5. To all cases between citizens of the same state, claiming lands
under the grants of different states.
6. To all cases between citizens of a state, and foreign states, or
their citizens or subjects.
One doubt arising on the judiciary article is, whether in these cases
of appellate jurisdiction, the appeal lies both from the state courts,
and the inferior federal courts, or only from the former, or only from
the latter.
Another doubt is, whether the inferior courts are to be branches of
the supreme court, constituted for convenience, and having equal
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, with the supreme court,
or whether the inferior courts are to be confined to an _original_
jurisdiction in those cases, wherein the supreme court has _appellate_
jurisdiction.
I shall not presume to decide absolutely on the genuine construction
of an article, which is said to have caused much private debate and
perplexity. I am however fully persuaded, that, as the article speaks
of an original and appellate jurisdiction, of a supreme court, and
inferior courts; and, as there is no intimation of appeals from the
several [22] state tribunals, the inferior federal courts are intended
to have original jurisdiction in all cases, wherein the supreme court
has appellate jurisdiction; and the appeal lies only from them. I can,
almost, with confidence, maintain, that, as there is no express clause,
or necessary implication, to oust the jurisdiction of state courts, an
action, after the adoption of the plan, may be instituted in any court,
having, at this time, a jurisdiction. And if an action be brought in
a state court, I do not, at present, perceive, that it can, in any
manner, be transferred to the supreme or inferior federal court.
According then to the best of my judgment the affair stands thus. The
supreme federal court will have an exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases relative to the rights of ambassadors, other ministers, and
consuls; because, as I humbly conceive, the several state governments
have at this time nothing to do with these cases. With respect to the
cases, in which a state may be party, the supreme federal court, and
the several state courts, will have, I conceive, concurrent original
jurisdiction, _provided a state may, at this time, institute an action
in its own name, in the courts of another state_. The inferior federal
courts, and the state courts, will, I conceive, have concurrent
original jurisdiction in all the enumerated cases wherein an appeal
lies to the supreme court, _except only the cases created by or under
the proposed constitution, in which, as they do not now exist, the
inferior federal courts will have exclusive jurisdiction_. From the
state inferior courts, I further apprehend, that an appeal will lie, in
all cases, to their own high courts of appeal, as heretofore.
A choice of jurisdictions has been ever esteemed a valuable right,
even where there are both of the same kind. The purpose of extending
so far the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, is to give every
assurance to the general government, of a faithful execution of its
laws, and to give citizens, states, and foreigners, an assurance of the
impartial administration of justice. Without the salutary institution,
the federal government might frequently be obstructed, and its servants
want protection. It is calculated not as an engine of oppression, but
to secure the blessings of peace and good [23] order. The provisions
respecting different states, their citizens, and foreigners, if not
absolutely necessary, are much to be applauded, The human mind is so
framed, that the slightest circumstance may prevent the most upright
and well known tribunal from giving complete satisfaction; and there
may happen a variety of cases, where the distrust and suspicion may not
be altogether destitute of a just foundation.
On these principles, an appeal as to fact is no less proper, than the
appeal from judges of law. A jury, whose legal qualifications are
only property and ripe age, may more probably incur the imputation of
weakness, partiality, or undue influence. But in regard to appeals, it
is very material to remark, that congress is to make such regulations
and exceptions, as upon mature deliberation, it shall think proper.
And indeed, before such regulations and exceptions shall be made,
the manner of appeal will not be ascertained. Is it then to be
presumed, that, in making regulations and exceptions, this appellate
jurisdiction shall be calculated as an engine of oppression, or to
serve only the purpose of vexation and delay.
As the rod of Aaron once swallowed up the rods of the Egyptian
_magi_, so also is it feared, that these federal courts, will, at
length, swallow up the state tribunals. A miracle, in one case, is as
necessary, as in the other.
But let not the officers of state courts be overmuch alarmed! The
causes, which, by possibility, may be(63) instituted in the federal
courts bear no comparison to the rest. [24] In the course of ten years,
not one action, that I know of, in Maryland, has concerned either
another state, or an ambassador, consul, or other minister. It is
hoped, that actions by foreigners, will, in a few years, become much
rarer than at any time heretofore, and these may still be determined in
the state courts. [25]
A gentleman, as it is conjectured, in the law department of a
neighboring state, has been pleased to infer, that fictions, similar to
those in the king’s bench and exchequer of England, will be contrived,
to draw causes into the federal courts. He seems not aware, that, even
in England, the established fictions of law are not of modern date.
They were ingenious devices, to remedy defects in the common law,
_without the aid_
_of parliament_. The fundamental principle however, with respect to
their adoption, was, that they _consist with equity, and be requisite
for the advancement of justice_. Now every man, who would establish
over his cause a jurisdiction in a federal court, must shew, that
such cause comes under the description of the constitution. If he
do not, there will be wanting that equity, which is the support of
legal fiction. But can any man seriously imagine, that fiction will
be permitted, to give the judges a power of legislation, denied to
congress itself? Wherefore should the judges, holding their commissions
during good behaviour, be guilty of such gross falsehood, perjury,
and breach of trust? Would there not be a general revolt against
such barefaced impudent innovations. Away then with your trumpery
of fictions! Accuse not the illustrious members of the convention
of having in their contemplation such sophistry, pettifogging and
chicane! But another fear is, that whatever actions may be instituted
in the federal courts will there seek an admission, on account of a
more speedy decision. That man alone, “on whose brow shame is ashamed
to sit,” will avow his opposition to a more speedy administration of
justice.
The institution of the trial by jury has been sanctified by the
experience of ages. It has been recognised by the constitution of
every state in the union. It is deemed the birthright of Americans; and
it is imagined, that liberty cannot subsist without it. The proposed
plan expressly adopts it, for the decision of all criminal accusations,
except impeachment; and is silent with respect to the determination of
facts in civil causes.
The inference, hence drawn by many, is not warranted by the premises.
By recognising the jury trial in criminal cases, the constitution
effectually provides, that it shall pre- [26] vail, so long as the
constitution itself shall remain unimpaired and unchanged. But,
from the great variety of civil cases, arising under this plan of
government, it would be unwise and impolitic to say aught about it, in
regard to these. Is there not a great variety of cases, in which this
trial is taken away in each of the states? Are there not many more
cases, where it is denied in England? For the convention to ascertain
in what cases it shall prevail, and in what others it may be expedient
to prefer other modes was impracticable. On this subject a future
congress is to decide; and I see no foundation under Heaven for the
opinion that congress will despise the known prejudices and inclination
of their countrymen. A very ingenious writer of Philadelphia has
mentioned the objections without deigning to refute that, which he
conceives to have originated in “sheer malice.”
I proceed to attack the whole body of anti-federalists in their strong
hold. The proposed constitution contains no _bill of rights_.
Consider again the nature and intent of a federal republic. It consists
of an assemblage of distinct states, each completely organized for the
protection of its own citizens, and the whole consolidated, by express
compact, under one head, for the general welfare and common defence.
Should the compact authorize the sovereign, or head to do all things
it may think necessary and proper, then there is no limitation to its
authority; and the liberty of each citizen in the union has no other
security, than the sound policy, good faith, virtue, and perhaps proper
interests, of the head.
When the compact confers the aforesaid general power, making
nevertheless some special reservations and exceptions, then is the
citizen protected further, so far as these reservations and exceptions
shall extend.
But, when the compact ascertains and defines the power delegated to the
federal head, then cannot this government, without manifest usurpation,
exert any power not expressly, or by _necessary_ implication, conferred
by the compact.
This doctrine is so obvious and plain, that I am amazed any good man
should deplore the omission of a bill of rights.
[27] When we were told, that the celebrated Mr. Wilson had advanced
this doctrine in effect, it was said, Mr. Wilson would not dare to
speak thus to a CONSTITUTIONALIST. With talents inferior to that
gentleman’s, I will maintain the doctrine against any CONSTITUTIONALIST
who will condescend to enter the lists, and behave like a gentleman.
