THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THE NORTHERN PRESS
--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA--DISPOSITION OF THE
TROOPS.
The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of March. The
effort to make a waterway through Lake Providence and the connecting
bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time.
At Milliken's Bend, and also at Young's Point, bayous or channels start,
which connecting with other bayous passing Richmond, Louisiana, enter
the Mississippi at Carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above Grand
Gulf. The Mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these
bayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these
points, is carried through these same channels to the river below. In
case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find its
outlet through the same channels. The dredges and laborers from the
canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, I
determined to open these other channels, if possible. If successful the
effort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our
transports. There was a good road back of the levees, along these
bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever
the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather.
Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a
base heretofore described, this new one was undertaken.
As early as the 4th of February I had written to Halleck about this
route, stating that I thought it much more practicable than the other
undertaking (the Lake Providence route), and that it would have been
accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got
all over the country.
The upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, further
than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber for
a distance of several miles from their source. It was necessary,
therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river.
This work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede
and the road to Richmond, Louisiana, emerged from the water. One small
steamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no further
use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond this it
was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter
was whiled away. All these failures would have been very discouraging
if I had expected much from the efforts; but I had not. From the first
the most I hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be used
below Vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteries
defending that city.
This long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water,
unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about
Vicksburg. The river was higher than its natural banks from December,
1862, to the following April. The war had suspended peaceful pursuits
in the South, further than the production of army supplies, and in
consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the
whole country was covered with water. Troops could scarcely find dry
ground on which to pitch their tents. Malarial fevers broke out among
the men. Measles and small-pox also attacked them. The hospital
arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the
loss of life was much less than might have been expected. Visitors to
the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; Northern papers came
back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. Because I would
not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle,
incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for
my removal. They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple
removal, but named who my successor should be. McClernand, Fremont,
Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection. I took no
steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as I
understood it, to the best of my ability. Every one has his
superstitions. One of mine is that in positions of great responsibility
every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned
by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to
change his position. While at Cairo I had watched with very great
interest the operations of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon that as
the main field of the war. I had no idea, myself, of ever having any
large command, nor did I suppose that I was equal to one; but I had the
vanity to think that as a cavalry officer I might succeed very well in
the command of a brigade. On one occasion, in talking about this to my
staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military
education whatever, I said that I would give anything if I were
commanding a brigade of cavalry in the Army of the Potomac and I
believed I could do some good. Captain Hillyer spoke up and suggested
that I make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry.
I then told him that I would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned
this superstition.
In time of war the President, being by the Constitution
Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for the
selection of commanders. He should not be embarrassed in making his
selections. I having been selected, my responsibility ended with my
doing the best I knew how. If I had sought the place, or obtained it
through personal or political influence, my belief is that I would have
feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably
have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. Persons obtaining
important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep
a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are
shown in case of disaster. Somebody must be responsible for their
failures.
With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President Lincoln
and General Halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. I had never
met Mr. Lincoln, but his support was constant.
At last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula
behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the
troops were all concentrated from distant points at Milliken's Bend
preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and
discouraging labors with success.
I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a
point below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the
possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted
to for the purpose of giving us a different base. This could not be
undertaken until the waters receded. I did not therefore communicate
this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to
make preparations for the start. My recollection is that Admiral Porter
was the first one to whom I mentioned it. The co-operation of the navy
was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of
such an enterprise. I had no more authority to command Porter than he
had to command me. It was necessary to have part of his fleet below
Vicksburg if the troops went there. Steamers to use as ferries were
also essential. The navy was the only escort and protection for these
steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles
of batteries. Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he
had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run
the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than
soldiers. I was glad to accept his proposition, not only because I
admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the
enemy a little longer our designs. Porter's fleet was on the east side
of the river above the mouth of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from the
enemy by the dense forests that intervened. Even spies could not get
near him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands.
Suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused. Our river guards
discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the
river near the east shore, from the direction of Vicksburg, towards the
fleet. On overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not much
larger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a
flag of truce in case of discovery. The boat, crew and passengers were
brought ashore to me. The chief personage aboard proved to be Jacob
Thompson, Secretary of the Interior under the administration of
President Buchanan. After a pleasant conversation of half an hour or
more I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to
Vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my
mind as to the good faith of Mr. Thompson and his flag.
Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their
hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. The great essential was to
protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the fires
under the boilers from view. This he accomplished by loading the
steamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the
deck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the
boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain. The hay and grain would
be wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by
the muddy roads over which we expected to march.
Before this I had been collecting, from St. Louis and Chicago, yawls and
barges to be used as ferries when we got below. By the 16th of April
Porter was ready to start on his perilous trip. The advance, flagship
Benton, Porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed at
intervals of a few minutes by the Lafayette with a captured steamer, the
Price, lashed to her side, the Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburgh and
Carondelet--all of these being naval vessels. Next came the transports
--Forest Queen, Silver Wave and Henry Clay, each towing barges loaded
with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers when
below the batteries. The gunboat Tuscumbia brought up the rear. Soon
after the start a battery between Vicksburg and Warrenton opened fire
across the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and
then by batteries all along the line. The gunboats ran up close under
the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probably
without much effect. They were under fire for more than two hours and
every vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to the
gunboats. The transports did not fare so well. The Henry Clay was
disabled and deserted by her crew. Soon after a shell burst in the
cotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned her
to the water's edge. The burning mass, however, floated down to
Carthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow.
The enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to
light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing
houses on the point of land opposite the city on the Louisiana side.
The sight was magnificent, but terrible. I witnessed it from the deck
of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low
down as it was prudent to go. My mind was much relieved when I learned
that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any,
wounded. During the running of the batteries men were stationed in the
holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes that
might be made in the hulls. All damage was afterwards soon repaired
under the direction of Admiral Porter.
The experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however,
during the war. Admiral Farragut had run the batteries at Port Hudson
with the flagship Hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from below
Vicksburg. The 13th of February Admiral Porter had sent the gunboat
Indianola, Lieutenant-Commander George Brown commanding, below. She met
Colonel Ellet of the Marine brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer.
Two of the Colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing
the greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi from
Vicksburg (*10) to the Red River.
The Indianola remained about the mouth of the Red River some days, and
then started up the Mississippi. The Confederates soon raised the Queen
of the West, (*11) and repaired her. With this vessel and the ram Webb,
which they had had for some time in the Red River, and two other
steamers, they followed the Indianola. The latter was encumbered with
barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speed
against the rapid current of the Mississippi. The Confederate fleet
overtook her just above Grand Gulf, and attacked her after dark on the
24th of February. The Indianola was superior to all the others in
armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away,
but for her encumbrance. As it was she fought them for an hour and a
half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and
other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking
condition. The armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore.
Officers and crew then surrendered.
I had started McClernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of
March, by way of Richmond, Louisiana, to New Carthage, hoping that he
might capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the troops could get
there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. Some
miles from New Carthage the levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in several
places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. Boats were
collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot
from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across
the overflowed interval. By the 6th of April McClernand had reached New
Carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through
the woods by these boats. On the 17th I visited New Carthage in person,
and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were
doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. The water
was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use
boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. McClernand had
already found a new route from Smith's plantation where the crevasse
occurred, to Perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below New
Carthage. This increased the march from Milliken's Bend from
twenty-seven to nearly forty miles. Four bridges had to be built across
bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two
thousand feet of bridging in all. The river falling made the current in
these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and
permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "Yankee
soldier" was equal to any emergency. The bridges were soon built of
such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they
that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with
artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun
(a thirty-two pounder). This, if my memory serves me correctly, broke
through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the
peninsula. These bridges were all built by McClernand's command, under
the supervision of Lieutenant Hains of the Engineer Corps.
I returned to Milliken's Bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20th
issued the following final order for the movement of troops:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, MILLIKEN'S BEND, LOUISIANA,
April 20, 1863.
Special Orders, No. 110. * * * * * *
* VIII. The following orders are published for the information and
guidance of the "Army in the Field," in its present movement to obtain a
foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi River, from which Vicksburg
can be approached by practicable roads.
First.--The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A. McClernand
commanding, will constitute the right wing.
Second.--The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sherman
commanding, will constitute the left wing.
Third.--The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B. McPherson
commanding, will constitute the centre.
Fourth.--The order of march to New Carthage will be from right to left.
Fifth.--Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or,
an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may
require. When the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will
remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander,
unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency.
Sixth.--Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can
be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage.
Seventh.--In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each
company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each
regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters;
and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders
having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for,
are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not
to exceed the number allowed by General Orders No. 160, A. G. O., series
of 1862.
Eighth.--All the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate
charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will
constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized
camp equipage of the army.
Ninth.--As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Seventeenth
army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in
like manner by the Fifteenth army corps.
Tenth.--Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps
commanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New Carthage.
Eleventh.--General hospitals will be established by the medical director
between Duckport and Milliken's Bend. All sick and disabled soldiers
will be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in charge of hospitals will
report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. Each corps
commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain
behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps;
officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into
squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to;
and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command
them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. The force so
organized will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport to
Milliken's Bend. They will furnish all the guards and details required
for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the
camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats.
Twelfth.--The movement of troops from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage
will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply
of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous
orders.
Thirteenth.--Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the
beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but
wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military
purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without
proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. All
such irregularities must be summarily punished.
Fourteenth.--Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to the
command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from
here to New Carthage. His particular attention is called to General
Orders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, of date
March 20, 1863.
By order of MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.
McClernand was already below on the Mississippi. Two of McPherson's
divisions were put upon the march immediately. The third had not yet
arrived from Lake Providence; it was on its way to Milliken's Bend and
was to follow on arrival.
Sherman was to follow McPherson. Two of his divisions were at Duckport
and Young's Point, and the third under Steele was under orders to return
from Greenville, Mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebel
battery that had been annoying our transports.
It had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon
train over the single narrow and almost impassable road between
Milliken's Bend and Perkins' plantation. Accordingly six more steamers
were protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded with
supplies. They took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations. On
the night of the 22d of April they ran the batteries, five getting
through more or less disabled while one was sunk. About half the barges
got through with their needed freight.
When it was first proposed to run the blockade at Vicksburg with river
steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to
accompany their vessels, and but one crew. Volunteers were called for
from the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating
the western rivers. Captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-hands
enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we
were moving through this dangerous ordeal. Most of them were from
Logan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part of
Illinois and from Missouri. All but two of the steamers were commanded
by volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. In this
instance, as in all others during the war, I found that volunteers could
be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every
call for aid whether mechanical or professional. Colonel W. S. Oliver
was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail.