_Sir_,—
The constitution which I enclosed to the general assembly in a late
official letter, appears without my signature. This circumstance,
although trivial in its own nature, has been rendered rather important
to myself at least by being misunderstood by some, and misrepresented
by others.—As I disdain to conceal the reasons for withholding my
subscription, I have always been, still am, and ever shall be, ready to
proclaim them to the world. To the legislature, therefore, by whom I
was deputed to the federal convention, I beg leave now to address them;
affecting no indifference to public opinion, but resolved not to court
it by an unmanly sacrifice of my own judgment.
As this explanation will involve a summary, but general review of our
federal situation, you will pardon me, I trust, although I should
transgress the usual bounds of a letter.
Before my departure for the convention, I believed, that the
confederation was not so eminently defective, as it had been supposed.
But after I had entered into a free communication with those who were
best informed of the condition and interest of each State; after I
had compared the intelligence derived from them with the properties
which ought to characterize the government of our union, I became
persuaded, that the confederation was destitute of every energy, which
a constitution of the United States ought to possess.
For the objects proposed by its institution were, that it should be a
shield against foreign hostility, and a firm resort against domestic
commotion; that it should cherish trade, and promote the prosperity of
the States under its care.
But these are not among the attributes of our present union. Severe
experience under the pressure of war—a ruinous weakness manifested
since the return of peace; and the contemplation of those dangers,
which darken the future prospect, have condemned the hope of grandeur
and of safety under the auspices of the confederation.
In the exigencies of war, indeed, the history of its effects is but
short; the final ratification having been delayed until the year
1781. But however short, this period is distinguished by melancholy
testimonies of its inability to maintain in harmony, the social
intercourse of the States, to defend congress against encroachments on
their rights, and to obtain by requisitions, supplies to the federal
treasury, or recruits to the federal armies. I shall not attempt
an enumeration of the particular instances; but leave to your own
remembrance and the records of congress the support of the assertions.
In the season of peace too, not many years have elapsed; and yet each
of them has produced fatal examples of delinquency, and sometimes of
pointed opposition to federal duties. To the various remonstrances of
congress, I appeal, for a gloomy, but unexaggerated narrative of the
injuries which our faith, honor and happiness, have sustained by the
failure of the States.
But these evils are past; and some may be led by an honest zeal to
conclude that they cannot be repeated. Yes, sir, they will be repeated
as long as the confederation exists, and will bring with them other
mischiefs springing from the same source, which cannot yet be foreseen
in their full array of terror.
If we examine the constitution and laws of the several States, it is
immediately discovered that the law of nations is unprovided with
sanctions in many cases, which deeply affect public dignity and public
justice. The letter however of the confederation does not permit
congress to remedy these defects, and such an authority, although
evidently deducible from its spirit, cannot without violation of the
second article, be assumed. Is it not a political phenomenon, that
the head of the confederacy should be doomed to be plunged into war,
from its wretched impotency to check offences against this law; and
sentenced to witness in unavailing anguish the infraction of their
engagements to foreign sovereigns?
And yet this is not the only grievous point of weakness. After a war
shall be inevitable, the requisitions of congress for quotas of men or
money, will again prove unproductive and fallacious. Two causes will
always conspire to this baneful consequence.
1. No government can be stable, which hangs on human inclination alone,
unbiased by the coercion; and 2, from the very connection between
States bound to proportionate contributions, jealousies and suspicions
naturally arise, which at least chill the ardor, if they do not excite
the murmurs of the whole. I do not forget indeed, that by one sudden
impulse our part of the American continent has been thrown into a
military posture, and that in the earlier annals of the war, our armies
marched to the field on the mere recommendations of congress. But ought
we to argue from a contest, thus signalized by the magnitude of its
stake, that as often as a flame shall be hereafter kindled, the same
enthusiasm will fill our legions, or renew them, as they may be filled
by losses?
If not, where shall we find protection? Impressions, like those, which
prevent a compliance with requisitions of regular forces, will deprive
the American republic of the services of militia. But let us suppose
that they are attainable, and acknowledge as I always shall, that they
are the natural support of a free government. When it is remembered,
that in their absence agriculture must languish; that they are not
habituated to military exposures and the rigour of military discipline,
and that the necessity of holding in readiness successive detachments,
carries the expense far beyond that of enlistments—This resource ought
to be adopted with caution.