It is, however, the idea of another most respectable character, that,
as a bill of rights could do no harm, and might quiet the minds of many
good people, the convention would have done well to indulge them. With
all due deference, I apprehend, that a bill of rights might not be this
innocent quieting instrument. Had the convention entered on the work,
they must have comprehended within it everything, which the citizens
of the United States claim as a natural or a civil right. An omission
of a single article would have caused more discontent, than is either
felt or pretended, on the present occasion. A multitude of articles
might be the source of infinite controversy, by clashing with the
powers intended to be given. To be full and certain, a bill of rights
might have cost the convention more time, than was expended on their
other work. The very appearance of it might raise more clamour than
its omission,—I mean from those who study pretexts for condemning the
whole fabric of the constitution.—“What! (might they say) did these
exalted spirits imagine, that the natural rights of mankind depend on
their gracious concession. If indeed they possessed that tyrannic sway,
which, the kings of England had once usurped, we might humbly thank
them for their _magna charta_, defective as it is. As that is not the
case, we will not suffer it to be understood, that their _new-fangled_
federal head shall domineer with the powers not excepted by their
precious bill of rights. What! if the owner of 1,000 acres of land
thinks proper to fell one half, is it necessary to take a release from
the vendee of the other half? Just as necessary is it for the people to
have a grant of their natural rights from a government which derives
everything it has, from the grant of the people.” [28]
The restraints laid on the state legislatures will tend to secure
domestic tranquility, more than all the bills, or declarations, of
rights, which human policy could devise. It is very justly asserted,
that the plan contains an avowal of many rights. It provides that
no man, shall suffer by expost facto laws or bills of attainder. It
declares, that gold and silver only shall be a tender for specie debts;
and that no law shall impair the obligation of a contract.
I have here perhaps touched a string, which secretly draws together
many of the foes to the plan. Too long have we sustained evils,
resulting from injudicious emissions of paper, and from the operation
of tender laws. To bills of credit as they are now falsely called,
may we impute the entire loss of confidence between men. Hence it is,
that specie has, in a great degree, ceased its proper office, and
been confined to speculations, baneful to the public, and enriching
a few enterprising sharp-sighted men, at the expence not only of the
ignorant, slothful, and needy, but of their country’s best benefactors.
Hence chiefly are the bankruptcies throughout America, and the
disreputable ruinous state of our commerce. Hence is it principally,
that America hath lost its credit abroad, and American faith become
a proverb. The convention plainly saw, that nothing short of a
renunciation of the right to emit bills of credit could produce that
grand consummation of policy, the RESTORATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
FAITH.
Were it possible for the nations abroad to suppose Great Britain would
emit bills on the terms whereon they have issued in America, how soon
would the wide arch of that mighty empire tumble into ruins? In no
other country in the universe has prevailed the idea of supplying,
by _promissory notes_, the want of coin, for commerce and taxes. In
America, indeed, they have heretofore served many valuable purposes.
It is this consideration, which has so powerfully attached to them
many well meaning honest citizens; and they talk of gratitude to paper
money, as if it were a sensible benefactor, entitled to the highest
rank and distinction; and as if, to abandon it, would be a deadly
sin. But when everything demonstrates the season to be past; when
the credit of America, in all places, depends on the security she
shall give to [29] contracts, it would be madness in the states to be
tenacious of their right. So long as Europe shall believe we regard
not justice, gratitude and honour, so long will America labour under
the disadvantages of an individual, who attempts to make good his way
through the world with a blasted reputation. To the man, who shall say,
“it is of no consequence to consult national honour,” I only answer
thus,—“If thy soul be so narrow and depraved, as to believe this, it
were a needless attempt to cure thee of thy error.”
On this subject there is no necessity for enlarging, to the people of
my native state; their conduct on a recent occasion having acquired
them great and deserved applause. Is it necessary to enlarge on the
propriety of giving more efficient powers to a federal head? At this
moment, congress is little more than a name, without power to effect a
single thing, which is the object of a confederate republic. Reflect
on the recent period, when, in a sister state, a numerous body of her
frantic citizens appeared armed for the destruction of a government,
framed by the people. When that unhappy state was devoted to the
miseries of a civil war, did congress even dare to interpose? Conscious
of its inability to protect, it could only await the result, in silence
and in terror. It indeed ventured to _make application_ to the states
for a small body of troops, under the poor pretext of another, and a
necessary, destination. But, notwithstanding the universal contagion
of the alarm, did the states, on _that_ occasion, comply with the
_requisition_? Suppose even an invasion by a foreign power,—in what
manner could congress provide for its own defence? In the contemptible
light in which America has lately stood, is it reasonable to expect she
will be suffered to remain long in peace? The distance between the two
continents is the only circumstance on which we can rely. All Europe is
now in suspence; and the result of your deliberations will instruct her
in the part she shall act.
