FABIUS.

[16] LETTER III.

The writer of this address hopes, that he will now be thought so

disengaged from the objections against the principle assumed, that

he may be excused for recurring to his assertion, that—the power of

the people pervading the proposed system, together with the strong

confederation of the states, will form an adequate security against

every danger that has been apprehended.

It is a mournful, but maybe a useful truth, that the liberty of single

republics has generally been destroyed by some of the citizens, and of

confederated republics, by some of the associated states.

It is more pleasing, and may be more profitable to reflect, that, their

tranquility and prosperity have commonly been promoted, in proportion

to the strength of their government for protecting the worthy against

the licentious.

As in forming a political society, each individual contributes some

of his rights, in order that he may, from _a common stock_ of rights,

derive greater benefits, than he could from merely _his own_; so,

in forming a confederation, each political society should contribute

such a share of their rights, as will, from _a common stock_ of these

rights, produce the largest quantity of benefits for them.

But, what is that share? and, how to be managed? Momentous questions!

Here, flattery is treason; and error, destruction.

[17] Are they unanswerable? No. Our most gracious _Creator_ does not

condemn us to sigh for unattainable blessedness: But one thing he

demands—that we should seek for happiness in his way, and not in our

own.

Humility and benevolence must take place of pride and overweening

selfishness. Reason, rising above these mists, will then discover

to us, that we cannot be true to ourselves, without being true

to others—that to love our neighbours as ourselves, is to love

ourselves in the best manner—that to give, is to gain—and, that we

never consult our own happiness more effectually, than when we most

endeavour to correspond with _the divine designs_, by communicating

happiness, as much as we can, to our fellow-creatures. _Inestimable

truth!_ sufficient, if they do not barely ask what it is, to melt

tyrants into men, and to soothe the inflamed minds of a multitude into

mildness—_Inestimable truth!_ which our Maker in his providence,

enables us, not only to talk and write about, but to adopt in practice

of vast extent, and of instructive example.

Let us now enquire, if there be not some _principle_, simple as the

laws of nature in other instances, from which, as from a _source_, the

many benefits of society are deduced.

We may with reverence say, that our _Creator_ designed men for society,

because otherwise they cannot be happy. They cannot be happy without

freedom; nor free without security; that is, without the absence of

fear; nor thus secure, without society. The conclusion [18] is strictly

syllogistic—that men cannot be free without society. Of course, they

cannot be equally free without society, _which freedom produces the

greatest happiness_.

As these premises are invincible, we have advanced a considerable way

in our enquiry upon _this deeply interesting subject_. If we can

determine, what share of his rights, every individual must contribute

to _the common stock_ of rights in forming a society, for obtaining

equal freedom, we determine at the same time, what share of their

rights each political society must contribute to _the common stock_ or

rights in forming a confederation, which is only a larger society, for

obtaining equal freedom: For, if the deposit be not proportioned to the

magnitude of the association in the latter case, it will generate the

same mischief among the component parts of it, from their inequality,

that would result from a defective contribution to association in the

former case, among the component parts of it, from their inequality.

Each individual then must contribute such a share of his rights,

as is necessary for attaining that _security_ that is essential to

freedom; and he is bound to make this contribution by the law of his

nature, which prompts him to a participated happiness; that is, by the

command of his creator; therefore, he must submit his will, _in what

concerns all_, to the will of all, that is of the whole society. What

does he lose by this submission; The power of doing [19] injuries to

others—and the dread of suffering injuries from them. What does he

gain by it? The aid of those associated with him, for his relief from

the incommodities of mental or bodily weakness—the pleasure for which

his heart is formed—of doing good—_protection_ against injuries—a

capacity of enjoying his undelegated rights to the best advantage—a

repeal of his fears—and tranquility of mind—or, in other words, that

perfect liberty better described in the Holy Scriptures, than any where

else, in these expressions—“When every man shall sit under his vine,

and under his fig-tree, and _none shall make him afraid_.”

The like submission, with a correspondent expansion and accommodation,

must be made between states, for obtaining the like benefits in a

confederation. _Men_ are the materials of both. As the largest number

is but a junction of _units_—a confederation is but an assemblage of

individuals. The auspicious influence of the law of his nature, upon

which the happiness of _man_ depends in society, must attend him in

confederation, or he becomes unhappy; for confederation should promote

the happiness of individuals, or it does not _answer the intended

purpose_. Herein there is a progression, not a contradiction. As

_man_, he becomes a citizen; as a citizen, he becomes a federalist.

The generation of one, is not the destruction of the other. He carries

into society his naked rights: These thereby improved, he carries still

forward into confederation. If that sacred law before mentioned, is not

here [20] observed, the confederation would not be real, but pretended.