As strongly too, am I persuaded, that the requisitions for money will
not be more cordially received. For besides the distrust, which would
prevail with respect to them also; besides the opinion, entertained
by each state of its own liberality and unsatisfied demands against
the United States, there is another consideration not less worth of
attention—the first rule for determining each quota of the value of
all lands granted or surveyed, and of the buildings and improvements
thereon. It is no longer doubted that an equitable, uniform mode of
estimating that value is impracticable; and therefore twelve States
have substituted the number of inhabitants under certain limitations,
as the standard according to which money is to be furnished. But under
the subsisting articles of the union, the assent of the thirteenth
State is necessary, and has not yet been given. This does of itself
lessen the hope of procuring a revenue for federal uses; and the
miscarriage of the impost almost rivets our despondency.
Amidst these disappointments, it would afford some consolation, if when
rebellion shall threaten any State, an ultimate asylum could be found
under the wing of congress. But it is at least equivocal whether they
can intrude forces into a State, rent asunder by civil discord, even
with the purest solicitude for our federal welfare, and on the most
urgent entreaties of the State itself. Nay the very allowance of this
power would be pageantry alone, from the want of money and men.
To these defects of congressional power, the history of man has
subjoined others not less alarming. I earnestly pray that the
recollection of common sufferings, which terminated in common glory,
may check the sallies of violence, and perpetuate mutual friendship
between the States. But I cannot presume, that we are superior to
those unsocial passions, which under like circumstances have infested
more ancient nations. I cannot presume, that through all time, in the
daily mixture of American citizens with each other, in the conflicts
for commercial advantages, in the discontents which the neighborhood
of territory has been seen to engender in other quarters of the
globe, and in the efforts of faction and intrigue—thirteen distinct
communities under no effective superintending control, (as the United
States confessedly now are, notwithstanding the bold terms of the
confederation) will avoid a hatred to each other deep and deadly.
In the prosecution of this enquiry, we shall find the general
prosperity to decline under a system thus unnerved. No sooner is the
merchant prepared for foreign ports, with the treasures which this
new world kindly offers to his acceptance, than it is announced to
him, that they are shut against American shipping, or opened under
oppressive regulations. He urges congress to a counter-policy, and
is answered only by a condolence on the general misfortune. He is
immediately struck with the conviction, that until exclusion shall be
opposed to exclusion, and restriction to restriction, the American flag
will be disgraced. For who can conceive, that thirteen legislatures,
viewing commerce under different regulations, and fancying themselves
discharged from every obligation to concede the smallest of their
commercial advantages for the benefit of the whole, will be wrought
into a concert of action and defiance of every prejudice? Nor is this
all: Let the great improvements be recounted, which have enriched and
illustrated Europe: Let it be noted, how few those are, which will be
absolutely denied to the United States, comprehending within their
boundaries, the choicest blessings of climate, soil and navigable
waters; then let the most sanguine patriot banish, if he can, the
mortifying belief that all these must sleep, until they shall be roused
by the vigor of a national government.
I have not exemplified the preceding remarks by minute details; because
they are evidently fortified by truth, and the consciousness of the
United States of America. I shall, therefore, no longer deplore the
unfitness of the confederation to secure our peace; but proceed with
a truly unaffected distrust of my own opinions to examine what order
of powers the government of the United States ought to enjoy? How
they ought to be defended against encroachments? Whether they can be
interwoven in the confederation, without an alteration of its very
essence, or must be lodged in new hands? Showing, at the same time, the
convulsions which seem to await us, from a dissolution of the union or
partial confederacies.
To mark the kind and degree of authority which ought to be confided
to the government of the United States, is no more than to reverse
the description which I have already given, of the defects of the
confederation.