With amazement, her nations contemplate a scene, of which the world is
too young to furnish a parallel. We assembled our sages, patriots, and
statesmen, to consult what mode of government is capable of producing
the greatest sum [30] of general good, with the least mixture of
general, and partial evil. Not that each individual in this august
assembly was expected to offer a system; but that the product of their
joint wisdom should be referred to the several states, to be adopted,
or rejected, as the great body of the people shall determine on a free
and full deliberation.
As the occasion was unparalleled so also is the plan, which, after many
months of painful investigation, is submitted, with an unanimity, also
unparalleled.
If there be any man, who approves the great outlines of the plan,
and, at the same time, would reject it, because he views some of the
minute parts as imperfect, he should reflect, that, if the states
think as he does, an alteration may be hereafter effected, at leisure.
When the convention determined, that the whole should be received,
or the whole fail, they did not on an arrogant conceit of their own
infallibility, but on the soundest principles of policy and common
sense. Were each state legislature, or convention, to take it up,
article by article, and section by section, with the liberty of
adopting some, and rejecting the rest, in all probability, so small
a part would be approved by nine states, on the narrow view which
each has of the subject, and attached as each is to its own supposed
interest, that, in its mutilated condition, it would be worse than the
present confederation. For thirteen different assemblies, in that way,
to approve so much of any plan whatever, as might merit the name of
system, the convention well knew to be impossible. Were there any one
body of men, invested with full power, in behalf of the whole United
States, to consider, and amend the plan, then would it be proper to
debate it by sections, in the same manner as it was originally debated.
With a view to defeat totally the plan, another general convention
is proposed; not with the power of giving a finishing hand to a
constitution; but _again_ to consider objections, to strike out, to
add, and _again_ to make their report to the several states.
In this way, there can never be an end. We must at last return to
this,—that whatever is agreed on, by the assembly appointed to
propose, must be either adopted in the whole, or in the whole rejected.
[31]
The idea of a new convention is started by some men, with the vain
expectation of having amendments made to suit a particular state, or
to advance their own selfish views. Were this fatal idea adopted, I
should bid a last adieu to that elevated hope, which now inspires me,
of living under the happiest form of government which the sun ever
beheld. Recollect again and again, that almost every state in the union
made a determined point of delegating its first characters to this
grand convention. Reflect upon the time spent in the arduous work, and
the sacrifices which those distinguished persons made to their country.
Should the same men be deputed again, would they not, think you, with
the same unanimity, subscribe and recommend the same plan? So far as I
have been informed, those members, who, in the progression of the plan,
had opposed certain parts, and yet afterwards subscribed cheerfully
to the whole, have, with the candour which becomes them, acknowledged
their errors in debate. Even an illustrious character, who was of
the minority, consisting only of three, I have been told, has since
regretted his refusal.
Suppose then a second convention, with a different choice of delegates.
These too would either speedily subscribe, or they might propose some
other system, to be debated, paragraph by paragraph, in thirteen
different assemblies; and then there would be the same probability
of a mutilated plan; or they would propose something, to be adopted
or rejected in the whole; and there would be the same necessity of
another convention. Besides, as the second convention, if it consist
of different men, must _inevitably_ be inferior to the first, there
is little probability that their work will be superior. Never again,
in an assembly constituted as that was, will there be found the same
liberality of sentiment, “the same spirit of amity, and the same mutual
deference and concession.”
If it be contended, that the second, being possessed of the various
objections from the several states, must be better able to determine, I
would ask, what conduct this second convention should adopt? Are they
to take the proposed plan, and strike out every thing objected to by
nine states? Or may they likewise adopt and recommend the entire plan?
In short, to [32] appoint a second convention, merely to consult and
propose, would be the most absurd expedient, that ever, in a matter of
this amazing magnitude, was proposed. Does any man then entertain the
thought of another kind of convention, invested with full powers to
consult, amend, adopt, and confirm? A scheme like this was never yet,
I trust, in agitation. But, if it were, I would propose this single
question. Whether is it better to amend, before it be tried, that plan,
which may be termed the result of the wisdom of America, or leave it to
be amended, at leisure, as mature experience shall direct?
