CHAPTER XX.

THE CHURCH AND THE STATE.

No injustice should be done to Leo XIII. If his position as the

official head of a great Church were not sufficient to shield him

against unfairness, his eminent Christian virtues should do so. Before

his election to the pontificate he had acquired the reputation of being

conspicuously great. He was, undoubtedly, the ablest defender of the

prerogative rights of the papacy among the entire body of cardinals;

and this distinction was well deserved. His arguments were then

addressed mainly to ecclesiastics, and were designed to encourage them

in their efforts to extinguish the revolutionary spirit which pervaded

the Roman Catholic populations of Europe.

Now that he has become pope, the circle of his influence is enlarged so

that it reaches the whole body of the Church of Rome through the medium

of his hierarchy and priesthood; of whom it may rightfully be said,

without intending offense, that they have no other spiritual work to

do but what he assigns to them. That they may be fitted for this they

have been deprived of all share in the responsibilities which pertain

to the conduct of human affairs--all participation in the active

operations of society and all those domestic associations which excite

generous and kindly emotions and give to life its greatest charm. They

are, consequently, molded by him into a compact organization, held in

cohesion by the power of a common purpose, with the special design of

assailing, in every part of the world, whatsoever he shall decide to

be under the ban of his pontifical displeasure. With such a force at

his command--unitedly resisting what he shall direct them to resist,

and defending what he shall direct them to defend--he constitutes

such a power in the presence of the nations as exists nowhere else.

Reaching, therefore, vaster multitudes of people, and possessing more

potential influence than any other man in the world, nothing should

be permitted to impair our obligation to become acquainted with his

present pontifical opinions and purposes, as well as with the habits of

thought which prepared him for his present eminent position. It can not

be rightfully complained that his pontifical opinions are interpreted

in the light of those previously entertained and expressed by him--more

especially since his biographer has made such liberal use of them to

prove his fitness to become the potential head of the Christian world.

While cardinal, he availed himself of frequent opportunities to

denounce the Italian Revolution as sinful, and supported all the

measures designed to suppress it. He aided Pius IX by his advice

and counsel, and defended the entire series of his pontifical

measures--condemning as heresy every professed form of Christianity

that did not recognize the obligation of obedience to the pope as a

divinely-appointed temporal sovereign. He regarded all other Churches

besides the Roman as impiously pretentious--having no legitimate

right to exist--and consequently as under the Divine displeasure. As

he considered unity of Christian faith essential to the unity of the

Church, and the temporal dominion of the pope as absolutely necessary

to both, he employed much of his time as cardinal in supplying the

clergy of Perugia with arguments against the revolution, and in

pointing out both its spiritual and temporal consequences. As part of

his pastoral work he insisted that the destruction of the temporal

power of the pope would necessarily and inevitably lead to infidelity

and atheism, because it would open the door to the toleration of other

religions besides the Roman. This, in his opinion, would inaugurate the

reign of "irreligion and libertinism," for the reason that there was

no middle state between obedience to the pope as an absolute temporal

monarch, with complete authority over the faith and consciences of his

subjects, and the ruin of society. He divided society into two classes:

one faithful to Christ, and therefore obedient to the pope; and the

other representing Belial--that is, Satan--because of the refusal of

that obedience. Upon all these points his meaning was plainly expressed

in eloquent and faultless style.

Although differing from Pius IX with regard to the duration of the

temporal power--fixing it at "eleven centuries," and not as obtained

at the fall of the Roman Empire, several hundred years previously--he,

nevertheless, considers it a "divine institution," conferring upon

the pope the "supreme and governing power in spirituals." Before

explaining, however, what he intends by "spirituals," he insists

that whatsoever they are, they can not become subject to any human

interference or limitation in any part of the world, but must be

everywhere complete and plenary. Upon this point his biographer assumes

to assist him, by interjecting between his sentences, as a key to his

meaning, the idea that the temporal power is "incarnate in a manner in

the Roman pontiff;" that is, that in some strangely mysterious way, it

so permeates the pope as to be made providentially inseparable from his

personal as well as official existence! But, seeming not to realize the

ridiculousness of his bold hyperbole, he omits to explain why this same

power was not incarnate in the popes before they placed crowns upon

their own heads at the fall of the Roman Empire. Perhaps he imagined

that the incarnate principle was in its germ during the first ages

of the Church, and that the process of its development into absolute

imperialism was not complete until the peaceful alliance between

the Eastern and the Western Christians was sundered by the invading

armies of Pepin and Charlemagne, when these sovereigns imparted a

portion of their royal prerogatives to the popes and protected them

by military force. Whatsoever meaning may have been intended, it is

manifestly designed to convey and enforce the sentiment as part of

the doctrinal faith of the Church, that because the temporal power

"maintains in their unity and integrity the Church and religion,"

