BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK--INVESTMENT OF
VICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS.
We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton,
without a possibility of a junction of their forces. Pemberton might
have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there and,
by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to
Johnston. But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would have been
his proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he
been in Pemberton's place. In fact it would have been in conformity
with Johnston's orders to Pemberton.
Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th
and reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. His rear guard
did not get in until two A.M. the 17th, but renewed their march by
daylight. He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leave
his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. At Bolton he was
informed of our victory. He was directed to commence the march early
next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to Bridgeport on the
Big Black River, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to
find the enemy. Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon
train as early as possible.
This movement brought Sherman's corps together, and at a point where I
hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected and Sherman's corps
used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a
crossing for the remainder of the army. I informed him that I would
endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river.
The advance division, Carr's (McClernand's corps), resumed the pursuit
at half-past three A.M. on the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus,
McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps. As I expected, the enemy
was found in position on the Big Black. The point was only six miles
from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at
an early hour. Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed
close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes
overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. A
bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which,
however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages. When
the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land
into an island. The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had
felled into the ditch. At this time there was a foot or two of water in
it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this
bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing
dirt over them. The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west
of the river. At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of
uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. Carr's
division was deployed on our right, Lawler's brigade forming his extreme
right and reaching through these woods to the river above. Osterhaus'
division was deployed to the left of Carr and covered the enemy's entire
front. McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to
come in wherever he could be of assistance.
While the troops were standing as here described an officer from Banks'
staff came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, dated
the 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks to
be forwarded to me. It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf and to
co-operate from there with Banks against Port Hudson, and then to return
with our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer that
the order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it now if he
knew our position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to
obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when I
heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that
direction, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the
enemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the
charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; I
think not even to this day.
The assault was successful. But little resistance was made. The enemy
fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and
leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. Many
tried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some were
drowned in the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners.
Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. The enemy probably
lost but few men except those captured and drowned. But for the
successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little
doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent
his occupying his defences around Vicksburg.
As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to
be built. It was but little after nine o'clock A.M. when the capture
took place. As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for
the construction of three bridges. One was taken charge of by
Lieutenant Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPherson
himself and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligent
volunteer officer. My recollection is that Hains built a raft bridge;
McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons;
and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting
only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops
interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from
their stumps. A bridge was then made with these trees to support the
roadway. Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever
found, for this purpose. By eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th
all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing.
Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found Blair with
the pontoon train already there. A few of the enemy were intrenched on
the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered.
Two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following
morning.
On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troops
and as soon as possible joined Sherman. My first anxiety was to secure
a base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg. Sherman's line
of march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy
the December before when he was repulsed. Sherman was equally anxious
with myself. Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and
well up with the advanced skirmishers. There were some detached works
along the crest of the hill. These were still occupied by the enemy, or
else the garrison from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their way
to Vicksburg. At all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick
and fast for a short time. In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure of
looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before on
the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action.
He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive
assurance of success. This, however, he said was the end of one of the
greatest campaigns in history and I ought to make a report of it at
once. Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what
might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was
a complete and successful campaign. I do not claim to quote Sherman's
language; but the substance only. My reason for mentioning this
incident will appear further on.
McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson and
Vicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear. He arrived at
night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. McClernand moved
by the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned to
the left and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's ferry to
Vicksburg. This brought him south of McPherson. I now had my three
corps up the works built for the defence of Vicksburg, on three roads
--one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city.
By the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited
number of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right, and covered the
high ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as his
troops would extend. McPherson joined on to his left, and occupied
ground on both sides of the Jackson road. McClernand took up the ground
to his left and extended as far towards Warrenton as he could, keeping a
continuous line.
On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were
getting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized by
his defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed he
would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at two
o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced
positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire
of the enemy.
The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making
roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou. Most of
the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations
issued by the commissary. They had an abundance of food, however, but
began to feel the want of bread. I remember that in passing around to
the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in
rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "Hard tack." In a
moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "Hard tack! Hard tack!"
I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the
arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with
everything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. By
the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them.
The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.
I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, only
fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I
had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of his
coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat my
anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent
the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save
sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and
would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. But
the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry
the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the
trenches if they had not been allowed to try.
The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten
o'clock A.M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in
position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all
might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant,
and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the
very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them;
but at no place were we able to enter. General McClernand reported that
he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted
reinforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could see
as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the
success he reported. But his request for reinforcements being repeated
I could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the 17th corps.
Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a
diversion in favor of McClernand. This last attack only served to
increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. As soon as
it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been
obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus
ended the last assault upon Vicksburg.