Russian Demoralization--On the Heels of the Enemy--Remarkable
Japanese Strategy--The Paper Army--The Thin Black Line of
Reinforcements--Position of the Russian Army--Kuropatkin Tied
to his Railway--The Second Scheme of Attack--A Model of
Organization--Perfect Secrecy of Plans--Cutting off Port
Arthur--Alexeieff's Command of Language--And the Sober
Truth--Third Blocking Attempt--Lurid Flashing of
Searchlights--On the Bones of their Predecessors--Half the
Passage Blocked--Honored but Unarmed--Russian
Acknowledgements--Terrific Casualties--Togo for Liao-tung--The
Japanese Landings--Escape of Alexeieff--Port Arthur Isolated.
[Sidenote: Russian Demoralization]
The signal victory of the despised Japanese at the Yalu River filled
official circles in St. Petersburg with the liveliest dismay and shook
that determined optimism which had survived even the unexampled series
of naval disasters sustained by the power of the Czar in the Far East.
There seems never to have been the least doubt among the Grand Dukes
and the Bureaucrats by whom the Emperor was surrounded that whatever
fate might befall the fleet, the "yellow monkeys," as they elegantly
called their foes, would fly headlong before the onslaught of the
Russian soldiery, accustomed as it was to victory on many a bloody
field in Europe. The fatuity of this overweening confidence now stood
revealed, and it was at last tardily recognized that as stern a task
awaited the Russian forces on land as at sea. But St. Petersburg
officialdom, wounded in pride and shaken in nerve as it was, still
preserved a bold front to the world, and excuses for the disaster that
had befallen the Russian arms were as prolific as ever. The army at the
disposal of General Sassulitch, it was explained, was but a small one;
that commander had blundered, and by giving battle to an overwhelmingly
superior force, had disobeyed or misunderstood the orders of General
Kuropatkin; and in any case, although severe losses were admitted, the
main body had retreated in good order to Feng-hwang-cheng, and the
_morale_ of the troops was unshaken. The plea that General Sassulitch
was solely responsible for the defeat which had befallen the Muscovite
arms, and that he had failed to follow the instructions of his
superior, has already been dealt with, and its extreme improbability
has been demonstrated, though, even if it were accurate, it would throw
a very unflattering light upon the powers of Russian leadership in the
higher commands. It was soon, however, to be shown that the suggestion
that the army of the Yalu had retired in good order and with unshaken
_morale_ was equally devoid of truth. As a matter of fact, the fierce
pursuit of the Japanese and the heavy losses which they inflicted upon
the retreating Russians at Hoh-mu-tang and elsewhere on the road to
Feng-hwang-cheng reduced the defeat to an utter rout, and it became
impossible for Sassulitch to make a stand at the latter point,
naturally strong as it was and admirably calculated to resist an attack.
[Illustration: AFTER THREE MONTHS.
The war began with the night attack on Port Arthur on February 8, but
it was not until two months later that the Japanese appeared on the
south-eastern border of Manchuria. On April 4 they occupied Wiju, on
the 21st troops began to land at Tatungkau, and on May 1 took place the
first great battle of the campaign, when the Japanese forced the
passage of the Yalu, and drove the Russians back upon Feng-wang-cheng.
On May 6 the latter place was occupied without resistance.
The shaded portion shows the Japanese advance.]
[Sidenote: On the Heels of the Enemy]
After a day or two spent in recuperating his tired troops, whose
tremendous exertions during the previous week must have tested their
powers of endurance to the utmost, and also in bringing his heavy guns
and supply train across the river from Wiju, in preparation for the
march General Kuroki began a forward movement into Manchuria with his
whole army. The cavalry led the advance, operating over a wide area of
country and sweeping the scattered units of the Russians before it.