therefore it is divine, and confers superhuman authority upon the pope

over the sentiments, opinions, and conduct of mankind. "Besides," said

Leo XIII, while yet Cardinal Pecci, "can it be intelligible that the

living interpreter of the divine law and will should be placed under

the jurisdiction of the civil authority, which itself derives its own

strength and authority from the same will and law?" To this question

he attempts no specific answer, but his meaning was well understood

by those to whom it was addressed; that is, by the ecclesiastics

whose minds had been molded by the same training as his own. It is

this: That as the authority of the pope and that of the State are

both derived from the same divine law, and as the pope alone is the

"living interpreter" of that law, therefore the State must accept

and obey what he shall declare as "the voice of God." Continuing,

however, he embraces this same meaning in equally expressive terms.

Happiness in this life he considers the only means of procuring

higher happiness hereafter, and therefore the pope as "high priest"

has "received from Christ the mission of guiding humanity toward the

everlasting felicity;" that is, there is no other true religion than

that announced and maintained by the pope; that all other forms are

false and heretical; and that those who do not profess it will, in the

great and unknown future, be cast into utter darkness, to weep and wail

and gnash their teeth forever. And then, basing his conclusion upon

this hypothesis, he breaks out in this ejaculation: "See, then, what

upsetting of ideas it would be to make the high priest of the Catholic

Church, the Roman pontiff, the subject of any earthly power;" as if God

had so endowed all the popes--even Alexander VI (!)--with the faculty

of inerrancy, that they alone, of all the ages, have had the mysteries

of nature and revelation revealed to them! He never permits this idea

of universal papal sovereignty to escape him without so expressing

its meaning as to show that wheresoever or into whatsoever country

he shall assert it, it can not become subject to any other law than

that which the pope himself shall prescribe. It requires but little

scrutiny to see that what he intends is, that when the pope sends

his ecclesiastical representatives into any part of the world, his

instructions must be to them a code of laws which they must obey at

every hazard, although it may become necessary to violate whatsoever

conflicting laws the civil authorities may enact. If the people of

the United States were to submit to this, from the moment they should

do so they would cease to exist as an independent nation, and their

progressive prosperity would wither and die under the spiritual tyranny

of papal Rome, as other republics have hitherto withered and died

under the temporal tyranny of imperial Rome. And thus that ancient

city which, by its iniquities, became the Babylon of the apostolic

times, would again acquire the power to rebuild by unrewarded labor

the monuments upon her seven hills, and to exult at the decay of the

present progressive nations, as her great prototype did when she looked

out upon the miserable but obedient populations who swarmed throughout

the valleys of the Tiber.

Leo XIII lays down his premise with such assumed authority as not to

admit of challenge, and logically argues from it certain satisfactory

conclusions, without pausing to inquire whether the premise itself is

true or false. In this respect he imitates some logicians who seem not

to realize the difference between assumption and proof. For example, he

insists that Christ established an independent Church and a dependent

State, so that the former does not exist in the latter, but the latter

must exist in the former, in its condition of dependence. He overlooks

the fact that States existed before the Church, and that instead of

interfering with their temporal affairs Christ paid tribute to them,

and recognized the independence of each in its own proper sphere--the

one spiritual and the other temporal. The spiritual obedience he

exacted was to the divine law, in order to promote the spiritual

welfare of individuals and consequently of society; the temporal

obedience was to make secure the political rights of citizenship,

including those of person and property. He did not consider States

as capable of rewards and punishment in another life, but as mere

aggregated communities who could bring them to an end by abandoning

their territories. Therefore, he left the State to its own temporal

government, independently of the Church, and not only obeyed its laws

himself, but enjoined the obligation of the same obedience upon his

disciples and followers; that is, of rendering "unto Cæsar the things

that are Cæsar's." He gave equal independence to the Church, so that

by administering to the spiritual welfare of individuals the temporal

welfare of the State would be advanced and the common prosperity the

better secured. And thus, by also rendering "unto God the things that

are God's," the general welfare of the State would rest upon firmer

foundations.

