§ 1. Antiquity.
The more ancient testimony is probably the better testimony. That it is
not by any means always so is a familiar fact. To quote the known dictum
of a competent judge: “It is no less true to fact than paradoxical in
sound, that the worst corruptions to which the New Testament has ever been
subjected, originated within a hundred years after it was composed; that
Irenaeus and the African Fathers and the whole Western, with a portion of
the Syriac Church, used far inferior manuscripts to those employed by
Stunica, or Erasmus, or Stephen, thirteen centuries after, when moulding
the Textus Receptus(27).” Therefore Antiquity alone affords no security
that the manuscript in our hands is not infected with the corruption which
sprang up largely in the first and second centuries. But it remains true,
notwithstanding, that until evidence has been produced to the contrary in
any particular instance, the more ancient of two witnesses may reasonably
be presumed to be the better informed witness. Shew me for example that,
whereas a copy of the Gospels (suppose Cod. B) introduces the clause
“Raise the dead” into our SAVIOUR’S ministerial commission to His Apostles
(St. Matt. x. 8),—another Codex, but only of the fourteenth century
(suppose Evan. 604 (Hoskier)), omits it;—am I not bound to assume that our
LORD did give this charge to His Apostles; did say to them, νεκροὺς
ἐγείρετε; and that the words in question have accidentally dropped out of
the sacred Text in that later copy? Show me besides that in three other of
our oldest Codexes (אCD) the place in St. Matthew is exhibited in the same
way as in Cod. B; and of what possible avail can it be that I should urge
in reply that in three more MSS. of the thirteenth or fourteenth century
the text is exhibited in the same way as in Evan. 604?
There is of course a strong antecedent probability, that the testimony
which comes nearest to the original autographs has more claim to be the
true record than that which has been produced at a further distance from
them. It is most likely that the earlier is separated from the original by
fewer links than the later:—though we can affirm this with no absolute
certainty, because the present survival of Uncials of various dates of
production shews that the existence of copies is measured by no span like
that of the life of men. Accordingly as a general rule, and a general rule
only, a single early Uncial possesses more authority than a single later
Uncial or Cursive, and a still earlier Version or Quotation by a Father
must be placed before the reading of the early Uncial.
Only let us clearly understand what principle is to guide us, in order
that we may know how we are to proceed. Is it to be assumed, for instance,
that Antiquity is to decide this matter? by which is meant only
this,—That, of two or more conflicting readings, that shall be deemed the
true reading which is observed to occur in the oldest known document. Is
that to be our fundamental principle? Are we, in other words, to put up
with the transparent fallacy that the oldest reading must of necessity be
found in the oldest document? Well, if we have made up our minds that such
is to be our method, then let us proceed to construct our text chiefly by
the aid of the Old Latin and Peshitto Versions,—the oldest authorities
extant of a continuous text: and certainly, wherever these are observed to
agree in respect of any given reading, let us hear nothing about the
conflicting testimony of א or B, which are of the fourth century; of D,
which is of the sixth; of L, which is of the eighth.
But if our adversaries shift their ground, disliking to be “hoist with
their own petard,” and if such a solution standing alone does not commend
itself to our own taste, we must ask, What is meant by Antiquity?
For myself, if I must assign a definite period, I am disposed to say the
first six or seven centuries of our era. But I observe that those who have
preceded me in these inquiries draw the line at an earlier period.
Lachmann fixes A.D. 400: Tregelles (ever illogical) gives the beginning of
the seventh century: Westcott and Hort, before the close of the fourth
century. In this absence of agreement, it is found to be both the safest
and the wisest course to avoid drawing any hard and fast line, and in fact
any line at all. Antiquity is a comparative term. What is ancient is not
only older than what is modern, but when constantly applied to the
continuous lapse of ages includes considerations of what is more or less
ancient. Codex E is ancient compared with Codex L: Cod. A compared with
Cod. E: Cod. א compared with Cod. A: Cod. B though in a much lesser degree
compared with Cod. א: the Old Latin and Peshitto Versions compared with
Cod. B: Clemens Romanus compared with either. If we had the copy of the
Gospels which belonged to Ignatius, I suppose we should by common consent
insist on following it almost implicitly. It certainly would be of
overwhelming authority. Its decrees would be only not decisive. [This is,
I think, too strong: there might be mistakes even in that.—E. M.]
Therefore by Antiquity as a principle involving more or less authority
must be meant the greater age of the earlier Copies, Versions, or Fathers.
That which is older will possess more authority than that which is more
recent: but age will not confer any exclusive, or indeed paramount, power
of decision. Antiquity is one Note of Truth: but even if it is divorced
from the arbitrary selection of Authorities which has regulated too much
the employment of it in Textual Criticism, it cannot be said to cover the
whole ground.
§ 2. Number.
We must proceed now to consider the other Notes, or Tests: and the next is
Number.
1. That “witnesses are to be weighed—not counted,”—is a maxim of which we
hear constantly. It may be said to embody much fundamental fallacy.
2. It assumes that the “witnesses” we possess,—meaning thereby every
single Codex, Version, Father—, (1) are capable of being weighed: and (2)
that every individual Critic is competent to weigh them: neither of which
propositions is true.