Some sharp skirmishes took place at Erh-tai-tsu and San-tai-tsu, but no
real difficulty was interposed in the way of the victorious Japanese,
who drove the enemy in flight before them. On May 6th the foremost
cavalry vedettes reached Feng-hwang-cheng, and instead of finding the
strongly held entrenchments which the Russian press was even then
busily assuring a sceptical Europe would prevent any further advance on
the part of the presumptuous foe, they discovered that the troops of
General Sassulitch had been withdrawn, and they entered the deserted
town without having to fire a shot. The leading columns of the
infantry, following quickly behind, marched in and took possession on
the same day. Before his hurried departure General Sassulitch had
ordered the magazine to be blown up, but large quantities of hospital
and other stores fell into the hands of the Japanese. General Kuroki's
main body was not far in the rear, and the position of the whole army
was soon securely established at this important point. Feng-hwang-cheng
is situated at a mountain pass on the Liao-yang road, at a distance of
about 25 miles from the Yalu. As already stated, it possesses great
strategical importance. It is the centre at which the roads meet,
coming from Liao-yang, Haicheng, and Kaiping, places which are situated
at about equal distances from one another along the Manchurian railway
from north to south, and it therefore constitutes a _point d'appui_
from which a force could be thrown against any of them, while it is
itself a position of great strength. General Kuroki immediately began
to entrench himself strongly at this spot and to consolidate his
forces, while he waited for the highly important developments which
were now to take place in other quarters of the theatre of war.
[Illustration: IN THE RUSSIAN TRENCHES.]
[Sidenote: Remarkable Japanese Strategy]
A wide view of the position of affairs as they now stood over the
entire field of operations is necessary at this point in order to make
clear the remarkable events that followed, and to throw into full
relief the extraordinary qualities of the Japanese strategy--a strategy
conceived after the most patient study of all the conditions of the
problems and worked out in practice with almost machine-like regularity
and precision.
[Sidenote: The Paper Army]
When General Kuropatkin arrived at Mukden at the end of March and
took over the command from General Linevitch, he had on paper an army
of over 250,000 men. It was made up as follows: 223,000 infantry;
21,764 cavalry; 4,000 engineers; and artillery consisting of 496
field guns, 30 horse artillery guns, and 24 machine guns. This large
force was organized in four Army Corps, each with divisions of
infantry and its quota of artillery and cavalry; while there were
also two independent divisions of Cossacks, four brigades of Frontier
Guards, railway troops, fortress artillery and a number of small
units not allotted. The First Army Corps was under the command of
General Baron Stackelberg, the Second under General Sassulitch, the
Third under General Stoessel, and the Fourth under General
Zarubaieff. It was an imposing force, this army of Manchuria,
calculated to strike terror into the hearts of an Oriental enemy, but
unfortunately for the Russians it lacked one thing, and that was
reality. The actual position of affairs was indeed very different. To
begin with, the greater part of the troops were not near the front at
all when the Commander-in-Chief appeared upon the scene to direct
operations, but were being pushed along the Siberian Railway with a
feverish haste which at the same time did not denote proportionate
speed. When they did arrive they arrived in detached fragments, and
the desperate necessities of the case did not admit of adherence to
the paper arrangements. For instance, the 7th and 8th Divisions,
which should have formed part of the Second Army Corps under General
Sassulitch, were, as a matter of fact, sent to assist in garrisoning
Port Arthur and Vladivostock. Port Arthur, it will be remembered, was
by this time under the command of General Stoessel, who was therefore
unable to direct the operations of the Third Army Corps, which
properly should have been entrusted to him. On the other hand, the
3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, which belonged to that Corps, and
the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, which should have been attached
to the First Army Corps, were sent to the Yalu, where, as we have
already seen, they took part in the ill-fated conflict of the 1st of
May. It will be observed from these shifts--only a few of the most
noticeable out of many--that the Army Corps system of the Manchurian
Army had completely broken down, and that the ideal of a coherent
fighting force, with officers and men trained together in peace under
the conditions to which they would be subjected in war, had not been
attained in the slightest degree. The lack of organization which
prevailed in the distribution of the larger commands was equally
manifest in the mobilization of the units of which they were
composed. Regiments were not complete; hastily-formed levies had to
be added to bring them up to their nominal strength; and the ranks of
the officers had to be filled up in many cases with volunteers from
regiments in other parts of the Empire. The result was a composite
force very different indeed in fighting power from the splendid
machine which the Mikado's strategists had been carefully perfecting
in time of peace in readiness for the struggle which they had so long
foreseen.