History, during all the ages since Christ, well attests the character

of his plan. For more than five hundred years the Church and the State

acted independently of each other, neither encroaching upon the sphere

of the other, and Christianity progressed until paganism disappeared

before it. When the ambitious popes brought on a conflict that

separated the Western from the Eastern Christians, and accepted the

crown of temporal dominion from Pepin and Charlemagne in consideration

of the pontifical ratification of the former's treason to France, the

world was plunged into the darkness and stupor of the Middle Ages,

and they became enabled to employ their power of absolute monarchism

to compel obedience from the State to the Church and the Inquisition,

to produce unity of religious faith. When the cloud of popular

ignorance became so dense as to be scarcely penetrable, and such popes

as Alexander VI could assert their own infallibility with impudent

impunity, and burn at the stake those who denied it, the necessity

for reform became so urgent that the period of the Reformation was

ushered in with such violence that the papacy, aided by the Jesuits,

was powerless to arrest it. And when the Reformation gave birth to

Protestantism, and enabled it to culminate, through the influence

of free religious thought, in the civil institutions of the United

States, such impetus was given to the liberalizing spirit of progress

that monarchism in both Church and State would be hastened to its

final decay, were it not that Leo XIII has thrown the great weight

of his Christian character into the scale in favor of it and against

the progressive spirit which has advanced the world to its present

condition of prosperity and happiness. Those who advise us to turn

back from this prosperity and happiness toward the Middle Ages, under

the pretense that they are produced by the triumph of irreligion and

licentiousness over Christianity, are, to say the least, counselors of

evil.

Leo XIII reasons within a narrow circle; or, rather, within a number

of circles, reaching always the same conclusion, that whatsoever is

adverse to the papacy must be opposed until it is put out of the way.

His spiritual power must be as comprehensive as he desires to make

it--including whatsoever of temporals he shall decide necessary to

its free exercise, or to the interests of the Church; and within this

circle his jurisdiction must be so full, complete, and independent,

that neither Governments nor communities nor individuals can place

any limitation upon it, or violate the rules and principles he shall

prescribe, without heresy. He is always explicit upon questions

concerning the relations between the pope and Governments--never losing

sight of the idea that he must be absolutely independent of them; so

much so that while they must obey him when he shall think proper, in

behalf of the Church and religion, to command their obedience, he

shall be under no obligation to obey any of their laws which he shall

consider in conflict with his pontifical plans or the interests of the

Church. "He must be free," he says, "to communicate without impediment

with bishops, sovereigns, subjects, in order that his word, the organ

and expression of the divine will, may have a free course all over

the earth, and be there canonically announced." Here, again, he gives

prominence to the idea that he is the only interpreter of the divine

will, coupling with it the additional one, that not only bishops, but

sovereigns and peoples everywhere, must recognize and obey it; for

obedience is necessarily implied, inasmuch as his commands would not

have "free course" without it. No Government must possess the power

to prohibit this, because he acts canonically; that is, his decrees,

being an embodiment of the divine will, become part of the Canon law,

which, having thus the stamp of divinity upon it, must be universally

recognized and obeyed, no matter what Governments may do or say to the

contrary. Practically it is the same as if he had said that the laws of

all the Governments, touching matters embraced within his pontifical

jurisdiction, must give way to the Canon law, because they are human

and it is divine.

There are many methods of illustrating the effect of this papal

doctrine which will occur to intelligent minds; but at this point one

is sufficient. In the United States we have separated Church and State,

and based our civil government upon the principle of toleration for

differences of religious faith. But by papal decrees and the Canon law

all this is declared to be heresy, and placed under the pontifical ban.

Hence, the sovereign spiritual power claimed by Leo XIII, as pope,

gives him the divine right, in the face of all our Constitutions,

National and State, to anathematize the heretical form of our

institutions, and to impose upon all who recognize obedience to him the

obligation to oppose this heresy, and to eradicate it whensoever it is

expedient to undertake it. Involved in this there is, also, the claim

of additional power to reconstruct our Government so as to unite Church

and State, and subordinate the latter to the former, by putting an end

to all religious differences, and establishing the religion of the

pope--whatever that is or may be--as the national religion.

But Cardinal Pecci--now Leo XIII--expressed himself more plainly and

emphatically upon these points, in assigning the reasons why the pope

should possess, and exercise throughout the world, this extraordinary

spiritual sovereignty. It is necessary, he said, in order that the pope

may be empowered "to keep off schism; to prevent the spread of public

heresies; to decide religious disputes; to speak freely to rulers and

peoples; to send nuncios and ambassadors; to conclude concordats; to

employ censures; to regulate, in fact, the consciences of two hundred

millions of Catholics scattered all over the earth; to preserve

inviolate dogmas and morals; to receive appeals from all parts of the

Christian world; to judge the causes thus submitted; to enforce the

execution of the sentences pronounced; to fulfill, in one word, all his

duties, and to maintain all the sacred rights of his primacy."

