THE ORATOR’S LOGIC.
Logic is either one of the most useful or one of the most useless
acquisitions of the orator. As taught in the middle ages, with its
barbarous jargon of symbols and terms, it can add but little directly to
the force or truth of any man’s speech, although even in that form it
may, like most other studies, accomplish something in the way of
sharpening the critical faculty and strengthening memory and attention.
Its definitions, also, are not altogether valueless. But not one student
in a thousand will apply its cumbrous rules in shaping his own
reasoning, or in judging of the reasoning of others. If the reader has
studied logic his own experience may be confidently appealed to. Do you
ever, in reading an argument, notice to which figure and mood of the
syllogism it conforms? If the argument seems false, do you ever seek to
find whether the fault is in negative promises, want of distribution of
the middle term, or in the violation of any other technical rule of
logic? The mind has a much more direct and summary mode for disposing of
unsatisfactory arguments.
But the principles of logic are few and simple, and when divested of all
technicality, are of universal application. We will venture to point out
some that may be of especial service to the speaker:
1st. Clear definition. The speaker should know the meaning of his
subject and of all the important terms used in connection with it. This
knowledge he should convey to his hearers in the most clear and striking
manner that his own powers will permit. To have an audience
misunderstand the speaker so far that while he was talking of one thing
they are understanding something totally different (even if known by the
same name) would be a grave logical fault. Exact and comprehensive
definition, often enlivened and simplified by similes or anecdotes, will
prevent such danger.
2d. Exact and comprehensive division of a subject is scarcely less
important than clear definition. This is of equal value in studying a
subject and in presenting it to an audience. If we wished to speak or
learn about the ocean, one of the first facts to be dealt with would be
its division into five parts—Atlantic, Pacific, etc. A good principle of
division should always be selected and faithfully applied. Then as many
subdivisions may be added as naturally follow from the application of
another good principle of division. Thus, astronomy may be first defined
as “the science of the stars.” Then it can be divided into planetary and
stellar astronomy. The former may be subdivided into descriptions of the
individual planets and other bodies in the solar system; the latter into
the classes of objects found among the fixed stars. All of this is not a
rhetorical or oratorical device, but has its foundation in mental laws;
in other words, it is logical.
3d. Classification lies at the foundation of many of the sciences, and
is a process of the highest importance in every domain of knowledge. In
no other manner can the vast multitude of facts discovered by millions
of observing eyes be preserved and made useful. The orator must also
classify his general knowledge, and that special part of it which he
intends to use for a speech. All his proofs, appeals, illustrative
facts, and even his digressions should be arranged according to those
natural bonds of congruity which constitute the basis of all
classification.
But in what way can the person who is ignorant of technical logic make a
harmonious classification? It will not add much to his ability to tell
him that two processes—abstraction and generalization—are the basis of
all true classification. It is simpler and means the same to say that
things should be classed together which agree in some permanent and
fundamental quality. Thus a vast number of animals of the most varied
sizes, shapes, and powers, agree in having backbones and are therefore
put into a class and called _vertebrates_. The study of agreements and
similarities in things the most diverse is exceedingly profitable to the
orator in many different ways. It affords inexhaustible material for
illustrations—“those windows of speech.” The difference between the
likeness upon which classification and illustrations are based is about
as follows: The similarities which give rise to scientific classes are
very important and essential; those from which illustrations spring may
be slight and superficial.
These three processes are of more importance to the orator than any
others embraced in logic. There is nothing “dry” or “repulsive” about
them—terms quite frequently applied to discourses which turn aside from
their own direct purpose to display the mere machinery of reasoning. By
division a distinct impression is made of each part of a subject; by
definition all misunderstandings are cleared away and attention fixed
upon the very points at issue; by classification all thoughts find their
proper places and are so gathered up into general ideas and joined with
other familiar thoughts, by way of illustration, that they may easily be
remembered and applied.
But how about the syllogism which logical treatises devote so much time
to explaining? Its many varieties and endless transformations wrought
out by acute minds from the time of Aristotle to the present, are
curious and interesting, but they are not specially available for a
speaker. Yet, since they rest upon a few easily understood principles,
we will refer to the most obvious.
If two things each resemble a third it is certain that they also
resemble each other. If one thing equals a second, but does not equal a
third, then the second and third do not equal each other.
In the syllogism two comparisons are made and the resulting agreement or
disagreement is expressed in the conclusion. Thus:
Corrupt men are bad citizens.
Men buying or selling votes are corrupt men.
Therefore, men buying or selling votes are bad citizens.
Here the class of corrupt men agrees with the class of bad citizens; it
also agrees with the class who buy or sell votes; now, as it agrees with
each of the two classes, it is certain that those two classes also agree
with each other. This is the plain form of the syllogism.
