BLOCKADES OF THE PAST AND THE FUTURE
Present compared with past conditions—Lessons of former
blockades—Plan of the Northern States—Action of the
Gulf-stream—Search-lights; their value to blockaders and
blockaded—Quick-firing guns—Speed of modern ships as affecting
a blockade—National character—Battle-ships and cruisers.
Although it is extremely improbable that the world will ever again
witness a war carried on under conditions similar to those obtaining in
the contest carried on between the North and South in the sixties, still
it is possible, as recent events have shown, that the United States
might find themselves involved in a struggle with a first-rate maritime
Power. If this were the case, the first step to be taken by that Power
would be to blockade the United States ports. This being so, it is
interesting to consider how, owing to increased speed, quick-firing
guns, and search-lights, the relationships between blockaders and
blockade-runners have been affected during the last thirty years.
In the civil war the conditions were very different from those likely to
occur in the future; the blockade-runners of those days were unarmed,
and their business was to dodge, not to fight, the blockaders, and the
shortness of the run before a safe port could be reached made possible a
heavy outlay for building and maintaining special vessels. But to my
mind the most salient alteration in the conditions affecting the
question is the introduction of quick-firing guns, search-lights, and
increased speed.
Before considering the effect of these changes on the future of
blockading, it will be as well to ascertain what lessons were learnt
from the blockade of the American coast.
We soon discovered that with due care and pluck the risk was far less
than people believed; except in a few cases our losses were caused by
ignorance of position in making the port. In some cases this was owing
to the fact of our being chased about by day; in others it was caused by
the irregular action of the Gulf-stream; and in some cases it was due to
neglect and want of care in keeping a proper look-out at daylight; also
to not keeping clear of vessels when seen, and to steaming too fast when
not necessary, thereby causing smoke, which discovered to the blockaders
the position of the runner. Discovery (after taking all possible
precautions) by a faster vessel was the cause of a small minority of
captures.
Again, the blockade was carried on on a wrong principle. The Northern
plan was,—to keep a number of ships close off the port, as a rule
anchoring by day and by night moving close in, and a few ships at a
moderate distance from the land. This plan enabled runners to lie out a
fair distance from the shore at sunset so as to run in when the time
came, having the whole night before them should they be seen. On coming
out, we felt that after the first ten miles or so from the shore there
was little chance of anything seeing us before daylight, and if we were
seen then the inshore squadron could not join in the chase.
Off Bermuda I rarely saw a cruiser; off the Bahamas there were three or
four, but not well placed; at sea most of the cruisers were in pairs, as
far as I could make out; so that their limit of vision was only that of
one, and in such a case there is always the possibility of the one
trusting to the other to keep a good look-out.
The action of the Gulf-stream was an important factor in the
calculations which the blockade-runners had to take into consideration.
Its rate is so uncertain, that unless you had taken a sight the day
before you got in you could not depend upon your position, and although
it could be verified by the soundings it could not be laid down by them
alone. Star observation, from the uncertain horizon, could not be
depended upon, and the moon of course was not available; on the other
hand, the general haze was in our favour.
That in the future there will ever be a similar blockade is improbable;
it will be one of armed ships against armed ships, and the only
exception, if it can be called running a blockade, will be that of armed
merchant-ships bringing food to England, which will be required to meet
cruisers on the open sea, and not to run in and out of a blockaded port.
I will now take up the three points of speed, quick-firing guns, and
search-lights.
To begin with search-lights: on first thoughts the search-light would
appear to be a formidable weapon in the hands of the blockader; but on
consideration I don't think it is so, excepting perhaps in the case of a
runner being chased at night, or into the night, by a cruiser of equal
or superior speed which could, by means of her search-light, keep her
quarry under observation, and, if within range, perhaps speedily sink
her. In the dash through an inside squadron lying off a port this would
not apply. True, it would be very uncomfortable for the blockade-runner
to find herself within the sphere of a dozen search-lights all around
her, but it would be equally uncomfortable for the ships exhibiting
those lights were they within range of the protecting fort, as they
would most probably immediately be plugged by its guns. Moreover, a fort
supplied with search-lights could be constantly flashing them over the
area comprised within the range of its guns, and this would tend to
force a blockading fleet to keep at a more respectable distance and so
widen out and render the passage between its lines more easy for the
blockade-runner.
The introduction of the search-light therefore appears to me to be in
favour of the runner. I assume that the light is in use at the port from
which the runner starts and is protected by guns. As most likely it will
be at fixed points, and as there can be no object for secrecy in its
use, it can be flashed from time to time irregularly so as to show
whether the vicinity of the port is clear of hostile cruisers or not. No
cruiser will care to come within range of the light; consequently the
runner will have the advantage of seeing his road is clear before him
when he starts, and the further out the cruisers are, the further apart,
given equal numbers, must they be.