Having thus enumerated these extraordinary powers of the pope--such as

exist nowhere else in the world--he goes a step further by defining

the relations between the papacy and those Governments and peoples

that have taken away, or refused to recognize, the existence of these

powers. In this he refers, primarily, to the kingdom of Italy, which

had committed the offense of abolishing the temporal power of the

pope and separated Church and State; and, secondarily, to all other

Governments throughout the world where the union between Church and

State is forbidden; that is, where Governments of, and for, and by the

people have been established. "Here, then," says he, "is what they

are aiming at by taking from the pope his temporal power: they mean

to render it impossible for him to exercise his spiritual power."

This goes to the bottom of the question, and states plainly the idea

present in his mind; that is, that the spiritual power, being superior

to the temporal, necessarily includes it to the extent he shall think

proper to assert--limited only by his pontifical discretion--so that

the latter must to that extent be kept in subordination to the former,

and obey its commands. For example, the pope considers it his duty to

send an army of ecclesiastics to all parts of the world, and to exact

from them implicit obedience to himself, so that wheresoever they

shall find temporal laws forbidding them to perform their spiritual

functions as he shall define them, he and they must be endowed with

sufficient spiritual power to enable them to disobey those laws and

set them aside when it becomes expedient to do so. He assumes that

"every Catholic"--no matter where he is--accepts this as part of his

religious faith, being instructed that the pope must possess such power

over both spirituals and temporals as shall make him independent of

every Government upon earth in all such matters as he shall declare

to be within his spiritual jurisdiction. Quoting some obscure "lodge

of Carbonarism in Italy," in order to show that where the pope does

not possess the power he claims for him, irreligion, infidelity, and

immorality must, of necessity, prevail, he declares that "it is no

longer matter of policy; it is matter of conscience" to remove out of

the way all impediments to papal supremacy, and that every Christian

must stand by the pope in order to put down the enemies of religion,

who are designated by him to be those who have taken away from the pope

or deny to him any or all of the above enumerated powers.

He does not fail to make his denunciation as comprehensive and sweeping

as possible, by characterizing as "irreligion and libertinism" the

progressive advancement of modern nations, which prevails where Church

and State have been separated. He attaches this character to all

these, because, according to him, they are not faithful to Christ,

or the Church, or the pope. He denounces the revolution in Italy as

"the result of conspiracy, deception, injustice, and sacrilege,"

merely because it abolished the temporal power of the pope, without

the least impairment of any single principle of religious faith that

can be traced back to Christ, to the apostles, or to the primitive

Christians. What seemed to him to be one of its deplorable and most

odious consequences was the loss of power by the pope in consequence of

the provision which placed the clergy upon equality with other citizens

in regard to civil duties and rights, and made them responsible to the

laws of the State, precisely as they are in the United States. This is

a point upon which neither the pope nor the clergy will compromise,

otherwise than upon compulsion. With them there is no heresy more

flagrant than compelling the clergy to comply with any law requiring

them to do what the pope forbids as prejudicial to the Church. The

right of the pope to require of them disobedience to any such law,

and their right to disobey it, is what they call independence, which,

according to them, can not be impaired without violating the divine

law. They submit to this in the United States, and wheresoever Church

and State are separated, but always with the unchangeable purpose of

securing, in the end, complete triumph for the law of the Church over

that of the State. Hence, when, as the result of the revolution, the

law of Umbria placed the clergy upon an equality with other citizens,

and made them responsible to the laws of the State, as they now are

in the United States, it was denounced by the present occupant of the

papal chair as a sacrilegious violation of the divine law. Is this

requirement any less "sacrilege" in the United States than in Umbria?

The degrees of latitude and longitude do not vary the meaning of the

divine law; but the difference in conditions may account for simulated

acquiescence in the one case and open protest in the other.

He saw also, in the "diffusion of pestilential books, of erroneous

doctrines, and heterodox teachings" another cause for the pontifical

curse, inasmuch as it impaired the power of the pope to place

restrictions upon the freedom of the press, which has opened the way

to liberalism and made the crowns of kings insecure. But that which

he condemned more than all, and considered the source of innumerable

ills, was the fact that Church and State were separated, and each

confined to its own distinct and independent sphere. Referring to the

law of Umbria which required the clergy to accept this--as the clergy

in the United States are required to accept it--he said: "They are

offered, as the basis of reconciliation, to accept _the condemned and

false system of the separation of Church and State_, which, being

equivalent to divorcing the State from the Church, would force Catholic

society to free itself from all religious influence." He manifestly

intended to impress the minds of all who acknowledged obedience to

the pope, whether in Europe, the United States, or elsewhere, with

the sentiment that the only true religion in the world required, as

a matter of faith, that Church and State should be united, with the

latter subordinate to the former in whatsoever concerns faith and

morals, and that where they have been separated their union should be

restored. Having thus made this the solemn religious duty of "every

Catholic" throughout the world, he has thereby placed himself, and

is preparing them to be placed when the proper time shall arrive, in

direct hostility to the principles which prevail in all modern liberal

Governments, including that of the United States.[206]

