WORKING WITH THE ALLIED NAVIES
The American Navy was the first section of the American fighting
forces to take part in the war. It was ready to begin operations at
once upon our declaration of war, it lost no time in sending its first
contingent across the ocean and the importance of its coöperation with
the navies of our co-belligerents constantly increased until the end
of hostilities. Aside from the vital consequence of its achievement in
operating an Atlantic ferry, one of the capital performances of the
entire war, its chief work was done in coöperation with the British,
French and Italian navies in European waters from the Mediterranean to
the White Sea.
Upon our entrance into the war a patrol force was at once organized
charged with the protection of the western waters of the Atlantic and
the shores of America, from the Bay of Fundy to Colombia, including the
West Indies and all the region west of the 50th degree of longitude.
But within a few months it became apparent that the enemy would
confine his efforts mainly to European waters and accordingly most of
our naval forces were sent overseas. For the protection of our own
coasts and coastwise shipping when, during the second summer, enemy
submarines appeared along our own shores, submarines, sub-chasers,
destroyers, mine sweepers and other small craft of offense and defense
were ready to be put into action and prevented the enemy from doing any
considerable damage.
At the end of hostilities we had in European waters 364 vessels of
all classes, of which 304 were warships, and serving there were 5,000
officers and 70,000 enlisted men of our Navy, a total greater than its
full strength when we entered the war. Our destroyers had been steaming
an average of 275,000 miles per month and our ships of all classes,
including only those actively engaged in naval duties and excluding
those operating as escorts, had steamed a total monthly average of
626,000 miles. Individual destroyers steamed a total, during the first
year of service overseas, of from 60,000 to 64,000 miles. The Navy
established bases at the Azores, Gibraltar, Corfu, at many places along
the French coast, at English Channel ports, on the Irish coast, in the
North Sea, at Murmansk and at Archangel, fifteen in all. Our 14-inch
naval guns mounted on British monitors did their share in the attack
on Zeebrugge, and smaller naval guns mounted on floats and manned by
Italian crews gave much aid in the defense of Venice.
The bases at the Azores and at Gibraltar, where we maintained a
considerable naval force, were provided with all the necessities for
our cruisers, destroyers, submarines, chasers and other small craft
which joined the Allied navies in the policing of the Mediterranean
and the adjacent Atlantic waters where we coöperated in the hunting of
the undersea enemy and the protecting of transport and merchant craft.
Several of our battleships and cruisers worked with the Italian Navy
in Mediterranean waters. American sub-chasers gave important aid in
the battle of Durazzo, in which they were given the advance post of
honor and, preceding the Allied fleet, went forward picking a way of
safety for the larger vessels through the thickly strewn mine field.
Inside the harbor they shared in the battle, aiding in the attacking
and sinking of Austrian steamers, destroyers and submarines. Assisting
in mining operations and in the construction of a mine barrage was
another of the important works of this group of submarine chasers in
the Adriatic Sea.
Several naval bases were established along the coast of France and
through the last year of the war seventy vessels, of which half were
destroyers, operated in these waters, their chief duty being to meet
the convoys of American troop and cargo ships and escort them through
the danger zone. They also worked up and down the French shores,
hunting enemy submarines and escorting coastwise shipping. At all
these repair and supply bases it was necessary to provide extensive
facilities; a number of huge fuel oil tanks were built, most of
the new destroyers and many other ships being oil-burners; several
naval hospitals were constructed; a dozen naval port offices were
established, from Cherbourg to Marseilles, to expedite the movements
of American shipping through as many ports; naval aviation stations
were built; rescue tugs and a wrecking steamer watched for and assisted
damaged vessels; minesweepers kept open the approaches to the ports.
The principal bases from which our destroyers operated were Gibraltar,
Brest and Queenstown, of which the last named was the largest; the
submarine chaser bases were at Queenstown, Plymouth and Corfu; and
those for our submarines were at the Azores and at Berehaven on the
Irish coast. The flotilla of destroyers that was dispatched from
the United States a few days after our declaration of war reached
Queenstown, part of it within four and the rest within five weeks after
that date, and the whole flotilla was at work in coöperation with the
British forces within eight weeks after our entrance into the war. In
the latter part of 1917 a squadron of six American battleships was
sent to strengthen and coöperate with the British Grand Fleet that
was on watch in the North Sea to give battle to the German ships if
they should come out from their hiding place behind the defenses of
Heligoland. It was this vigilant watch of the Grand Fleet, assisted by
our battleships, that kept the German navy off the high seas, where it
would have raided commerce, made far more difficult the transporting of
our troops and war material to France, fought our own and the Allied
warships and greatly prolonged the war and made it even more bloody and
destructive. Our craft constituted twelve per cent of the fleet that
kept the German navy thus bottled up and rendered it incapable of harm.