Although a very great variety of ostensible objections have been
publicly offered, the real and sincere objections are hardly ever
disclosed in private. There is a class, opposed to the union of
_thirteen different states_, and the reason they assign, is the vast
extent of our territory. Let us consider well their objection.
To consolidate the whole thirteen states into a single organization,
was out of the convention’s contemplation,—for two unanswerable
reasons. In the first place, they were satisfied, that not one of
the states would renounce its sovereignty. In the next place, they
considered, that, in a single government, with a great extent of
territory, the advantages are most unequally diffused. As the extreme
parts are scarcely sensible of its protection, so are they scarcely
under its domination. It is generally agreed, that a great extended
nation can long continue under no _single_ form of government, except a
despotism into which, either a republic, or a limited monarchy, will
be certain to degenerate. And hence, if I understand the man who styles
himself a _Centinel_, he insinuates, that, if these states will persist
in remaining under one head, they must soon fall under the dominion of
a despot. But, my fellow-citizens, in a confederate
republic, consisting of distinct states, completely organized within
themselves, and each of no greater extent than is proper for a
republican form, almost all the blessings of government are equally
diffused. Its protection extends to the remotest corner, and there
every man is under restraint of laws. [33]
A true federal republic is always capable of accession by the peaceable
and friendly admission of new single states. _Its true size is neither
greater nor less than that, which may comprehend all the states, which,
by their contiguity, may become enemies, unless united under one common
head, capable of reconciling all their differences._ Such a government
as this, excels any single government, extending over the same
territory, as a band of brothers is superior to a band of slaves, or as
thirteen common men, for the purposes of agriculture, would be superior
to a giant, enjoying strength of body equal to them all.
The idea of a balance has long influenced the politics of Europe. But
how much superior to this almost impracticable balance would be a
general league, constituting a kind of federal republic, consisting of
all the independent powers of Europe, for preventing the impositions
and encroachments of one upon another! A true and perfect confederate
government, however, in her situation, is not to be attained; although
the great soul of HENRY THE FOURTH is said to have conceived the idea.
Shall America then form one grand federal republic? Or shall she, after
experiencing the benefits of even an imperfect union, and when a union
the most perfect is requisite for her permanent safety;—shall she, in
this situation, divide into thirteen contemptible single governments,
exposed to every insult and wrong from abroad, and watching each
other’s motions, with all the captiousness of jealous rivals? Or shall
she divide into two or more federal republics, actuated by the same
malignant dispositions? In either of these cases, after struggling
through infinite toils, difficulty, and danger, should the thirteen
single states be, at last, delivered from foreign foes, they will fall
upon each other; and no man can predict, what forms of government, or
division of territory, shall finally obtain——. Two or three federal
republics might possibly retain their independence. But they would
be in the same situation, with respect to each other, as France,
England, and Spain, scarcely ever free from war; practicing the arts
of dissimulation and intrigue; in vain striving to impose, by endless
negotiation; and, after all, relying only on the immense naval and land
forces, which they continually maintain. [34]
Let us then, my countrymen, embrace those blessings which Providence
is ready to shower on us. Open and extend your views! Let the prospect
comprehend the present and future generations, yourselves, your
children, your relatives, your fellow-citizens, dwellers on the same
continent, and inhabitants of the whole terraqueous globe.
With the prospect of my country’s future glory, presented to my
glowing imagination, it is difficult to resist the strong impulse of
enthusiasm. But it is neither _my_ talent, nor desire, to mislead. I
wish only to impress the genuine advantages of the proposed plan; and,
if possible, to rouse every man from that supineness, into which he is
lulled by the present deceitful calm. To acquit themselves, like men,
when visible danger assails; and, when it is repelled, to sink like
savages, into indolence, is said to be characteristic of Americans. I
am not, however, one of those, who imagine a necessity for embracing
almost any scheme, which the convention might have devised, for giving
to the union more efficient powers. Had the plan, they have proposed,
contained the seeds of much, though distant, evil, perhaps a _faithful
patriot_ might address you thus:
“Let us not, my friends, in a fit of unmanly apprehension, betray
that immense charge, with which Americans, at this day are entrusted!
