore concentrated
all his available forces at that powerful and highly fortified position
in preparation for a great pitched battle. During the months which had
elapsed since the arrival of the Russian Commander-in-Chief at the seat
of war, Liao-yang had been turned into a great place of arms. Its great
natural defensive advantages had been skilfully improved upon. Every
inch of suitable ground had been carefully fortified, and there can be
little doubt from the character of the dispositions which had been made
that Kuropatkin hoped to be able not only to make a stand here, but to
hurl back the armies of the Mikado in disorder, save Southern Manchuria
for the Czar, and perhaps even march forward afterwards to the relief
of the beleaguered fortress of Port Arthur.
His armies, indeed, had been tragically reduced in numbers in every
combat that had yet taken place. The arrival of the Tenth and
Seventeenth Army Corps had put him in a better position; but against
this had to be set the loss of nearly 30,000 men killed or wounded
since the battle of the Yalu proved the magnitude of the task which lay
before him. Yet he now possessed a force of about 132,000 men, with 400
guns, and he held a position of enormous strength. All of his troops,
indeed, had tasted the bitterness and discouragement of defeat in the
course of the fifteen engagements which had taken place since the
outbreak of the war, but he himself had not yet been present in person
upon the field of battle, and he might well hope that the failure which
had attended all the efforts of his lieutenants would give place to
victory when he took the direction of affairs into his own hands.
[Sidenote: Kuropatkin's Urgent Motives]
At all events, whatever the issue of the battle might be, there could
be no doubt that a retreat from Liao-yang without fighting was for
every reason impossible. The Court of St. Petersburg had already been
rendered restive by the continual withdrawal of the main body of
Muscovite armies to the north; his enemies were busy with their
detractions; and the irrepressible Alexeieff was always near to make
capital out of the difficulties, and to distort and misrepresent the
actions of his abler rival. But beyond all these personal reasons,
powerful enough in themselves in the eyes of a man holding such a
position as Kuropatkin, there were more worthy considerations which
weighed heavily in the scale in favor of boldly submitting his fortunes
to the cast of the die and risking all in one mighty struggle. The
honor of the Russian arms and the prestige of the Empire were at stake;
a continued retreat without a supreme effort to roll back the tide of
invasion was politically dangerous to a Dominion which owed its very
existence in the East to the preservation of a haughty and determined
front; and, more serious even than the growing restlessness of all
those Oriental races who yield unwilling allegiance to the Little White
Father, was the increasing discontent in Russia itself, and the
uprising once more of the forbidding spectre of Nihilism and
revolution. A pitched battle on a grand scale was, therefore, for every
reason unavoidable, and, in spite of all the risks he ran, Kuropatkin
faced the prospect before him with calm courage and resolution.
[Sidenote: Oyama's Great Resources]
The state of things on the other side was very different. Here there
was nothing to discourage, but everything to inspire hope.
Field-Marshal Oyama, who had now reached the scene of operations, found
at his disposal three great armies upon whose banners victory had
consistently rested during a now prolonged campaign. The organization
of the whole of the forces was perfect, and though it was now far from
its base, its supplies were ample and constant. The natural
difficulties of the advance were, indeed, great, but they were no
greater than those which had already been triumphantly overcome. His
chief lieutenants were men of tried capacity. The subordinate officers
had proved their efficiency in tactics on many a hard-fought field, and
the rank and file were inspired, not only with a rare intelligence, but
with a fanatical patriotism, which made them, perhaps, the most
formidable instruments of warfare the world has ever seen. And after
all the inevitable losses of the past three months, he yet had under
his command a total field force (exclusive of the army of 100,000 men
engaged in besieging Port Arthur) of 220,000 men and 600 guns. It was
plain that only the most desperate resistance on the part of the
Russians could prevent the crowning mercy of a great victory, and
already foreign critics were anticipating a Russian Sedan upon the
banks of the Taitse River.
[Illustration: THE SIX DAYS ACTION AROUND LIAOYANG
AUG. 29TH-SEPT. 3RD.]
[Sidenote: Twelve Days' Battle]
Torrential rains again delayed operations for upwards of three weeks,
but by the 24th of August comparatively dry weather had set in, and on
the 25th the general advance of the Japanese upon Liao-yang began. We
now enter upon one of the most tremendous dramas ever known in military
history--the twelve days' battle around Liao-yang. No fighting so
fierce, so sustained, and so bloody has been experienced since the
armies of Grant and Lee met in their great death grapple in the
Wilderness in the Civil War. The terrible conflict raged for the most
part simultaneously over an enormously extended front, and an adequate
description can only be given by following in turn the fortunes of the
separate Japanese armies. But for sake of clearness it will be well to
attempt, first, a brief and comprehensive account of the main lines of
the operations and their final result.