In all this there is no disguise--nothing equivocal. Nor is there

any reason why there should have been, inasmuch as these admonitions

were addressed to a population reared and educated in the faith of

the Church at Rome, for centuries obedient to the commands of the

pope and his clergy, and in whose minds there was supposed to linger

such sentiments of reverence for the papacy as would, if vigorously

appealed to, stimulate them to demand the restoration of the temporal

power. Therefore, the foremost man among the clergy--he whose eloquence

stirred the heart and whose virtues were universally acknowledged--was

chosen as the champion of the papal cause. But for events which

have subsequently occurred--more especially his election to the

pontificate--and the tolerant spirit which pervades our institutions,

it is not probable they would ever have reached the people of the

United States. And even now, since they have done so in the pope's

biography, there are scarcely five out of every hundred thousand of our

population who will ever read them, or, if they do, will turn aside

from the multitude of their pursuits to investigate and scan them

closely enough to discover their true meaning, plainly and fairly as it

is expressed. By such investigation and discovery they would see that

Leo XIII considers the following propositions irrevocably settled as

religious dogmas: That God provided for the Italian people a form of

civil government subject to the absolute dominion of the pope, as the

only one that can be religiously tolerated; that revolution to set it

aside and establish a popular and constitutional form of government in

its place, violates the law of God, and is heresy; that self-government

by the people is an abomination which can never obtain the sanction

and approbation of the papacy; and that the people of Italy, in order

to remain faithful to the Church, should continue forever obedient

subjects of this imperial absolutism, no matter how severe its

oppressions may become, or how much they may desire to rid themselves

and their children of it. And it will be observed that the condition of

Italy, in rebellion against the temporal absolutism of the pope, serves

him to illustrate the principle which lies at the bottom of all his

reasoning; that as God governs the world in equity, and has provided

this imperial absolutism for that purpose, with the pope to preside

over all that is spiritual and whatsoever temporals shall involve

spirituals, therefore all other forms of government are founded upon

"irreligion and libertinism," especially such as make the whole body of

the people the source of civil power.

The integrity of Leo XIII is not questioned by any one. But he might

be liable to the suspicion of insincerity if he had been personally

enabled to contrast the present improved condition of the people of the

United States, which has been reached within little more than a century

of time, with that of the peoples who have for more than twelve hundred

years been compelled to submit to the authority and spiritual dominion

of the papacy. At all events, it is difficult, for minds impressed

by the influences of free popular government, to appreciate either

the force or merits of his arguments, when he attempts to make the

temporal indispensable to the spiritual power, and asserts the divine

right to maintain it when possessed, and the duty of acquiring it when

not possessed, as equally indispensable parts of religious faith.

The fact that the Italian people--otherwise devoted to the Church of

Rome--repudiated this doctrine both politically and religiously,

should have impressed his mind with its want of adaptability to the

present condition of the world, distinguished as it is either by some

form of progress or the popular desire for it among all the nations.

