The long piece signed BRUTUS, (which was first published in a New-York
paper, and was afterwards copied into the Pennsylvania Packet of the
26th instant) is wrote in a very good stile; the language is easy, and
the address is polite and insinuating: but the sentiments, I conceive,
are not only unsound, but wild and chimerical; the dreary fears and
apprehensions, altogether groundless; and the whole tendency of the
piece, in this important crisis of our politics, very hurtful. I have
therefore thought it my duty to make some animadversions on it; which I
here offer, with all due deference, to the Author and to the Public.
His first question is, _Whether a confederated government is best for
the United States?_
I answer, If Brutus, or any body else, cannot find any benefit
resulting from the union of the Thirteen States; if they can do
_without_ as well as _with_ the respectability, the protection, and
the security, which the States might derive from that union, I have
nothing further to say: but if that union is to be supported in any
such manner as to afford [4] respectability, protection, or security to
the States, I say it must be done by an adequate government, and cannot
be otherwise done.
This government must have a supreme power, _superior to and able to
controul_ each and all of its parts. ’Tis essential to all governments,
that such a power be somewhere existing in it; and if _the place_ where
the proposed Constitution has fixed it, does not suit Brutus and his
friends, I will give him leave to stow it away in any _other place that
is better_: but I will not consent to have it _annihilated_; neither
will I agree to have it _cramped and pinched_ for room, so as to lessen
its energy; for that will _destroy_ both its nature and use.
The supreme power of government ought to be _full_, _definite_,
_established_, and _acknowledged_. Powers of government too limited, or
uncertain and disputed, have ever proved, like _Pandora’s_ box, a most
fruitful source of quarrels, animosities, wars, devastation, and ruin,
in all shapes and degrees, in all communities, states and kingdoms on
earth.
Nothing tends more to the honour, establishment, and peace of society,
than public decisions, grounded on principles of right, natural fitness
and prudence; but when the powers of government are _too limited_, such
decisions can’t be made and enforced; so the mischief goes without a
remedy: dreadful examples of which we have felt, in instances more than
enough, for seven years past.
[5] Further, where the powers of government are not _definite_ but
_disputed_, the administration dare not make decisions on the footing
of impartial justice and right; but must temporize with the parties,
lest they lose friends or make enemies: and of course the _righteous_
go off injured and disgusted, and the _wicked_ go grumbling to; for
’tis rare that any sacrifices of a court can satisfy a prevailing party
in the state.
’Tis necessary in States, as well as in private families, that
controversies should have a just, _speedy_,and effectual decision,
that right may be done before the contention has _time_ to grow up
into habits of malignity, resentment, ill nature, and ill offices. If
a controversy happens between two states, must it continue undecided,
and daily increase, and be more and more aggravated, by the repeated
insults and injuries of the contending parties, ’till they are ripe for
the decision of the sword? or must the weaker states suffer, without
remedy, the groundless demands and oppressions of their stronger
neighbours, because they have no avenger, or umpire of their disputes?
Or shall we institute a supreme power with full and effectual authority
to controul the animosities, and decide the disputes of these strong
contending bodies? In the one proposed to us, we have perhaps every
chance of a _righteous judgment_, that we have any reason [6] to hope
for; but I am clearly of opinion, that even a _wrongful decision_,
would, in most cases, be preferable to the continuance of such
destructive controversies.
I suppose that neither Brutus nor any of his friends would wish to
see our government _embroiled abroad_; and therefore will admit it
necessary to institute some federal authority, sufficient to punish
_any individual or State_, who shall violate our treaties with foreign
nations, insult their dignity, or abuse their citizens, and compel due
reparation in all such cases.
I further apprehend, that Brutus is willing to have the _general_
interest and _welfare_ of the States well provided for and supported,
and therefore will consent that there shall exist in the states, an
authority to _do_ all this _effectually_; but he seems grieved that
Congress should be the _judges of this general welfare_ of the states.
If he will be kind enough to point out any other more suitable and
proper judges, I will consent to have them admitted.
Indeed I begin to have hopes of Brutus, and think he may come right at
last; for I observe (after all his fear and tremblings about the new
government) the constitution he _defines and adopts_, is the very same
as that which the federal convention have proposed to us, _viz._ “that
the Thirteen States should continue thirteen confederated republics
under the _direction and controul_ of a supreme [7] federal head, for
certain defined national purposes, only.” Where we may observe,
1. That the new Constitution leaves all the Thirteen States, complete
republics, as it found them, but all confederated under the direction
and controul of a federal head, for certain defined national purposes
only, _i. e._ it leaves all the dignities, authorities, and internal
police of each State in free, full, and perfect condition; unless when
national purposes make the controul of them by the federal head, or
authority, necessary to the general benefit.
