_On the safety of the people, from the nature of the House of
Representatives._
In pursuing the consideration of the new fœderal constitution,
it remains now to examine the nature and powers of the House of
Representatives—the immediate delegates of the people.
Each member of this truly popular assembly will be chosen by about
six thousand electors, by the poor as well as the rich. No decayed or
venal borough will have an unjust share in their determinations—no
old Sarum will send thither a representative by the voice of a single
elector.(35) As we shall have no royal ministers to purchase votes,
so we shall have no votes for sale; for the suffrages of six thousand
enlightened and independent freemen are above all price. When the
increasing population of the country shall render the body too [13]
large at the rate of one member for every thirty thousand persons, they
will be returned at the greater rate of one for every forty or fifty
thousand, which will render the electors still more incorruptible.
For this regulation is only designed to prevent a smaller number than
thirty thousand from having a representative. Thus we see a provision
follows, that no state shall have less than one member, for if a new
and greater number than thirty thousand should hereafter be fixed on,
which should exceed the whole of the inhabitants of any state, such
state, without this wholesome provision, would lose its voice in the
House of Representatives—a circumstance which the constitution renders
impossible.
The people of England, whose House of commons is filled with military
and civil officers and pensioners, say their liberties would be
perfectly secured by triennial Parliaments. With us no placeman
can sit among the representatives of the people, and two years
are the constitutional term of their existence. Here, again, lest
wealth, powerful connections, or even the unwariness of the people
should place in this important trust an undeserving, unqualified or
inexperienced youth, the wisdom of the Convention has proposed an
absolute incapacity till the age of twenty-five. At twenty-one a
young man is made the guardian of his own interest, but he cannot,
for a few years more be intrusted with the affairs of the nation. He
must be an inhabitant of the state that elects him, that he may be
intimately acquainted with their particular circumstances—The house
of Representatives is not, as the senate, to have a President chosen
for them from without their body, but are to elect their speaker from
their own number—They will also appoint all their other officers. In
great state cases, they will be the grand inquest of the nation, for
they possess the sole and uncontroulable power of impeachment. They are
neither to wait the call, nor abide the prorogations and dissolutions
[14] of a perverse or ambitious Prince, for they are to meet at least
once in every year, and to sit on adjournments to be agreed on between
themselves and the other servants of the people. Should they differ
in opinion, the President, who is a temporary fellow-servant, and not
their hereditary master, has a mediatorial power to adjust it for
them, but cannot prevent their constitutional meeting within the year.
They can compel the attendance of their members, that their public
duty may not be evaded in times of difficulty or danger—The vote of
each representative can be always known, as well as the proceedings
of the house, that so the people may be acquainted with the conduct
of those in whom they repose so important a trust. As was observed
of the Senators, they cannot make new offices for themselves, nor
increase, for their own benefit, the emoluments of old ones, by which
the people will be exempted from needless additions to the public
expences, on such sordid and mercenary principles—They are not to
be restrained from the firm and plain language, which becomes the
independent representatives of freedom, for there is to be a perfect
liberty of speech. Without their consent, no monies can be obtained,
no armies raised, no navies provided. They, alone, can originate bills
for drawing forth the revenues of the union, and they will have a
negative upon every legislative act of the other house.—So far, in
short, as the sphere of fœderal jurisdiction extends, they will be
controulable only by the people, and, in contentions with the other
branch, so far as they shall be right, they must ever finally prevail.
Such, my Countrymen, are some of the cautionary provisions of the
frame of government your faithful convention have submitted to your
consideration—such the foundations of peace, liberty and safety, which
have been laid by their unwearied labors—They have guarded you against
all servants but those “whom choice and common good ordain,” against
all masters, “save preserving Heaven.”
[15] NUMBER IV.
_The security for national safety and happiness, resulting from other
parts of the fœderal Government._
In considering the respective powers of the President, the Senate and
the House of Representatives, under the fœderal constitution, we
have seen a part of the wholesome precautions, which are contained in
the new system. Let us examine what further securities for the safety
and happiness of the people are contained in the general stipulations
and provisions.
The United States guarantee to every state in the union a separate
republican form of government. From thence it follows, that any man or
body of men, however rich or powerful, who shall make an alteration in
the form of government of any state, whereby the powers thereof shall
be attempted to be taken out of the hands of the people at large,
will stand guilty of high treason; or should a foreign power seduce
or over-awe the people of any state, so as to cause them to vest in
the families of any ambitious citizens or foreigners the powers of
hereditary governors, whether as Kings or Nobles, that such investment
of powers would be void in itself, and every person attempting to
execute them would also be guilty of treason.