Yet, instead of coming to some terms with this progressive spirit

among the Italians--which needed only acquiescence in the loss of

the temporal power--he was constrained by the united pledge of the

College of Cardinals, at the time of his election, to persist in the

protesting and aggressive policy of his immediate predecessor. And as

he could not turn back without an entire abandonment of the temporal

power, he has been likewise constrained to define the extent to which

this power, if restored, must be recognized, as a matter of religious

faith, beyond Rome and the States of the Church. Without this, the

faithful would have been left to suppose that the restoration was

designed only to force an absolute temporal monarch upon the people

of Italy without their consent, and, therefore, that no religious

motive for it existed. Consequently he defined the universal faith

to be that, by the restoration of the temporal power, the pope would

become again so absolutely sovereign and independent of all Governments

that he could not "be placed under the jurisdiction of the civil

authority" anywhere in the world, so that whatsoever he shall command

in his "mission of guiding humanity," he must be obeyed, no matter

what any civil authority may provide to the contrary; that is, that

the laws of every State, in conflict with such religious dogmas as he

shall announce, must become void and inoperative in so far as they

may impede the measures directed by him. Entering upon particulars,

he does not shrink from the responsibility of declaring, as we have

seen, that the pope must have power to prevent schism and heresy, which

includes the means necessary to suppress them; that is, to put an end

to Protestantism and all that it has produced. He alone must decide

"religious disputes," and every question involving dogmas and morality,

and what he shall determine concerning all these must direct and guide

the consciences of all "the faithful" throughout the world. And he

shall have the right "to enforce the execution" of whatsoever judgment

he shall pronounce, no matter whether against Governments, communities,

or individuals. The word "enforce" is his own, evidently employed with

a full understanding of its import; for the completeness of his style

shows that it is not his habit to waste words, or to use them without

deliberation. He could not have intended a resort to force as a primary

remedy against heresy, but probably considers it justifiable when

circumstances render it necessary, as in the cases of rebellious and

obdurate heretics whose defiance of papal authority becomes flagrant.

It is desirable, however, to follow him further, in order to become

entirely familiar with the practical working of his doctrines, as

he himself applied them to the state of affairs with which he was

directly concerned, in carrying on the battle with "irreligion" and the

revolution.

When the Archbishops and Bishops of Umbria deemed it proper to protest

to the Piedmontese Government against its infringement of papal

rights, Cardinal Pecci was chosen by them as specially fitted for that

delicate and important work. As the population of Piedmont were Roman

Catholic, and there had been no attempt on the part of the Government

to interfere with what they considered the established faith of the

Church upon strictly religious points, this protest was mainly intended

to express opposition to the laws which regulated the relations of the

clergy to the State, by requiring them to obey the public statutes, as

they are required to do in the United States, and in such countries as

have disunited Church and State. Up till that time they had been an

exclusive and independent class, with privileges and prerogatives not

enjoyed by the mass of citizens--such as exemption from taxes and from

the support of the Government--and to the change in these relations

this protest was intended to apply. The laws then existing were

considered an irreligious invasion of the liberty of the clergy; that

is, of their right of exemption from all governmental obligations.

Consequently the feeling upon the subject became very intense among

the clergy, as was to be expected after so many years of license and

indulgence; and it furnished Cardinal Pecci with the opportunity of

making an admirable display of his intellectual powers and eloquence.

Without preface, he came to the question directly in these words: "It

is a grievous error against Catholic doctrine to pretend that the

Church is the subject of any earthly power, and bound by the same

economy and relations which regulate civil society. The Church is not

a human institution, nor is it a portion of the political edifice,

although it is destined to promote the welfare of the men among whom

it lives. It affirms that from God came directly its own being, its

constitution, and the necessary faculties for attaining its own

sublime destiny, which is one different (from that of the State), and

altogether of a supernatural order. Divinely ordered, with a hierarchy

of its own, it is by its nature _independent of the State_."

He makes the whole superstructure of his argument rest upon the

foundation that as the constitution and all the faculties of the Church

came from God, therefore it must of necessity have a "hierarchy of its

own," and entirely "independent of the State;" that is, the clergy

must be bound to obey the pope, and released from all obligation to

obey the laws of the State, unless they also shall be approved by the

pope. To require from them this obedience to State laws, "invades,"

according to this protest, "the sacred province of the priesthood,"

as well, also, as "the rights and liberties of the Church," because

it tempts them "away from the due subjection to their superiors," who

are governed only by the pope and the Canon law. And, in order to

show that the Church can not tolerate liberalism in the form of the

freedom of religious belief or of the press, this protest deplores

the "licentiousness of the theater and the press, and the continual

snares laid to surprise pious souls, to undermine faith by circulating

infamous pamphlets and heterodox writings, and by the declamations of

fanatical preachers of impiety;"[207] in other words, by Protestantism

and Protestants.

Cardinal Pecci dealt more directly with the "irreligion and

libertinism" of the present age in a Lenten pastoral "on the current

errors against religion and Christian life." He here expressed himself

with severe intolerance against those who proclaim that "_man is free

in his own conscience; he can embrace any religion he likes_;" that is,

he condemned the freedom of religious belief. He could not have done

otherwise without causing his fidelity to the papacy to be suspected.