2. These powers of controul by the federal head or authority, are
_defined_ in the new constitution, as minutely as may be, in their
principle; and any detail of them which may become necessary, is
committed to the wisdom of Congress.
3. It extends the controuling power of the federal head to no one case,
to which the jurisdiction or power of definitive decision of any one
state, can be competent. And,
4. In every such case, the controuling power of the federal head,
is absolutely necessary to the support, dignity, and benefit of the
national government, and the safety of individuals; neither of which
can, by any possibility, be secured without it.
All this falls in pretty well with Brutus’s sentiments; for he does not
think that the new Constitution in _its present state_ so very bad, [8]
but fears that it will not preserve its purity of institution; but if
adopted, will immediately verge to, and terminate in _a consolidation_,
_i. e._ a destruction of the state governments. For argument, he
suggests the avidity of power natural to rulers; and the eager grasp
with which they hold it when obtained; and their strong propensity to
abuse their power, and encroach on the liberties of the people.
He dwells on the vast powers vested in Congress by the new
Constitution, _i. e._ of levying taxes, raising armies, appointing
federal courts, &c.; takes it for granted, that all these powers will
be abused, and carried to an oppressive excess; and then harangues on
the dreadful case we shall be in, when our _wealth_ is all devoured by
taxes, our _liberty_ destroyed by the power of the army, and our _civil
rights_ all sacrificed by the unbounded power of the federal courts, &c.
And when he has run himself out of breath with this dreary declamation,
he comes to the conclusion he set out with, _viz._ That the Thirteen
States are too big for a republican government, which requires _small
territory_, and can’t be supported in _more extensive nations_; that
in large states liberty will soon be swallowed up, and lost in the
magnitude of power requisite in the government, &c.
[9] If any conclusion at all can be drawn from this baseless assemblage
of gloomy thoughts, I think it must be _against any union at all_;
against _any kind of federal government_. For nothing can be plainer
than this, _viz._ that _the union can’t by any possibility be supported
with success, without adequate and effectual powers of government?_
We must have _money_ to support the union, and therefore the power of
raising it must be lodged somewhere; we must have _a military force_,
and of consequence the power of raising and directing it must exist;
civil and criminal causes of national concern will arise, therefore
there must be somewhere a power of appointing _courts_ to hear and
determine them.
These powers must be vested in Congress; for nobody pretends to wish to
have them vested in any other body of men.
The Thirteen States have a territory very extensive, and inhabitants
very numerous, and every day rapidly increasing; therefore the powers
of government necessary to support their union must be great in
proportion. If the ship is large the mast must be proportionately
great, or it will be impossible to make her sail well. The federal
powers must extend to every part of the federal territory, _i.e._ to
the utmost limits of the Thirteen States, and to every part of them;
and must carry with them, sufficient [10] authority to secure the
execution of them; and these powers must be vested in Congress, and the
execution of them must be under their direction and controul.
These powers are _vast_, I know, and the trust is of the most _weighty
kind_ that can be committed to human direction; and the execution and
administration of it will require the greatest _wisdom_, _knowledge_,
_firmness_, and _integrity_ in that august body; and I hope they will
have all the _abilities and virtues_ necessary to that important
station, and will _perform their duty well_; but if they fail, the
fault is in them, not in the constitution. The best constitution
possible, even a divine one, badly administered, will make a bad
government.
The members of Congress will be the best we can get; they will all of
them derive their appointment from the States, and if the States are
not wise enough to send _good and suitable_ men, great _blame_, great
_sin_ will lie at their door. Put I suppose nobody would wish to mend
this fault by taking away the election of the people, and directing the
appointment of Congress to be made in any other way.
When we have got the best that can be obtained, we ought to be quiet
and cease complaining. ’Tis not in the power of human wisdom to do
more; ’tis the fate of human nature to _be imperfect and to err_;
and [11] no doubt but Congress, with all their _dignity of station
and character_, with all their _opportunities_ to gain _wisdom and
information_, with all their _inducements to virtue and integrity_,
will err, and abuse or misapply their powers in more or less instances.