On the other hand, the blockader wishes to keep his position dark and
will not use his light for fear of being seen; so it is useless to him.
Again, a light on the Mound at Fort Fisher would have been invaluable to
us; the light thrown up into the air would have been of no use to the
blockader, while to us it would have fixed the position and enabled us
to run in with confidence. For my part, if in command of a blockader,
unless it was to call friends to my assistance, I would prefer not to
use the light.
The present condition of affairs with regard to quick-firing guns and
the armament of modern war-vessels, in my opinion, would be distinctly
in favour of the blockader. Seeing how many more of this description of
gun are carried by our modern ships compared with the slow-firing
old-fashioned guns of thirty years ago, to say nothing of their
increased range and accuracy, I fear a blockade-runner would stand a
poor chance if she allowed herself to come within the range of the guns
of a cruiser so armed, at all events in daylight. Of course at night,
and if she were within the range of the guns of a protecting fort, her
chances would be more equally balanced; as the fort would be supplied
with similar guns to those of her assailants, and would doubtless use
them with effect. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the modern gun is
distinctly in favour of the blockader as compared with the runner. The
report of the quick-firing gun is much sharper and the flash much more
brilliant than that of the old-fashioned gun; and this constitutes an
additional element in favour of the blockader, for the report and flash,
being heard and seen at a greater distance, would call any neighbouring
cruiser to the blockader's assistance.
Though the increase of speed attained by modern ships affects both
sides, the enormous speed now developed by cruisers and torpedo
destroyers would seem at first sight to give the blockading force a
distinct advantage. But if war-vessels have improved their speed
merchant-steamers have done the same; and, as I have pointed out in
previous chapters, the blockade-runner has several points in her favour
by always being in good going condition and on the alert, whereas the
blockader cannot always have steam handy or be ready for the advent of
the runner on the scene. If, however, the maritime Power in question
could afford a large number of exceedingly fast cruisers and torpedo
catchers to be constantly patrolling the seas adjacent to the blockaded
ports, and could keep those vessels supplied with coals, I think the
runner's chances of success would be materially reduced under the new
regime. But could this be done, seeing the difficulty there would be of
procuring coal and supplies from perhaps a distant base? There is one
factor resulting from increased speed which certainly is in favour of
the runner; that is, in consequence of her being at sea a shorter time
while making her hazardous passage, her risk is diminished. And this is
a material point. In the olden days it was considered a fast passage if
the distance between Wilmington and Nassau, which now could be traversed
in some thirty hours, was covered in fifty. On the whole, therefore,
increased speed is in favour of the runner. Speed requires coal, and a
man who knows what he has to do can economise coal to an extent
unattainable by the man whose movements are uncertain. He can be either
going full speed with clear fires, or be ready for it to a greater
extent than a man who is waiting until his speed is required. As
probably in the future there will not be short runs from shallow ports,
the runner can be of a size equal to, if not greater than, the
blockader; consequently, unless in smooth water, more likely to attain
greater speed.
A point of great importance, which should not be overlooked, is the
effect of national character. In the American war, with the exception of
one or two Danes, all the officers and crews of the runners were either
British or Southerners. It is a question whether any other European
State would show sufficient spirit of enterprise to carry a blockade on
a large scale to a successful issue. What is wanted in blockade-runners
is not only capable leaders, but a large number of people who will trust
each other and their leaders.
Hitherto I have only considered the question of evading a superior force
outside, and of being prepared to run and not to fight unless necessary.
A fleet, if going to sea, ought to go by day and fight its way out. A
squadron of cruisers, on the other hand, may find it advisable to slip
out night by night and meet at a given distant rendezvous, at the same
time being prepared to act on their own individual account if necessary;
_i.e._ if they find that the chance of the original plan cannot be
carried out. Ships of the line of battle cannot do this. They must in
all probability fight together or fail, as their not being able to come
out without fighting shows that there is a fleet of battle ships
outside. If equal powers are inside and out, I do not think that any
blockade can be made effective; the chances of breaking a modern
blockade compared with those which existed in the sixties are much the
same, provided the runner has the proper tools to work with, in the
shape of speedy and seaworthy steamers commanded and manned by
determined and cautious men.