The American squadron worked in entire harmony with the Grand Fleet,
and was assigned to one of the two places of honor and importance in
line of battle, the head or rear of the battleship force. So vigilantly
did the Grand Fleet keep its watch and so persistently did it go after
the enemy whenever he dared to appear, whether in a single ship, a
squadron or his entire fleet, and so vigorously chase him back that he
ventured out less and less frequently and toward the end rarely came
more than a few miles from his base. All manner of temptations were
used to induce him to come out into the open where battle could be
joined--a few ships apparently detached venturing into the Heligoland
Bight, merchant ships apparently without protection passing near
the entrance to the Bight, and other devices. When the German fleet
did emerge and a battle seemed imminent, the American division of
battleships headed the line and would have led the attack if the enemy
had not slipped quickly back.
The plan of laying a mine barrage across the North Sea, from the
Scottish coast to the Norwegian shore waters, originated with the
Ordnance Bureau of the American Navy. For some time the British
Admiralty insisted that it was not practicable, but after much
discussion they finally consented and the details of the operation of
the scheme were worked out together. A new type of mine was demanded,
because of the depth of the water, and this and a new firing device
had already been developed by the Ordnance Bureau of the Navy. The
number of mines required to lay a barrage 245 miles long and 20 miles
wide was so enormous and the need to have them ready at the earliest
possible moment so urgent that it was impossible to provide them by
the usual methods of manufacture. Therefore the mine was divided into
its many component parts and these were separately produced in as many
as four hundred industrial factories. The parts were partially brought
together in sub-assemblies in this country, and were thus shipped to
Europe, where the complete assembling was done just prior to issue to
the mine planters. There were manufactured 100,000 of these mines,
of which about 85,000 were shipped abroad, some of them being used
in similar mine barrages elsewhere. For this purpose a fleet of over
fifty merchant ships was taken over by the navy and fitted out for the
carrying of all this mine material overseas. Out of the entire fleet
only one was lost by enemy action. Mine bases were established on the
coast of Scotland, many mine layers and auxiliary vessels were fitted
out and the work was carried on at a high rate of speed, sometimes as
many as a thousand mines a day being laid. The American Navy furnished
all the mines and laid 80 per cent of them for this huge barrage, of a
greater length and in deeper water than had ever before been thought
possible. The barrage was fatal to at least ten submarines within a
short time after it was finished, and had the war continued would have
reduced the submarine danger to little consequence.
Immense quantities of oil were needed on the east coast of Scotland
for the British and American ships of the Grand Fleet and other
purposes and the practice had been to send it on its journey from
the United States in tankers around the north coast of Scotland. But
enemy submarines took a heavy toll of the precious liquid and the Navy
Department suggested the laying of a pipe line across Scotland. The
work of laying the line was mainly done by the American Navy, which
furnished the pipe for the work. The line could deliver 100 tons per
hour and was the longest in Europe. The entire work was completed in
six months and was finished on the day when firing ceased.
The relations of the American Navy with the Allied fleets were in
every case cordial and harmonious. The close and friendly coöperation
was especially noteworthy with the British fleet, because the major
portion of American operations was with it and the association was
closer and more constant. American vessels operated under British
command and British under American command effectively and without
friction and the ability, skill and seamanlike qualities of each,
officers and men alike, won hearty praise from the other. The British
Admiralty sent a commission to the American squadron of the Grand Fleet
to inquire how the ships were kept in such a state of readiness and
high efficiency without sending them to the dockyards.
American naval forces in European waters engaged in 500 battles with
submarines, in which it was known that at least ten undersea boats were
sunk by them and thirty-six others damaged. Deaths in the Navy from war
causes totaled 1,200 and at the close of hostilities there were 15,000
patients in naval hospitals.
In both European and American waters a total of 48 naval vessels of
all classes was lost during the war, of which the armored cruiser, San
Diego, which struck a mine off the coast of New York, was the most
important. The losses were occasioned by submarines, mines, collisions
and miscellaneous causes.