I have no expectation that they will make _a court of angels_, or
be anything more than _men_: ’tis probable many of them will be
_insufficient_ men, and some of them may be _bad men_.
The greatest wisdom, care, and caution, has been used in the _mode_ of
their appointment; in the _restraints and checks_ under which they must
act; in the numerous _discussions and deliberations_ which all their
acts must pass through, before they can receive the stamp of authority;
in the terrors of _punishment_ if they misbehave. I say, in all _these
ways_ the greatest care has been used to procure and form a good
Congress.
The _dignity and importance_ of their station and character will afford
all the inducements to virtue and effort, which can influence a mind
_capable_ of their force.
Their own _personal reputation_, with the eyes of all the world on
them,—the _approbation of their fellow citizens_, which every man in
public station naturally wishes to enjoy,—and the _dread of censure
and shame_, all contribute very forceable and strong inducements to
noble, upright and worthy behavior.
[12] The _particular interest_ which every member of Congress has in
every public order and resolution, is _another strong motive_ to right
action. For every act to which any member gives his sanction, if it be
raising an _army_, levying a _tax_, instituting a _court_, or any other
act to bind the _States_,—such act will equally bind _himself, his
nearest connections, and his posterity_.
Another mighty influence to the noblest principle of action will be
_the fear of God before their eyes_; for while they sit in the place
of God, to give law, justice, and right to the States, they must be
_monsters indeed_ if they do not regard _his law_, and imitate _his
character_.
If all this will not produce a Congress fit to be trusted, and worthy
of the public confidence, I think we may give the matter up as
impracticable. But still we must make ourselves as easy as we can,
under a _mischief_ which admits _no remedy_, and bear with patience
an _evil_ which can’t be _cured_: for a government we must have; there
is no safety without it; though we know it will be imperfect, we still
must prefer it to anarchy or no government at all. ’Tis the height of
folly and madness to reject a necessary convenience, because it is not
a perfect good.
Upon this statement of facts and principles, (for the truth and reality
of which, I appeal [13] to every candid man,) I beg leave to remark,
1. That the federal Convention, in the constitution proposed to us,
have exerted their utmost to produce _a Congress worthy of the public
confidence_, who shall have _abilities_ adequate to their important
duty, and shall act under every possible inducement to execute it
_faithfully_.
2. That this affords every chance which the nature of the thing will
admit, of a wise and upright administration.
3. Yet all this notwithstanding, ’tis very possible that Congress _may
err, may abuse, or misapply_ their powers, which no precaution of human
wisdom can prevent.
4. ’Tis _vain_, ’tis _childish_, ’tis _contentious_ to object to a
constitution thus framed and guarded, on pretence that the commonwealth
may suffer by a bad administration of it; or to _withhold_ the
_necessary powers_ of government, from the supreme rulers of it, least
they should _abuse_ or _misapply_ those powers. This is an objection
which will operate with equal force against every institution that
can be made in this world, whether of policy, religion, commerce, or
any other human concern, which can require regulations: for ’tis not
possible to form any institution however necessary, wise and good,
whose uses may not be lessened or destroyed by bad management.
If Brutus, or any body else, can point out [14] any _checks_,
_cautions_, or _regulations_, which have been hitherto omitted, which
will make Congress more _wise_, more _capable_, more _diligent_, or
more _faithful_, I am willing to attend to them. But to set Congress at
the head of the government, and object to their being vested with full
and sufficient power to manage all the great departments of it, appears
to me _absurd_, quite _wild_, and _chimerical_: it would produce a
plan which would destroy itself as it went along, would be a sort of
counter position of contrary parts, and render it impossible for rulers
to render those services, and secure those benefits to the States,
which are the only great ends of their appointment.
The constitution under Brutus’s corrections would stand thus, _viz._
Congress would have power to _raise money_, but must not direct the
_quantity_, or _mode of levying_ it; they might raise _armies_, but
must not judge to the _number_ of soldiers necessary, or direct their
destination; they ought to provide for the _general welfare_, but must
not be judges of what that welfare _consists in_, or in _what manner_
’tis to be provided for; they might controul the several States, for
_defined national purposes_, but must not be judges of _what purposes_
would come within that _definition_, &c.
Any body with half an eye, may see what sort of administration the
constitution, thus corrected, would produce, _e. g._ it would [15]
require much greater trouble to leave the work _undone_, than would be
necessary to get it _well done_, under a constitution of sufficient
powers. If any one wishes to view more minutely this blessed operation,
he may see a lively sample of it, in the last seven years practice of
our federal government.