Let us confide in _the wisdom of our great men_, with the assistance
of Heaven, to establish yet our safety and happiness! Let us, in the
meantime, sustain all our evils, with resignation and firmness. Let us
hope, that no foreign power, or lawless internal combinations, shall
do us a mighty injury! Let us be frugal, economical, industrious! Let
us suspend the cruel collection of debts! Let commerce continue to
droop! Let us awhile submit even to infamy; and turn a callous ear
to the indignant reproaches of our late faithful and affectionate
servants, friends and benefactors.”
To this purpose might a man plausibly declaim; provided the proposed
plan contained many and great faults; provided it were not calculated
to promote the general good, without violating the _just rights_
of a single individual; and provided it were not the best, which,
under all circumstances, could be reasonably expected. It was the
parting declaration of [35] the American NESTOR, to his exalted
fellow-labourers, that “he would subscribe, because he thought it
good, and because he did not know, but it was the best that could be
contrived.” My own declaration, which would be the same, were I now
standing on the verge of eternity, is, that if the whole matter were
left to my discretion, I would not change a single part. On reflection,
I was pleased with the conduct of the Virginia and Maryland assemblies,
in appointing distant days for the meeting of their state conventions.
Not that I greatly admired the supposed motive; but because I sincerely
wished every man might have time to comprehend and weigh the plan,
before the ultimate decision of these two states should be pronounced.
The longer it is contemplated, after it is understood, the greater, I
am persuaded, will be the approbation of those, who wish the public
good, and to whose private views and expectations, nothing, which tends
to promote that good, can be greatly detrimental.
But alas! My fellow citizens, on the adoption of this fatal plan,
and when every part of the great complicated machine shall be put in
motion, the lustre of our state assemblies will be diminished by the
superior splendour of the federal head. This single consideration,
although many hesitate to avow it, will cause more opposition, than all
the rest united. Weigh well the objection. If ever it be material to
inquire, by whom reasons are adduced, it is on this peculiar occasion.
From the objection itself, may perhaps be discerned the danger we are
opposed to, from the secret views and selfish considerations of the
objector.
What at this moment to the nations abroad is the state of Maryland? The
poor member of a defenceless system of petty republics. In what light
is she viewed by her sister states? Whatever rank she now possesses,
will remain after the great alteration of the system. They will all
rise or fall in the proportion which now exists. What then are the
powers an individual state will lose? She will no longer be able to
deny congress that, which congress, at this moment, has a right to
demand. She will have no power to enter into a treaty, alliance, or
confederation. She shall, in time of war, grant no letters of marque
and reprisal. She shall [36] coin no money, emit no bills of credit,
nor make any thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts.
She shall pass no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of a contract. She shall grant no title of
nobility. She shall not, _without consent of congress_, lay any duty
on imports or exports, except what may be necessary for executing her
inspection laws. She shall not, _without consent of congress_, lay any
duty on tonnage, keep troops or(64) ships of war, in time of peace;
enter into any agreement, or compact, with another state, or with a
foreign power; or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent danger, as will not admit of delay.
Of the several powers, from which an individual state is thus
restrained, some are improper to be used at all; others belong not even
now to the individual states; and the rest are strictly proper for only
the federal head. The aversion from ceding them to congress, is just
as reasonable as in a state of nature would be the reluctance of an
individual to relinquish any of his natural rights, upon entering into
a state of society. The principle, on which, at length, he surrenders,
is the necessity of every one’s making a cession of some rights,
to enable the sovereign to protect the rest. Each state is fully
sensible, that she cannot protect herself; and yet she would enjoy the
advantages of an union, without making the necessary contributions. To
discern how preposterous is the idea, requires not more than a moment’s
reflection.
For the honour of my countrymen, I hope this extreme reluctance to
surrender power is confined to those, whose ambition, or private
interest, would have all things subservient to the omnipotence of
assembly. In the few years that the state constitutions have endured,
has not everyone seen pregnant proofs of the vain love of domination?
Has he not also seen decisive marks of overbearing secret influence?
Where are the instances of exalted patriotism? But I forbear. [37]
Far from me is the wish to cast wantonly one stinging or disagreeable
reflection. The subject naturally required the general remark, and I
hope, this short hint may be excused.