[Sidenote: The Great Armies in Touch]
On the 25th Kuroki's army of three divisions advanced upon Anping, and,
after desperate fighting, drove the Russians back from that place to
Liao-yang. At the same time the Third Army under General Nodzu,
manoeuvring with Oku's forces on the left, turned the enemy out of
their strong position at Anshanchan, situated about 15 miles to the
south of Liao-yang. The advance of Oku was delayed considerably by the
efforts of an enterprising rear guard left by Kuropatkin to cover the
retreat, and by the thick mud, which made the roads almost impassable;
but on the 29th both he and Nodzu came into touch with the enemy in
their main position in front of Liao-yang. Here Kuropatkin held an
entrenched front of about five miles, with three lines of defence
formed by separate ranges of low hills, fortified with consummate skill.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING ROUTE OF MARCH AND PRINCIPAL ACTIONS OF THE
FOUR JAPANESE ARMIES
Feb. 7th-Sept. 4th.]
[Sidenote: Frightful Carnage]
To the Japanese, however, no obstacle seemed too great. After a
prolonged artillery preparation, in which for the first time the
Russians showed themselves equal, if not superior, to their opponents,
the superb infantry of Dai Nippon were ordered to the attack. Then
ensued the most frightful scene of carnage and heroic endurance. For
five long days the splendid troops of Oku and Nodzu flung themselves
upon a foe not less gallant than themselves, and time after time they
were held back with broken ranks, leaving behind great heaps of dead.
And when at last they did make their bloody passage into the town of
Liao-yang, it was only to learn the mortifying intelligence that their
enemy had escaped from the toils so carefully set for him, and that for
a considerable time their tremendous struggle had been conducted, not
with the main body of Kuropatkin's army, but with a rear guard.
[Illustration: JAPANESE ASSAULT ON A RUSSIAN POSITION AT LIAO-YANG.]
[Sidenote: Costly but Indecisive]
For those incalculable factors which so often defeat the best laid
schemes of strategy had come into play, and had seriously affected the
success of the great move which Kuroki was endeavoring to carry out on
the Japanese right. In this case they proved to be the weather, which
had swollen the Taitse River into a flood, and a sudden display of
great tactical ability by Kuropatkin, which his previous failures in
the sphere of strategy had led no one to expect. Upon Kuroki, of
course, as holding the most advanced position on the Japanese right, it
depended to envelope the left flank of the Russians and cut off their
retreat to the north. But, unfortunately for the success of Oyama's
strategy, the river Taitse, which runs from east to west just north of
Liao-yang, and which had to be crossed by the Japanese, was so flooded
that a day or two elapsed before it could be forded, and it was not
till the 31st that Kuroki's forces were able to take up a position on
the opposite bank. It was hoped, however, that a rapid march to the
northwest would place the commander of the First Army astride of the
railway at Yentai, and that he would thus be able to cut off
Kuropatkin's retreat and enclose him in another Sedan within a ring of
steel. But the delay proved fatal, for it gave Kuropatkin time to
rescue his army from the perilous position in which it was placed. With
a skill which must always extort the admiration of military critics he
withdrew the greater part of his forces across the river in the most
perfect order, unknown to the Japanese, and massed them on his left
flank. The consequence was that instead of finding a division, or at
the most two divisions, opposed to him, Kuroki was faced by the greater
part of the Russian Army, established in strong positions on a range of
hills between himself and the railway line. It was a masterly piece of
generalship on the part of the Russian Commander-in-Chief, and it saved
the situation. Indeed, at one point it threatened Kuroki with
destruction, for he was almost cut off from support, and for
twenty-four hours both officers and men were without either drink or
food except small rations of dried rice. But the extraordinary
gallantry of the sons of Japan rose superior even to these conditions.
Again and again they advanced to the attack against powerful positions
held by superior numbers, and the salient point in the Russian defence,
the hill of Haiyentai, was heaped with the dead of the heroic
combatants. Despite every effort, however, Kuroki could not pierce the
enemy's line, and it was not till a fine forced march by a division
detached from General Nodzu's army arrived to reinforce him that he was
able to reach the railway after four days of tremendous combat. But by
that time it was too late. The skilful dispositions made by the Russian
General had pulled the bulk of his force out of the trap, and they were
in full retreat upon Mukden. It would be difficult to describe the
horrors of that retreat, but the Japanese were too exhausted to make as
effective a pursuit as they would otherwise have done, and the Russians
managed to get away without losing a single piece of artillery. The
losses in this tremendous battle, or rather series of battles, were
enormous. The Japanese official account places their casualties at
17,539, but, if we are to believe the correspondents, that is an
understatement. The exact Russian losses, including those incurred
during the retreat, are placed by some authorities at 25,000, by others
as high as 35,000. Unfortunately for the Japanese, all this costly
expenditure of life was indecisive in its results, and left the main
object of their strategy unfulfilled. Kuropatkin had been defeated,
indeed, but he had not been routed, and it was apparent that the
fighting would have to be resumed once more in the neighborhood of
Mukden.