The paganism of antiquity is based on a primitive religion, _i.e._ it is
originally in the main homogeneous with the religions nowadays met with in
the so-called primitive peoples. It underwent, however, a long process of
evolution parallel with and conditioned by the development of Greek and
later Roman civilisation. This evolution carried ancient religion far away
from its primitive starting-point; it produced numerous new formations,
above all a huge system of anthropomorphic gods, each with a definite
character and personality of his own. This development is the result of an
interplay of numerous factors: changing social and economical conditions
evoked the desire for new religious ideas; the influence of other peoples
made itself felt; poetry and the fine arts contributed largely to the
moulding of these ideas; conscious reflection, too, arose early and
modified original simplicity. But what is characteristic of the whole
process is the fact that it went on continuously without breaks or sudden
bounds. Nowhere in ancient religion, as far as we can trace it, did a
powerful religious personality strike in with a radical transformation,
with a direct rejection of old ideas and dogmatic accentuation of new
ones. The result of this quiet growth was an exceedingly heterogeneous
organism, in which remains of ancient, highly primitive customs and ideas
were retained along with other elements of a far more advanced character.
Such a state of things need not in itself trouble the general
consciousness; it is a well-established fact that in religion the most
divergent elements are not incompatible. Nevertheless, among the Greeks,
with their strong proclivity to reflective thought, criticism early arose
against the traditional conceptions of the gods. The typical method of
this criticism is that the higher conceptions of the gods are used against
the lower. From the earliest times the Greek religious sense favoured
absoluteness of definition where the gods are concerned; even in Homer
they are not only eternal and happy, but also all-powerful and
all-knowing. Corresponding expressions of a moral character are hardly to
be found in Homer; but as early as Hesiod and Solon we find, at any rate,
Zeus as the representative of heavenly justice. With such definitions a
large number of customs of public worship and, above all, a number of
stories about the gods, were in violent contradiction; thus we find even
so old and so pious a poet as Pindar occasionally rejecting mythical
stories which he thinks at variance with the sublime nature of the gods.
This form of criticism of popular beliefs is continued through the whole
of antiquity; it is found not only in philosophers and philosophically
educated laymen, but appears spontaneously in everybody of a reflective
mind; its best known representative in earlier times is Euripides. Typical
of its popular form is in the first place its casualness; it is directed
against details which at the moment attract attention, while it leaves
other things alone which in principle are quite as offensive, but either
not very obviously so, or else not relevant to the matter in hand.
Secondly, it is naïve: it takes the gods of the popular belief for granted
essentially as they are; it does not raise the crucial question whether
the popular belief is not quite justified in attributing to these higher
beings all kinds of imperfection, and wrong in attributing perfection to
them, and still less if such beings, whether they are defined as perfect
or imperfect, exist at all. It follows that as a whole this form of
criticism is outside the scope of our inquiry.
Still, there is one single personality in early Greek thought who seems to
have proceeded still further on the lines of this naïve criticism, namely,
Xenophanes of Colophon. He is generally included amongst the philosophers,
and rightly in so far as he initiated a philosophical speculation which
was of the highest importance in the development of Greek scientific
thought. But in the present connexion it would, nevertheless, be
misleading to place Xenophanes among those philosophers who came into
conflict with the popular belief because their conception of Existence was
based on science. The starting-point for his criticism of the popular
belief is in fact not philosophical, but religious; he ranks with
personalities like Pindar and Euripides—he was also a verse-writer
himself, with considerable poetic gift—and is only distinguished from them
by the greater consistency of his thought. Hence, the correct course is to
deal with him in this place as the only eminent thinker in antiquity about
whom it is known that—starting from popular belief and religious
motives—he reached a standpoint which at any rate with some truth may be
designated as atheism.
Xenophanes lived in the latter part of the sixth and the beginning of the
fifth centuries B.C. (according to his own statement he reached an age of
more than ninety years). He was an itinerant singer who travelled about
and recited poetry, presumably not merely his own but also that of others.
