CHAPTER LXX. THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF

LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF

LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

CHAPTER XL.

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS--COMMANDING

MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL AT

CHATTANOOGA.

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing my

arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to

proceed immediately to the Galt House, Louisville, where I would meet an

officer of the War Department with my instructions. I left Cairo within

an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via

Indianapolis. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot

at Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the

Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent

conversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee.

Occasionally at night he would order the wires between the War

Department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a

conversation for an hour or two. On this occasion the Secretary was

accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he

and my father had been old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed the

special train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied me

to Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I

left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches

that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of

troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretary

handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. The

two were identical in all but one particular. Both created the

"Military Division of Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of

the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all

the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of

Banks's command in the south-west. One order left the department

commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned

Thomas to his place. I accepted the latter. We reached Louisville

after night and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. The

Secretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that

occasion from which he never expected to recover. He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the military news

at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of

some of the campaigns. By the evening of the day after our arrival all

matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend

the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having

relatives living in Louisville. In the course of the evening Mr.

Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga,

informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and

advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the

government the propriety of a movement against Mobile. General

Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large and

well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting

him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on

the defensive. But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's army was

largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being

reinforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote General Halleck

suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing he

would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay

Chattanooga open to capture. General Halleck strongly approved the

suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered

Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to

comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war,

had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two

decisive battles at the same time." If true, the maxim was not

applicable in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive

battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I,

however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn

from Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory

were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was

over, when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to

move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege.

Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards

Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to

return.

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the

movement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland

was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but

also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line

over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly

being strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the

absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than

artillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same time

the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its

defence. Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg. My judgment

was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over

other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the

most service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and

required assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to

give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile.

It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent

from every available point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee

River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and

intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and

the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. But he pushed

on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from

Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative.

Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army

together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before

the main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th and

20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss

in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured.

The corps under Major-General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while

Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas

returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. Bragg

followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlooking

Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, which

Rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the

river road as far back as Bridgeport. The National troops were now

strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River

behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and

west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain,

and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of the way, in front of

their line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all

the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to

Rosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his

way, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of

Vicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It would

not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to

us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery

still left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that

army itself, either by capture or demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The

railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the

government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the

south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout and

Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river

and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the

Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance between

these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the

position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a

circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country,

increasing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten

thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw

a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick.

The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time,

with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the

country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the

cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the

condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." Indeed,

the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with

a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard

bread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF."

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without

sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season.

What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines was

exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it

from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only way of

supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees

on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream,

form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing

on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It

would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of

the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if

followed by the enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Finding

that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person

he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was,

and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. About eleven

o'clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house,

every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparently

partaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to the room of the

Secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown.

Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. I

immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of

the Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans. I then

telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the

command of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must hold

Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I would

be at the front as soon as possible. A prompt reply was received from

Thomas, saying, "We will hold the town till we starve." I appreciated

the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of

affairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if but two courses

were open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, and

proceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not prudent to

travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until the

next morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, Military

Governor of Tennessee. He delivered a speech of welcome. His composure

showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. It was long, and I

was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be

expected from me in response. I was relieved, however, the people

assembled having apparently heard enough. At all events they commenced

a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of

it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville,

that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that

they could be held with the least number of men; to Admiral Porter at

Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, that

rations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying

his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to

Thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the

wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching

Stevenson Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north.

He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described

very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent

suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had

not carried them out. We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stopped

for the night. From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and

over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and the

roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from

wash-outs on the mountain sides. I had been on crutches since the time

of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it

was not safe to cross on horseback. The roads were strewn with the

debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules

and horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there

was a halt. General O. O. Howard had his headquarters there. From this

point I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred

rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. We stopped for

the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. The

next day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark. I went directly

to General Thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until

I could establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their

respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed out

on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans

had contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved the

move they did not say so to me. I found General W. F. Smith occupying

the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. I had

known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having

met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. He explained the

situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly

that I could see it without an inspection. I found that he had

established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old

engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north

side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons

and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there

already. He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing

the boats for a third bridge. In addition to this he had far under way

a steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever we

might get possession of the river. This boat consisted of a scow, made

of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel

attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or

factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of my

arrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command of

the Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field. The request was

at once complied with.