Is there a possible advantage to be derived to the public, from a
single state’s exercising powers proper only for the federal head;
suppose even each state should use them properly and alike; which,
in the nature of things, is not to be expected? If there be men, who
delight in parliamentary warfare; who choose a fair wide field for
displaying their talents; who wish to see every servant of the public
prostrate before them; whose ears soothed by humble supplication; they
may still enjoy rich sources of gratification. Are not the regulations
of property, the regulations of the penal law, the protection of the
weak, the promotion of useful arts, the whole internal government of
their respective republics; are not these the main objects of every
wise and honest legislature? Are not these things still in their power;
and, whilst free from invasion or injuries abroad, are not these almost
the only things, in which sovereignty is exercised?
That the state legislatures will soon “drop out of sight,” is an idea
most extravagant and absurd; because, in addition to the importance
of their duties, the very existence of the congress depends upon
them. That they will, at least, dwindle into something like city
corporations, is an apprehension, founded on no better principle. May
the Ruler of the universe inspire them with wisdom to discharge those
numerous and extensive duties, which they will find remaining. To do
this, as they ought, will be far preferable to the(65) breaking all
useful national measures, and marring the concerns of a continent.
To do this, as they ought, will afford more true pleasure to a good
mind, than the carrying, by consummate eloquence and address, the
most interesting federal measure, which cannot be contrived by an
enlightened honest politician, in a state assembly, possessing all its
darling sovereignties!
You have been assured, that, soon as this fatal plan shall [38]
succeed, an host of rapacious collectors will _invade_ the land; that
they will wrest from you the hard product of your industry, turn out
your children from their dwellings, perhaps commit your bodies to a
jail; and your own immediate representatives will have no power to
relieve you. This is the mere phrenzy of declamation, the ridiculous
conjuration of spectres and hobgobblins!
To the five per cent. impost most of the states have more than once
given their assent. This is the only tax which congress wishes
immediately to impose. Of the imposition of assessment, capitation, or
direct taxes of any kind, the congress entertains no idea at present;
and although it be proper for the federal head to possess this power
in reserve, nothing but some unforeseen disaster will ever drive them
to such ineligible expedients. Setting aside the immediate advantages
of revived credit and trade, and the increased value of your property
and labour, you will be delivered, in a great measure, from that load
of direct taxation, which has been so unequally borne, and produced so
little substantial good.
Permit me to demand, what mighty benefit has resulted from the exercise
of those sovereign rights, that, in general, you should be loth to
resign them? Has not a perpetual clamour been kept up (it matters not
whether justly or otherwise) concerning the enormous impositions on
the people? And what are the advantages derived to the people of the
respective states, to the union, or to meritorious individuals?
Has not the far greater part of a state’s internal expences been
owing to the extreme length of sessions? Have not these sessions been
consumed in disgusting altercation, and in passing laws, serving to
little better purpose, than to swell the statute book, encourage a
negligence of duty, and obstruct the administration of justice?
To trace each real and ostensible objection up to its proper course,
would be a task equally invidious, irksome and unnecessary. The
characters of the principal advocates and opponents are well known. To
him who declines not a public avowal of his sentiments, some credit is
due, for his candour; and he is entitled to your patient attention.
But, he that prefers a secret corner, for dealing forth his ob- [39]
jections, and expositions, should be heard with caution and distrust.
It is in a land of slavery alone, where truth shuns the open day.—Each
side has imputed to the other illiberal and selfish motives. Consider
then the particular interests of each; and bear this in your minds,
that an interest may be either honourable and praiseworthy, or directly
the reverse.
You have been told that the proposed plan was calculated peculiarly for
the rich. In all governments, not merely despotic, the wealthy must,
in most things, find an advantage, from the possession of that, which
is too much the end and aim of mankind. In the proposed plan, there
is nothing like a discrimination in their favour. How this amazing
objection is to be supported, I am at a loss to conjecture. Is it a
just cause of reproach, that the constitution effectually secures
property? Or would the objectors introduce a general scramble? In
eligibility to office, in suffrage, and in every other civil right, men
are all on terms of perfect equality. And yet, notwithstanding this
just equality, each man is to pay taxes in proportion to his ability,
or his expences.
