NAVAL LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE WAR.
After the remarkable victory at Santiago de Cuba, where Admiral
Cervera's fleet, which attempted to steal out of the harbor, with the
loss of but one man on the American side, Admiral Sampson, with a
portion of his fleet, proceeded to San Juan in Porto Rico. This city he
bombarded, directing his principal fire against Morro Castle.
What followed bears strong testimony to the remarkable gunnery of our
"jackies."
Morro Castle and the buildings on the high ground in its rear were
simply riddled. Great holes were in places blown out by our large shells
and the walls were pitted by the hail of the smaller ones.
There was one entire building which was blown to pieces, and a whole
section of the Cuartel was laid in ruins. To be sure, many of our shells
were wasted in the sea wall, but this is not to be wondered at, as the
parapet had embrasures for guns, and from where our ships were lying,
these would naturally be mistaken for a sea battery.
Neither in Morro Castle nor in the more pretentious fortifications known
as San Cristobal, were there any great number of modern guns. There were
a few Krupp guns, but the remainder consisted of muzzleloaders of an
ancient pattern; most of the latter were mounted upon parapets of
masonry. It may be said that the defences of San Juan were opposed to
every theory of modern military science. The defenses might have been
considered impregnable some fifty years or so ago, but to-day they are
by no means formidable.
Our marvelous naval victories have taught a lesson to the entire world,
and America to-day stands stronger than she ever did before. In fact,
there is not a nation that does not respect us and fear us, which
possibly could not have been said before the American-Spanish war. Prior
to that, it was rather the fashion to sneer at the Yankee army and navy,
but that will never be done again.
Foreign nations know now what the United States really is.
"Dewey's and Sampson's victories must be very depressing to French,
German and Russian naval aspirations," observes a gentleman of
Washington, who is a most competent authority. "For years they have been
measuring up against England, and quietly calculating what combinations
they could make to overthrow British sea power. France, particularly,
has been building a navy which she hoped, in spite of past experience,
might cope with England's. She has spent immense sums upon it, and
relative to the interests it has to guard, it is larger and stronger
than England's. But Spain's experience reiterates the old story that it
is not so much the ships as the men on them who win victories. Had the
Americans been on Spanish ships and the Spanish on the American there
would have been a very different story to tell. While the French are
very superior to the Spanish, they are of the same Latin blood, and
there is just enough similiarity between the two peoples to hint at the
success French ships would have in encountering with Anglo-Saxons,
either sailing under the Star Spangled Banner or the Cross of St.
George. Germany is likely to have the same sort of a chill. The Gentians
have never been a maritime nation. A German war vessel has never fired a
hostile shot, and Germans may well have solicitous thoughts as to the
result of a struggle with men who have shown themselves past masters in
the art of naval warfare. Russia is in the same situation. She has never
actually fought anybody at sea but the Turks. The wiser among these
peoples are very likely to begin thinking that their dreams of sea power
are vain illusions, and that they had better save the money they have
been spending on navies and resign the dominion of the sea to the
English-speaking races."
There is no doubt that our naval victories have taught many and valuable
lessons, and it is perhaps proper to make a slight digression here and
show what some of these lessons are.
Let us then consider the deliberations of a board of naval officers,
some of the ablest experts in the service, appointed by Admiral Sampson,
after the battle of Santiago de Cuba, to report upon the condition of
Cervera's sunken fleet, the extent of damages done by American shells
and the lessons to be learned therefrom to guide the United States in
its future ship construction.
The conclusions reached by the board were as follows:
The use of wood in the construction and equipment of war ships should be
reduced to the utmost minimum possible.
Loaded torpedoes above the water line are a serious menace to the
vessels carrying them, and they should not be so carried by vessels
other than torpedo boats.
The value of rapid-fire batteries cannot be too highly estimated.
All water and steam pipes should be laid beneath the protective deck and
below the water line and fitted with risers at such points as may be
considered necessary.
The board also found that the ships Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante
Oquendo and Viscaya were destroyed by conflagration, caused by the
explosion of shells in the interior, which set fire to the woodwork. The
upper deck and all other woodwork on their ships was entirely consumed
except the extremities. This shows the importance of fireproofing all
woodwork on board ships.