3. In the very form of the maxim,—“_Not_ to be counted—_but_ to be
weighed,”—the undeniable fact is overlooked that “number” is the most
ordinary ingredient of weight, and indeed in matters of human testimony,
is an element which even cannot be cast away. Ask one of Her Majesty’s
Judges if it be not so. Ten witnesses (suppose) are called in to give
evidence: of whom one resolutely contradicts what is solemnly deposed to
by the other nine. Which of the two parties do we suppose the Judge will
be inclined to believe?
4. But it may be urged—would not the discovery of the one original
autograph of the Gospels exceed in “weight” any “number” of copies which
can be named? No doubt it would, I answer. But only because it would be
the original document, and not “a copy” at all: not “a witness” to the
fact, but the very fact itself. It would be as if in the midst of a
trial,—turning, suppose, on the history of the will of some testator—, the
dead man himself were to step into Court, and proclaim what had actually
taken place. Yet the laws of Evidence would remain unchanged: and in the
very next trial which came on, if one or two witnesses out of as many
hundred were to claim that their evidence should be held to outweigh that
of all the rest, they would be required to establish the reasonableness of
their claim to the satisfaction of the Judge: or they must submit to the
inevitable consequence of being left in an inconsiderable minority.
5. Number then constitutes Weight, or in other words,—since I have used
“Weight” here in a more general sense than usual,—is a Note of Truth. Not
of course absolutely, as being the sole Test, but _caeteris paribus_, and
in its own place and proportion. And this, happily, our opponents freely
admit: so freely in fact, that my only wonder is that they do not discover
their own inconsistency.
6. But the axiom in question labours under the far graver defect of
disparaging the Divine method, under which in the multitude of evidence
preserved all down the ages provision has been made as matter of hard
fact, not by weight but by number, for the integrity of the Deposit. The
prevalent use of the Holy Scriptures in the Church caused copies of them
to abound everywhere. The demand enforced the supply. They were read in
the public Services of the Church. The constant quotation of them by
Ecclesiastical Writers from the first proves that they were a source to
Christians of continual study, and that they were used as an ultimate
appeal in the decision of knotty questions. They were cited copiously in
Sermons. They were employed in the conversion of the heathen, and as in
the case of St. Cyprian must have exercised a strong influence in bringing
people to believe.
Such an abundance of early copies must have ensured perforce the
production of a resulting abundance of other copies made everywhere in
continuous succession from them until the invention of printing.
Accordingly, although countless numbers must have perished by age, use,
destruction in war, and by accident and other causes, nevertheless 63
Uncials, 737 Cursives, and 414 Lectionaries are known to survive of the
Gospels alone(28). Add the various Versions, and the mass of quotations by
Ecclesiastical Writers, and it will at once be evident what materials
exist to constitute a Majority which shall outnumber by many times the
Minority, and also that Number has been ordained to be a factor which
cannot be left out of the calculation.
7. Another circumstance however of much significance has yet to be stated.
Practically the Axiom under consideration is discovered to be nothing else
but a plausible proposition of a general character intended to shelter the
following particular application of it:—“We are able”—says Dr.
Tregelles—“to take the _few_ documents ... and safely discard ... the
89/90 or whatever else their numerical proportion may be(29).” Accordingly
in his edition of the Gospels, the learned writer rejects the evidence of
all the cursive Codexes extant but three. He is mainly followed by the
rest of his school, including Westcott and Hort.
Now again I ask,—Is it likely, is it in any way credible, that we can be
warranted in rejecting the testimony of (suppose) 1490 ancient witnesses,
in favour of the testimony borne by (suppose) ten? Granting freely that
two of these ten are older by 50 or 100 years than any single MS. of the
1490 I confidently repeat the question. The respective dates of the
witnesses before us may perhaps be thus stated. The ten MSS. so
confidently relied upon date as follows, speaking generally:—
2 about A.D. 330-340.
1 about 550.
1 about 750.
6 (say) about 950 to A.D. 1350.
The 1490 MSS. which are constantly observed to bear consentient testimony
against the ten, date somewhat thus:—
1: A.D. 400.
1: 450.
2: 500.
16 (say): 650 to A.D. 850.
1470: 850 to A.D. 1350.
And the question to which I invite the reader to render an answer is
this:—By what process of reasoning, apart from an appeal to other
authorities, (which we are going to make by-and-by), can it be thought
credible that the few witnesses shall prove the trustworthy guides,—and
the many witnesses the deceivers?
Now those many MSS. were executed demonstrably at different times in
different countries. They bear signs in their many hundreds of
representing the entire area of the Church, except where versions were
used instead of copies in the original Greek. Many of them were written in
monasteries where a special room was set aside for such copying. Those who
were in trust endeavoured with the utmost pains and jealousy to secure
accuracy in the transcription. Copying was a sacred art. And yet, of
multitudes of them that survive, hardly any have been copied from any of
the rest. On the contrary, they are discovered to differ among themselves
in countless unimportant particulars; and every here and there single
copies exhibit idiosyncrasies which are altogether startling and
extraordinary. There has therefore demonstrably been no collusion—no
assimilation to an arbitrary standard,—no wholesale fraud. It is certain
that every one of them represents a MS., or a pedigree of MSS., older than
itself; and it is but fair to suppose that it exercises such
representation with tolerable accuracy. It can often be proved, when any
of them exhibit marked extravagancy, that such extravagancy dates back as
far as the second or third century. I venture to think—and shall assume
until I find that I am mistaken—that, besides the Uncials, all the cursive
copies in existence represent lost Codexes of great antiquity with at
least the same general fidelity as Ev. 1, 33, 69, which enjoy so much
favour in some quarters only because they represent lost MSS. demonstrably
of the same general type as Codd. אBD(30).