CHAPTER XLI.

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES--BATTLE

OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection,

taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my

personal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving

to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at

Brown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by

the enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approached

the water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on the

opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within

easy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our

presence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers.

But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as

prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would

be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport--a

cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. They had been so

long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a

line over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runs

nearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley five or six

miles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs. To the east of

the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet

above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more

before reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is Lookout

Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. Just below the town

the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout

Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. The

Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountain

stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South

Chickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and west

of that, Raccoon Mountains. Lookout Mountain, at its northern end,

rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a

gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a

palisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping ground,

between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse,

which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of

Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south,

thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountain

was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in

Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending

down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it

useless to us. In addition to this there was an intrenched line in

Chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout

Mountain, to make the investment complete. Besides the fortifications

on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with

occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. The enemy's

pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the

pickets of the two armies could converse. At one point they were

separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley

and town, and from which both sides drew water. The Union lines were

shorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to

the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. Practically,

the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with his

cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition

and medical supplies. The Union army was short of both, not having

ammunition enough for a day's fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered

parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals

Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the

Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans. It would have been folly to send them

to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They were

consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to

them. Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at

Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move

which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the

manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should

have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he

was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following

details were made: General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was

ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by

Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with a

division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move

down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite

Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had

passed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under

General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under

General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of

night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout,

down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive

away the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainder

of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river

to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge

as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his

eastward march. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen

moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave

and well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near the

river when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of

hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road

parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout.

It was over this road Smith marched. At five o'clock Hazen landed at

Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. By

seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in

possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily

fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clock

the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, was

fortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges over

the Tennessee River--a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at

Brown's Ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the

fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker

found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th

emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's

Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped

three miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now

cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport.

Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a

narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to

increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem

it. To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled

up by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigating

the stream from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry. The latter point is only

eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road,

which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side

of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river

opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and

abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good

supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so

long deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the east a full

supply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected to

hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. In

five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport

and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops

were receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye-witness

to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and

also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a

cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither

officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak

and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at

once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume

it must have been correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited

Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to

be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. "These

dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's

speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed

of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements

must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a

question of time." But the dispositions were not "faithfully

sustained," and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to

"sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. There was no time during

the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was

more to be benefited by its defeat than the North. The latter had the

people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and

prosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institution

abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which

degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class.

With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have

extended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, nor

allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming

degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." The

system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people

poor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small

slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. Soon the

slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy

with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The

war was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood

and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of

supplies. He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover

the line from us. His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to

Hooker's command in the valley below. From Missionary Ridge he had to

march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach

Lookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made

on Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps. When the battle

commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had three

miles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel

troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road

was commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and

captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many

prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to

reinforce Geary. Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for about

three hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark that

the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of

the flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and uproar Hooker's

teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. The mules also

became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded

directly towards the enemy. The latter, no doubt, took this for a

charge, and stampeded in turn. By four o'clock in the morning the

battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward

disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and

four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry,

captured. In the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416

killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops

buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a

hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our

supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation

of the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek

comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of

the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly,

and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. This

creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two

lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from

the same stream. As I would be under short-range fire and in an open

country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed

some distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left.

When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the

call, "Turn out the guard for the commanding general." I replied,

"Never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their

tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek,

were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their post

called out in like manner, "Turn out the guard for the commanding

general," and, I believe, added, "General Grant." Their line in a

moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I

returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the

two armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the

stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing

water for their camps. General Longstreet's corps was stationed there

at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform.

Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced

conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was very

polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General

Longstreet's corps. I asked him a few questions--but not with a view of

gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and I rode

off.