Many of the guns on board the burned ships were found loaded at the time
of the board's visit, indicating the haste with which the crews were
driven from the guns.
With talks with experts the following was developed as to what the war
showed:
First--That the gun is still the dominating factor in war.
Second--That rapid-fire guns are especially valuable, but that it is
advisable to retain guns of large calibres.
Third--That smokeless powder is absolutely essential for modern warfare.
Fourth--That there should be a great reduction in the amount of woodwork
on board ship and that that left on board should be fireproof, some
going so far as to say that woodwork should be eliminated entirely, its
place to be taken by some other substance.
Fifth--That armor should be distributed over the entire ship rather than
be limited to the section where its vitals are located.
Sixth--That monitors are useless for cruising purposes or for fighting
in rough waters.
Seventh--That the United States should have a larger navy, with speedier
battleships and fast armored cruisers, and with coaling stations in
different sections of the globe, where men-of-war can procure supplies
and make repairs if necessary.
Captain Charles O'Neil, chief of the bureau of ordnance, gave his
opinion as follows:
"I do not think the battle off Santiago de Cuba demonstrated that we
should abandon the heavy calibres of guns. Serious injury to an enemy's
thickly-armored battleships can be inflicted only by large-calibre guns.
"It is possible that with rapid-fire guns you may shoot away the lightly
armored superstructure, but as long as the vitals are protected and the
turret armor is intact the guns in the turret will be able to do
execution, and large-calibred guns will be necessary to perforate the
armor and disable those weapons. Even with her 12-inch guns the Texas
can fire at the rate of one round per minute, and this record is as
good as that made by any foreign ships. Rapid fire consists in good
facilities for handling ammunition and loading the gun with a quick
working breech mechanism.
"We are now building at the Washington gun factory an experimental
6-inch rapid-fire gun, different from the rapid-fire guns we have now in
service, which are supplied with what is termed fixed ammunition. The
powder and projectile to be used in the experimental gun will be
separate, and two operations consequently will have to be employed in
loading. This can be done so quickly that it is expected that a very
rapid fire will be obtained.
"It is the policy of the Department to have our ships a little ahead of
those of any other nation, to have them equipped with armor of greater
resistive power, and guns capable of doing more execution. The 13-inch
gun, as at present designed, is a more destructive gun than a 12-inch
ordinarily, and its energy is very much greater, the result naturally
being that it has superior armor-piercing powers.
"I think we should keep the 13-inch gun on board of our battleships. On
account of the light armor which protected the Spanish men-of-war, it is
difficult to compare the ships and the effect of their fire, or to draw
conclusions. We would have learned more if the Spanish fleet had been
made up of battleships, and the fire of their gunners had been more
accurate. As it is, the value of the secondary battery was certainly
demonstrated.
"The necessity of eliminating wood to the greatest extent possible and
fireproofing what remains, was shown by the destruction of the Spanish
men-of-war. Fire mains should be kept below the protective deck. The
battle proved that ships moving rapidly can attack other vessels also
under way and inflict serious injury.
"The excellent gunnery of the American sailors is entirely due to the
practice which they had undergone, but the target fired at was
stationary, while their ship was moving. The conditions were different
in action. The Spanish were under way, yet the American gunners fired as
well as if they were merely practising."
The New York Herald speaks as follows of our naval victories:
"Ramming, that expedient of despair, was not attempted. Torpedoing,
despite the opportunities afforded, was estopped by the quick service of
rapid-fire guns on board an inferior but superbly handled construction,
and that final effort, a 'charge through,' was never allowed to
challenge the combined energies of our fleet. If audacity could have
merited success, these Spaniards deserved much, but here the marrow of
the war proverb was not with them.
"Pitted against similar ships, even in superior numbers, some of the
fleeing cruisers might have slipped seaward in hot haste for the
breaking of the Havana blockade. Failing that, all might have
concentrated an assault upon certain selected vessels and found
consolation for final defeat in the foundering hulls of their enemy. But
audacity did not count, individual bravery went for naught; because,
while heavier constructions barred the way, and superior guns smashed
the pathways of escape, energized skill overcame untrained courage and
patient discipline crushed unorganized effort.