From thence it will follow, that the operations of peace and war will
be clogged without regular advances of money, and that these will
be slow indeed, if dependent on supplication alone. For what better
name do requisitions deserve, which may be evaded or opposed without
the fear of coercion? But although coercion is an indispensable
ingredient, it ought not to be directed against a State, as a State;
it being impossible to attempt it except by blockading the trade of
the delinquent, or carrying war into its bowels. Even if these violent
schemes were eligible, in other respects, both of them might, perhaps,
be defeated by the scantiness of the public chest; would be tardy in
their complete effect, as the expense of the land and naval equipments
must be first reimbursed; and might drive the proscribed State into
the desperate resolve of inviting foreign alliances. Against each of
them lie separate unconquerable objections. A blockade is not equally
applicable to all the States, they being differently circumstanced
in commerce and in ports; nay an excommunication from the privilege
of the union would be vain, because every regulation or prohibition
may be easily eluded under the rights of American citizenship, or of
foreign nations. But how shall we speak of the intrusion of troops?
Shall we arm citizens against citizens, and habituate them to shed
kindred blood? Shall we risk the inflicting of wounds which will
generate a rancour never to be subdued? Would there be no room to fear,
that an army accustomed to fight for the establishment of authority,
would salute an emperor of their own? Let us not bring these things
into jeopardy. Let us rather substitute the same process by which
individuals are compelled to contribute to the government of their own
States. Instead of making requisitions to the legislatures, it would
appear more proper that taxes should be imposed by the federal head,
under due modifications and guards; that the collectors should demand
from the citizens their respective quotas, and be supported as in the
collection of ordinary taxes.
It follows, too, that, as the general government will be responsible to
foreign nations, it ought to be able to annul any offensive measure, or
enforce any public right. Perhaps among the topics on which they may be
aggrieved or complain, the commercial intercourse, and the manner in
which contracts are discharged, may constitute the principal articles
of clamor.
It follows, too, that the general government ought to be the supreme
arbiter for adjusting every contention among the States. In all their
connections, therefore, with each other, and particularly in commerce,
which will probably create the greatest discord, it ought to hold the
reins.
It follows, too, that the general government ought to protect each
State against domestic as well as external violence.
And lastly, it follows, that through the general government alone, can
we ever assume the rank to which we are entitled by our resources and
situation.
Should the people of America surrender these powers, they can be
paramount to the constitutions and ordinary acts of legislation, only
by being delegated by them. I do not pretend to affirm, but I venture
to believe, that if the confederation had been solemnly questioned in
opposition to our constitution, or even to one of our laws, posterior
to it, it must have given away. For never did it obtain a higher
ratification, than a resolution of assembly in the daily form.
This will be one security against encroachment. But another not less
effectual is, to exclude the individual States from any agency in the
national government, as far as it may be safe, and their interposition
may not be absolutely necessary.
But now, sir, permit me to declare, that in my humbled judgment, the
powers by which alone the blessings of a general government can be
accomplished, cannot be interwoven in the confederation, without a
change in its very essence, or, in other words, that the confederation
must be thrown aside. This is almost demonstrable from the inefficacy
of requisitions, and from the necessity of converting them into acts
of authority. My suffrage, as a citizen, is also for additional
powers. But to whom shall we commit those acts of authority, these
additional powers? To congress? When I formerly lamented the defects
in the jurisdiction of congress, I had no view to indicate any other
opinion, than that the federal head ought not to be so circumscribed.
For free as I am at all times to profess my reverence for that body,
and the individuals who compose it, I am yet equally free to make
known my aversion to repose such a trust in a tribunal so constituted.
My objections are not the visions of theory, but the results of my
own observations in America, and of the experience of others abroad.
1. The legislative and executive are concentred in the same persons.
This, where real power exists, must eventuate in tyranny. 2. The
representation of the States bears no proportion to their importance.
This is an unreasonable subjection of the will of the majority to that
of the minority, 3. The mode of election and the liability of being
recalled, may too often render the delegates rather partizans of their
own States than representatives of the union. 4. Cabal and intrigue
must consequently gain an ascendancy in a course of years. 5. A single
house of legislation will sometimes be precipitate, perhaps passionate.
6. As long as seven States are required for the smallest, and nine
for the greatest votes, may not foreign influence at some future day
insinuate itself, so as to interrupt every active exertion? 7. To
crown the whole, it is scarce within the verge of possibility, that so
numerous an assembly should acquire that secrecy, dispatch, and vigour,
which are the test of excellence in the executive department.
My inference from these facts and principles, is, that the new powers
must be deposited in a new body, growing out of a consolidation of
the union, as far as the circumstances of the State will allow.