Consequently, he made his meaning perfectly clear, so that none of

the faithful could mistake it, and doubtless because the freedom of

conscience is necessary to popular government, which, in serving the

pope, he was obliged to condemn. Nevertheless, he was driven to the

necessity of admitting that man is created "free and gifted with

reason," but sought to break the force of the admission by insisting

that this natural freedom must be subject to restraint, because God

has imposed obligations upon him and dictated laws for him which he

is bound to obey. He, however, gives no latitude to the individual

and makes no allowance for his private conscience, but considers him

incompetent to decide for himself within the scope of religious laws,

and as fit only for obedience to authority; that is, the Church at

Rome, and the pope who may, for the time being, preside over it. In

setting forth the manner in which God has made known his laws for

the direction and government of individual consciences, and how he

requires them to be obeyed, he insists that they are only such as the

Roman Church has announced, and that the natural right of the human

reason to its freedom must be restrained into obedience to them, so

that the only liberty of thought or conscience to be allowed must be

that which centers in this obedience. To him any other freedom than

this violates the divine law, and is heresy. But he plainly involves

himself in the absurdity of supposing that to be freedom which is the

very reverse of it; for there can be no proposition more palpably

true than that a man has no freedom of thought or conscience when

constrained, by a force he is powerless to resist, to exchange his own

opinions for those of others. It may well be doubted whether opinions

formed under the dictation of authority are in fact such. Fear of

consequences may induce acquiescence in them, or even their avowal;

but as the laws which govern the mind and conscience have no agency

in their production, they are simple utterances of the lips which are

not responded to by the heart. This must be the case with enlightened

minds, except where pre-existing opinions are changed by the force

of argument and new enlightenment. The papacy understood this, and

therefore kept in ignorance the populations within the circle of its

influence and jurisdiction; and Cardinal Pecci, instructed as his mind

was upon general topics, was unable to conceive any other methods

of human thought than those instilled into his mind by his Jesuit

education, and which his official position made it necessary for him to

maintain.

Controlled entirely by the idea of unresisting and uninquiring

obedience to authority, without any regard for the dictates of

individual conscience or the suggestions of reason, he announced the

logical result of his own and the papal teachings in these words: "Nor

is it left to the free will of man to refuse it, or to fashion for

himself a form of worship and service such as he pleases to render."

It does not require a man of learning to understand this; it is plain

and palpable to any ordinary mind. He could have chosen no words more

expressly condemnatory of the freedom of conscience; nor could he have

more formally arraigned the people of the United States for having

asserted the right of every man to worship God as his own conscience

dictates, and having made that fundamental in their institutions and

necessary to their existence. According to him this is heresy, because

it draws the people away from obedience to the pope; and no man has

the right to refuse this obedience, or "to fashion for himself a form

of worship or service" which the pope shall condemn! He is immeasurably

shocked at the idea that men should be permitted to entertain and

express different religious opinions, and to reject the teachings of

the pope, to whom alone implicit obedience is due! He had too much

character at stake to disguise anything upon this point--leaving that

to others in free countries, where the pretense of toleration may be

maintained with the hope that it may ultimately pave the way to papal

intolerance. Continuing, therefore, the same undisguised denunciation

of the freedom of conscience, he says: "It would be not only impious,

but monstrous, to maintain every form of worship is acceptable and

indifferent, that the human conscience is free to adopt whichever form

it pleases, and to fashion out a religion to suit itself." It is not

necessary to comment here upon this bold and defiant assault upon our

civil institutions. But it is well to remark that it ought to tinge the

cheeks of those in this country who, in one breath, profess obedience

to the pope who uttered the language here quoted, and in the next talk

glibly about their advocacy of the freedom of conscience, which he has

condemned as "impious" and "monstrous"--as an unpardonable offense

against God!

He then proceeds to speak of the relation of the State to the education

of the young, by saying that it is "not called upon to discharge this

great parental duty, but to keep the natural educators in their work,"

by permitting it to "be carried on under the direction of the Church,

the depository and teacher of religious doctrines." This is as if he

had said that the State shall be forbidden to participate in the work

of education even to the extent of teaching patriotism to its youth,

for the reason that such State education has the tendency to substitute

love of country for fidelity to the pope; and for the further reason

that all education that can be tolerated should "be carried on under

the direction of the Church" and confined exclusively to "religious

doctrines." He expresses the same idea more fully by insisting that

all other kinds of education are "devoid of all the external practices

and duties of the Christian faith, and calculated to familiarize young

people with 'freedom of conscience' and indifferentism;" that is, to

encourage them in the belief that popular freedom is worth striving

after, and that people are more prosperous and happy when governed by

laws of their own making than by those dictated by the ambition of

those who claim that they alone are divinely chosen to govern mankind.