[Sidenote: The Thin Black Line of Reinforcements]
In bringing even this haphazard collection of unco-ordinated units to
the front in Manchuria, the greatest difficulties had been experienced.
All that European observers had predicted about the working capacity of
a railway like the Trans-Siberian for the conveyance of a huge army for
thousands of miles came true to the letter. Prince Khilkoff, the
Director-General of Russian Railways, undoubtedly did wonders, and the
tremendous efforts which he and his staff put forth, especially in
surmounting the great natural obstacle presented by Lake Baikal, were
worthy of all praise. But to carry an army of 250,000 men, with all its
necessary supplies and munitions of war, into Manchuria in the time
required for the purpose of striking an effective blow at an enemy like
the Japanese was a task beyond the powers of any railway staff in the
world. The rickety single line, with infrequent sidings, which
stretches across the steppes of Siberia from Harbin to the Urals was
quite inadequate for such a feat of transport. By the middle of May,
therefore, the position in which General Kuropatkin found himself--a
position partly created by himself, as Minister of War, and partly
created for him by the ineptitude of others--was widely different from
that which the easy and thoughtless optimists in St. Petersburg had
anticipated when the war broke out. The Fourth Army Corps was not
across Lake Baikal; 30,000 or 40,000 men were shut up in the fortresses
of Port Arthur and Vladivostock, and were not only useless for field
operations, but were themselves liable to siege and capture; and,
allowing the highest possible estimate, the Russian Commander-in-Chief
had at his disposal for assuming the offensive in Manchuria no more
than 100,000 men with 260 guns.
[Sidenote: Position of the Russian Army]
With this army he was holding the railway line from Mukden to Port
Arthur, a distance of about 230 miles. His headquarters were at
Liao-yang, and he held Haicheng and Kaiping in force, while a
detachment was thrown out to the south-west and occupied Niuchwang. In
the extreme south Port Arthur, though closely blockaded from the sea by
the watchful Togo, was as yet open to communication by land, and no
attempt had hitherto been made by the Japanese to secure a footing on
the Liao-tung Peninsula. On the east of the Liao-yang--Kaiping line the
Russian troops occupied three important passes, namely, Ta-ling, about
50 miles distant, in a northeasterly direction, from Liao-yang; the
Motien-ling, about 25 miles away on the main road to Feng-hwang-cheng;
and Fen-chu-ling, half way on the road from Tashihchao to Siuyen.
Tashihchao is on the railway midway between Haicheng and Kaiping. The
Motien-ling Pass was the scene of a sanguinary combat between the
Chinese and the Japanese in the war of 1894, and on that occasion the
Mikado's forces had the greatest trouble in capturing it. Besides
holding these passes General Kuropatkin had pushed forward his Cossack
patrols to scour the country as far as Feng-hwang-cheng, and constant
small encounters took place between them and General Kuroki's outposts
during the ensuing six weeks.
[Sidenote: Kuropatkin Tied to His Railway]
It is clear from this brief statement of the Russian position that the
Japanese, always provided that they could retain the command of the
sea, were placed at a great strategical advantage compared with their
enemy. Holding their First Army poised at Feng-hwang-cheng, they could
throw their Second and Third Armies upon the coast at any point that
suited them best for the purpose of making a great combined movement.
On the other hand, Kuropatkin was practically tied to the railway, and,
with the inadequate force at his disposal, could not advance against
Kuroki to destroy him in detail before the arrival of fresh armies from
Japan. He was liable to attack at any point, and it was the peculiar
difficulty of his situation that he could not tell which point would be
selected. As a matter of fact, when the blow fell, as it soon did with
crushing effect, he was powerless to prevent it.
