THE MANAGEMENT OF FUEL
In the world war fuel fought, and food, and steel, as well as men.
Fuel quickly became as much of a fighting necessity as were the
munitions which could not be made without it and the food for whose
transportation it was necessary. It was a war of manufactures, of
applied science, and the foundations of both are laid in fuel. And
therefore fuel, which means chiefly coal, had to be mobilized for war
and its production and distribution so managed that its potency could
be applied where needed and when needed without unnecessary detriment
to civilian welfare. During the first months of our participation
in the war and for nearly a year previous there had been a menacing
coal situation in which the increasing demand for coal, inadequate
transportation and storage facilities and other causes had combined to
send prices to four and even five times their former level and to cause
uneasiness and dissatisfaction among consumers and in the ranks of both
labor and capital. As soon as Congress gave the necessary authority, in
August, 1917, the President fixed schedules of provisional prices and
appointed a Fuel Administrator for the United States.
Before the Fuel Administration was created there had unfortunately
been published unauthorized and unwarranted assurance of prospective
better conditions in the coal situation which had led many to postpone
their usual summer and autumn purchases. When the winter set in, at
an unusually early date, with its unprecedentedly long continued and
bitter cold and frequent storms, this delay on the part of so many
buyers added much to the universal difficulties and discomforts. To
all the usual demand for coal and the extraordinary demand due to the
unwonted weather, there were added the large and increasing fuel needs
for war manufacture, for the bunkering of ships, for the heating of the
many cantonments and camps, each a goodly sized city in itself, and
other war activities. And with all this increased demand, there were
fewer workers in the mines, for many had joined the fighting forces or
gone to work in munition factories, and transportation facilities were
disorganized by the strain upon them and disabled by storms and zero
weather. This was the situation with which the Fuel Administration was
contending three months after it began its work.
The total coal production of the country during 1917 amounted to
651,402,000 net tons, of which approximately 100,000,000 tons were
anthracite and the rest bituminous. This was an increase over all
previous production records of more than 60,000,000 tons, but it
did not meet the ever increasing demands of the war machine, whose
requirements for bituminous coal for 1918 went above this amount by
nearly 100,000,000 tons. It was necessary to stir production in the
mines to utmost endeavor, to facilitate that production by prompt and
adequate distribution and to induce such fuel saving among consumers as
would supplement production sufficiently to meet war needs.
Not only was there a decrease of many thousands in the number of men
employed in the production of coal, but also in many mines efficiency
was lessened by the hatreds and suspicions of the different racial
representatives--Magyar, Pole, Italian, Slovak, Jugo-Slav, with their
animosities bred in the bone, brought with them from Europe and fanned
into fresh activity by the war. Each furbished up anew his old grudge
and carried it on his shoulder, where it quickly received the knocking
it challenged, and old racial battles were fought over again while the
mining of coal was laid aside.
To better conditions and stimulate effort a Production Bureau was
formed in the Fuel Administration whose representatives were sent to
every mine. There they worked with and through a committee composed
of mine operators and mine workers. The Bureau bent its energies
incessantly to the influencing of mine operators and managers to
establish such conditions and methods as would keep the miners
satisfied and busy and of the miners to put forth their utmost efforts.
Its representatives dealt tactfully with the racial hatreds, using
the foreign language newspapers read by each group and also dealing
with individual men in person, allaying suspicions, and showing each
group what the success of the Allied and American armies would mean
for its people in Europe. Officials of the United Mine Workers toured
the mining regions, addressing the workers, informing the men on the
questions involved in the war and urging them to do their best. Other
speakers, including men returned from army service in France, went up
and down through the mining regions, holding meetings, talking to the
workers. The President’s proclamation addressed to all engaged in
coal mining and appeals from other men of influence among them were
distributed everywhere.
The result was a hearty response from the mining men. They dealt
amicably with the production committees, they kept the peace with their
racial enemies, they agreed to forego holidays and the usual laying
off for funeral days, they worked even on Labor Day, they plunged into
the increased production program with enthusiasm, they worked more
efficiently and many old men who had quit active work on account of
age voluntarily took up again the pick and shovel. The average number
of days worked by each miner in the bituminous fields was increased
over that of the previous year by twelve and by twenty-five over that
of 1916. From week to week during the summer and fall of 1918, until
November, the weekly production of coal showed an increase in the
neighborhood of a million tons over the same week in the previous
year. During the half-year period from the first of April to the end
of September more coal was mined than ever before in any half year in
the history of the American coal industry. In that time the bituminous
production was twelve per cent greater than in the corresponding period
in 1917, which had itself established a record.