It will be seen that the proofs in favour of Number being a recognized and
powerful Note of Truth are so strong, that nothing but the interests of an
absorbing argument can prevent the acknowledgement of this position. It is
doubtless inconvenient to find some 1490 witnesses contravening some ten,
or if you will, twenty favourites: but Truth is imperative and knows
nothing of the inconvenience or convenience of Critics.
8. When therefore the great bulk of the witnesses,—in the proportion
suppose of a hundred or even fifty to one,—yield unfaltering testimony to
a certain reading; and the remaining little handful of authorities, while
advocating a different reading, are yet observed to be unable to agree
among themselves as to what that different reading shall precisely
be,—then that other reading concerning which all that discrepancy of
detail is observed to exist, may be regarded as certainly false.
I will now give an instance of the general need of the testimony of Number
being added to Antiquity, in order to establish a Reading.
There is an obscure expression in the Epistle to the Hebrews,—Alford
speaks of it as “almost a _locus desperatus_”—which illustrates the matter
in hand not unaptly. The received reading of Heb. iv. 2,—“not being mixed
[viz. the word preached] with faith in them that heard it,”—is supported
by the united testimony of the Peshitto and of the Latin versions(31).
Accordingly, the discovery that א also exhibits συγκεκερασμενος determined
Tischendorf, who however stands alone with Scholz, to retain in this place
the singular participle. And confessedly the note of Antiquity it enjoys
in perfection; as well as yields a sufficiently intelligible sense. But
then unfortunately it proves to be incredible that St. Paul can have been
the author of the expression(32). All the known copies but four(33) read
not συγκεκραμένος but -μένους. So do all the Fathers who are known to
quote the place(34):—Macarius(35), Chrysostom(36), Theodorus of
Mopsuestia(37), Cyril(38), Theodoret(39), Damascene(40), Photius(41),
Theophylactus(42), Oecumenius(43). The testimony of four of the older of
these is even express: and such an amount of evidence is decisive. But we
are able to add that of the Harkleian, Bohairic, Ethiopic, and Armenian
versions. However uncongenial therefore the effort may prove, there can be
no doubt at all that we must henceforth read here,—“But the word listened
to did not profit them, because they were not united in respect of faith
with those who listened [and believed]”: or words to that effect(44). Let
this then be remembered as a proof that, besides even the note of Variety
to some extent super-added to that of Antiquity, it must further be shewn
on behalf of any reading which claims to be authentic, that it enjoys also
the support of a multitude of witnesses: in other words that it has the
note of Number as well(45).
And let no one cherish a secret suspicion that because the Syriac and the
Latin versions are such venerable documents they must be held to outweigh
all the rest, and may be right in this matter after all. It will be found
explained elsewhere that in places like the present, those famous versions
are often observed to interpret rather than to reproduce the inspired
verity: to discharge the office of a Targum rather than of a translation.
The sympathy thus evinced between א and the Latin should be observed: the
significance of it will come under consideration afterwards.
§ 3. Variety.
I must point out in the next place, that Evidence on any passage, which
exhibits in perfection the first of the two foregoing characteristics—that
of Antiquity, may nevertheless so easily fall under suspicion, that it
becomes in the highest degree necessary to fortify it by other notes of
Truth. And there cannot be a stronger ally than Variety.
No one can doubt, for it stands to reason, that Variety distinguishing
witnesses massed together must needs constitute a most powerful argument
for believing such Evidence to be true. Witnesses of different kinds; from
different countries; speaking different tongues:—witnesses who can never
have met, and between whom it is incredible that there should exist
collusion of any kind:—such witnesses deserve to be listened to most
respectfully. Indeed, when witnesses of so varied a sort agree in large
numbers, they must needs be accounted worthy of even implicit confidence.
Accordingly, the essential feature of the proposed Test will be, that the
Evidence of which “Variety” is to be predicated shall be derived from a
variety of sources. Readings which are witnessed to by MSS. only; or by
ancient Versions only: or by one or more of the Fathers only:—whatever
else may be urged on their behalf, are at least without the full support
of this note of Truth; unless there be in the case of MSS. a sufficient
note of Variety within their own circle. It needs only a slight
acquaintance with the principles which regulate the value of evidence, and
a comparison with other cases enjoying it of one where there is actually
no variety, to see the extreme importance of this third Test. When there
is real variety, what may be called hole-and-corner
work,—conspiracy,—influence of sect or clique,—are impossible. Variety it
is which imparts virtue to mere Number, prevents the witness-box from
being filled with packed deponents, ensures genuine testimony. False
witness is thus detected and condemned, because it agrees not with the
rest. Variety is the consent of independent witnesses, and is therefore
eminently Catholic. Origen or the Vatican and the Sinaitic, often stand
all but alone, because there are scarce any in the assembly who do not
hail from other parts with testimony different from theirs, whilst their
own evidence finds little or no verification.
