The several transactions or attempted transactions which took place at
various periods of the War between the Yugoslav members of the
Austro-Hungarian navy, associated with other Yugoslavs, on the one
hand and the Italian authorities on the other, were frustrated time
and again by the astounding conduct of the Italians. Had they made
anything like a proper use of the invaluable information that was
showered upon them or if they had requested the other Allied navies in
the Mediterranean to act on their behalf many Allied ships in the
Mediterranean would not have been torpedoed--since the submarine
activity centred at Kotor, one of the stations which could have been
seized--the Austrian front in Albania must have collapsed and the
entire war would have ended sooner.
In October 1917 the Austrian torpedo boat No. 11 was seized by the
Slav members of her crew and brought into Ancona, but their offers of
service were refused. The ringleaders showed, by refusing to accept
large sums of money, that their purpose was purely patriotic. The
Italians, however, simply interned them.
A much more serious affair was that of February 1, 1918, on which day
it had been arranged that the Slav sailors at Pola and Kotor should
mutiny. At the former place it did not succeed, at Kotor it was so far
successful that the mutineers, after imprisoning Admiral Njegovan and
many other officers whom they suspected of not being in sympathy with
them, took command of the ships and left unanswered an ultimatum
addressed to them by the High Naval Command. There was a prospect of
the whole fleet shaking off the Austro-Hungarian authority. The chief
revolutionary leader was Ante Sesan, a Croat ensign, twenty-six years
of age, from near Dubrovnik and the son of a well-known sea captain on
the coast. "We drew up," he says, "a proclamation representing our
case to the Yugoslavs, Czechs and Poles from the national point of
view, and to the Germans and Magyars from the socialist point of view.
The Germans threw in their lot with us, but the Magyars went against
us. From our ship we continually sent wireless messages asking for
help from the Entente fleet, and at first from Italy which was nearest
and could help most quickly. The messages were continually jammed by
sailors at the Ercegnovo station loyal to Austria-Hungary, but
nevertheless it was known in Italy that something was happening at
Kotor. We told the High Command at Bok Kotor (Bocche di Cattaro) that
we no longer recognized their authority and asked that we might get
into touch with our deputies, whom alone we recognized. The High
Command consented. We wired for the following deputies to come to us:
Tre[vs]i['c] (Yugoslav), Stanjek (Czech), Karolyi (Magyar), Adler
(German) and one Polish deputy, but our wires did not, for the most
part, get through. Our object was to get help, but meanwhile our
situation became more and more desperate. We knew that the Third
Division was coming from Pola against us, and also the army in
Herzegovina. We were prepared to take the battery of the Punta
d'Ostro, the most important battery and the key to Bok Kotor, which
was in the hands of sailors inimical to us. The news came from Gaa
that the Magyars there had got the upper hand. We tried to bring them
over to us, but in vain. They said, 'If you don't stop this, we shall
join the Third Division and take action against you.' The Magyars from
other boats sent the same message. The Council of Sailors then debated
what was to be done, and it was suggested that Rasha (who was shot
later) should go in a hydroplane to Italy to give information on the
situation and ask for help, and that we in the meantime should lie
low, and in the event of help coming, again raise a revolt. Rasha
objected that he did not know Italian, and proposed that I should go.
The Third Division meanwhile was already in the port Bok Kotor.
"At half-past eight in the morning we flew away in the hydroplane to
Italy, I and two Poles. At ten we reached Mattinato, and I explained
at the Carabineers' station why I had come and asked to be brought as
soon as possible before the Commander of the District. Later I saw
Captain Odo (of the Territorials) and told him all, and asked him to
put me into communication with Brindisi, Taranto or Rome. He had us
put under arrest. I was interviewed by two flying officers two days
later, but they went off to Brindisi in my hydroplane without me.