As important as increased production in the mines was the rapid
distribution of coal as soon as it was brought to the surface. Coal
is not commercially produced until it is distributed, for coal dumped
at the mine mouth or lying in cars on railroad switches is of no more
use to the consumer than that still underground. It was mainly the
efficient work of the Railroad Administration that brought order and
successful achievement into this phase of the war coal situation. The
manner in which it relieved the freight congestion which had paralyzed
traffic during the last months of 1917 is described in the chapter on
“Running the Railroads.” By the prompt actions it took it released
the tied-up trains of coal, sent them to their destination and made
possible the swift, economical and steady service of all cars available
for the carrying of coal from mines to consumers’ bins.
But so much in excess of possible production was the amount of coal
that was urgently necessary for war making purposes that only a great
and general program of coal saving would prevent the slacking of our
war effort. The Fuel Administrator turned at once to the American
people, confident that, if they understood the need, they would
voluntarily endeavor to meet it. Articles explaining the situation and
showing why it was necessary for consumers to save in the neighborhood
of fifty million tons of coal during the next few months in newspapers
and magazines, all of which throughout the country cordially coöperated
with the Fuel Administration, brought the responsibility of the
continuing of the nation’s prosecution of the war straight to the
feet of every individual user of coal, gas and electricity. Widely
circulated leaflets urged conservation of coal and posters that met the
eye at every turn emphasized their message. Instructions were published
in periodicals of every sort for the economical but equally efficient
use of coal in manufacturing and domestic furnaces, in kitchen ranges
and household stoves. To save each day at least one shovelful of coal
was laid upon the conscience of every consumer.
So-called “lightless nights” were established on which was forbidden
the use of electricity, gas, oil, or coal for the illumination or
display of windows, advertisements or signs and street lighting was
reduced to the minimum necessary for safety. In order to aid in
the conserving of coal by reducing the amount of artificial light
necessary, the daylight saving measure was passed by Congress and the
clocks moved ahead for an hour from the end of March to the end of
October. Non-war industries had their consumption of coal curtailed.
In January, 1918, the public east of the Mississippi River was asked
to observe a series of so-called “heatless days” in which there should
be no consumption of fuel except for absolutely necessary uses. The
purpose was to make possible the bunkering of two hundred and fifty
ships at eastern ports laden with food and war materials for Europe,
but unable to move for lack of coal. There was dire need of their
cargoes in France. The United States Government had been told that the
Western Allies could not continue their war effort unless these cargoes
were delivered on the other side of the Atlantic in the quickest
possible time. For a five-day period in January and for each following
Monday for several weeks the Fuel Administration asked commerce and
industry to forego as far as possible the burning of coal in order that
it might give priority for deliveries of coal to the waiting ships
and to the newly established Railroad Administration, struggling with
ice-covered tracks, frozen engines and storm-tied trains, a little time
in which to relieve the congestion of cars and set in motion long lines
of stalled coal trains. The “heatless day” period was loyally observed
and by the day after it ended every one of the two hundred and fifty
ships had bunkered and was speeding across the ocean to deliver its
sorely needed cargo. There had also been accumulated a stock of coal
for the equally necessary bunkering of the other ships that came and
went in a steady stream to supply the demands of war.
For all these measures the response of the public was immediate and
willing. Manufacturers of nonessentials voluntarily offered to curtail
operation if by so doing they could aid the nation’s war effort.
Domestic consumers reduced their lights and watched their furnaces and
stoves as they had never done before, and everywhere any attempt on the
part of merchants, corporations or private individuals to use light
or fuel in excess of the Fuel Administration’s requests and rules was
frowned down by the public.
The Oil Division of the Fuel Administration played so important a
part in the final success of the Allied and Associated nations that
if it was true, as a British authority declared, that “we floated to
victory on a sea of oil,” the credit belongs largely to the men who
directed the American oil supply, for the Western front was dependent
almost wholly upon oil from America. There was a constantly increasing
production of crude oil, which was speeded by all possible methods, and
the proportion of gasoline extracted was continually being increased.
