HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD--THE ADVANCE UPON CORINTH
--OCCUPATION OF CORINTH--THE ARMY SEPARATED.
General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of April and
immediately assumed command in the field. On the 21st General Pope
arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of Island
Number Ten in the Mississippi River. He went into camp at Hamburg
landing five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies: the
Army of the Ohio, Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Pope
commanding; and the Army of the Tennessee. His orders divided the
combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing.
Major-General George H. Thomas, who had been in Buell's army, was
transferred with his division to the Army of the Tennessee and given
command of the right wing, composed of all of that army except
McClernand's and Lew. Wallace's divisions. McClernand was assigned to
the command of the reserve, composed of his own and Lew. Wallace's
divisions. Buell commanded the centre, the Army of the Ohio; and Pope
the left wing, the Army of the Mississippi. I was named second in
command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the
right wing and reserve.
Orders were given to all the commanders engaged at Shiloh to send in
their reports without delay to department headquarters. Those from
officers of the Army of the Tennessee were sent through me; but from the
Army of the Ohio they were sent by General Buell without passing through
my hands. General Halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report,
but I positively declined on the ground that he had received the reports
of a part of the army engaged at Shiloh without their coming through me.
He admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, but
explained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving the
command, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it to
Washington.
Preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for
an advance on Corinth. Owl Creek, on our right, was bridged, and
expeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if our
position was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towards
Corinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were also
constructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by different
routes could reinforce each other. All commanders were cautioned
against bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that it
would be better to retreat than to fight. By the 30th of April all
preparations were complete; the country west to the Mobile and Ohio
railroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to Corinth as far as
Monterey twelve miles from Pittsburg. Everywhere small bodies of the
enemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force to
fight battles.
Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from Pittsburg
landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, but
probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. It is about four miles
south of the line dividing the States of Tennessee and Mississippi, and
at the junction of the Mississippi and Chattanooga railroad with the
Mobile and Ohio road which runs from Columbus to Mobile. From Pittsburg
to Corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation
that makes high hills to pass over. In 1862 the greater part of the
country was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses.
Underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines,
but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passing
through with ease. There are two small creeks running from north of the
town and connecting some four miles south, where they form Bridge Creek
which empties into the Tuscumbia River. Corinth is on the ridge between
these streams and is a naturally strong defensive position. The creeks
are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens
out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an
enemy. On the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was
strongly intrenched.
Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and
consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. We ought to
have seized it immediately after the fall of Donelson and Nashville,
when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it
should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at
Pittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh. In fact the arrival of
Pope should not have been awaited. There was no time from the battle of
Shiloh up to the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would not have
left if pushed. The demoralization among the Confederates from their
defeats at Henry and Donelson; their long marches from Bowling Green,
Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at Shiloh; in fact from
having been driven out of Kentucky and Tennessee, was so great that a
stand for the time would have been impossible. Beauregard made
strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. He
appealed to the people of the South-west for new regiments, and received
a few. A. S. Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same
quarter, before the battle of Shiloh, but in a different way. He had
negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks
and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the
ranks. The people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were
not willing to part with their negroes. It is only fair to state that
they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for
the families left at home.
Beauregard, however, was reinforced by Van Dorn immediately after Shiloh
with 17,000 men. Interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to
add to the strength at Corinth. With these reinforcements and the new
regiments, Beauregard had, during the month of May, 1862, a large force
on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men. We estimated
his strength at 70,000. Our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. The
defensible nature of the ground at Corinth, and the fortifications, made
50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number
for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of.
On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from Shiloh
upon Corinth. The movement was a siege from the start to the close.
The National troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course
the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for
an advance. Even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "not
to bring on an engagement." "It is better to retreat than to fight."
The enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply
observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to become
battles. All the engagements fought ought to have served to encourage
the enemy. Roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; a
line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position.
Cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troops
to concentrate in case of attack. The National armies were thoroughly
intrenched all the way from the Tennessee River to Corinth.
For myself I was little more than an observer. Orders were sent direct
to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from
one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. My position
was so embarrassing in fact that I made several applications during the
siege to be relieved.
General Halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time,
with the right wing. Pope being on the extreme left did not see so much
of his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times. On the 3d
of May he was at Seven Mile Creek with the main body of his command, but
threw forward a division to Farmington, within four miles of Corinth.