It is precisely this consideration which constrains us to pay supreme
attention to the combined testimony of the Uncials and of the whole body
of the Cursive Copies. They are (_a_) dotted over at least 1000 years:
(_b_) they evidently belong to so many divers countries,—Greece,
Constantinople, Asia Minor, Palestine, Syria, Alexandria, and other parts
of Africa, not to say Sicily, Southern Italy, Gaul, England, and Ireland:
(_c_) they exhibit so many strange characteristics and peculiar
sympathies: (_d_) they so clearly represent countless families of MSS.,
being in no single instance absolutely identical in their text, and
certainly not being copies of any other Codex in existence,—that their
unanimous decision I hold to be an absolutely irrefragable evidence of the
Truth(46). If, again, only a few of these copies disagree with the main
body of them, I hold that the value of the verdict of the great majority
is but slightly disturbed. Even then however the accession of another
class of confirmatory evidence is most valuable. Thus, when it is
perceived that Codd. אBCD are the only uncials which contain the clause
νεκροὺς ἐγείρετε in St. Matt. x. 8, already spoken of, and that the merest
fraction of the cursives exhibit the same reading, the main body of the
cursives and all the other uncials being for omitting it, it is felt at
once that the features of the problem have been very nearly reversed. On
such occasions we inquire eagerly for the verdict of the most ancient of
the Versions: and when, as on the present occasion, they are divided,—the
Latin and the Ethiopic recognizing the clause, the Syriac and the Egyptian
disallowing it,—an impartial student will eagerly inquire with one of old
time,—“Is there not here a prophet of the Lord besides, that we might
inquire of him?” He will wish to hear what the old Fathers have to say on
this subject. I take the liberty of adding that when he has once perceived
that the text employed by Origen corresponds usually to a surprising
extent with the text represented by Codex B and some of the Old Latin
Versions, he will learn to lay less stress on every fresh instance of such
correspondence. He will desiderate greater variety of testimony,—the
utmost variety which is attainable. The verdict of various other Fathers
on this passage supplies what is wanted(47). Speaking generally, the
consentient testimony of two, four, six, or more witnesses, coming to us
from widely sundered regions is weightier by far than the same number of
witnesses proceeding from one and the same locality, between whom there
probably exists some sort of sympathy, and possibly some degree of
collusion. Thus when it is found that the scribe of B wrote “six conjugate
leaves of Cod. א(48),” it is impossible to regard their united testimony
in the same light as we should have done, if one had been produced in
Palestine and the other at Constantinople. So also of primitive Patristic
testimony. The combined testimony of Cyril, patriarch of
Alexandria;—Isidore of Pelusium, a city at the mouth of the Nile;—and
Nonnus of Panopolis in the Thebaid, is not nearly so weighty as the
testimony of one of the same three writers in conjunction with Irenaeus,
Bishop of Lyons in Gaul, and with Chrysostom who passed the greater part
of his life at Antioch. The same remark holds true of Versions. Thus, the
two Egyptian Versions when they conspire in witnessing to the same
singular reading are entitled to far less attention than one of those same
Versions in combination with the Syriac, or with the Latin, or with the
Gothic.
§ 4. Weight, or Respectability.
We must request our readers to observe, that the term “weight” may be
taken as regards Textual Evidence in two senses, the one general and the
other special. In the general sense, Weight includes all the notes of
truth,—it may relate to the entire mass of evidence;—or else it may be
employed as concerning the value of an individual manuscript, or a single
Version, or a separate Father. Antiquity confers some amount of Weight: so
does Number: and so does Variety also, as well as each of the other notes
of truth. This distinction ought not to be allowed to go out of sight in
the discussion which is now about to occupy our attention.
We proceed then to consider Weight in the special sense and as attached to
single Witnesses.
Undeniable as it is, (_a_) that ancient documents do not admit of being
placed in scales and weighed; and (_b_) that if they did, the man does not
exist who is capable of conducting the operation,—there are yet, happily,
principles of sound reason,—considerations based on the common sense of
mankind, learned and unlearned alike,—by the aid of which something may be
effected which is strictly analogous to the process of weighing solid
bodies in an ordinary pair of scales. I proceed to explain.
1. In the first place, the witnesses in favour of any given reading should
be respectable. “Respectability” is of course a relative term; but its use
and applicability in this department of Science will be generally
understood and admitted by scholars, although they may not be altogether
agreed as to the classification of their authorities. Some critics will
claim, not respectability only, but absolute and oracular authority for a
certain set of ancient witnesses,—which others will hold in suspicion. It
is clear however that respectability cannot by itself confer pre-eminence,
much less the privilege of oracular decision. We listen to any one whose
character has won our respect: but dogmatism as to things outside of
actual experience or mathematical calculation is the prerogative only of
Revelation or inspired utterance; and if assumed by men who have no
authority to dogmatize, is only accepted by weak minds who find a relief
when they are able
“jurare in verba magistri.”
“To swear whate’er the master says is true.”