[Sidenote: The Second Scheme of Attack]
The chapter of strategy which now opens is a fascinating one to any
student of war, and fortunately its main features can be readily
appreciated also by any layman who makes an intelligent study of a map
of Manchuria and the Liao-tung Peninsula. The prime object of the
Japanese plainly was to cut General Kuropatkin's extended line of
communications, isolate Port Arthur, and then attempt to envelope his
main force by advancing simultaneously from the south, the east, and
the northeast. It was consequently necessary, as a preliminary, to
establish the First Army securely in Manchuria, it being clear that
with this menace on his left flank, General Kuropatkin would not be
able to detach many troops to the south to prevent the investment of
Port Arthur. Everything, therefore, depended on the fortune that would
attend the advance of General Kuroki across the Yalu, and the Moltkes
at Tokio, after a patient study of all the conditions of an intricate
problem, had thought out two great alternative schemes to meet the
eventuality either of victory or defeat. In case of General Kuroki's
finding the task of crossing the Yalu unaided to be an insuperable one,
the Second Army, under General Oku, was to be landed at Takushan, a
port on the coast some miles to the west of the mouth of the river, and
thence to strike a blow at General Sassulitch's right flank. On the
other hand, if Kuroki met with success, Oku's army was to be landed at
a point on the Liao-tung Peninsula to cut Kuropatkin's communications
and invest Port Arthur. As we have seen, General Kuroki's signal
triumph at the Yalu River rendered the first alternative unnecessary,
and opened the way for the more decisive and dramatic stroke involved
in the second scheme.
[Sidenote: A Model of Organization]
But before anything could be done to land the Second Army, either at
Takushan or on the Liao-tung Peninsula, it was imperatively necessary
to disarm the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, and prevent even the
remotest possibility of its interfering with the operations. Here, as
always, the two services, the army and the navy, had to work in close
correspondence and interdependence. From the beginning of the war these
separate branches of the Japanese forces had fitted into one another
like parts of the same piece of machinery, the whole directed by one
uniform purpose and striving towards one great common end. The joint
schemes of the naval and military strategists at Tokio will ever
provide an invaluable object-lesson to all students of the art of war;
and it may be predicted that they will prove of valuable assistance to
the strategists of our own army and navy. One of the most remarkable
features of the war has been the certainty and precision with which the
Japanese have worked out their complex plans; it is no less remarkable,
and affords a further striking evidence of their efficiency, that they
felt able, absolutely, to count upon that certainty and precision, and
to make arrangements long beforehand, which with a less carefully
organized scheme and less trustworthy commanders to carry it out would
have been foolhardy, or at least wasteful. Failure in any real sense
does not seem to have entered into their calculations. One portion of
the plan, indeed, might miscarry, but, as we have seen, partial failure
had been provided against, and a rapid modification of strategy to meet
the case would have been possible. It was, in fact, one of the most
interesting examples of the application of brains to war that have ever
been seen in the history of the world.
[Sidenote: Perfect Secrecy of Plans]
In the action and inter-action, then, of this great double machine, the
army had done all that it was possible for it to do for the moment; and
once again it came round to the turn of the navy to make the next
decisive move. Upon the success of this move may be said to have
depended the whole success of the after operations, but, calculating
with absolute confidence upon the skill of Admiral Togo, the Mikado's
strategists had already put the Second Army into a state of complete
preparation, and had even ordered it to be conveyed to a place from
which it could be transferred to the front at any quarter at a moment's
notice. Arrangements for its embarkation were begun as soon as General
Kuroki reached Wiju with the First Army in the early days of April.
When that commander was able to report that his dispositions for the
attack upon the Russian entrenchments on the right bank of the Yalu
were well advanced, the process of embarking General Oku's troops was
started at once. Not a hint was allowed to escape as to their
destination; even if the press correspondents, chafing under their
enforced inaction at Tokio, had learnt the name, the censor would not
have let it pass to the outer world; but, as a matter of fact, it is
safe to say that the secret was safely locked in the breasts of half a
dozen men. By April 22nd the whole army with its transports,
commissariat, ammunition train, and hospital corps, had been put on
board ship, and said farewell to the shores of Japan, vanishing, for
all the world could tell, into the inane. For more than a fortnight
nothing further was heard of it No one could report its landing
anywhere, no one could say what it was doing, and day by day the
mystery grew more mysterious. Only on May 7th was the veil lifted, when
this great army fell upon the coast of Liao-tung as if from the
heavens, and proceeded to the investment of Port Arthur. The truth was
that during this fortnight it had been lying _perdu_ on some small
islands close to the west coast of Korea, called the Sir James Hall
group, and distant 160 miles in a southeastern direction from the
shores of Liao-tung.