Oil-burning vessels in the British, French, Italian and American
navies needed the oil and the Motor Transport Services of all the
armies needed immense and rapidly increasing quantities of gasoline.
Oil production was increased in 1918 to 344,000,000 barrels, which
was 50,000,000 barrels more than it had been in 1914. To provide
transportation a fleet of oil tankers was built and when the war closed
over half the gross tonnage of tankers in service was American.
Gasoline this country sent across the ocean in an ever increasing
flood which grew in 1917 by a million and a half of barrels over the
previous year and in 1918 amounted to 13,312,000 barrels, an increase
of more than 9,000 barrels per day over that sent in the previous year.
But so sharp grew the need for it at the front in the summer of 1918
that restriction had to be put upon its use at home. The Allied forces
warned by cable that without increased and early deliveries of gasoline
their plans were likely to collapse. Marshal Foch’s cablegram said
bluntly, “If you don’t keep up your petroleum supply we shall lose the
war.” Immediate saving of gasoline was the only answer to the necessity
and the Fuel Administration asked the people living east of the
Mississippi River to forego the use of motor-propelled vehicles, except
for specified necessary purposes, on Sundays. Compliance was voluntary
and for military reasons the public could not be told how dire was the
necessity.
But so immediate and universal was the response that from every section
reports showed that Sunday motoring was almost wholly abandoned, the
reduction being from 75 to 99 per cent. During the nearly two months
that the restriction continued it was estimated that a saving had been
made of approximately 1,000,000 barrels of gasoline, of which more than
500,000 barrels, ten shiploads, had been sent overseas.
A comprehensive plan was worked out by the Fuel Administration for the
saving of fuel by conservation of light and power which enlisted the
aid of a force of engineers and of other departments of the Government.
A study was made by inspectors and engineers of conditions in large
manufacturing concerns and in public utilities plants all over the
country which brought about, by the willing coöperation of their
managers, such rearrangements of machinery and appliances, elimination
of duplicating plants and of unnecessary expenses as resulted in
important savings, ranging from ten to thirty per cent in the amount
of coal consumed, without interfering with the output. The Fuel
Administration urged the generation of electric energy from water power
instead of steam wherever possible, and enough plants made the change
to effect a considerable saving in coal consumption.
A zone system for the distribution of bituminous coal providing for
the supply of each section of the country from the nearest mines, put
into operation by the Fuel and Railroad Administrations together,
eliminated approximately 160,000,000 car miles and affected more than
half of the total distribution of bituminous coal. The overcoming of
this waste in transportation made possible the swifter and steadier use
of rolling stock, thus speeding deliveries and more quickly returning
cars and engines to the mines for new loads, and made more effective
the railroad consumption of coal, which amounts to about twenty-five
per cent of the coal production of the country.
The organization of the Fuel Administration stretched out in a network
that touched every community. The fuel administrator of each state,
working under the national organization, had under him administrators
and local committees for cities and counties whose duty it was to
keep in constant touch with the supplies and the needs of their own
localities. Upon their reports the state administrator apportioned
the supply to be allowed each locality and upon their investigations
into business costs were based the maximum local retail prices of
coal to be charged. The fixing of local retail prices was in addition
to the regulation of prices at the mines and violators of either,
whether mine operators, jobbers or retailers, were made to refund their
excess profits and were then turned over to the Department of Justice
for prosecution. Each of the several divisions of the work of the
Fuel Administration, in addition to that of fuel distribution, such
as conservation, production and oil, was organized by districts or
specialized bureaus for intensive and effective work.
Economies urged by the Fuel Administration resulted in the saving
during the first half of 1918 of 12,700,000 tons of coal. Although
the coal mining industry lost 100,000 or more workers to other war
industries and to the fighting forces, the speeding program of the
Fuel Administration resulted in a production of bituminous coal during
1918 of 585,883,000 tons, setting a new high record and exceeding the
production of the previous year by 34,000,000 tons. Notwithstanding the
enormous and constantly growing increase there had been throughout the
preceding eighteen months in the consumption of coal for war purposes,
at the end of hostilities the country faced the approaching winter with
stocks of coal on hand greatly in excess of previous years.