And if on the contrary certain witnesses are found to range themselves
continually on the side which is condemned by a large majority of others
exhibiting other notes of truth entitling them to credence, those few
witnesses must inevitably lose in respectability according to the extent
and frequency of such eccentric action.
2. If one Codex (_z_) is demonstrably the mere transcript of another Codex
(_f_), these may no longer be reckoned as two Codexes, but as one Codex.
It is hard therefore to understand how Tischendorf constantly adduces the
evidence of “E of Paul” although he was perfectly well aware that E is “_a
mere transcript_ of the Cod. Claromontanus(49)” or D of Paul. Or again,
how he quotes the cursive Evan. 102; because the readings of that unknown
seventeenth-century copy of the Gospels are ascertained to have been
derived from Cod. B itself(50).
3. By strict parity of reasoning, when once it has been ascertained that,
in any particular instance, Patristic testimony is not original but
derived, each successive reproduction of the evidence must obviously be
held to add nothing at all to the weight of the original statement. Thus,
it used to be the fashion to cite (in proof of the spuriousness of “the
last twelve verses” of St. Mark’s Gospel) the authority of “Eusebius,
Gregory of Nyssa, Victor of Antioch, Severus of Antioch, Jerome(51),”—to
which were added “Epiphanius and Caesarius(52),”—“Hesychius of Jerusalem
and Euthymius(53).” In this enumeration, the names of Gregory, Victor,
Severus, Epiphanius and Caesarius were introduced in error. There remains
Eusebius,—whose exaggeration (_a_) Jerome translates, (_b_) Hesychius
(sixth century) copies, and (_c_) Euthymius (A.D. 1116) refers to(54) and
Eusebius himself neutralizes(55). The evidence therefore (such as it is)
collapses hopelessly: being reducible probably to a random statement in
the lost treatise of Origen on St. Mark(56), which Eusebius repudiates,
even while in his latitudinarian way he reproduces it. The weight of such
testimony is obviously slight indeed.
4. Again, if two, three, or four Codexes are discovered by reason of the
peculiarities of text which they exhibit to have been derived,—nay,
confessedly are derived—from one and the same archetype,—those two, three,
or four Codexes may no longer be spoken of as if they were so many.
Codexes B and א, for example, being certainly the twin products of a lost
exemplar, cannot in fairness be reckoned as = 2. Whether their combined
evidence is to be estimated at = 1.75, 1.50, or 1.25, or as only 1.0,—let
diviners decide. May I be allowed to suggest that whenever they agree in
an extraordinary reading their combined evidence is to be reckoned at
about 1.50: when in an all but unique reading, at 1.25: when the reading
they contain is absolutely unique, as when they exhibit συστρεφομένων δὲ
αὐτῶν in St. Matt. xvii. 22, they should be reckoned as a single Codex?
Never, at all events, can they be jointly reckoned as absolutely two. I
would have them cited as B-א. Similar considerations should be attached to
F and G of St. Paul, as being “independent transcripts of the same
venerable archetype(57),” and to Evan. 13, 69, 124, 346, 556, 561, and
perhaps 348, 624, 788(58), as being also the representatives of only one
anterior manuscript of uncertain date.
5. It requires further to be pointed out that when once a clear note of
affinity has been ascertained to exist between a small set of documents,
their exclusive joint consent is henceforward to be regarded with
suspicion: in other words, their evidential Weight becomes impaired. For
instance, the sympathy between D and some Old Latin copies is so marked,
so constant, in fact so extraordinary, that it becomes perfectly evident
that D, though only of the sixth century, must represent a Greek or Latin
Codex of the inaccurate class which prevailed in the earliest age of all,
a class from which some of the Latin translations were made(59).
6. I suppose it may be laid down that an ancient Version outweighs any
single Codex, ancient or modern, which can be named: the reason being,
that it is scarcely credible that a Version—the Peshitto, for example, an
Egyptian, or the Gothic—can have been executed from a single exemplar. But
indeed that is not all. The first of the above-named Versions and some of
the Latin are older,—perhaps by two centuries—than the oldest known copy.
From this it will appear that if the only witnesses producible for a
certain reading were the Old Latin Versions and the Syriac Version on the
one hand,—Codd. B-א on the other,—the united testimony of the first two
would very largely overbalance the combined testimony of the last. If B or
if א stood alone, neither of them singly would be any match for either the
Syriac or the Old Latin Versions,—still less for the two combined.
7. The cogency of the considerations involved in the last paragraph
becomes even more apparent when Patristic testimony has to be considered.
It has been pointed out elsewhere(60) that, in and by itself, the
testimony of any first-rate Father, where it can be had, must be held to
outweigh the solitary testimony of any single Codex which can be named.
The circumstance requires to be again insisted on here. How to represent
the amount of this preponderance by a formula, I know not: nor as I
believe does any one else know. But the fact that it exists, remains, and
is in truth undeniable. For instance, the origin and history of Codexes
ABאC is wholly unknown: their dates and the places of their several
production are matters of conjecture only. But when we are listening to
the articulate utterance of any of the ancient Fathers, we not only know
with more or less of precision the actual date of the testimony before us,
but we even know the very diocese of Christendom in which we are standing.