CHAPTER XLII.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL BURNSIDE'S

SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S POSITION

--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now

began to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in

about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been,

only he was not yet besieged. He was a hundred miles from the nearest

possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther

from any railroad we had possession of. The roads back were over

mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been

exhausted. His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses

lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky.

East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but

it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small

rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice.

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October.

His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to

bring up supplies. The distance was about three hundred and thirty

miles through a hostile country. His entire command could not have

maintained the road if it had been completed. The bridges had all been

destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. A hostile community

lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or

less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West. Often Sherman's

work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance

away.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River at

Eastport, Mississippi. Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to

supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from

St. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at

Eastport. These he got. I now ordered him to discontinue his work of

repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson,

Alabama, without delay. This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger,

who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over Muscle

Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th. In this Sherman was

notified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, East

Tennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops

were in the best position to beat them there. Sherman, with his

characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and

pushed on at once. On the 1st of November he crossed the Tennessee at

Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of

column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair

bringing up the rear.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and

trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville. All

indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying

Burnside's command in East Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the

same route. A single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, an

order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command, of about eight

thousand men, at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange

his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville, and

to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a

broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of

considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All the

bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and

twisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off had

been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All

bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur,

and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the

Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road

would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the

army. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river

supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced

railroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of the

pioneers--axes, picks, and spades. With these he was able to intrench

his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the

enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed

back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men

was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He

had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all

they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could

be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along

the line of the army. When these were not near enough to the troops for

protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road.

Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved

up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the

tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were put to

work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives

when the road should be completed. Car-builders were set to work

repairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroad

building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with

food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or

laborer except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars

the men could not make without material, and there was not enough

rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full

capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply these

deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at

Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten.

I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and

on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives

and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to

Nashville. The military manager of railroads also was directed to

furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material.

General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after

receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred

and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of

road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against

Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland.

Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington,

and, on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga, caused me much

uneasiness. Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do

something for Burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of

holding East Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for the

protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. We had not at

Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a

supply train. Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he had

neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed,

bread and meat for the men he had. There was no relief possible for him

except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about

Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen

thousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go

against Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was more

aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up.

The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the

safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than

ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th,

before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered

Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the

return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him to

take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to

move the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration that

he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he

could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done but

to answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman forward,

although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage

Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be

relieved. All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence

in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out.

He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held

south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his

base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when

the battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon;

but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's

suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14th

I telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be

ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can hold

Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back

can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to

force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and

Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes

by every available road, to get to his supplies. Sherman would have

been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some

thirty miles up that river to cross."

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as

follows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell

better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your

showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the

most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made

to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth

of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his

left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary

Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland

and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry

Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on

his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's

advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The

remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from

Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and

leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.

Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only

reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest

day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think

you can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly conceive of the

enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they

should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has

ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will

ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out

of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be

spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from

here?"

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.

That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable

he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a position

threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought

back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon,

Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that

evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival

(*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be

engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no

special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's

corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on

the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the

remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards

appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower

palisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank,

form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so

as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him

either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his

base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our

right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley

in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to

Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there

across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to

Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear

on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with

the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault

while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's

Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of

Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of

sight of the enemy on the ridge. There are two streams called

Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga--North

Chickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, flowing south, and emptying

into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the South

Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and

empties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town.

There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga

River, their presence there being unknown to the enemy.

At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two

o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each

boat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga,

capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two

banks of the river. The rest were to land on the south side of the

Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a

sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side

to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on the

south side intrenched themselves. Thomas was to move out from his lines

facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against an

attack down the valley. Lookout Valley being of no present value to us,

and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge,

Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders brought him to

Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee. He was

then to move out to the right to Rossville.

Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us so

long as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line for

supplying the army. But it was not essential after the enemy was

dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was

begun. Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past

Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. By

crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into

Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the

valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. Orders were

accordingly given to march by this route. But days before the battle

began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action

were all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult one

to make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as to

lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they

were more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the

same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be

crossed. I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout

Mountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge. By

marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream,

and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named

time; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behind

him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably cause the

evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout

Mountain. Hooker's order was changed accordingly. As explained

elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood

in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the

passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all

the troops together against Missionary Ridge.