INDEX
Abaco lighthouse, 83
_Alabama_, the, 7, 8, 78
American Civil War, outbreak of, 1
Arab horse, an, 97, 98, 99
_Astoria_, the, 30
Avery, Mrs., 159
Azores, gale off the, 20
Bahamas, the, 24, 27, 39, 48, 82, 169
_Banshee_, the, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 47, 48,
51, 59, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 84, 93, 114, 115
breakdown of, 71
capture of, 85
crew of, 34
defects of, 35
engines of, 47
fire on, 76, 77
open house on, 65
precautions on, 50
total loss of, 85
_Banshee_ No. 2, the, 85, 98, 99, 100, 101, 124, 137, 139,
141, 143, 148, 150, 151, 157, 160, 161, 163, 164
Baton Rouge, 159
Bayley, Mrs., 88
Bermuda, 24, 39, 115, 117, 129, 169
Big Hill, the, 53
Blockade, declaration, 3
experts, 28
lessons of the, 167
Blockaders and blockade-runners, 167
Blockade-running, excitement of, 49
profits of, 10, 69, 85
risks of, 10
Blockades of the future, 169
Blockading fleet, the, 6
Bragg, General, 163
Branchville, 137
British Government, attitude of, 9, 39
British merchants, Southern sympathies of, 38
Burgoyne, Captain Hugh, V.C., 59, 89, 91
Burroughs, Pilot, 43, 51, 52, 53, 75, 117
Butler, General, 133
Cape Fear, 49
Cape Fear Club, 63
Cape Fear river, 44, 47, 58
Cape Hatteras, 4, 85
Capper, Captain, 101, 102, 108, 109
_Captain_, H.M.S., 59, 89, 91
Captures, 12
Charleston, 24, 25, 28, 38, 117, 137, 163
ships blockading, 6
trade of, 25
Chase, a weary, 81
City Point, 58
Clawson, Mr. T. W., 61
Collie and Co., Alexander, 26
Commerce destroyers, 7
Confederate fleet, the, 6, 7, 8
ports, 11
states, trade of, 18
_Congress_, the, 7
Craig's Landing, 60, 62
Crawford, Mr., 146
Cuba, 145, 162
_Cumberland_, the, 7
Curtis, General, 57, 61, 62, 63
Danville, 135, 140
Davis, Mr. Jefferson, 97
Deserter, execution of a, 159
_Despatch_, the, 17, 30
breakdown of, 19, 20
cargo on, 17, 19
condemned, 28
in quarantine, 30
reaches Nassau, 20
release of, 32
seizure of, 31
start of, 19
yellow fever on board, 30
Dinner bill, a, 139
Dixie, 58
Doering, Mr. Arthur, 88, 89, 94, 96
_Don_, the, 90
Erskine, chief engineer, 42, 77, 78, 81, 82
_Eugénie_, the, 76
_Falcon_, the, 124, 128
Farragut, Admiral, 8
Fastnet, the, 35
Federal Navy, inadequacy of the, 8
_Florida_, the, 7
Fort Caswell, 111, 112
Fort Fisher, 46, 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61,
67, 73, 99, 103, 113, 114, 116, 140, 141, 163
Fort Lafayette, 85
Fraser, Trenholm and Co., 26
Freight charges, 18
Funchal Bay, 38
Galveston, 25, 44, 111, 148, 150, 151,
152, 153, 157, 159, 160, 163
Galveston Bay, 157
Game-cock, a, 100
Georgia, 137
_Georgia_, the, 7
Grace Church, 57
_Great Eastern_, the, 59
Greenough or Greenhow, Mrs. Rose, 60, 128
Gulf-stream, action of the, 169
Halifax, 115
Halpin, Captain, 59, 76, 77
Hamilton, 116
Hampton Roads, 7
Harper, Captain John, 63
Harper's Ferry, 57
Havana, 25, 145, 146, 148, 149, 154, 162, 164
Heiliger, Mr., 97, 133
Hewett, Captain, afterwards Admiral, V.C., 59, 89, 91, 124, 125
Hicks Pasha, 89
Hobart Pasha, 59, 89, 90
Mrs., 87, 89
Hoke, General, 134
Holcombe, Professor, 60
Houston, 158, 159, 160
Hurst, Mr. Frank, 88, 90, 115, 148, 154, 158, 161, 165
Infernal machine, an, 129
International Exhibition, the, 9
Irishman, a resourceful, 121
James _Adger_, the, 78, 80, 84
James river, the, 135, 136
John Brown raid, the, 57
Joint Stock Companies, establishment of, 93
Lafitte, Mr. J. B., 26
Lamb, Col. William, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 63,
67, 75, 99, 104, 118, 125, 137, 163
Mrs., 56, 57
Lawley, Hon. Francis, 59
Lee, General, 135, 137
army of, 137, 139, 163
Lincoln, President, 2, 3, 8
Liquidation, a disastrous, 164
Liverpool, 33
confederate vessel in, 17
feeling in, 3, 10
Loading, reckless, 66
Look-out man, pay of the, 48