His troops had quite a little engagement at Farmington on that day, but
carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. There would then
have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form
a new line well up to the enemy, but Pope was ordered back to conform
with the general line. On the 8th of May he moved again, taking his
whole force to Farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the
rebel line. Again he was ordered back. By the 4th of May the centre
and right wing reached Monterey, twelve miles out. Their advance was
slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. The
left wing moved up again on the 25th of May and intrenched itself close
to the enemy. The creek with the marsh before described, separated the
two lines. Skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained either
line at this point.
Our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right of
the right wing was probably five miles from Corinth and four from the
works in their front. The creek, which was a formidable obstacle for
either side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on our
right. Here the enemy occupied two positions. One of them, as much as
two miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation and
defended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. A heavy wood
intervened between this work and the National forces. In rear to the
south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of this
clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied by
infantry. Sherman's division carried these two positions with some loss
to himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of May,
and on that day the investment of Corinth was complete, or as complete
as it was ever made. Thomas' right now rested west of the Mobile and
Ohio railroad. Pope's left commanded the Memphis and Charleston railroad
east of Corinth.
Some days before I had suggested to the commanding general that I
thought if he would move the Army of the Mississippi at night, by the
rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, Pope would
find no natural obstacle in his front and, I believed, no serious
artificial one. The ground, or works, occupied by our left could be
held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. To
the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. I was
silenced so quickly that I felt that possibly I had suggested an
unmilitary movement.
Later, probably on the 28th of May, General Logan, whose command was
then on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been
evacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into Corinth
with his brigade. Trains of cars were heard coming in and going out of
Corinth constantly. Some of the men who had been engaged in various
capacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, by
putting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were
moving but which trains were loaded and which were empty. They said
loaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones coming
in. Subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment.
Beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of Corinth on the
26th of May and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on
the 30th of May General Halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for
battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our
left was to be attacked that morning. Corinth had already been
evacuated and the National troops marched on and took possession without
opposition. Everything had been destroyed or carried away. The
Confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the
arrival of every train to create the impression among the Yankees that
reinforcements were arriving. There was not a sick or wounded man left
by the Confederates, nor stores of any kind. Some ammunition had been
blown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few Quaker guns,
logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of
wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us.
The possession of Corinth by the National troops was of strategic
importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. It
was nearly bloodless. It is a question whether the MORALE of the
Confederate troops engaged at Corinth was not improved by the immunity
with which they were permitted to remove all public property and then
withdraw themselves. On our side I know officers and men of the Army of
the Tennessee--and I presume the same is true of those of the other
commands--were disappointed at the result. They could not see how the
mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective
rebel armies existed. They believed that a well-directed attack would
at least have partially destroyed the army defending Corinth. For
myself I am satisfied that Corinth could have been captured in a two
days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after
the battle of Shiloh.
General Halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around Corinth
on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took the
whole National army to do it. All commanding points two or three miles
to the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified. It was
expected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits.
They were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to
fully man them. It was probably thought that a final battle of the war
would be fought at that point. These fortifications were never used.
Immediately after the occupation of Corinth by the National troops,
General Pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and General
Buell soon followed. Buell was the senior of the two generals and
commanded the entire column. The pursuit was kept up for some thirty
miles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war or
prisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and were
willing captives. On the 10th of June the pursuing column was all back
at Corinth. The Army of the Tennessee was not engaged in any of these
movements.
The Confederates were now driven out of West Tennessee, and on the 6th
of June, after a well-contested naval battle, the National forces took
possession of Memphis and held the Mississippi river from its source to
that point. The railroad from Columbus to Corinth was at once put in
good condition and held by us. We had garrisons at Donelson,
Clarksville and Nashville, on the Cumberland River, and held the
Tennessee River from its mouth to Eastport. New Orleans and Baton Rouge
had fallen into the possession of the National forces, so that now the
Confederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication with
Richmond to the single line of road running east from Vicksburg. To
dispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the first
importance. The possession of the Mississippi by us from Memphis to
Baton Rouge was also a most important object. It would be equal to the
amputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy.
After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides
enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion
for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the
rebellion. In addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell
the effective force. But the work of depletion commenced. Buell with
the Army of the Ohio was sent east, following the line of the Memphis
and Charleston railroad. This he was ordered to repair as he advanced
--only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as
soon as he was out of the way. If he had been sent directly to
Chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions
along the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could have
arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss
of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chattanooga. Bragg
would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession
of middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone River
and Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside would
not have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of helping himself
or escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not have been fought.
These are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable,
which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after Corinth
fell into the possession of the National forces. The positive results
might have been: a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or to
any other desired point south of Corinth in the interior of Mississippi.