No religious test is ever to be required of any officer or servant
of the United States. The people may employ any wise or good citizen
in the execution of the various duties of the government. In Italy,
Spain, and Portugal, no protestant can hold a public trust. In England
every Presbyterian, and other person not of their established church,
is incapable of holding an office. No such impious deprivation of the
rights of men can take place under the new fœderal constitution. The
convention [16] has the honour of proposing the first public act, by
which any nation has ever divested itself of a power, every exercise of
which is a trespass on the Majesty of Heaven.
No qualification in monied or landed property is required by the
proposed plan; nor does it admit any preference from the preposterous
distinctions of birth and rank. The office of the President, a Senator,
and a Representative, and every other place of power or profit, are
therefore open to the whole body of the people. Any wise, informed and
upright man, be his property what it may, can exercise the trusts and
powers of the state, provided he possesses the moral, religious and
political virtues which are necessary to secure the confidence of his
fellow citizens.
The importation of slaves from any foreign country is, by a clear
implication, held up to the world as equally inconsistent with
the dispositions and the duties of the people of America. A solid
foundation is laid for exploding the principles of negro slavery, in
which many good men of all parties in Pennsylvania, and throughout
the union, have already concurred. The temporary reservation of any
particular matter must ever be deemed an admission that it should be
done away. This appears to have been well understood. In addition
to the arguments drawn from liberty, justice and religion, opinions
against this practice, founded in sound policy, have no doubt been
urged. Regard was necessarily paid to the peculiar situation of our
southern fellow-citizens; but they, on the other hand, have not been
insensible of the delicate situation of our national character on this
subject.
The people will remain, under the proposed constitution, the fountain
of power and public honour. The President, the Senate, and the House
of Representatives, will be the channels through which the stream [17]
will flow—but it will flow from the people, and from them only. Every
office, religious, civil and military will be either their immediate
gift, or it will come from them through the hands of their servants.
And this, as observed before, will be guaranteed to them under the
state constitution which they respectively approve; for they cannot be
royal forms, cannot be aristocratical, but must be republican.
The people of those states which have faithfully discharged their duty
to the union will be no longer subjected alone to the weight of the
public debts. Proper arrangements will call forth the just proportion
of their sister states, and our national character will again be as
unstained as it was once exalted. Elevation to independence, with
the loss of our good name, is only to be conspicuous in disgrace.
The liberties of a people involved in debt are as uncertain as the
liberty of an individual in the same situation. Their virtue is more
precarious. The unfortunate citizen must yield to the operation of
the laws, while a bankrupt nation too easy annihilates the sacred
obligations of gratitude and honour, and becomes execrable and
infamous. I cannot refrain from reminding my fellow-citizens of our
near approach to that deplorable situation, which must be our miserable
condition, if the defects of the old confederation remain without
amendment. The proposed constitution will cure the evil, and restore us
to our rank among mankind.
Laws, made after the commission of the fact, have been a dreadful
engine in the hands of tyrannical governors. Some of the most virtuous
and shining characters in the world have been put to death, by laws
formed to render them punishable, for parts of their conduct which
innocence permitted, and to which patriotism impelled them. These have
been called ex post facto laws, and are exploded by the new system. If
a time of public contention shall hereafter arrive, [18] the firm and
ardent friends to liberty may know the length to which they can push
their noble opposition, on the foundation of the laws. Should their
country’s cause impel them further, they will be acquainted with the
hazard, and using those arms which Providence has put into their hands,
will make a solemn appeal to “the power above.”
The destruction of the ancient republics was occasioned in every
instance by their being ignorant of a great political position, which
was left for America to discover and establish. Self-evident as
the truth appears, we find no friend to liberty in ancient Greece or
Rome asserting, that taxation and representation were inseparable.