To such a deponent we can assign a definite amount of credibility, whereas
in the estimate of the former class of evidence we have only inferences to
guide us.
Individually, therefore, a Father’s evidence, where it can be certainly
obtained—_caeteris paribus_, is considerably greater than that of any
single known Codex. Collectively, however, the Copies, without question,
outweigh either the Versions by themselves, or the Fathers by themselves.
I have met—very rarely I confess—but I have met with cases where the
Versions, as a body, were opposed in their testimony to the combined
witness of Copies and Fathers. Also, but very rarely, I have known the
Fathers, as a body, opposed to the evidence of Copies and Versions. But I
have never known a case where the Copies stood alone—with the Versions and
the Fathers united against them.
I consider that such illustrious Fathers as Irenaeus and
Hippolytus,—Athanasius and Didymus,—Epiphanius and Basil,—the two
Gregories and Chrysostom,—Cyril and Theodoret, among the
Greeks,—Tertullian and Cyprian,—Hilary and Ambrose,—Jerome and Augustine,
among the Latins,—are more respectable witnesses by far than the same
number of Greek or Latin Codexes. Origen, Clemens Alexandrinus, and
Eusebius, though first-rate Authors, were so much addicted to Textual
Criticism themselves, or else employed such inconsistent copies,—that
their testimony is that of indifferent witnesses or bad judges.
As to the Weight which belongs to separate Copies, that must be determined
mainly by watching their evidence. If they go wrong continually, their
character must be low. They are governed in this respect by the rules
which hold good in life. We shall treat afterwards of the character of
Codex D, of א, and of B.
§ 5. Continuity.
In proposing Continuous Existence as another note of a genuine reading, I
wish to provide against those cases where the Evidence is not only
ancient, but being derived from two different sources may seem to have a
claim to variety also. I am glad to have the opportunity thus early of
pointing out that the note of variety may not fairly be claimed for
readings which are not advocated by more than two distinct specimens of
ancient evidence. But just now my actual business is to insist that some
sort of Continuousness is requisite as well as Antiquity, Number, Variety,
and Weight.
We can of course only know the words of Holy Scripture according as they
have been handed down to us; and in ascertaining what those words actually
were, we are driven perforce to the Tradition of them as it has descended
to us through the ages of the Church. But if that Tradition is broken in
the process of its descent, it cannot but be deprived of much of the
credit with which it would otherwise appeal for acceptance. A clear
groundwork of reasonableness lay underneath, and a distinct province was
assigned, when _quod semper_ was added to _quod ubique et quod ab
omnibus_. So there is a Catholicity of time, as well as of space and of
people: and all must be claimed in the ascertainment and support of Holy
Writ.
When therefore a reading is observed to leave traces of its existence and
of its use all down the ages, it comes with an authority of a peculiarly
commanding nature. And on the contrary, when a chasm of greater or less
breadth of years yawns in the vast mass of evidence which is ready for
employment, or when a tradition is found to have died out, upon such a
fact alone suspicion or grave doubt, or rejection must inevitably ensue.
Still more, when upon the admission of the Advocates of the opinions which
we are opposing the chasm is no longer restricted but engulfs not less
than fifteen centuries in its hungry abyss, or else when the transmission
ceased after four centuries, it is evident that according to an essential
Note of Truth, those opinions cannot fail to be self-destroyed as well as
to labour under condemnation during more than three quarters of the
accomplished life of Christendom.
How Churchmen of eminence and ability, who in other respects hold the
truths involved in Churchmanship, are able to maintain and propagate such
opinions without surrendering their Churchmanship, we are unable to
explain. We would only hope and pray that they may be led to see the
inconsistencies of their position. And to others who do not accept Church
doctrine we would urge that, inasmuch as internal evidence is so uncertain
as often to face both ways, they really cannot rest upon anything else
than continuous teaching if they would mount above personal likings and
dislikings to the possession of definite and unmistakable support. In fact
all traditional teaching which is not continuous must be like the detached
pieces of a disunited chain.
To put the question in the most moderate form, my meaning is, that
although it is possible that no trace may be discoverable in any later
document of what is already attested by documents of the fourth century to
be the true reading of any given place of Scripture, yet it is a highly
improbable circumstance that the evidence should entirely disappear at
such a very early period. It is reasonable to expect that if a reading
advocated by Codexes א and B, for instance, and the Old Latin Versions,
besides one or two of the Fathers, were trustworthy, there ought to be
found at least a fair proportion of the later Uncial and the Cursive
Copies to reproduce it. If, on the contrary, many of the Fathers knew
nothing at all about the matter; if Jerome reverses the evidence borne by
the Old Latin; if the later Uncials, and if the main body of the Cursives
are silent also:—what can be said but that it is altogether unreasonable
to demand acceptance for a reading which comes to us upon such a very
slender claim to our confidence?
That is the most important inference: and it is difficult to see how in
the nature of the case it can be got over. But in other respects
also:—when a smaller break occurs in the transmission, the evidence is
proportionally injured. And the remark must be added, that in cases where
there is a transmission by several lines of descent which, having in other
respects traces of independence, coincide upon a certain point, it is but
reasonable to conclude that those lines enjoy, perhaps, a silent, yet a
parallel and unbroken tradition all down the ages till they emerge. This
principle is often illustrated in the independent yet consentient
testimony of the whole body of the Cursives and later Uncials(61).
§ 6. Context.
A prevailing fallacy with some critical writers on the subject to which
the present volume is devoted, may be thus described. In the case of a
disputed reading, they seem to think that they do enough if they simply
marshal the authorities for and against, and deliver an oracular verdict.
In critical editions of the Greek text, such a summary method is perhaps
unavoidable. But I take leave to point out that in Sacred Textual
Criticism there are several other considerations which absolutely require
attention besides, and that those considerations ought to find expression
where the space permits. It is to some of these that I proceed now to
invite the reader’s attention.
A word,—a phrase,—a clause,—or even a sentence or a paragraph,—must have
some relation to the rest of the entire passage which precedes or comes
after it. Therefore it will often be necessary, in order to reach all the
evidence that bears upon a disputed question, to examine both the meaning
and the language lying on both sides of the point in dispute. We do not at
present lay so much stress upon the contextual meaning, because people are
generally not unready to observe it, and it is often open to much
difference of opinion:—we refrain especially, because we find from
experience that there is in the case of the New Testament always enough
external evidence of whose existence no doubt can be entertained to settle
any textual question that can arise.
Nevertheless, it may be as well to give a single instance. In 1 Cor. xiii.
5, Codex B and Clement of Alexandria read τὸ μὴ ἑαυτῆς instead of τὰ
ἑαυτῆς, i.e. “charity seeketh not what does not belong to her,” instead of
“seeketh not her own.” That is to say, we are invited, in the midst of
that magnificent passage which is full of lofty principles, to suppose
that a gross violation of the eighth commandment is forbidden, and to
insert a commonplace repudiation of gross dishonesty. We are to sink
suddenly from a grand atmosphere down to a vulgar level. In fact, the
light shed on the words in question from the context on either side of
course utterly excludes such a supposition; consequently, the only result
is that we are led to distrust the witnesses that have given evidence
which is so palpably absurd.
But as regards the precise form of language employed, it will be found
also a salutary safeguard against error in every instance, to inspect with
severe critical exactness the entire context of the passage in dispute. If
in certain Codexes that context shall prove to be confessedly in a very
corrupt state, then it becomes even self-evident that those Codexes can
only be admitted as witnesses with considerable suspicion and reserve.
Take as an illustration of what I have been saying the exceedingly
precious verse, “Howbeit, this kind goeth not out but by prayer and
fasting” (St. Matt. xvii. 21), which has met with rejection by the recent
school of critics. Here the evidence against the verse is confined to B
and the first reading of א amongst the Uncials, Evan. 33 alone of the
Cursives, e and ff1 of the Old Latin Versions, as well as the Curetonian
and the Lewis, Jerusalem, Sahidic, a few Bohairic copies, a few Ethiopic,
and the Greek of Eusebius’ Canons:—evidence of a slight and shifty
character, when contrasted with the witness of all the other Uncials and
Cursives, the rest of the Versions, and more than thirteen of the Fathers
beginning with Tertullian and Origen(62). It is plain that the stress of
the case for rejection, since א being afterwards corrected speaks
uncertainly, rests such as it is upon B; and that if the evidence of that
MS. is found to be unworthy of credit in the whole passage, weak indeed
must be the contention which consists mainly of such support.
Now if we inspect vv. 19, 20, 22, and 23, to go no farther, we shall
discover that the entire passage in B is wrapped in a fog of error. It
differs from the main body of the witnesses in ten places; in four of
which its evidence is rejected by Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles,
Westcott and Hort, and the Revisers(63); in two more by the Revisers(64);
and of the remaining four, it is supported in two by only א and severally
by one or six Cursives, and in the other two by only א and D with
severally four or five Cursive copies(65).
Inspection of the Context therefore adds here strong confirmation:—though
indeed in this instance to have recourse to such a weapon is to slay the
already slain.
St. Matthew (xi. 2, 3) relates that John Baptist “having heard in the
prison the works of CHRIST, sent two of his Disciples” (δύο τῶν μαθητῶν
αὐτοῦ) with the inquiry, “Art Thou He that should come(66), or are we to
look for another (ἕτερον)?” So all the known copies but nine. So the
Vulgate, Bohairic, Ethiopic. So Origen. So Chrysostom. It is interesting
to note with what differences of expression St. Luke reproduces this
statement. Having explained in ver. 18 that it was the Forerunner’s
disciples who brought him tidings concerning CHRIST, St. Luke (vii. 19)
adds that John “called for certain two” (δύο τινάς) of them, and “sent
them to JESUS”: thus emphasizing, while he repeats, the record of the
earlier Evangelist. Inasmuch however as ἕτερον means, in strictness, “the
other _of two_,” in order not to repeat himself, he substitutes ἄλλον for
it. Now all this is hopelessly obscured by the oldest amongst our
manuscript authorities. It in no wise surprises us to find that τινάς has
disappeared from D, the Peshitto, Latin, Bohairic, Gothic, and Ethiopic.
The word has disappeared from our English version also. But it offends us
greatly to discover that (1) אBLRXΞ (with Cyril) obliterate ἄλλον from St.
