THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
Admitting, for the sake of the argument, that prior to the revolution,
slavery had a constitutional existence, (so far as it is possible that
crime can have such an existence,) was it not abolished by the
declaration of independence?
The Declaration was certainly the constitutional law of this country for
certain purposes. For example, it absolved the people from their
allegiance to the English crown. It would have been so declared by the
judicial tribunals of this country, if an American, during the
revolutionary war or since, had been tried for treason to the crown. If,
then, the declaration were the constitutional law of the country for
that purpose, was it not also constitutional law for the purpose of
recognizing and establishing, as law, the natural and inalienable right
of individuals to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness? The
lawfulness of the act of absolving themselves from their allegiance to
the crown, was avowed by the people of the country--and that too in the
same instrument that declared the absolution--to rest entirely upon, and
to be only a consequence of the natural right of all men to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. If, then, the act of absolution
was lawful, does it not necessarily follow that the principles that
legalized the act, were also law? And if the country ratified the act of
absolution, did they not also necessarily ratify and acknowledge the
principles which they declared legalized the act?
It is sufficient for our purpose, if it be admitted that this principle
was the law of the country at that particular time, (1776)--even though
it had continued to be the law only for a year, or even a day. For if it
were the law of the country even for a day, it freed every slave in the
country--(if there were, as we say there were not, any legal slaves then
in the country.) And the burden would then be upon the slaveholder to
show that slavery had _since_ been _constitutionally_ established. And
to show this, he must show an express _constitutional_ designation of
the particular individuals, who have since been made slaves. Without
such particular designation of the individuals to be made slaves, (and
not even the present constitutions of the slave States make any such
designation,) all constitutional provisions, purporting to authorize
slavery, are indefinite, and uncertain in their application, and for
that reason void.
But again. The people of this country--in the very instrument by which
they first announced their independent political existence, and first
asserted their right to establish governments of their own--declared
that the natural and inalienable right of all men to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness, was a "_self-evident truth_."
Now, all "_self-evident truths_," except such as may be explicitly, or
by necessary implication, denied, (and no government has a right to deny
any of them,) enter into, are taken for granted by, and constitute an
essential part of all constitutions, compacts and systems of government
whatsoever.--Otherwise it would be impossible for any systematic
government to be established; for it must obviously be impossible to
make an actual enumeration of all the "self-evident truths," that are to
be taken into account in the administration of such a government. This
is more especially true of governments founded, like ours, upon
contract. It is clearly impossible, in a contract of government, to
enumerate all the "self-evident truths" which must be acted upon in the
administration of law. And therefore they are _all_ taken for granted,
unless particular ones be plainly denied.
This principle, that all "self-evident truths," though not enumerated,
make a part of all laws and contracts, unless clearly denied, is not
only indispensable to the very existence of civil society, but it is
even indispensable to the administration of justice in every individual
case or suit, that may arise, out of contract or otherwise, between
individuals. It would be impossible for individuals to make contracts at
all, if it were necessary for them to enumerate all the "self-evident
truths," that might have a bearing upon their construction before a
judicial tribunal. All such truths are therefore taken for granted. And
it is the same in all compacts of government, unless particular truths
are plainly denied. And governments, no more than individuals, have a
right to deny them in any case. To deny, in any case, that "self-evident
truths" are a part of the law, is equivalent to asserting that
"self-evident falsehood" is law.
If, then, it be a "self-evident truth," that all men have a natural and
inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, _that
truth_ constitutes a part of all our laws and all our constitutions,
unless it have been unequivocally and authoritatively denied.
It will hereafter be shown that this "self-evident truth" has _never
been denied_ by the people of this country, in their fundamental
constitution, or in any other explicit or authoritative manner. On the
contrary, it has been reiterated, by them, annually, daily and hourly,
for the last sixty-nine years, in almost every possible way, and in the
most solemn possible manner. On the 4th of July, '76, they collectively
asserted it, as their justification and authority for an act the most
momentous and responsible of any in the history of the country. And this
assertion has never been retracted by us, as a people. We have virtually
re-asserted the same truth in nearly every state constitution since
adopted. We have virtually re-asserted it in the national constitution.
It is a truth that lives on the tongues and in the hearts of all. It is
true we have, in our practice, been so unjust as to withhold the
benefits of this truth from a certain class of our fellow men.--But,
even in this respect, this truth has but shared the common fate of other
truths. They are generally allowed but a partial application. Still,
this truth itself, _as a truth_, has never been denied by us, _as a
people_, in any authentic form, or otherwise than impliedly by our
practice in particular cases. If it have, say when and where. If it have
not, it is still law; and courts are bound to administer it, as law,
impartially to all.
Our courts would want no other authority than this truth, thus
acknowledged, for setting at liberty any individual, other than one
having negro blood, whom our governments, state or national, should
assume to authorize another individual to enslave. Why, then, do they
not apply the same law in behalf of the African? Certainly not because
it is not as much the law of his case, as of others. _But it is simply
because they will not._ It is because the courts are parties to an
understanding, prevailing among the white race, but expressed in no
authentic constitutional form, that the negro may be deprived of his
rights at the pleasure of avarice and power. And they carry out this
unexpressed understanding in defiance of, and suffer it to prevail over,
all our constitutional principles of government--all our authentic,
avowed, open and fundamental law.