[Sidenote: Cutting off Port Arthur]
Here, briefly stated, is the manner in which the scheme worked out. On
May 1st General Kuroki triumphantly crossed the Yalu and stormed the
heights above Chiu-lien-cheng. On May 2nd Admiral Togo descended once
more upon Port Arthur, and blocked the harbor completely by sinking
eight steamers at the entrance to the channel. On the afternoon of May
3rd, having made sure of the thoroughness of the work, he set off at
full speed for the Sir James Hall Islands, reaching his destination by
early morning on the 4th. Everything there was in readiness for the
expedition, and within a few hours the whole of the transports,
escorted by the fleet, set sail for the east coast of Liao-tung. At
dawn the next day they reached the point on the peninsula which had
been selected for the landing--Yentoa Bay--and in a few short hours a
considerable portion of the force had been disembarked, the resistance
offered by a small detachment of Cossacks, the only force possessed by
the Russians in the neighborhood, being entirely negligible. On the 6th
the railway line was severed, and in a few days more the Japanese were
sitting securely astride of the peninsula, and Port Arthur was cut off
from the world. The scheme had been carried out like the combinations
of a skilful chess player, or like the successive steps of a
mathematical problem.
[Illustration: A DESPERATE ENCOUNTER AT PORT ARTHUR.]
[Sidenote: Alexeieff's Command of Language]
It is necessary now to follow the development of these operations more
in detail. The first that falls to be described is the successful
attempt, the third of the series, to block the entrance to the harbor
of Port Arthur. But before giving the real version of this thrilling
enterprise it may be interesting to quote the report sent to the Grand
Admiral unconquerable Alexeieff, whose optimism rose superior to every
disaster and the alchemy of whose dispatches could still transmute
defeat into signal victory. Here is the message, so soothing to the
nerves of his fellow-countrymen, in which he announced the event that
enabled the Japanese to land troops at any point they desired up their
enemy's coasts:--
"I respectfully report to your Highness that a fresh attack made by the
enemy last night with the object of obstructing the entrance to the
port was successfully repelled.
"At 1 o'clock in the morning five torpedo-boats were perceived near the
coast from the eastern batteries. Under the fire of our batteries and
warships they retreated southward.
"At 1.45 the first fireship, escorted by several torpedo-boats, came in
sight. We opened fire upon it from our batteries and warships.
Three-quarters of an hour afterwards our searchlights revealed a number
of fireships making for the entrance to the harbor from the east and
southeast. The _Otvajni_, the _Giliak_, the _Gremiashtchi_, and the
batteries on the shore repulsed each Japanese ship by a well-directed
fire.
"Altogether eight ships were sunk by our vigorous cannonade, by
Whitehead torpedoes launched from our torpedo-boats, and by the
explosion of several submarine mines.
"Further, according to the reports of the officers commanding the
batteries and the warship _Giliak_, two Japanese torpedo-boats were
destroyed.
"After 4 a. m., the batteries and gunboats ceased fire, subsequently
firing only at intervals on the enemy's torpedo-boats, which were
visible on the horizon.
"All the fireships carried quick-firing guns, with which the enemy
maintained a constant fire.
"Up to the present thirty men, including two mortally wounded officers
who sought refuge in the launches, or were rescued from the fireships
by us, have been picked up. The inspection of the roadstead and the
work of saving drowning men are hindered by the heavy sea which is
running.
"We suffered no casualties with the exception of a seaman belonging to
the torpedo-boat destroyer _Boevoi_."