Luke vii. 19, and thrust ἕτερον into its place,—as clear an instance of
vicious assimilation as could anywhere be found: while (2) for δύο (in St.
Matt. xi. 3) אBCDPZΔ write διά: which is acquiesced in by the Peshitto,
Harkleian, Gothic and Armenian Versions. The Old Latin Versions
prevaricate as usual: two read, _mittens duos ex discipulis suis_: all the
rest,—_mittens discipulos suos_,—which is the reading of Cureton’s Syriac
and the Dialogus (p. 819), but of no known Greek MS.(67) Lastly (3) for
Ἰησοῦν in St. Luke, BLRΞ substitute κύριον. What would be thought of us if
we were freely imposed upon by readings so plainly corrupt as these three?
But light is thrown upon them by the context in St. Luke. In the thirteen
verses which immediately follow, Tischendorf himself being the judge, the
text has experienced depravation in at least fourteen particulars(68).
With what reason can the same critic straightway insist on other readings
which rest exclusively upon the same authorities which the fourteen
readings just mentioned claim for their support?
This Note of Truth has for its foundation the well-known law that mistakes
have a tendency to repeat themselves in the same or in other shapes. The
carelessness, or the vitiated atmosphere, that leads a copyist to
misrepresent one word is sure to lead him into error about another. The
ill-ordered assiduity which prompted one bad correction most probably did
not rest there. And the errors committed by a witness just before or just
after the testimony which is being sifted was given cannot but be held to
be closely germane to the inquiry.
So too on the other side. Clearness, correctness, self-collectedness, near
to the moment in question, add to the authority of the evidence.
Consequently, the witness of the Context cannot but be held to be
positively or negatively, though perhaps more often negatively than
positively, a very apposite Note of Truth.
§ 7. Internal Evidence.
It would be a serious omission indeed to close this enumeration of Tests
of Truth without adverting to those Internal Considerations which will
make themselves heard, and are sometimes unanswerable.
Thus the reading of πάντων (masculine or neuter) which is found in Cod. B
(St. Luke xix. 37) we reject at once because of its grammatical
impossibility as agreeing with δυνάμεων (feminine); and that of καρδίαις
(2 Cor. iii. 3) according to the witness of AאBCDEGLP on the score of its
utter impossibility(69). Geographical reasons are sufficiently strong
against reading with Codd. אIKNΠ ἑκατὸν καὶ ἑξήκοντα in St. Luke xxiv. 13
(i.e. a hundred and threescore furlongs), to make it of no manner of
importance that a few additional authorities, as Origen, Eusebius, and
Jerome, can be produced in support of the same manifestly corrupt reading.
On grounds of ordinary reasonableness we cannot hear of the sun being
eclipsed when the moon was full, or of our Lord being pierced before
death. The truth of history, otherwise sufficiently attested both by St.
Matthew and Josephus, absolutely forbids αὐτοῦ (אBDLΔ) to be read for
αὐτῆς (St. Mark vi. 22), and in consequence the wretched daughter of
Herodias to be taken to have been the daughter of Herod.
In these and such-like instances, the Internal reasons are plain and
strong. But there is a manifest danger, when critics forsake those
considerations which depend upon clear and definite points, and build
their own inventions and theories into a system of strict canons which
they apply in the teeth of manifold evidence that has really everything to
recommend it. The extent to which some critics are ready to go may be seen
in the monstrous Canon proposed by Griesbach, that where there are more
readings than one of any place, that reading which favours orthodoxy is an
object of suspicion(70). There is doubtless some reason in the Canon which
asserts that “The harder the reading, the less likely it is to have been
invented, and the more likely it is to be genuine,” under which
δευτεροπώτῳ (St. Luke vi. 1) must receive additional justification. But
people are ordinarily so constituted, that when they have once constructed
a system of Canons they place no limits to their operation, and become
slaves to them.
Accordingly, the true reading of passages must be ascertained, with very
slight exception indeed, from the preponderating weight of external
evidence, judged according to its antiquity, to number, variety, relative
value, continuousness, and with the help of the context. Internal
considerations, unless in exceptional cases they are found in strong
opposition to evident error, have only a subsidiary force. Often they are
the product of personal bias, or limited observation: and where one
scholar approves, another dogmatically condemns. Circumstantial evidence
is deservedly rated low in the courts of justice: and lawyers always
produce witnesses when they can. The Text of Holy Scripture does not vary
with the weathercock according to changing winds of individual or general
opinion or caprice: it is decided by the Tradition of the Church as
testified by eye-witnesses and written in black and white and gold in all
countries of Christendom, and all down the ages since the New Testament
was composed.
I desire to point out concerning the foregoing seven Notes of Truth in
Textual Evidence that the student can never afford entirely to lose sight
of any of them. The reason is because although no doubt it is conceivable
that any one of the seven might possibly in itself suffice to establish
almost any reading which can be named, practically this is never the case.
And why? Because we never meet with any one of these Tests in the fullest
possible measure. No Test ever attains to perfection, or indeed can
attain. An approximation to the Test is all that can be expected, or even
desired. And sometimes we are obliged to put up with a very slight
approximation indeed. Their strength resides in their co-operation.