The Roman citizens, proud of their own liberty, imposed, in the
freest times of the commonwealth, the most grievous burdens on their
wretched provinces. At other times we find thousands of their citizens,
though residing within the walls of Rome, deprived of legislative
representatives. When America asserted the novel truth, Great Britain,
though boasting herself as alone free among the modern nations, denied
it by her legislature, and endeavoured to refute it by her arms—the
reasoning of tyrants. But the attempt was vain, for the voice of truth
was heard above the thunders of the war, and reached the ears of all
nations. Henceforth the people of the earth will consider this position
as the only rock on which they can found the temple of liberty, that
taxation and representation are inseparable. Our new constitution
carries it into execution on the most enlarged and liberal scale, for a
Representative will be chosen by six thousand of his fellow-citizens, a
Senator by half a sovereign state, a President by a whole nation.
The old fœderal constitution contained many of the same things,
which from error or disingenuousness are urged against the new ones.
Neither of them have a bill of rights, nor does either notice the
liberty of the press, because they are already provided for by the [19]
state constitutions; and relating only to personal rights, they could
not be mentioned in a contract among foreign states.
Both the old and new fœderal constitutions, and indeed the
constitution of Pennsylvania, admit of courts in which no use is made
of a jury. The board of property, the court of admiralty, and the high
court of errors and appeals, in the state of Pennsylvania, as also the
court of appeals under the old confederation, exclude juries. Trial
by jury will therefore be in the express words of the Pennsylvania
constitution, “as heretofore,”—almost always used, though sometimes
omitted. Trials for lands lying in any state between persons residing
in such state, for bonds, notes, book debts, contracts, trespasses,
assumptions, and all other matters between two or more citizens of any
state, will be held in the state courts by juries, as now. In these
cases the fœderal courts cannot interfere.(36) But when a dispute
arises between the citizens of any state about lands lying out of the
bounds thereof, or when a trial is to be had between the citizens of
any state and those of another, or the government of another, the
private citizen will not be obliged to go into a court constituted by
the state, with which, or with the citizens of which, his dispute is.
He can appeal to a disinterested fœderal court. This is surely a
great advantage, and promises a fair trial, and an impartial judgment.
The trial by jury is not excluded in these fœderal courts. In all
criminal cases, where the property, liberty or life of the citizen is
at stake, he has the benefit of a jury. If convicted on impeachment,
which is never done by a jury in any country, he cannot be fined,
imprisoned or punished, but only may be disqualified from doing
public mischief by losing his office, [20] and his capacity to hold
another. If the nature of his offence, besides its danger to his
country, should be criminal in itself—should involve a charge of
fraud, murder or treason—he may be tried for such crime, but cannot be
convicted without a jury. In trials about property in the fœderal
courts, which can only be as above stated, there is nothing in the
new constitution to prevent a trial by jury. No doubt it will be the
mode in every case, wherein it is practicable. This will be adjusted
by law, and it could not be done otherwise. In short, the sphere of
jurisdiction for the fœderal courts is limited, and that sphere only
is subject to the regulations of our fœderal government. The known
principles of justice, the attachment to trial by jury whenever it can
be used, the instructions of the state legislatures, the instructions
of the people at large, the operation of the fœderal regulations
on the property of a president, a senator, a representative, a judge,
as well as on that of a private citizen, will certainly render those
regulations as favorable as possible to property; for life and
liberty are put more than ever into the hands of the juries. Under
the present constitution of all the states, a public officer may be
condemned to imprisonment or death on impeachment, without a jury;
but the new fœderal constitution protects the accused, till he
shall be convicted, from the hands of power, by rendering a jury the
indispensible judges of all crimes.
The influence which foreign powers may attempt to exercise in our
affairs was foreseen, and a wholesome provision has been made against
it; for no person holding an office under the United States is
permitted to enjoy any foreign honours, powers or emoluments.
The apprehensions of the people have been excited, perhaps by persons
with good intentions, about the powers of the new government to raise
an army. Let us consider this point with moderation and candour. As
enemies will sometimes insult us, invade our country [21] and capture
our property, it is clear a power in our government to oppose, restrain
or destroy them, is necessary to our honor, safety and existence. The
military should, however, be regarded with a watchful eye; for it is
a profession that is liable to dangerous perversion. But the powers
vested in the fœderal government do not go the length which has been
said. A standing army is not granted or intended, for there can be no
provision for its continuing three years, much less for its permanent
establishment. Two years are the utmost time for which the money can be
given. It will be under all the restrictions which wisdom and jealousy
can suggest, and the original grant of the supplies must be made by
the House of representatives, the immediate delegates of the people.