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas

and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed

them the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out

generally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities in

Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety.

Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this

anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops

were up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman

started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I

believe, from Kelly's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the night

of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the

above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back

the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the

importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season

would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the

head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division

(Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that

Lookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders at

the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the

following morning. News had been received that the battle had been

commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic

communications. The President, the Secretary of War, and General

Halleck, were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, but

more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve

the situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the

next day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the

assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that

date. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and

21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the

pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at

this time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville

--about Maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the

North. A dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened

from the east. The following was sent in reply:

"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our

attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If successful, such a

move will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold

out. Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause

alarm. He would find the country so bare that he would lose his

transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet

such a force before he got through, that he could not return."

Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as

his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in full

view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, however,

the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side,

and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain

or Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the

bank of the river. But when Sherman's advance reached a point opposite

the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been

concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march

to join the troops on the south side. His crossing was in full view

both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy of

course supposed these troops to be Sherman's. This enabled Sherman to

get to his assigned position without discovery.

CHAPTER XLIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY

--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so

heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's

Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of

a battle raging at Knoxville; of Willcox being threatened by a force

from the east--a letter was received from Bragg which contained these

words: "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I

deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early

withdrawal." Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to

deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the

22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving

our front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce

Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but was

recalled. The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to

detain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be

returned to Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed,

one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North

Chickamauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out

of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the

Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in

Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his

relief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the

Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very

strong for defence during the months it had been besieged. The line was

about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small

stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the

Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on

the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points on

the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. The

important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified

and supplied with a proper armament. Among the elevations so fortified

was one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood. It owed its

importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and

Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. Fort

Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach

the nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23d

Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two

divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood,

and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right,

Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek. Palmer, commanding

the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest.

He supported Sheridan with one division (Baird's), while his other

division under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be

moved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. The

picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At two

o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the

clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position

all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming of

cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel pickets

were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and

detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These too were

carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their

advance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. This

movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we

occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to

this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other

way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this

preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the

enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were

captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from

Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the

fighting for the first day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been

assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have

rested more easily. But we were doing the best we could for him and the

cause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move,

though one division (Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at

Brown's Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it

impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to

cross; but I was determined to move that night even without this

division. Orders were sent to Osterhaus accordingly to report to

Hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the

24th. Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again

changed, but this time only back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the

Military Division. To him were given the general direction of moving

troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they

reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his

office of chief engineer. During the night General Morgan L. Smith's

division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the

brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning

the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the

river. During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief of

artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the

Cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to

command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the

point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to use

Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none.

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out

from the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each

loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with their

precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid

attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the

enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few

boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the

picket guard known to be at that point. The guard were surprised, and

twenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected a

landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good

results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north

side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the

purpose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. The

rest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E.

Smith. The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their

position. By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well

covered by the works they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and

cavalry, was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was continued

with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast

as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a little

past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South

Chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades

below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the

Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. By

one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the

course of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little

to the rear; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to

the rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the

right if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish line

preceded each of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached;

the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports.

By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without

having sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was now

brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand.

The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the

hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and

the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary

Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the

enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with

their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the

day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and

Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was

completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges

and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga

Station. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee.

During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and

carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th,

there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his

position. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a

junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him. With two or

three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks

of the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid.

He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end,

and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving

himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway

put upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between

them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker

was engaged on the west. He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the

15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of the

Potomac; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary was on

the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown's

Ferry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the

east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three

brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. These

brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L.