[Sidenote: And the Sober Truth]
No one reading this remarkable account could imagine that it described
an operation which ultimately sealed the doom of Port Arthur. For a
more sober but a more accurate narrative we must turn to the dispatches
of Admiral Togo. On May 2nd, as already recounted, the Japanese Naval
Commander-in-Chief received the news of the successful crossing of the
Yalu. His plans were already laid and his preparations were complete.
Eight merchant steamers this time had been secured for the service, and
upwards of 20,000 men volunteered for the glorious duty of manning them
and dying for their country. Of these, 159 were ultimately selected.
The names of the steamers were the _Mikawa_, _Sakura_, _Totomi_,
_Yedo_, _Otaru_, _Sagami_, _Aikoku_, and _Asagawo_. The vessels ordered
to escort the doomed hulks were the gunboats _Akagi_ and _Chokai_, the
2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th destroyer flotillas, and the 9th, 10th, and 14th
torpedo-boat flotillas. The whole force, which was under the command of
Commander Hayashi, started for its destination on the night of May 2nd.
[Sidenote: Third Blocking Attempt]
It is a melancholy circumstance, typical of the sombre, but ofttimes
splendid, tragedy of war, that of this third and most successful
attempt to block the harbor the narrative is necessarily the most
fragmentary and obscure, owing to the loss of life which it entailed.
On the two previous occasions, reckless as was the gallantry of the
Japanese and enormous as were the risks they ran, the casualties were
surprisingly small, and the majority of the men engaged were able to
return to their ships and tell the story of their enterprise. On this
night, however, everything was against success; the Russians were more
fully prepared to meet attack than they had ever been before; their
shooting was more effective; and worse still, the weather turned out
wholly unfavorable, the ships had to proceed singly upon their way; and
when they were sunk the difficulties in the way of recovering their
crews proved more than usually arduous, and most of them were either
shot or drowned or taken prisoner. In spite of all these adverse
circumstances a splendid success was achieved, but it was achieved
under conditions which largely obliterated the record, and leaves but
sparse material for the historian.
[Sidenote: Lurid Flashing of Searchlights]
The broad outlines of the story, however, are clear. When the steamers
with their accompanying flotillas were well on their way, a strong
southeasterly breeze sprang up, which rapidly freshened into a gale. It
was impossible in the circumstances to keep the vessels together, and,
fearing that the attack would in consequence be ineffective, Commander
Hayashi signalled to his subordinates to abandon the expedition for the
time being. But the weather and the heavy seas prevented his signals
from being observed, and the gallant enterprise therefore proceeded
unchecked. By one in the morning the 14th torpedo-boat flotilla reached
the roadstead and pressed steadily towards the eastern side of the
harbor mouth. The little vessels were soon exposed to the glare of the
searchlights, and at once a furious bombardment broke out upon them
from the Russian gunboats and the shore batteries. For the moment they
retreated, drawing the enemy's fire upon them, while the leading
steamer, which was close behind, made a dash for the channel. This
vessel was the _Mikawa_, under the command of Lieut. Sosa. The
Russians, as we have said, were much better prepared to resist attack
than on previous occasions. Piles of combustibles, stationed at various
points on the shore on each side of the harbor mouth, were set on fire,
and cast a lurid light on the scene, throwing into strong relief the
dark forms of the advancing ships, while the searchlights flashed
backwards and forwards over the unquiet surface of the sea, and made
every movement of the Japanese fatally visible to the defenders on the
fortress. A storm of missiles burst over the devoted expedition, but
undeterred, intent only on reaching the centre of the channel, Lieut.
Sosa pushed his vessel forward at the top of her speed. Nothing could
stop him or his crew--nor raging sea, nor searchlight, nor even the
rain of shot and shell. The _Mikawa_ stuck bravely to her course, and,
breaking through the boom which stretched across the mouth, anchored
right in the middle of the channel. In a moment the fuse was lighted,
and as the commander and his crew pushed off in the boats the ship blew
up and sank in the fairway. The _Sakura_, which was not far behind, was
less lucky than her companion. She was driven upon a rock at the
eastern side of the entrance, and blew up outside the channel.
