CREATING A NEW BRANCH OF WARFARE
The United States had to create for itself, after entering the war, not
only the new arm of air warfare almost from its very foundation, but
also the industry for its development and support. Much controversy
raged over the Government’s air program and its progress during almost
the entire year and a half and many and loud and long-continued were
the charges of inefficiency, incompetence and failure. Mistakes there
were, since human beings have not yet ceased the making of them, but
when America’s achievement in air warfare is considered in all its
phases and as a whole the frank and fair judgment can not fail to be
that her development of the air section of her fighting forces deserves
to rank among the most notable of all her wartime achievements.
In April, 1917, this country had in the Aviation Section of the
Signal Corps two small and poorly equipped flying fields, sixty-five
officers, 1,120 men and less than 300 second rate planes, most of them
for training, and there were ready for its use comparatively few of
the many and varied manufacturing industries and the trained workmen
necessary for the development of an extensive war aviation program.
Nor was there any one who had more than a vague appreciation of the
complicated technique that would be required for such a development.
Although aviation had been born in the United States it had not
received here the interest and commercial encouragement necessary for
its growth and had had to betake itself to Europe to find the means
and the opportunity for development. This lack of commercial interest
had been reflected in the army and a conservative General Staff had
given only the slightest consideration to the military possibilities
of aircraft. Not until the summer of 1914 had an aviation section been
incorporated in the army and there had been very little increase or
betterment in its facilities during the following two and a half years.
Even after our declaration of war an important aircraft participation
was not contemplated by the General Staff until it was asked for by our
war associates.
At the outbreak of the war each of the great belligerents was better
equipped for air warfare than was the United States, just as they were
better prepared for war in every way--war having been for centuries
almost the normal condition of Europe, while wars had been few in
America’s short history. But even their planes were comparatively
few in number, poorly equipped and of uncertain military value.
Aircraft had quickly proved their importance and under the stress
and competition of actual warfare there had been already wonderful
developments in the size, horse-power, equipment and usefulness of the
planes and in the skill of the pilots and the methods of training.
But, because the needs at the front were ever changing and it was
often necessary to discard one week the successful achievement of the
week before and constantly to reach out for new means and new methods,
all this development was of less value to the United States than it
would have been under more stable conditions. Any of it might have to
be scrapped any day because of the developments of the day before.
Moreover, so urgent was the need of England, France and Italy for every
flier and every plane they possessed that, in justice to their own hard
pressed battle lines, they could not offer as much assistance as they
would have liked to give to the development of our rapidly planned air
program.
That program was instituted in accordance with the urgent
representations of the British and French war missions which came to
this country soon after our declaration of war. The plans of the Allied
forces, formed under the immediate and the clearly foreseen conditions
of battle, called for great numbers of planes, pilots and mechanicians
at the earliest possible moment they could be sent overseas. Therefore,
the Government began at once to provide the industries and institute
the training facilities necessary for the creation of this new branch
of warfare. The development had to be from the foundation on both the
side of production and the side of training. From the cutting of spruce
trees in northwestern forests and the weaving of wing fabric to the
making of the engines and the oil for their lubrication, the industry
of airplane production had to be developed and speeded to the point
where it would meet the desires of our war associates. This country
had never trained an aviator sufficiently for participation in aerial
warfare and it had neither schools, nor flying fields, nor fliers
trained for teaching, nor a scheme of instruction. Neither had it
the mechanics necessary for the upkeep of training planes nor schools
in which to train them. It had to begin at the beginning in all these
things, and it had to develop industries and establish schools and
prepare fields and train fliers all at the same time. One could not
wait upon another phase lest the final result be delayed.
Nineteen months later, when the armistice was signed, the two small
and poorly equipped flying fields had increased to thirty-six in the
United States and seventeen in France, preparing students for all of
the demands of aerial warfare. The sixty-five officers had multiplied
to 10,300 flying men and there were 5,460 cadets in training and almost
ready to be added to the number of those in the air, while there were
nearly 8,000 officers in the non-flying divisions of the service, which
contained also 133,600 enlisted men, trained for their specialized
work. Within a year and a half the Air Service had been expanded from
a beginning of little consequence to a size greater than that of the
army in the years before the war and all of it had been trained in the
technique of a new branch of warfare. In the production of aircraft and
accessories 200,000 men and women were engaged, nearly all of whom had
been trained for this skill-demanding work. There had been produced
over 12,000 air and sea planes, more than 1,000 balloons and 31,800
aviation engines. During the last month of the war production, which
had then reached a quantity basis, had mounted to the rate of 1,500
planes and 5,000 engines per month.