Stevenson was in command of the whole. Why any troops, except artillery

with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not

see. A hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for

more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men

from the position Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged,

heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance

with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up, the

ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. On the east

side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging

up it, connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division,

supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a

crossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge

over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to move

up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Gross's brigade

after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. This attracted

the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy

mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the

mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the

picket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending

the mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seen

coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into

their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleven

o'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp

skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed

and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushing

up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his

front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. The enemy,

seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by

Cruft and Osterhaus. Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the whole

command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary

had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his

right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong

fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line

was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of

Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made

our line a continuous one. It was in full view, extending from the

Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the

base of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to

Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more,

across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope

of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The day was

hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at

moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and

musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially

fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon

the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide

whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and

made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At

four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little

after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops

was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to cross

Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it,

and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and was

assigned to his left. I now telegraphed to Washington: "The fight

to-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary

Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga

Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and

now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports two

thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into

our hands from Missionary Ridge." The next day the President replied:

"Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well

done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." And Halleck also

telegraphed: "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans.

I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may

prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been

sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were

deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of

citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with

Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain

to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour

in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.

CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY

--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders

for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside.

Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move

at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he

still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and

operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.

Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As I

was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders

from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was

in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day.

Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff

officers--could be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost

disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over

which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a

railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was

to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and back

farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification

commanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to

see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the

hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of

Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades

of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between the

two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. The ridge is

steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops

were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west

side. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the

rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy

off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by

rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. The

enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the

position we had gained, but without success. The contest lasted for two

hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in

this assault. Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores,

and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to

strengthen his right. From the position I occupied I could see column

after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every

Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was

concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the

west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command, over open

ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry,

and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, but

the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was

compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards

brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed,

when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his

intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the

position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce

him. Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard

Knob. It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of

the enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once commenced massing in the

same direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be late

in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing

the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass

in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected

he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga

Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker

was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance

and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossing

Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected

from his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was

to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's

condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could

not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early

morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed

Thomas to order the charge at once (*16). I watched eagerly to see the

effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any

charge being made. The centre of the line which was to make the charge

was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an

intervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay,

I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders

who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General

Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. He

replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but

that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him

to make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in an

incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were

driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge. The

Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front

of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our

men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so

rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went

over the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels were

captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher

up the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued.

The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the

enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that

occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position.

Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops

went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus

effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the

24th (*17) for this charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along the

rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air: but

the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. The

pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were

seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front

of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy along

most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and

his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, and

thousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a

point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops

occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover

the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It was

now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed

his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the

attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right

and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement

before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat,

leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To

Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation,

are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and

small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way

would not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas

with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the

assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the

entire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen going

over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his

command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas left

about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already in

pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the

division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in

the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, in

Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the

resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I ordered

Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much

excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy

had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got

well out of the way. The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing

everything to their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was

not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he

received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he

directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland,

to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and to

move forward to Chickamauga Station. He ordered Howard to move up the

stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during

the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L.

Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still

held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies.

The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow Howard at daylight

in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction

of the bridge at that point. He got his troops over, with the exception

of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock.

Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed,

he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came

upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a

retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make

but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many

of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker's

position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending east

of the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated,

and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold

out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him

that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the

relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was

directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga

loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's corps was

to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the

Holston, and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat. In addition

to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds

of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in

haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from

the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland

participated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and

the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the

organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders,

during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the

12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps,

Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of the

Cumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corps

from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of the

Army of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. Indeed,

I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of

this intermingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them,

and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him,

and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was

accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the

advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily

than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes:

first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty

thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve

of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of

his impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary

Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and

believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between

Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the

campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. I

had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very

well. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my

graduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in

the Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally

subsequently. I could well understand how there might be an

irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally

and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of

an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of the

highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army

he was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the

lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as

a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest

neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg.

On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded

by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and

at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He was

first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other

duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the

quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. As quartermaster he

declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his

reasons for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urging

that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and

that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster

he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs

Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post.

The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:

"My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army,

and now you are quarrelling with yourself!"

Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest,

intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just

and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he

had the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect a

slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason

stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military

genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one

stone." On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of

the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR MILITARY GENIUS.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his military

capacity. He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of

his nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have

said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga

were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did;

Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep

across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near

Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the

Cumberland was to assault in the centre. Before Sherman arrived,

however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to

Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the

river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's

Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing

troops upon it. For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by

telegraph back to what they were originally.------

NOTE.--From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of

the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by

General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present

arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and

18th of July, 1885.

CHAPTER XLV.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE--VISITING

KNOXVILLE-CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, I

immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the

situation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious.

Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to the

relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing

Chattanooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built and

fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run.

General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with

rations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of

the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.

General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand

men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no

circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. With the

provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it

was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, after

which event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for

Burnside's army and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the

27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas,

verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me;

advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the

situation. I was not right sure but that Bragg's troops might be over

their stampede by the time they reached Dalton. In that case Bragg

might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence

towards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon

Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat

was most earnest. The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and

small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving

like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division,

which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's division took

the road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chickamauga

Station toward the same point. As soon as I saw the situation at

Ringgold I sent a staff officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of

the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Granger

at once. Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the

relief of Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold

through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East

Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles south-east

from Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left

behind at Chattanooga Creek got up. His men were attacking Cleburne's

division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as

to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge

which presents itself at that point. Just beyond the gorge the valley

is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great

many times in the course of the first mile. This attack was

unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. Hooker captured,

however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead

were left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the

neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the

mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not

to make any wanton destruction.

At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with his

troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him. Palmer had picked up

many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. I went back in

the evening to Graysville with Sherman, remained there over night and

did not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. I

then found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a

full day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of

Knoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the month

Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve

days and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but if

not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender

or attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been an

impossibility. He was already very low in ammunition, and with an army

pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to

go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I

sent word to General Sherman of the situation and directed him to march

to the relief of Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had to

solve--that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and

that he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville,

having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to

Cleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these

troops had not yet returned to camp. I was very loath to send Sherman,

because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard

fighting at Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside would

not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near

Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked

rations in their haversacks. Expecting to be back in their tents by

that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them

neither overcoats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and at

night they must have suffered more or less. The two days' rations had

already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country

which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but

little probability of finding much food. They did, however, succeed in

capturing some flour. They also found a good deal of bran in some of

the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways

they eked out an existence until they could reach Knoxville.

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being

taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if

it became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him. I

therefore sent a member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into

Knoxville if he could report to Burnside the situation fully, and give

him all the encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana was at

Chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed

command. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and did

accompany him. I put the information of what was being done for the

relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other

it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the

hands of General Longstreet. They made the trip safely; General

Longstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching

there, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if

it had been necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch scows

and flats as they floated down. On these, by previous arrangements with

the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with

forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of

the Union troops. They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east

side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived

Burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these engagements

amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. We captured

6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for

their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and

caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. The enemy's loss in arms

was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a

great many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. Bragg had

about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable.

It was his own fault that he did not have more men present. He had sent

Longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over

twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and

depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command.

He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by

way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full

rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements

were coming to me. Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while

Chattanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga,

Knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a

struggle. I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on

the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to

reinforce Longstreet. He also started another division a day later, but

our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it

back. It had got so far, however, that it could not return to

Chattanooga in time to be of service there. It is possible this latter

blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what

was going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to

the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view of

Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack.

They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of

the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. Bragg knew

it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of

view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the

Tennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was

therefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet,

cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. If he had captured

Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. It

would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from

Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the

besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen

ground and nearly annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we

were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:

but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of

them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands

who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. There

was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the

soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away

if they could. Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year

with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much

the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the

North the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowed

the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North,

Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the

preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such that

I thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had

previously been named by the President for promotion to the grade of

major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I was

not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly

recommended him for a major-generalcy. My recommendation was heeded and

the appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the

authorities at Washington--the President and Secretary of War--of the

fact, which caused great rejoicing there. The President especially was

rejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further

bloodshed. The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East

Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for

several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve

the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops

by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly,

to "remember Burnside," "do something for Burnside," and other appeals

of like tenor. He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our

victory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be

out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his

anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven

from the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty

miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would

leave the State. The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a

short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter

off East Tennessee. Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman made

disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with

instructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the

20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my

entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington.