Perhaps, however, some may meditate its dissolution, and others partial
confederacies.
The first is an idea awful indeed, and irreconcilable with a very
early, and hitherto uniform conviction, that without union, we must be
undone. For, before the voice of war was heard, the pulse of the then
colonies was tried, and found to beat in unison. The unremitted labor
of our enemies was to divide, and the policy of every congress to bind
us together. But in no example was this truth more clearly displayed,
than in the prudence with which independence was unfolded to the sight,
and in the forbearance to declare it, until America almost unanimously
called for it. After we had thus launched into troubles, never before
explored, and the hour of heavy distress, the remembrance of our social
strength not only forbade despair, but drew from congress the most
illustrious repetition of their settled purpose to depise all terms,
short of independence.
Behold, then, how successful and glorious we have been, while we acted
in fraternal concord. But let us discard the illusion, that by this
success, and this glory, the crest of danger has irrecoverably fallen.
Our governments are yet too youthful to have acquired stability from
habit. Our very quiet depends upon the duration of the union. Among
the upright and intelligent, few can read without emotion the future
fate of the States, if severed from each other. Then shall we learn
the full weight of foreign intrigue. Then shall we hear of partitions
of our country. If a prince, inflamed by the lust of conquest, should
use one State as the instrument of enslaving others—if every State
is to be wearied by perpetual alarms, and compelled to maintain large
military establishments—if all questions are to be decided by an
appeal to arms, where a difference of opinion cannot be removed by
negociation—in a word, if all the direful misfortunes which haunt the
peace of rival nations, are to triumph over the land, for what have
we to contend? why have we exhausted our wealth? why have we basely
betrayed the heroic martyrs of the federal cause?
But dreadful as the total dissolution of the union is to my mind, I
entertain no less horror at the thought of partial confederacies. I
have not the least ground for supposing that an overture of this kind
would be listened to by a single State, and the presumption is, that
the politics of the greater part of the States, flow from the warmest
attachment to an union of the whole. If, however, a lesser confederacy
could be obtained by Virginia, let me conjure my countrymen well to
weigh the probable consequences, before they attempt to form it.
On such an event, the strength of the union would be divided in two,
or perhaps three parts. Has it so increased since the war as to be
divisible—and yet remain sufficient for our happiness?
The utmost limit of any partial confederacy, which Virginia could
expect to form, would comprehend the three southern States, and her
nearest northern neighbour. But they, like ourselves, are diminished in
their real force, by the mixture of an unhappy species of population.
Again, may I ask, whether the opulence of the United States has been
augmented since the war? This is answered in the negative, by a load of
debt, and the declension of trade.
At all times must a southern confederacy support ships of war, and
soldiery? As soon would a navy move from the forest, and an army
from the earth, as such a confederacy, indebted, impoverished in its
commerce, and destitute of men, could, for some years at least, provide
an ample defence for itself.
Let it not be forgotten, that nations which can enforce their rights,
have large claims against the United States, and that the creditor may
insist on payment from any of them. Which of them would probably be
the victim? The most productive and the most exposed. When vexed by
reprisals of war, the southern States will sue for alliance on this
continent or beyond sea. If for the former, the necessity of an union
of the whole is decided; if for the latter, America will, I fear,
re-act the scenes of confusion and bloodshed, exhibited among most of
those nations, which have, too late, repented the folly of relying on
auxiliaries.
Two or more confederacies cannot but be competitors for power. The
ancient friendship between the citizens of America, being thus cut off,
bitterness and hostility will succeed in its place; in order to prepare
against surrounding danger, we shall be compelled to vest some where or
other, power approaching near to military government.
The annals of the world have abounded so much with instances of a
divided people being a prey to foreign influence, that I shall not
restrain my apprehensions of it, should our union be torn asunder. The
opportunity of insinuating it, will be multiplied in proportion to the
parts into which we may be broken.
In short, sir, I am fatigued with summoning up to my imagination the
miseries which will harass the United States, if torn from each other,
and which will not end until they are superseded by fresh mischiefs
under the yoke of a tyrant.