The Senate and President, who also derive their power from the people,
appoint the officers; and the heads of the departments, who must submit
their accounts to the whole legislature, are to pay and provide them,
as shall be directed by the laws that shall contain the conditions
of the grant. The militia, who are in fact the effective part of the
people at large, will render many troops quite unnecessary. They will
form a powerful check upon the regular troops, and will generally be
sufficient to over-awe them—for our detached situation will seldom
give occasion to raise an army, though a few scattered companies may
often be necessary. But whenever, even on the most obvious reasons,
an army shall be raised, the several states will be called, by the
nature of things, to attend to the condition of the militia. Republican
jealousy, the guardian angel of these states, will watch the motions of
our military citizens, even though they will be the soldiers of a free
people. There is a wide difference however between the troops of such
commonwealths as ours, founded on equal and unalterable principles,
and those of a regal government, where ambition and oppression are the
profession of the king. In the first case, a military officer is the
occasional servant of the people, employed for their defence; in [22]
the second, he is the ever ready instrument to execute the schemes of
conquest or oppression, with which the mind of his royal master may be
disturbed.
Observations have been made on the power given to the fœderal
Government in regard to the elections of Representatives and Senators.
The regulations of these elections are, by the first part of the
clause, to be prescribed by the state legislatures, who are certainly
the proper bodies, if they will always execute the duty. But in case
the union or the public safety should be endangered by an omission
of this duty, as in the case of Rhode-Island, then the legislature
of the United States can name for the people a convenient time, and
do other matters necessary to insure the free exercise of their
right of election. The exception, in regard to the places of chusing
Senators, was made from due respect to the sovereignty of the state
legislatures, who are to elect the senators, and whose place of meeting
ought not to be prescribed to them by any authority, except, indeed,
as we always must, by the authority of the people. This power given to
the fœderal legislature is no more than what is possessed by the
governments of all the states. The constitution of Pennsylvania permits
two-thirds of such cities and counties, as shall elect representatives,
to exercise all the powers of the General Assembly, “as fully and amply
as if the whole were present,” should any part of the state neglect
or refuse to perform their duty in this particular. In short, it is a
power necessary to preserve the social compact of each state and the
confederation of the United States.
Besides the securities for the liberties of the people arising
out of the fœderal government, they are guarded by their state
constitutions, and by the nature of things in the separate states. The
Governor or President in each commonwealth, the Councils, Senates,
Assemblies, Judges, Sheriffs, Grand and Pettit Juries, Officers of
Militia, Clergy and Lay Officers of all churches, state and county
Treasurer, Prothonotaries, Registers, [23] Presidents and other
officers of Universities, Colleges and Academies, Wardens of ports
and cities, Burgesses of towns, Commissioners of counties, County
Lieutenants, and many other officers of power and influence, will
still be chosen within each state, without any possible interference
of the fœderal Government. The separate states will also choose all
the members of the legislative and executive branches of the United
States. The people at large in each state will choose their fœderal
representative, and, unless ordered otherwise by state legislatures,
may choose the electors of the President and Vice-President of the
Union. And lastly, the legislature of the state will have the election
of the senate, as they have heretofore had of the Members of Congress.
Let us then, with a candor worthy of the subject, ask ourselves,
whether it can be feared, that a majority of the Representatives, each
of whom will be chosen by six thousand enlightened freemen, can betray
their country?—Whether a majority of the Senate, each of whom will
be chosen by the legislature of a free, sovereign and independent
state, without any stipulations in favour of wealth or the contemptible
distinctions of birth or rank, and who will be closely observed by the
state legislatures, can destroy our liberties, controuled as they are
too by the house of representatives? or whether a temporary, limited,
executive officer, watched by the fœderal Representatives, by the
Senate, by the state legislatures, by his personal enemies among the
people of his own state, by the jealousy of the people of rival states,
and by the whole of the people of the Union, can ever endanger our
Freedom.(37)
[24] Permit me, my fellow-citizens, to close these observations by
remarking, that there is no spirit of arrogance in the new fœderal
constitution. It addresses you with becoming modesty, admitting that
it may contain errors. Let us give it a trial; and when experience
has taught its mistakes, the people, whom it preserves absolutely
all powerful, can reform and amend them. That I may be perfectly
understood, I will acknowledge its acceptance by all the states,
without delay, is the second wish of my heart. The first is, that our
country may be virtuous and free.