While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic

communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my

command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20)

so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which

they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies

so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the

appearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected to

retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign

against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made

against Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy

that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way

of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west. I

was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my

expectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in our

possession: if not, to Savannah; and in this manner to get possession

of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy.

But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until

their animals had nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself to

see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring,

and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter

part of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of

the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there,

and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch

with the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been repaired up

to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains. I went by rail

therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days. General John

G. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio. It was an

intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every

morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from

there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could

reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of

broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip

to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had been cut up to as

great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that

condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to

Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless

one, and very disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee

and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They would

collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me,

generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. The people

naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in

the party. I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director

was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowds

would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of

quietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me an

opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another

about their general. Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to

the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his

being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were

all in after a hard day's ride. I was back in Nashville by the 13th of

January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person

along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the

cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly.

Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had

taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and

determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone,

should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, as

well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders

whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the War

Department through General Stager all the dispatches which they received

or forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville,

because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to

be forwarded from there. As I have said, it was necessary for me also

to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this

cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War

Department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along

the line of wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly I

ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B.

Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and

discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the

operator at my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain

Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War

Department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any

one else. I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said that

if he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he most

certainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that punishment was certain

if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even

if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his

disobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded. When I

returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator had

been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. I informed

the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the

telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only

obeyed my orders. It was absolutely necessary for me to have the

cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had

not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished

anybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference

between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was

over, when we had another little spat. Owing to his natural disposition

to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything

whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while

issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out

of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. This was

done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from

me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined

them and given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, in

examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that

orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days

before he would sanction them. I remonstrated against this in writing,

and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of

General-in-Chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took control

much as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that he

should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside

assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and

which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of

Longstreet without availing himself of this offer. As before stated

Sherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, near

Chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats

or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps

by the end of that time. The weather was now cold and they were

suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had

it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into

service. Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent,

marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River.

CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE--COMMISSIONED

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--FIRST

INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his

forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Sherman

suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits

of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the

purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the

east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our

boats. He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the

same thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut

commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collected

and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to where

McPherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as

to give him about 20,000 men in all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with his

headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable

force of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined, therefore, to

move directly upon Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's

department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis.

Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so

as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against

Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis. Smith was

ordered to move about the 1st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with

his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and

strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could

gather. When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the

information of General Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength and

disposition of his command.

Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly

well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective.

Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not equal, man to

man, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's men had

had. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and

followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an

extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in

result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. This

same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and

for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither

army could present a more effective officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition,

meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and

with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson,

Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on

the 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns

to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the

march. Here, however, there were indications of the concentration of

Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close

together. He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy

who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by

the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated

toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in

thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for

the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest

before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a

superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on

his return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while

waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River,

instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the

11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest's

favor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movement

with him against Shreveport, subject to my approval. I disapproved of

Sherman's going himself, because I had other important work for him to

do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks,

though their time to remain absent must be limited. We must have them

for the spring campaign. The trans-Mississippi movement proved

abortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and

siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he

had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtained

permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to see

him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I was

permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one

else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to

communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington,

just as though I had remained at Nashville.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again

to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part

of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi. I

directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a

threatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again

relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as

possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent two

divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against

Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee. Seeing

that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at

least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already to

the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in

command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his

department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My

object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the

preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the

Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him

(*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep

Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East

Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped

army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for

their cause. I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view,

countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if

possible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had

not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how

important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with

Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then again on

the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start

the next day. He finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fell

back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as

strong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could not go

any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly

starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soon

fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not carry

supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies still

left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving

towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding

from theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's

success, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I was

ordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had

passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February. My

nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed

the next day (the 2d). I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive

my commission, and started the day following that. The commission was

handed to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive

Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest

son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating,

however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had

drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public,

and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of

reply. The President said: