CHAPTER II.

WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS.

Taking it for granted that it has now been shown that no rule of civil

conduct, that is inconsistent with the natural rights of men, can be

rightfully established by government, or consequently be made obligatory

as law, either upon the people, or upon judicial tribunals--let us now

proceed to test the legality of slavery by those written constitutions

of government, which judicial tribunals actually recognize as

authoritative.

In making this examination, however, I shall not insist upon the

principle of the preceding chapter, that there can be no law contrary to

natural right; but shall admit, for the sake of the argument, that there

may be such laws. I shall only claim that in the interpretation of all

statutes and constitutions, the ordinary legal rules of interpretation

be observed. The most important of these rules, and the one to which it

will be necessary constantly to refer, is the one that all language

must be construed strictly in favor of natural right.--The rule is laid

down by the Supreme Court of the United States in these words, to wit:

"Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are

overthrown, where the general system of the law is departed from, the

legislative intention must be expressed with _irresistible clearness_,

to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such

objects."[3]

It will probably appear from this examination of the written

constitutions, that slavery neither has, _nor ever had_ any

constitutional existence in this country; that it has always been a mere

abuse, sustained, in the first instance, merely by the common consent of

the strongest party, without any law on the subject, and, in the second

place, by a few unconstitutional enactments, made in defiance of the

plainest provisions of their fundamental law.

For the more convenient consideration of this point, we will divide the

constitutional history of the country into three periods; the first

embracing the time from the first settlement of the country up to the

Declaration of Independence; the second embracing the time from the

Declaration of Independence to the adoption of the Constitution of the

United States in 1789; and the third embracing all the time since the

adoption of the Constitution of the United States.

Let us now consider the first period; that is, from the settlement of

the country, to the Declaration of Independence.

[Footnote 3: United States _vs._ Fisher, 2 Cranch, 390.]

The Unconstitutionality of Slavery · 第 2 / 14 章