In his own poems he severely attacked the manner in which Homer and
Hesiod, the most famous poets of Greece, had represented the gods: they
had attributed to them everything which in man’s eyes is outrageous and
reprehensible—theft, adultery and deception of one another. Their accounts
of the fights of the gods against Titans and Giants he denounced as
“inventions of the ancients.” But he did not stop at that: “Men believe
that the gods are born, are clothed and shaped and speak like themselves”;
“if oxen and horses and lions could draw and paint, they would delineate
their gods in their own image”; “the Negroes believe that their gods are
flat-nosed and black, the Thracians that theirs have blue eyes and red
hair.” Thus he attacked directly the popular belief that the gods are
anthropomorphic, and his arguments testify that he clearly realised that
men create their gods in their own image. On another main point, too, he
was in direct opposition to the religious ideas of his time: he rejected
Divination, the belief that the gods imparted the secrets of the future to
men—which was deemed a mainstay of the belief in the existence of the
gods. As a positive counterpart to the anthropomorphic gods, Xenophanes
set up a philosophical conception of God: God must be One, Eternal,
Unchangeable and identical with himself in every way (all sight, all
hearing and all mind). This deity, according to the explicit statements of
our earliest sources, he identified with the universe.
If we examine more closely the arguments put forth by Xenophanes in
support of his remarkable conception of the deity, we realise that he
everywhere starts from the definitions of the nature of the gods as given
by popular religion; but, be it understood, solely from the absolute
definitions. He takes the existence of the divine, with its absolute
attributes, for granted; it is in fact the basis of all his speculation.
His criticism of the popular ideas of the gods is therefore closely
connected with his philosophical conception of God; the two are the
positive and negative sides of the same thing. Altogether his connexion
with what I call the naïve criticism of the popular religion is
unmistakable.
It is undoubtedly a remarkable fact that we meet at this early date with
such a consistent representative of this criticism. If we take Xenophanes
at his word we must describe him as an atheist, and atheism in the sixth
century B.C. is a very curious phenomenon indeed. Neither was it
acknowledged in antiquity; no one placed Xenophanes amongst _atheoi_; and
Cicero even says somewhere (according to Greek authority) that Xenophanes
was the only one of those who believed in gods who rejected divination. In
more recent times, too, serious doubt has been expressed whether
Xenophanes actually denied the existence of the gods. Reference has
amongst other things been made to the fact that he speaks in several
places about “gods” where he, according to his view, ought to say “God”;
nay, he has even formulated his fundamental idea in the words: “One God,
the greatest amongst gods and men, neither in shape nor mind like unto any
mortal.” To be sure, Xenophanes is not always consistent in his language;
but no weight whatever ought to be attached to this, least of all in the
case of a man who exclusively expressed himself in verse. Another theory
rests on the tradition that Xenophanes regarded his deity and the universe
as identical, consequently was a pantheist. In that case, it is said, he
may very well have considered, for instance, the heavenly bodies as
deities. Sound as this argument is in general, it does not apply to this
case. When a thinker arrives at pantheism, starting from a criticism of
polytheism which is expressly based on the antithesis between the unity
and plurality of the deity—then very valid proofs, indeed, are needed in
order to justify the assumption that he after all believed in a plurality
of gods; and such proofs are wanting in the case of Xenophanes.
Judging from the material in hand one can hardly arrive at any other
conclusion than that the standpoint of Xenophanes comes under our
definition of atheism. But we must not forget that only fragments of his
writings have been preserved, and that the more extensive of them do not
assist us greatly to the understanding of his religious standpoint. It is
possible that we might have arrived at a different conclusion had we but
possessed his chief philosophical work in its entirety, or at least larger
portions of it. And I must candidly confess that if I were asked whether,
in my heart of hearts, I believed that a Greek of the sixth century B.C.
denied point-blank the existence of his gods, my answer would be in the
negative.
That Xenophanes was not considered an atheist by the ancients may possibly
be explained by the fact that they objected to fasten this designation on
a man whose reasoning took the deity as a starting-point and whose sole
aim was to define its nature. Perhaps they also had an inkling that he in
reality stood on the ground of popular belief, even if he went beyond it.
Still more curious is the fact that his religious view does not seem to
have influenced the immediately succeeding philosophy at all. His
successors, Parmenides and Zeno, developed his doctrine of unity, but in a
pantheistic direction, and on a logical, not religious line of argument;
about their attitude to popular belief we are told practically nothing.
And Ionic speculation took a quite different direction. Not till a century
later, in Euripides, do we observe a distinct influence of his criticism
of popular belief; but at that time other currents of opinion had
intervened which are not dependent on Xenophanes, but might direct
attention to him.