The following is an instance of disagreement:
Good citizens are patriotic men.
Traitors are not patriotic.
Therefore, traitors are not good citizens.
When an agreement and disagreement are thus stated in the first and
second lines, the result stated in the third line must be a
disagreement. But if the first and second lines both state disagreements
no result can be drawn, for there is more than one mode of disagreement.
This may be illustrated by the case of two witnesses to the same
circumstance. If both tell the truth their stories will agree; if one
tells the truth and the other does not, their stories disagree; but if
neither tells the truth, their stories may or may not agree—that is,
they may tell the same falsehood or different kinds of falsehood.
In the syllogism it is necessary to see that the comparisons made are
real and not fictitious. False logic or fallacies arise where a
comparison seems to be made which is not real. Part of one thing or
class may be compared with the whole of another, and then an agreement
affirmed or denied for the whole of the two things or classes, and this
fatal fault in reasoning may be very carefully concealed. It can usually
be detected by turning around the sentence in which the defective
comparison is made. Thus:
Men are animals.
Horses are animals.
Therefore, men are horses.
This seems to be a perfectly fair specimen of correct syllogisms. But in
the first line the class “men” is compared with only a part of the class
“animals,” and in the second line the whole of the class “horses” is
compared with another part of the class “animals,” and as the comparison
is not restricted to the same objects no statement of agreement or
disagreement can be made. We detect the insufficiency of the comparison
by saying, it is true that all men are animals, but not true that all
animals are men.
Another mode of making a seeming comparison without the reality is by
using words in unlike senses. Thus:
All light bodies dispel darkness.
A bag of feathers is a light body.
Therefore, a bag of feathers will dispel darkness.
To guard against this and all similar fallacies it is only necessary to
notice whether the comparison is fair and complete. Practice will give
great expertness in doing this, even when the comparison is implied
rather than expressed.
Indeed, the greater part of reasoning lies outside the range of formal
logic. The orator who would reduce each argument to a syllogistic form
would be considered a clown endeavoring to make sport of, or for his
audience. A statement is often made which depends for its validity upon
a comparison or even a series of comparisons either flashing through the
mind at the moment, or recalled as having previously been made. To this
there can be no objection, provided such comparisons are obvious and
indisputable. If a chain of reasoning rests upon the understanding that
all men desire to be happy, it will be just as forcible as if that
truism were stated or proved. Anything which an audience will accept
without question is only weakened by the processes of proof. Something
must be taken for granted in all kinds of argument, and the wider the
domain of such assumptions can be fairly made the better for the
interest and effectiveness of the arguments which follow.
A syllogism in which one of the essential parts is left to be supplied
in the mind is called an _enthymeme_, and is the most common of all
forms of reasoning. Whenever we state a fact, and adduce a reason for
that fact, it takes this form. As an instance, we may give the
beatitudes in the fifth chapter of St. Matthew. In each we have a
declaration made and a reason given for that declaration, but that
reason would have no necessary validity were it not for a
well-understood principle, upon which, in each case, it is founded. When
it is said, “Blessed are the poor in spirit; for theirs is the kingdom
of heaven,” we mentally add, or concede even without thinking it,
“_whoever has the kingdom of heaven is blessed_.”
The same declaration may be put in logical form, thus:
Whoever possesses the kingdom of heaven is blessed.
The poor in spirit possess the kingdom of heaven.
Therefore, they are blessed.
It will be noticed that in all the beatitudes the syllogism is inverted,
the conclusion coming first (which also is placed in an inverted form),
while the major premise is left to be mentally supplied.
Another instance may be given of this most common of all the syllogistic
forms—the only one of which the orator makes very frequent use.
It is stated, “Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall see God;”
the reader mentally supplies, “and those who see God are blessed.”
Or in syllogistic form:
Those who see God are blessed.
The pure in heart see God.
Therefore, the pure in heart are blessed.
The great frequency of the _enthymeme_ is explained by the very nature
of reasoning, which—at least in the case of the true orator—ever
proceeds from the known to the unknown. One of our propositions should
either be self-evident or tacitly conceded; it need not therefore be
expressed. The other must be brought out fully and proved by appropriate
evidence, and from these two foundations we draw out the conclusion, or,
what is only another way of accomplishing the same purpose, we state the
conclusion and then give a reason for it, which itself rests upon
another reason mentally supplied. We may test the correctness of the
process by inquiring if the unexpressed reason be of the nature of a
necessary, or at least of a generally received, truth; then, if the
expressed reason is supported by impregnable evidence (which in the case
of the beatitudes is the authority of Teacher Himself); and finally, if
the conclusion inevitably results from the union of the two preceding
parts.