I come, therefore, to the last, and perhaps only refuge in our
difficulties, a consolidation of the union, as far as circumstances
will permit. To fulfil this desirable object, the constitution was
framed by the federal convention. A quorum of eleven States, and the
only member from a twelfth have subscribed it; Mr. Mason, of Virginia,
Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, and myself having refused to subscribe.
Why I refused, will, I hope, be solved to the satisfaction of those
who know me, by saying, that a sense of duty commanded me thus to
act. It commanded me, sir, for believe me, that no event of my life
ever occupied more of my reflection. To subscribe, seemed to offer no
inconsiderable gratification, since it would have presented me to the
world as a fellow laborer with the learned and zealous statesmen of
America.
But it was far more interesting to my feelings, that I was about to
differ from three of my colleagues, one of whom is, to the honor of
the country which he has saved, embosomed in their affections, and can
receive no praise from the highest lustre of language; the other two of
whom have been long enrolled among the wisest and best lovers of the
commonwealth; and the unshaken and intimate friendship of all of whom
I have ever prized, and still do prize, as among the happiest of all
acquisitions.—I was no stranger to the reigning partiality for the
members who composed the convention, and had not the smallest doubt,
that from this cause, and from the ardor of a reform of government, the
first applauses at least would be loud and profuse. I suspected, too,
that there was something in the human breast which for a time would
be apt to construe a temperateness in politics, into an enmity to the
union. Nay, I plainly foresaw, that in the dissensions of parties, a
middle line would probably be interpreted into a want of enterprise
and decision.—But these considerations, how seducing soever, were
feeble opponents to the suggestions of my conscience. I was sent to
exercise my judgment, and to exercise it was my fixed determination;
being instructed by even an imperfect acquaintance with mankind, that
self approbation is the only true reward which a political career
can bestow, and that popularity would have been but another name for
perfidy, if to secure it, I had given up the freedom of thinking for
myself.
It would have been a peculiar pleasure to me to have ascertained
before I left Virginia, the temper and genius of my fellow citizens,
considered relatively to a government, so substantially differing from
the confederation as that which is now submitted. But this was, for
many obvious reasons, impossible; and I was thereby deprived of what I
thought the necessary guides.
I saw, however, that the confederation was tottering from its own
weakness, and that the sitting of a convention was a signal of its
total insufficiency. I was therefore ready to assent to a scheme of
government, which was proposed, and which went beyond the limits of the
confederation, believing, that without being too extensive it would
have preserved our tranquility, until that temper and that genius
should be collected.
But when the plan which is now before the general assembly, was on its
passage through the convention, I moved, that the State conventions
should be at liberty to amend, and that a second general convention
should beholden, to discuss the amendments, which should be suggested
by them. This motion was in some measure justified by the manner in
which the confederation was forwarded originally, by congress to the
State legislatures, in many of which amendments were proposed, and
those amendments were afterwards examined in congress. Such a motion
was doubly expedient here, as the delegation of so much power was
sought for. But it was negatived. I then expressed my unwillingness to
sign. My reasons were the following:
1. It is said in the resolutions which accompany the constitution, that
it is to be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each State
by the people thereof, for their assent and ratification. The meaning
of these terms is allowed universally to be, that the convention must
either adopt the constitution in the whole, or reject it in the whole,
and is positively forbidden to amend. If therefore, I had signed,
I should have felt myself bound to be silent as to amendments, and
to endeavor to support the constitution without the correction of a
letter. With this consequence before my eyes, and with a determination
to attempt an amendment, I was taught by a regard for consistency not
to sign.
2. My opinion always was, and still is, that every citizen of America,
let the crisis be what it may, ought to have a full opportunity to
propose, through his representatives, any amendment which in his
apprehension, tends to the public welfare. By signing, I should have
contradicted this sentiment.
3. A constitution ought to have the hearts of the people on its side.
But if at a future day it should be burdensome after having been
adopted in the whole, and they should insinuate that it was in some
measure forced upon them, by being confined to the single alternative
of taking or rejecting it altogether, under my impressions, and with my
opinions, I should not be able to justify myself had I signed.