A still more surpassing objection remains to be considered. “This
new constitution, so much bepraised, and admired, will commence in a
moderate aristocracy. To a corrupt and oppressive one the transition
is easy, and inevitable, unless some Cæsar, or a Cromwell, in their
stead, shall make a seizure of their liberties. As to the house of
representatives, they will either be insignificant spectators of the
contest between the president and the senate, or their weight will be
thrown in to one of the scales.”
No man, indeed, has exactly used these words; but they contain the sum
and scope of several recent publications.
In the course of my remarks, I have already said enough to expose the
futility of certain objections, which are ushered to the world, under
the auspices of a pair of honourable names. Notwithstanding the care
and pomposity, with which they are circulated, it is not worth while to
draw invidious comparison. One gentleman, whose name is thus _freely_
used, I think, calls the house of representatives a mere [40] shred,
or rag of representation. Does he consider the distinction between the
objects of a confederate republic, and of a single government? It is
a poor return for that singular respect which the convention paid to
the majesty of the people, in contriving, that congress shall not only
be a representation of states, as heretofore, but also an immediate
representation of the people. Were 5, 10, or even 20,000, the ratio
proposed, then peradventure the honourable objector might clamour about
the expence of a mobbish legislature.
The fact is, that the new government, constructed on the broad basis
of equality, mutual benefits, and national good, is not calculated to
secure a single state all her natural advantages at the expence of the
natural and acquired advantages of her respectable brethren of New
England.
His real objection against constituting the senate an executive
council arises, I conceive, from the equality of representation. As
to the trite maxim, that the legislative and executive ought ever
to be distinct and separate, I would, in addition to my foregoing
observations on this head, refer him to Montesquieu’s chapter on
the English government. I could wish, the writings of that great
man, and of Judge Blackstone, so often either copied, or cited for
conclusive authority, were better understood. Should a second, or a
third convention, be obtained, the aforesaid honourable gentlemen can
never be _fully_ indulged in their main object of a proportionate
representation.
The examples of a genuine aristocracy are rare. They were founded in
times of profound ignorance, and when the mass of property was in
the hands of a few, whilst the rest pined in want and wretchedness.
One European aristocratic government, if such it can be called, has
grown out of the original defective form, the offspring of necessity,
and commenced amidst the horrors of a civil war. Although the people
of that country fought, and intended, to be free, their compact of
government never was complete; they did not attend to the principle
of rotation, and checks; and a genuine representation did never there
prevail.
An aristocracy can perhaps subsist with only a moderate extent of
territory and population. But it is a farce to talk of an aristocracy;
when there are two branches, so dif- [41] ferently formed; when the
members of each are chosen for a reasonable term; and when their
reappointment depends on the good opinion of their countrymen. It is
not in nature, that a man with the least portion of _common_ sense
can believe the people of America will consent to such a deplorable
change in their constitution, as shall confine all power to a few noble
families, or that, without their consent, the change will be effected,
by internal policy, or force.
Whilst mankind shall believe freedom to be better than slavery;
whilst our lands shall be generally distributed, and not held by a
few insolent barons, on the debasing terms of vassalage; whilst we
shall teach our children to read and write; whilst the liberty of the
press, that grand palladium, which tyrants are compelled to respect,
shall remain; whilst a spark of public love shall animate even a small
part of the people; whilst even self-love shall be the general ruling
principle; so long will it be impossible for an aristocracy to arise
from the proposed plan.—Should Heaven, in its wrath, inflict blindness
on the people of America; should they reject this fair offer of
permanent safety and happiness; to predict what species of government
shall at last spring from disorder, is beyond the short reach of
political foresight.
Believe me, my fellow citizens, that no overweening self conceit,
no vain ambition, no restless meddling spirit, has produced this
address. Long had I waited to see this vast question treated, as it
deserves; and the publication disseminated in my native state. Many
judicious observations had appeared in newspapers and handbills. But
no publication, that I have seen, has gone fully into the merits,
considered the objections, and explained that, which is doubtful and
obscure. On this account I, at length, made the attempt. That my
performance is equal to my wishes, I can by no means believe. I have,
however, a consolation in reflecting, that it will be difficult for
any man to demonstrate, that, in this business, I have a particular
interest. In many of my remarks, I have been anticipated by writings,
which I have seen; and I have collected ma- [42] terials, wherever I
could find them. Could I be convinced, that I have said nothing, which
had not before been said or thought by thousands, the reflection would
yield far less mortification than pleasure.