5. Brutus all along sounds his objections, and fears on _extreme
cases_ of abuse or misapplication of supreme powers, which may
_possibly_ happen, under the administration of a wild, weak, or wicked
Congress; but ’tis easy to observe that all institutions are liable to
_extremes_, but ought not _to be judged by them_; they do not often
appear, and perhaps never may; but if they should happen in the cases
supposed, (which God forbid) there is a remedy pointed out, in the
Constitution itself.
’Tis not supposeable that such abuses could arise to any ruinous
height, before they would affect the States so much, that at least
two-thirds of them would unite in pursuing a remedy in the mode
prescribed by the Constitution, which will always be liable to
amendment, whenever any mischiefs or abuses appear in the government,
which the Constitution in its present state, can’t reach and correct.
6. Brutus thinks we can never be too much afraid of the encroaching
avidity of rulers; but ’tis pretty plain, that however great the
natural lust of power in rulers may be, the jealousy of the people
in giving it, is about [16] equal; these two opposite passions, will
always operate in opposite directions to each other, and like _action_
and _reaction_ in natural bodies, will ever tend to a good ballance.
At any rate, the Congress can never get more power than the people will
give, nor hold it any longer than they will permit; for should they
assume tyrannical powers, and make incroachments on liberty without the
consent of the people, they would soon attone for their temerity, with
shame and disgrace, and probably with their heads.
But ’tis here to be noted, that all the danger does not arise from
the extreme of power in the rulers; for when the ballance verges to
the contrary extreme, and the power of the rulers becomes too much
limited and cramped, all the nerves of government are weakened, and the
administration must unavoidably sicken, and lose that energy which is
absolutely necessary for the support of the State, and the security of
the people. For ’tis a truth worthy of great attention, that laws are
not made so much for the righteous as for the wicked; who never fail
to shelter themselves from punishment, whenever they can, under the
defects of the law, and the weakness of government.
I now come to consider the grand proposition which Brutus sets out
with, concludes with, and interlards all along, and which [17] seems
to be the great gift of his performance, viz. That a confederation of
the Thirteen States into one great republic is not best for them: and
goes on to prove by a variety of arguments, that a republican form of
government is not compatible, and cannot be convenient to so extensive
a territory as the said States possess. He begins by taking one
assumption for granted (for I can’t see that his arguments prove it at
all) _viz._ That the Constitution proposed will melt down and destroy
the jurisdiction of the particular States, and consolidate them all
into one great republic.
I can’t see the least reason for this sentiment; nor the least
tendency in the new Constitution to produce this effect. For the
Constitution does not suffer the federal powers to controul in the
least, or so much as to interfere in the internal policy, jurisdiction,
or municipal rights of any particular State: except where great and
manifest national purposes and interests make that controul necessary.
It appears very evident to me, that the Constitution gives an
establishment, support, and protection to the internal and separate
police of each State, under the superintendency of the federal powers,
which it could not possibly enjoy in an independent state. Under the
confederation each State derives strength, firmness and permanency from
its compact with the other States. Like a stave in a cask well bound
with hoops, it [18] stands firmer, is not so easily shaken, bent, or
broken, as it would be were it set up by itself alone, without any
connection with its neighbours.
There can be no doubt that each State will receive from the union
great support and protection against the invasions and inroads of
foreign enemies, as well as against riots and insurrections of their
own citizens; and of consequence, the course of their internal
administration will be secured by this means against any interruption
or embarrassment from either of these causes.
They will also derive their share of benefit from the respectability
of the union abroad, from the treaties and alliances which may be made
with foreign nations, &c.
Another benefit they will receive from the controul of the supreme
power of the union is this, viz. they will be restrained from making
angry, oppressive, and destructive laws, from declaring ruinous wars
with their neighbours, from fomenting quarrels and controversies, &c.
all which ever weaken a state, tend to its fatal disorder, and often
end in its dissolution. Righteousness exalts and strengthens a nation;
but sin is a reproach and weakening of any people.
They will indeed have the privilege of oppressing their own citizens
by bad laws or bad administration; but the moment the mischief extends
beyond their own State, and [19] begins to affect the citizens of other
States, strangers, or the national welfare,—the salutary controul
of the supreme power will check the evil, and restore strength and
security, as well as honesty and right, to the offending state.