[Sidenote: On the Bones of their Predecessors]
There was a short pause, and then came a fresh contingent of fireships,
rushing upon destruction. The aim of the Russian gunners had much
improved; in the fierce glare of the searchlights and the flaming
beacons every detail of the steamers was distinctly visible, and that
they should have succeeded in advancing into the channel in the face of
such a withering blast as swept across their course was little short of
a miracle. The waters, too, were thickly sown with mines, in readiness
for such an assault as this, and they did serious execution. The
_Aikoku_ was distant only five cables from the mouth when she struck
one of these deadly engines and blew up, her race cut short just when
the goal was at hand. Her commander, Lieut. Uchida, the chief engineer,
Aoki, and eight of the crew were killed or drowned. The _Asagawo_ was
riddled with shot, her rudder was smashed, and drifting upon the shore
beneath Golden Hill, she blew up and sank where the bones of so many of
her predecessors were already reposing.
[Sidenote: Half the Passage Blocked]
But the other vessels were more successful. The _Otaru_ and the
_Sagami_ reached the harbor mouth before they were sunk, and
contributed a large share to the obstruction of the entrance. The
_Yedo_ did better still, for she got further up than these two others.
Just as her anchor was being got ready her gallant commander, Lieut.
Takayanagi, fell dead, shot through the stomach; but there was no pause
in the operations. Sub-Lieut. Nagatu at once stepped into his
superior's place, and, anchoring the ship with the utmost coolness,
sank her in the fairway. The _Totomi_ did best of all, for, like the
_Mikawa_, she burst through the boom in the teeth of the Russian guns,
got well inside, and turning right across the channel from east to
west, sank in that position, blocking up at least half the passage.
[Sidenote: Honored, but Unarmed]
Admiral Togo, in his brief and dignified way, thus referred to the
magnificent services rendered by the men who had fallen in this great
enterprise:--"The undertaking, when compared with the last two
attempts, involved a heavier casualty on our side owing to the
inclemency of the weather and increased preparation for defence of the
enemy. We could not save any of the officers and men of the _Otaru_,
_Sagami_, _Sakura_ and _Asagawo_, and I regret that nothing particular
could be learned about the gallant way in which they discharged their
duties, although the memory of their exemplary conduct will long
survive in the Imperial navy."
[Sidenote: Russian Acknowledgments]
But though the Japanese Commander-in-Chief could learn nothing
particular about the gallant way in which his men had performed their
duties, the gap in our knowledge can fortunately be supplied, to some
extent at all events, by the Russians, who bore ample and chivalrous
testimony to the splendid heroism displayed by their foes. They
acknowledged, said a telegram from St. Petersburg, "that the enemy
attacked in brilliant style, seeming never to notice the murderous fire
which greeted them." One incident in particular struck upon their minds
and extorted from them the warmest expressions of admiration. "On board
the fireships," they remarked, "were a number of Japanese cadets, who
displayed extraordinary bravery. As the ships were sinking several of
these lads rushed aloft, and sitting on the cross-trees of the
topmasts, fired their revolvers before they plunged into the sea." The
account ends with a sentence of terse significance: "It is believed
that none were saved."
[Sidenote: Terrific Casualties]
Of the total of 159 men engaged in this work of desperate heroism only
36 returned in safety, and of these 28 were wounded. Two officers (both
mortally wounded) and 30 men were picked up by the Russians and taken
prisoners. The number of the killed was 75. They had not died in vain.
The harbor of Port Arthur was now securely blocked--not permanently
indeed, for while divers and dynamite can be obtained no harbor in the
world can be obstructed for ever in this way; but blocked to such an
extent that the Russians could not get any big ships through for weeks,
even given the most advantageous conditions in which to carry on the
work of removing the obstacles. And for the momentous operations that
were to follow the Japanese required not so much weeks as days.