4. I was always satisfied, as I have now experienced, that this great
subject would be placed in new lights and attitudes by the criticism
of the world, and that no man can assure himself how a constitution
will work for a course of years, until at least he shall have heard the
observations of the people at large. I also fear more from inaccuracies
in a constitution, than from gross errors in any other composition;
because our dearest interests are to be regulated by it; and power,
if loosely given, especially where it will be interpreted with great
latitude, may bring sorrow in its execution. Had I signed with these
ideas, I should have virtually shut my ears against the information
which I ardently desired.
5. I was afraid that if the constitution was to be submitted to
the people, to be wholly adopted or wholly rejected by them, they
would not only reject it, but bid a lasting farewell to the union.
This formidable event I wished to avert, by keeping myself free to
propose amendments, and thus, if possible, to remove the obstacles
to an effectual government. But it will be asked, whether all these
arguments, were not be well weighed in convention. They were, sir,
with great candor. Nay, when I called to mind the respectability of
those, with whom I was associated, I almost lost confidence in these
principles. On other occasions, I should cheerfully have yielded to a
majority; on this the fate of thousands yet unborn, enjoined me not to
yield until I was convinced.
Again, may I be asked, why the mode pointed out in the constitution
for its amendment, may not be a sufficient security against its
imperfections, without now arresting it in its progress? My answers
are—1. That it is better to amend, while we have the constitution in
our power, while the passions of designing men are not yet enlisted,
and while a bare majority of the States may amend than to wait for
the uncertain assent of three fourths of the States. 2. That a bad
feature in government, becomes more and more fixed every day. 3. That
frequent changes of a constitution, even if practicable, ought not to
be wished, but avoided as much as possible. And 4. That in the present
case, it may be questionable, whether, after the particular advantages
of its operation shall be discerned, three fourths of the States can be
induced to amend.
I confess, that it is no easy task, to devise a scheme which shall
be suitable to the views of all. Many expedients have occurred to
me, but none of them appear less exceptionable than this; that if
our convention should choose to amend, another federal convention be
recommended: that in that federal convention the amendments proposed
by this or any other State be discussed; and if incorporated in the
constitution or rejected, or if a proper number of the other States
should be unwilling to accede to a second convention, the constitution
be again laid before the same State conventions, which shall again
assemble on the summons of the executives, and it shall be either
wholly adopted, or wholly rejected, without a further power of
amendment. I count such a delay as nothing in comparison with so grand
an object; especially too as the privilege of amending must terminate
after the use of it once.
I should now conclude this letter, which is already too long, were it
not incumbent on me, from having contended for amendments, to set forth
the particulars, which I conceive to require correction. I undertake
this with reluctance: because it is remote from my intentions to
catch the prejudices or prepossessions of any man. But as I mean only
to manifest that I have not been actuated by caprice, and now to
explain every objection at full length would be an immense labour,
I shall content myself with enumerating certain heads, in which the
constitution is most repugnant to my wishes.
The two first points are the equality of suffrage in the senate, and
the submission of commerce to a mere majority in the legislature, with
no other check than the revision of the president. I conjecture that
neither of these things can be corrected; and particularly the former,
without which we must have risen perhaps in disorder.
But I am sanguine in hoping that in every other justly obnoxious cause,
Virginia will be seconded by a majority of the States. I hope that she
will be seconded. 1. In causing all ambiguities of expression to be
precisely explained. 2. In rendering the president ineligible after a
given number of years. 3. In taking from him the power of nominating
to the judiciary offices, or of filling up vacancies which may there
happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which
shall expire at the end of their next sessions. 4. In taking from him
the power of pardoning for treason at least before conviction. 5. In
drawing a line between the powers of congress and individual States;
and in defining the former, so as to leave no clashing of jurisdictions
nor dangerous disputes; and to prevent the one from being swallowed
up by the other, under cover of general words, and implication. 6. In
abridging the power of the senate to make treaties supreme laws of
the land. 7. In incapacitating the congress to determine their own
salaries. And 8. In limiting and defining the judicial power.
The proper remedy must be consigned to the wisdom of the convention;
and the final step which Virginia shall pursue, if her overtures shall
be discarded, must also rest with them.
You will excuse me, sir, for having been thus tedious. My feelings
and duty demanded this exposition; for through no other channel could
I rescue my omission to sign from misrepresentation, and no more
effectual way could I exhibit to the general assembly an unreserved
history of my conduct.
I have the honor, sir, to be with great respect, your most obedient
servant,