It appears then very plain, that the natural effect and tendency of
the supreme powers of the union is to give strength, establishment,
and permanency to the internal police and jurisdiction of each of the
particular States; not to melt down and destroy, but to support and
confirm them all.
By what sort of assurance, then, can Brutus tell us that the new
Constitution, if executed, must certainly and infallibly terminate in a
consolidation of the whole, into one great republic, subverting all the
State authorities. His only argument is, that the federal powers may be
corrupted, abused, and misapplied, ’till this effect shall be produced.
’Tis true that the constitution, like every other on earth, committed
to human management, may be corrupted by a bad administration, and be
made to operate to the destruction of the very capital benefits and
uses, which were the great end of its institution. The same argument
will prove with equal cogency, that the constitution of each particular
State, may be corrupted in practice, become tyranical and inimical to
liberty. In short the argument proves too much, and therefore proves
nothing: [20] ’tis empty, childish, and futile, and a serious proposal
of it, is, I conceive, an affront to the human understanding.
But after all, supposing this event should take place, and by some
strange fatality, the several states should be melted down, and merged
in the great commonwealth, in the form of counties, or districts;
I don’t see why a commonwealth mode of government, would not be
as suitable and convenient for the great State, as any other form
whatever; I cannot see any sufficient ground or reason, for the
position pretty often and boldly advanced, that a republican form of
government can never be suitable for any nation of extensive territory,
and numerous population: for if Congress can be chosen by the several
States, though under the form and name of counties, or election
districts, and be in every respect, instituted as directed by the new
constitution, I don’t see but we shall have as suitable a national
council, as wise a legislative, and as strong and safe an executive
power, as can be obtained under any form of government whatever; let
our territory be ever so extensive or populous.
The most despotic monarch that can exist, must have his councils, and
officers of state; and I can’t see any one circumstance of their being
appointed under a monarchy, that can afford any chance of their being
any wiser or better, than ours may be. ’Tis true indeed, [21] the
despot may, if he pleases, act without any advice at all; but when he
does so, I conceive it will be very rare that the nation will receive
greater advantages from his unadvised edicts, than may be drawed from
the deliberate acts and orders of our supreme powers. All that can be
said in favour of those, is, that they will have less chance of delay,
and more of secrecy, than these; but I think it probable, that the
latter will be grounded on better information, and greater wisdom; will
carry more weights and be better supported.
The Romans rose, from small beginnings, to a very great extent of
territory, population, and wisdom; I don’t think their constitution of
government, was near so good as the one proposed to us, yet we find
their power, strength, and establishment, were raised to their utmost
height, under a republican form of government. Their State received
very little acquisition of territory, strength, or wealth, after their
government became imperial; but soon began to weaken and decay.
The Carthagenians acquired an amazing degree of strength, wealth, and
extent of dominion, under a republican form of government. Neither
they or the Romans, owed their dissolution to any causes arising from
that kind of government: ’twas the party rage, animosity, and violence
of their citizens, which destroyed them both; it weakened them, ’till
the [22] one fell under the power of their enemy, and was thereby
reduced to ruin; the other changed their form of government, to a
monarchy, which proved in the end, equally fatal to them.
The same causes, if they can’t be restrained, will weaken or destroy
any nation on earth, let their form of government be what it will;
witness the division and dissolution of the Roman empire; the late
dismemberment of Poland; the intestine divisions, rage, and wars of
Italy, of France, of Spain, and of England.
No form of government can preserve a nation which can’t controul the
party rage of its own citizens; when any one citizen can rise above the
controul of the laws, ruin draws near. ’Tis not possible for any nation
on earth, to hold their strength and establishment, when the dignity of
their government is lost, and this dignity will forever depend on the
wisdom and firmness of the officers of government, aided and supported
by the virtue and patriotism of their citizens.
On the whole, I don’t see but that any form of government may be
safe and practicable, where the controuling authority of the supreme
powers, is strong enough to effect the ends of its appointment, and at
the same time, sufficiently checked to keep it within due bounds, and
limit it to the objects of its duty; and I think it appears, that the
constitution proposed to us, has all these qualities [23] in as great
perfection, as any form we can devise.
But after all, the grand secret of forming a good government, is, to
put good men into the administration: for wild, vicious, or idle men,
will ever make a bad government, let its principles be ever so good;
but grave, wise, and faithful men, acting under a good constitution,
will afford the best chances of security, peace, and prosperity, to the
the citizens, which can be derived from civil police, under the present
disorders, and uncertainty of all earthly things.
PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 4, 1787.