[Sidenote: Togo for Liao-tung]
The fleet remained off Port Arthur till the afternoon to make sure that
all the rescue work possible had been accomplished. In this duty the
destroyer and torpedo-boat flotillas rendered admirable service. Once
again, happy to relate, they emerged themselves from the dangerous
enterprise with singularly slight damages, and lost only two men
killed. At last, having realized that no more remained to be done in
saving life, and having made sure that the "bottle" had finally been
"corked," Admiral Togo leaving behind a small squadron to watch Port
Arthur, set off at full steam with his main fleet for the Sir James
Hall Islands. There he was joined by the gunboat squadron under
Rear-Admiral Hosoya, which had rendered such effective service in the
lower reaches of the river at the battle of the Yalu. The transports,
with the Second Army on board, were practically ready for departure,
and on the morning of the 4th of May the whole expedition set out for
the Liao-tung Peninsula. At daybreak on the 5th Yentoa Bay was sighted.
[Sidenote: The Japanese Landings]
Yentoa Bay is admirably suited for the landing of a large force, for
the shelving shore, with shallow waters, presents no difficulty to the
approach of boats such as the Japanese use for this purpose.
Furthermore, it possesses great strategical advantages. It is within
easy striking distance of the railway, while the country in the
immediate neighborhood favors the advance of an attacking force and
gives little opportunity for defence. The likelihood of a landing here,
however, does not seem to have occurred to the Russians, who had
prepared instead for a descent upon Niuchwang. The whole affair is an
excellent illustration of the advantages conferred upon a combatant by
the command of the sea, especially when the openings for attack are
numerous, as they are in the case of the Liao-tung Peninsula. General
Kuropatkin could not tell where the descent of the enemy would be made,
and though he could defend some of the possible points, he could not
defend all. The Japanese, on the other hand, could select the spot that
suited them best without any serious risk of interference. Yentoa Bay
was therefore practically undefended when Admiral Togo's fleet arrived
convoying the Second Army. A troop of about 100 Cossacks was patrolling
the shore, but the gunboat squadron quickly dispersed it with a few
shells, and the work of landing could then be carried through without
interruption.
[Illustration: GENERAL STOESSEL EXHORTING HIS TROOPS IN THE DEFENSE OF
PORT ARTHUR.]
[Sidenote: Escape of Alexeieff]
The first to make for the shore was a force of marines, two battalions
of whom waded through the shallows and occupied the rising ground above
the shore. Within an hour the advance guard of the army itself had been
disembarked, and the rest of General Oku's troops quickly followed; the
whole process being carried out with the smoothness and dispatch which
characterized all the operations of this kind on the Japanese side. On
the 6th, a flying column was sent to the northwards to seize the small
port of Pitszewo, and more important still, another column moved across
the neck of the peninsula with great rapidity and, occupying Pulantien,
broke up the railway and cut off all communication between General
Kuropatkin and Port Arthur. But before this was done one notable train
load of passengers managed to escape from the beleaguered fortress.
Chief among them were the Viceroy of the Far East, Admiral Alexeieff
himself, and the Grand Duke Boris. They left only just in time. The
gallant Admiral of the inventive pen had at last discovered that the
repulse of the Japanese naval attack on which he had prided himself in
his grandiloquent dispatch to the authorities at St. Petersburg was in
reality no repulse at all; that as a matter of fact the Japanese had
done just what they wanted to do; and that they were now able to
proceed, in their methodical way, to land troops on the peninsula and
invest Port Arthur. That the Viceroy should be shut up in the fortress,
too, was not to be thought of--though probably it would have been
better for the success of General Kuropatkin's strategy if his
troublesome colleague had been safely removed out of the way for the
rest of the campaign--and so by a desperate effort the gallant Admiral
burst through the gradually tightening cordon.
[Sidenote: Port Arthur Isolated]
After the first interruption of communications the Japanese force
temporarily withdrew, and the success of the Russians in relaying the
line and in running a train loaded with ammunition through to Port
Arthur revived the drooping spirits of the official classes in St.
Petersburg. The act was one of extreme gallantry, and reflected the
highest credit on Colonel Spiridonoff, the officer in command, but
beyond giving the garrison some greatly needed supplies it did not
materially alter the situation. The line was again broken up, the
Japanese occupied the neck of land in force, and in a few days Port
Arthur was completely cut off from the outer world.