He would confide, and be deceived.(41)

[21] The dilemma is inevitable. There must either be one will, or

several wills. If but one will, all the people are concerned: if

several wills, few comparatively are concerned. Surprizing! that this

doctrine should be contended for by those, who declare, that the

constitution is not founded on a bottom broad enough; and, though _the

whole people_ of the United States are to be _trebly_ represented in it

in _three different modes_ of representation, and their servants will

have the most advantageous situations and opportunities of acquiring

all requisite information for the welfare of the [22] whole union, yet

insist for a privilege of opposing, obstructing, and confounding all

their measures taken with common consent for the general weal, by the

delays, negligences, rivalries, or other selfish views of parts of the

union.

Thus, while one state should be relied upon by the union for giving

aid, upon a recommendation of Congress, to another in distress, the

latter might be ruined; and the state relied upon, might suppose, it

would gain by such an event.

When any persons speak of a consideration, do they, or do they not

acknowledge, that the whole is interested in the safety of every

part—in the agreement of parts—in the relation of parts [23] to one

another—to the whole—or, to other societies? If they do—then, the

authority of the whole, must be co-extensive with its interests—and if

it is, the will of the whole must and ought in such cases to govern;

or else the whole would have interests without an authority to manage

them—a position which prejudice itself cannot digest.

If they do not acknowledge, that the whole is thus interested, the

conversation should cease. Such persons mean not a confederation, but

something else.

As to the idea, that this superintending sovereign will must of

consequence destroy the subordinate sovereignties of the several

states, it is begging a concession of the question, by inferring, that

a manifest and great usefulness must necessarily end in abuse; and not

only so, but it requires an extinction of the principle of all society:

for the subordinate sovereignties, or, in other words, the undelegated

rights of the several states, in a confederation, stand upon the

very same foundation with the undelegated rights of individuals in a

society, the federal sovereign will being composed of the subordinate

sovereign wills of the several confederated states. As some persons

seem to think, a bill of rights is the best security of rights, the

sovereignties of the several states have this best security by the

proposed constitution, and more than this best security, for they are

not barely declared to be rights, but are taken into it as component

parts for their perpetual preservation—by themselves. In short, the

government of each state is, and is to be, [24] sovereign and supreme

in all matters that relate to each state only. It is to be subordinate

barely in those matters that relate to the whole; and it will be their

_own faults_ if the several states suffer the federal sovereignty to

interfere in things of their respective jurisdictions. An instance of

such interference with regard to any single state, will be a dangerous

precedent as to all, and therefore will be guarded against by all, as

the trustees or servants of the several states will not dare, if they

retain their senses, so to violate the independent sovereignty of their

respective states, _that justly darling object_ of American affections,

to which they are responsible, besides being endeared by all the

charities of life.

The common sense of mankind agrees to the devolutions of individual

wills in society; and if it has not been as universally assented to in

confederation, the reasons are evident, and worthy of being retained

in remembrance by Americans. They were want of opportunities, or the

loss of them, through defects of knowledge and virtue. The principle,

however, has been sufficiently vindicated in imperfect combinations, as

their prosperity has generally been commensurate to its operation.

How beautifully and forcibly does the inspired Apostle Paul, argue upon

a sublimer subject, with a train of reasoning strictly applicable to

the present? His words are—“If the foot shall say, because I am not

the hand, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? and if

the ear shall say, because I am [25] not the eye, I am not of the body;

is it therefore not of the body?” As plainly inferring, as could be

done in that allegorical manner, the strongest censure of such partial

discontents and dissentions, especially, as his meaning is enforced by

his description of the benefits of union in these expressions—“But,

now they are many members, yet but one body: and the eye _cannot_ say

to the hand, I have no need of thee.”

When the commons of Rome upon a rupture with the Senate, seceded in

arms at the Mons sacer, Menemius Agrippa used the like allusion to

the human body, in his famous apologue of a quarrel among some of

the members. The unpolished but honest-hearted Romans of that day,

understood him, and were appeased.

Another comparison has been made by the learned, between a natural

and a political body; and no wonder indeed, when the title of the

latter was borrowed from the resemblance. It has therefore been justly

observed, that if a mortification takes place in one or some of the

limbs, and the rest of the body is sound, remedies may be applied,

and not only the contagion prevented from spreading, but the diseased

part or parts saved by the connection with the body, and restored to

former usefulness. When general putrefaction prevails, death is to be

expected. History sacred and profane tells us, that, _corruption of

manners sinks nations into slavery_.

Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States Published During Its Discussion by the People 1787-1788 · 第 46 / 257 题