"The battleships not only fought the armored cruisers in a long, stern
chase down the shore, but destroying as they ran, finally forced them
blazing in their own wrecks upon a hostile coast. The torpedo boat
destroyers engaged single handed by the Gloucester succumbed so quickly
to inferior armament and speed that their value in a day attack, or,
indeed, their value at any time save as weapons of surprise, need no
longer be reckoned with. This will be a rude awakening to the zealots
who had seen in this weapon the downfall of the ship of the fighting
line, but it will be a heart-cheering confirmation to the loyal seamen
who in season and out have never ceased to proclaim that the integrity
of sea nations rests on battleships and the well-served guns of a
fleet."
"I think sometimes if it had not been for the work of the Oregon the
Colon might have got away," was the statement made by an admiral on the
retired list. "I am not sure that the Brooklyn, with all her speed,
could have stopped the Colon, but I think it quite likely that the New
York would have finally overtaken the Colon and stopped her."
More emphasis was laid upon the speed of the Oregon and the closeness of
her position than upon her 13-inch shells, one of which played such
havoc. The admiral was not seemingly impressed with the difference in
effectiveness between the guns of large and small calibre, but continued
to lay stress on the admirable speed of the Oregon.
"But," he continued, "the war has proved nothing so far as the navy is
concerned. The Spaniards showed no enterprise. If we had come up against
the navy of England there would have been some basis for a conclusion,
but shooting in the air, as the Spaniards did, proves nothing. They had
a fine fleet, with most modern equipment, and yet they could kill only
one man in the whole encounter."
Admiral Sir George Elliot, of the British Navy, considers that at least
five important lessons have been taught by the war. His opinions are as
follows:
"First, in state of peace be fully prepared for war in every respect;
second, the value of adequately-protected coaling stations; third, the
value of superior speed for the cruiser class, and especially for the
more weakly-armored vessels; fourth, the naval defense of seaports by
gunboats and the raising of the naval volunteer corps as an integral
portion of the naval reserve forces; fifth, that great importance be
attached to a steady gun platform for quick-firing guns, looking to the
small number of hits compared with numerous shots fired.
"In this connection," said Sir George Elliot, "I am informed that the
Americans are likely to adopt Captain Hodgett's form of bottom for their
new ships, which must give greater steadiness than bilge keels."
Admiral Sir Henry Nicholson, who was captain of the Temeraire at the
bombardment of Alexandria, and has since been commander in chief at the
Cape of Good Hope and at the Nore, has spoken thus:
"This war has taught us nothing. The state of the Spanish navy has been
for years so hopelessly rotten that when the moment for action arrived
its military value was nil. The Spanish gunners hardly seem to have got
a hit in on any American ship. Nothing is taught us as to the relative
value of the belt or deck armor."
As regards ships versus forts, he said:
"The Spanish forts seem to have been, probably from various reasons, as
inefficient as their ships. Both the Spaniards and the Americans in
their use of torpedo craft have shown very remarkable absence of dash.
Practically neither side has made any use of this dreaded arm."
Captain Montagu Burrow, who is professor of modern history at the
University of Oxford, had this opinion to offer:
"There are no new lessons to be learned, but only confirmation of some
that are very old. The state of unreadiness in Spain when the war
suddenly broke out might, from the unfortunate circumstances of that
country, have been expected, but if the United States had had to deal
with a Power anything like its own strength it would have found its own
position intensely difficult. The war will probably have the effect of
inducing their government to keep up a standing army and navy of a very
superior kind to that of their present system. The recent warning of
their admirable writer, Captain Mahau, will now have a chance of being
listened to, but the Americans have only to expand what is already
proved to be good. The training of their officers and men must have been
of a superior kind to enable them to handle their ships and point their
guns with such excellent effect. It was at one time considered doubtful
whether modern guns could be as accurately fired at great distances as
the old armament at shorter ranges, but they were laid quite as
accurately, and were far more destructive."
As the New York Herald declared at the time, the United States had now
attained their majority. They were now of age, and their voice must be
heard in the council of nations.
There were misgivings all over Europe, especially in Germany and France,
old and bitter foes though they are.
A prominent Parisian thus summed up these misgivings:
"The young American giant," he said, "is only trying his strength on
Spain, but what if he should use it against us?"