Madeira, 36
Maffitt, Captain, 42
Magruder, General, 157
May, Mr., 126
_Merrimac_, the, 7, 8
Mexico, Gulf of, 149, 162
_Minnesota_, the, 67
Mississippi, the, 159
Mobile, 7, 8, 25
_Monitor_, the, 7
Murray-Aynsley, Admiral, 59, 79, 81, 83, 90, 92, 165
Mrs., 87, 89
Nassau, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 47,
69, 80, 82, 101, 109, 114, 115, 129, 131, 133, 140,
141, 145, 146, 147, 149, 160, 162, 163, 165, 174
agencies at, 24
freight charges at, 18
life at, 86-100
yellow fever at, 96, 97
National character, 175
New Orleans, 25
New Providence, 20
New York, 30
_Night Hawk_, the, 59, 116, 117, 118, 126, 162, 164
boarded by Northerners, 120
on fire, 121, 122, 123
_Niphon_, the, 74
Norfolk Navy Yard, 5, 7
Norfolk, surrender of, 57
North Breaker shoal, the, 54, 73, 119
North, policy of the, 29
"Norther," a, 149, 150, 154
Northerners, energy of the, 5
fleet of the, 5
views of, as to belligerents, 36
_Oreto_, the, 42
Orton, 58
Paris, Congress at, 4
Petersburg, 133, 135
Plimsoll Act, the, 16
Port Royal, 30
Porter's fleet, admiral, 60, 140, 141, 142
Portman, Mr. Maurice, 89
Potomac river, 4
Power, Mr. Tom, 64
Providence, 57
Quarantine, 97
Queenstown, 20, 35
Quick-firing guns, 172
Race, a ding-dong, 79
Randolph, General, 142
Mrs., 143
_Rappahanock_, the, 8
Rhode Island, 57
Richmond, 44, 98, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140
privations in, 138
Rio Grande, the, 4
"Roberts," Captain, 59, 90, 91
Royal Proclamation, reception of a, 9
St. John, 32
Savannah, 42
Search-lights, 170, 171
Seceding States, seaboard of, 4
_Shenandoah_, the, 7
Sherman, General, 137
Smith's Inlet, 118
Smith's Island, 45
Somnambulism, 20, 21
South, acknowledgment of the, as belligerents, 3
partisan leaning towards, 12
_Southern Historical Papers_, extract from, 57
Southern Ports, blockade of the, 3
cargo suitable for, 18
States, secession of, 2
traders, 26
Southerners, Navy of the, 6, 7
Speed of vessels, 173
Stanton, Mr. Secretary, 58
Steele, Captain, 41, 42, 51, 52, 53, 67, 76,
78, 79, 82, 85, 89, 109, 113, 152, 154
_Stormy Petrel_, the, 114
Stowaway, a, 80
Suakim, Admiral Hewett, V.C., at, 91
_Sumpter_, the, 8
_Tallahasse_, the, 8
Taylor, Mr. Tom, 59
Tennessee, 137
_Tennessee_, the, 8
Texas, 158
_Trent_ affair, the, 13, 39
_Trent_, the, 13
Tripod, the, 161, 162
_Tristram Shandy_, the, 94, 95
_Tubal Cain_, the, 42
United States, fleet of the, 4
Mercantile Navy of the, 8
_Venus_, the, 92
Virginia, 140
Vizitelly, Mr. Frank, 59, 89
War, end of the, 163
Washington, 58, 85
Watson, Mr. L. G., 26, 89
Whiting, General, 60, 62
Whitworth guns, Colonel Lamb's, 56, 137
_Wild Dayrell_, the, 111, 114
loss of, 113
_Wild Rover_, the, 114, 141
Wilkes, Captain, afterwards Admiral, 13, 14, 39, 40
_Will-o'-the-wisp_, the, 101, 114, 144, 151
ashore, 105
destruction of, 111
on fire, 106
sale of, 110
Wilmington, 24, 25, 38, 43, 44, 45, 47, 58,
64, 66, 80, 83, 92, 95, 102, 106, 115,
117, 125, 127, 128, 131, 132, 137, 139,
140, 142, 145, 148, 149, 157, 163, 174
ships blockading, 6
ship-building at, 8
trade of, 25
yellow fever at, 96, 97
Wilmington Bar, 46, 118
_Wilmington_, the, 63
_Wilmington Messenger_, extract from the, 61
Wood, Mr. Henry, 63
Yellow Fever, 96
THE END
_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_
[Illustration: Map of the East Coast of North America]
TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
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public domain.
Punctuation has been normalized.
Variations in spelling and hyphenation were maintained.
Italicized words and phrases are presented by surrounding the text with
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End of Project Gutenberg's Running the Blockade, by Thomas E. Taylor