He sees nothing in such religious liberty as our institutions establish

but "irreligion and libertinism," to which it has given rise, and

against which he strives hard to enlist all the supporters of the

papacy.[208]

From the papal standpoint his arguments are sound and logical, because

the general enlightenment of the mind, which enables it to investigate

and understand the causes of things, and makes it competent to form

conclusions of its own, tends to create self-reliance and opposition to

oppressive laws; and has, on these accounts, been odious to the popes

ever since they acquired temporal power and made the Church, by means

of it, the most potent instrument in maintaining monarchism. Therefore

the student of history finds that the papacy has grown weaker as the

world has increased in enlightenment. But from the standpoint of our

free institutions, both his positions and reasoning are radically wrong

and indefensible, because they assail the freedom of conscience which

our institutions guarantee to every individual, and our common-school

system, which is more responsive to the public sentiment and will than

any other measure of our public policy. The plain and manifest import

of what he has said is this: That if he were allowed full liberty in

this country to dictate what shall and what shall not be regarded as

true religion, we would have neither freedom of conscience nor public

schools. And this, by his subsequent elevation to the pontificate,

constitutes to-day, the greatest if not the only danger which threatens

our free, popular form of government.

By his election as pope, Leo XIII occupies a different position from

that filled by him as Cardinal Pecci. In the latter he defended

the papal doctrines and recommended them for strict observance by

the faithful; in the former he dictates and commands, allowing

no discretion and submitting to no disobedience. Therefore it is

manifestly proper, as well as necessary, that we in this country

shall know to what extent the religious doctrines of the cardinal are

embodied in the authoritative teachings of the pope. In this latter

capacity he has undoubtedly flattered himself, as Pius IX did, that

he has at his back and subject to his command, two hundred millions

of obedient subjects throughout the world, and has, consequently,

availed himself of his first consistorial allocution to prepare them

for submission, by announcing that he has been chosen "to fill on earth

the place of the Prince of pastors, Christ Jesus!" He must have known,

when these words were traced by his pontifical pen, that Christ was

never the pastor of an organized Church with a constitution of either

spiritual or temporal government; that when the primitive Churches were

established by the apostles, they were independent of each other; that

none of these ever had a bishop or a presbyter with temporal power in

his hands; that this power was not acquired until after the fall of

the Roman Empire, according to Pius IX, and not until several hundred

years later, according to himself; and that even then it was wrenched

from the people by the aid of ambitious monarchs and their armies,

and maintained by the false and forged "donation of Constantine," the

pseudo-decretals of Isidore, and other means long since repudiated

in all parts of the world, and not now defended except by the most

mendacious. Yet, with this knowledge in his possession, he strangely

complains that the "Apostolic See" has been "violently stripped of its

temporal sovereignty" in disobedience of the divine law--pretending

thereby that Christ exercised and possessed such sovereignty when upon

earth, and that he, as his only representative, is his legitimate

successor!

His mind must have been overflowing with exhilaration, when, giving

full play to his imagination, he fancied himself thus elevated above

and superior to all other human beings. But, like many others who

indulge in similar flights and "build castles in the air," the excesses

of his fancy were checked by the conviction that the world was, at

last, a practical reality in what concerns its welfare, and that the

Italian people, who had for many centuries submitted to papal dominion,

would not permit him to place the crown of temporal royalty upon his

head. Seemingly saddened by this melancholy conviction, he found

himself constrained to announce to his "venerable brothers" of the

episcopacy that the papacy had been "reduced to a condition in which it

can in no wise enjoy the full, free, and unimpeded use of its powers,"

well knowing that it had not been deprived of any of its spiritual

authority except that involved in his right to wear a temporal crown

and govern the people arbitrarily as a temporal monarch. And then,

under the stimulant of hope, he imposed upon them the religious

obligation to labor for the restoration of this lost temporal power,

by reminding them how gloriously Pius IX had served the papacy by his

efforts "to re-establish the episcopal hierarchy" in Scotland, in

the face of the Government of England and the religious sentiment of

the Scotch people. Under the influence of these mingled emotions of

despondency and hope, his pontificate commenced. What fruits it is

destined to bear are hidden in the womb of time. What he intends to

accomplish, so far as he can, it is the duty of the civilized world to

understand, not by what any cardinal, archbishop, bishop, or priest

shall say, but as he himself has chosen officially to announce it. No

other man upon earth besides him has the right, according to the papal

theory, to prescribe a single tenet of religious faith, because he

alone occupies the place of Christ upon earth!

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 206: Life of Leo XIII. By O'Reilly. Pages 200-214.]

[Footnote 207: Life of Leo XIII. By O'Reilly. Pages 219 to 222.]

[Footnote 208: Life of Leo XIII, pp. 230 to 239.]

The Footprints of the Jesuits · 第 20 / 26 章