Much might be said of fallacies and their various forms, but the student
who has not time to pursue a full course of logic would find little
profit in such a brief sketch as is here possible. It will be enough to
point out that all false reasoning involves a violation of some logical
rules, the simplest and most useful of which we have already pointed
out. The orator who carefully defines his terms, who watches every
comparison to see if it is real and not merely pretended, who refuses to
accept a plausible statement for a universal truth, who notices what an
argument takes for granted as carefully as what it states, will not be
likely to commit glaring errors himself, or to be led into them by
others.
In controversy a most important logical direction may be given. Strive
to ascertain just the standpoint of the audience in regard to your
subject. Every speaker has much in common with his hearers, and if he
would convince or persuade them he must start from that common position.
In doing this there is no compromise of principle. It is simply leaving
out of view points of difference until points of agreement are explored.
From these an argument, as strong as logic can make it, should lead to
the conclusion either in thought or action to which you wish your
audience conducted. The eminent Methodist missionary, Rev. Wm. Taylor,
in speaking to the heathen of Africa, used first to dwell upon those
things in their belief which were common with his own, giving them
credit for trying to worship the true God as well as they could, and
then declaring that he came to them with a fuller revelation from the
same source. In this way he persuaded thousands to accept his guidance
and believe the Bible, who would have been utterly repelled if he had
first attacked their superstitions, and tried to show that they were
wrong in everything. In the same manner every masterly persuader of men
must proceed. Seeking out all that he regards as true in their opinions
and beliefs, he will waste no time in proving what they already believe,
or in persuading them to do what they are already engaged in, but will
show them other things which necessarily follow from what they already
admit. St. Paul, on Mars’ Hill, got a great logical advantage by his
reference to the Unknown God, and from this starting place he worked his
way carefully to the new truth which he had to declare. A political
orator may simply abuse the opposite party; but he makes no converts and
wins no enduring laurels by that method. If he will strive to understand
the position of his opponents and then from the great principles
regarding government, which all parties hold in common, proceed to show
that the side he advocates carries out those principles to their
legitimate result, he may change votes, and will be sought for where the
empty declamation of one who pursues the opposite course would be felt
as a hindrance rather than a help. “What do you do when you have no case
at all?” said one lawyer to another. “Oh!” was the reply, “I abuse the
opposite counsel.” This was only a mode of covering a retreat, and may
have answered that purpose well enough after the battle had been lost;
but as long as there is any hope of convincing the judge or winning the
jury, such abuse is worse than useless. The advocate should not,
however, take his opponent’s view of the subject at issue as the
groundwork of his argument, but that which he believes the jury to
entertain. Success in this instance is not won by convincing an
opponent, but by bringing over to his views that body of men in the
jury-box who are supposed to be impartial, but who always have their
mode of viewing any given subject—a mode which an ingenious and
observant advocate will not be slow to discover.
There are three phases of any controverted question which the orator who
will discuss it successfully needs to study. He should know and estimate
justly all that a determined opponent of his own view can advance.
Nothing is gained by failing to appreciate the strength and plausibility
of an adversary’s position. Complete justice to an enemy is often the
first step to complete victory over him. Then the position of that part
of an audience—possibly few in numbers, but from the logical standpoint
exceedingly important—who are in suspense, and as ready to fall to one
side as the other, ought to be fully weighed. The more perfectly
intellectual sympathy exists between them and the orator, the more
likely is he to bring them over to his own party. And this is the great
object to be aimed at. Pronounced opponents are not often converted. “A
man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still.” The
attention directed to them is really for the sake of the doubtful class
who may, unless resistance is offered, be won over by their efforts.
Some attention may also properly be given by the speaker to confirming
his own party by showing them the solid grounds upon which their
opinions rest. But usually the same arguments which are likely to decide
the wavering will best accomplish this purpose also. Beginning with a
simple but clearly defined statement of those principles or facts upon
which he intends to base his arguments, and about which no difference of
opinion is possible, he shows clearly that the opinions he and his
friends hold must follow from the grounds already conceded. This should
be set forth as the establishment of positive truth rather than as the
refutation of any errors; then, when the waverers have been convinced
and his own party strongly confirmed, he may, with advantage, show the
weakness and absurdity of the position of those who hold opposed views.
Such a course pursued by an able reasoner who really has truth on his
side, which he thoroughly understands, will seldom fail to win all whose
minds are open to conviction.
It is to these broad principles and to the careful study of all aspects
of the questions he has to treat, rather than to the refinements of
mediæval logic, that we would direct the orator’s attention. Whoever
will follow the course prescribed in preceding chapters, carefully
arranging the outline of his address, mastering all his material, and
speaking the language of his own convictions, will be truly logical, and
such logic carried to the highest degree will take nothing from any
other grace either of form or substance that belongs to oratory.