"On February 17 I was taken under armed escort to Brindisi, where I
was imprisoned in a cabin of the man-of-war _Varese_.... I told the
commander of the ship that I was at his disposal with all my knowledge
of the Austrian fleet. I asked him to put questions, because I did
not know how much he knew. It was all to no purpose. On February 21
the Admiral in command at Brindisi saw me. From what he said I
understood that nothing had been done about Bok Kotor and, what was
more, that not one hydroplane had been sent to investigate the
situation there. I learned that I was to go to Rome. They clapped me
into barracks.... I again asked the Italians to allow me to speak to
the Serbian Minister, whom I considered the representative of the
Yugoslav people, but the request was refused on the plea that it was a
question of high politics. Meanwhile the Polish representative
Zamorski was allowed to visit the Poles, but from February 3 to May 25
I was unable to get into communication with any of our people."
In May there was another outbreak at Kotor, but it was overpowered,
and many Yugoslav sailors were shot or imprisoned. Sesan was also kept
in his Italian prison, though occasionally he was brought out,
questioned and then taken back again. Thus at Ferrara he informed
Captain Ciano about the whole organization of the Austrian offensive
and defensive forces, and especially about Pola and Split. Sesan
begged to be allowed to take part in the action against the Austrian
fleet, and, at Rome, where he came before Captain Soldati, of the
Bureau of Information, he made the same request. With two motor
launches he undertook to organize communication between Italy and the
Slavs of Dalmatia, in this way to follow events in Austria and help
the revolutionary movement. It would be possible to procure the secret
wireless codes which the Austrian and German submarines used--but the
Italians would do nothing, because they were not willing to recognize
that the Yugoslavs were fighting against Austria.... Seeing that he
would never move the Italians to take serious action against the
Austrian fleet, Sesan asked to be sent to the Serbian army in
Macedonia, so that at Salonica he could get into touch with the French
and British fleet. In this also he failed, for he was interned from
June till December with Yugoslav officers at Nocera Umbra. While there
he was visited by Bissolati, from whom he learned that the Chief of
the Admiralty was hostile to the Yugoslavs. And at Nocera Umbra he
remained until December 6, when he was liberated, owing to the
efforts of Trumbi['c] and other members of the Yugoslav Committee.
In the month of September a memorandum was drawn up by Trumbi['c], in
which he proposed to English and American political and military
circles the landing at [vS]ibenik of a force of 50,000 men. This would
have been assisted by the mutinous crews of the Austro-Hungarian
Fleet, whose preparations had been completed in July (at this port 90
per cent. of the sailors of the fleet were Yugoslavs, and among them
there was a strong national feeling; in fact, if their political
leaders had not held them back, they would have endeavoured in July to
blow up the naval fortifications and sail with the ships to Corfu).
The expeditionary army, once at [vS]ibenik, could have penetrated
inland and, acting in consort with the many Yugoslav deserters and the
insurgent population of Dalmatia and Bosnia, have accelerated the
Austrian _debacle_. In this memorandum Trumbi['c] asked that the
combined Anglo-American-French fleet should support the action, but
that the Italians, whom the Yugoslavs distrusted, should take no part.
He sneered at the cowardice of the Italians who, with a huge army, did
not dare to start an offensive on a grand scale.
[In well-informed circles in Italy this memorandum was already known,
but when it was read in the Italian Chamber in the spring of 1919 it
made a considerable sensation.]
On October 3, Messrs. Frederick [vS]tepanek, Rudolph Giunio, Valentine
Zi['c] (of [vS]ibenik) and other authorized Czecho-Slovak and Yugoslav
emissaries went in a sailing-boat from Vis to Italy, with a view to
getting into connection with Dr. Bene[vs] (afterwards the
Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister) and Dr. Trumbi['c], to inform them as
to the situation in the Monarchy and to obtain instructions regarding
the moment of the revolution in which their soldiers and sailors were
to participate. On arrival in Rome on October 7, the delegates were
interrogated by Major Trojani of the Bureau of Information and on the
same day for three hours by the Inspector-General of Public Safety.
From then till October 20, they were interned in the Macoa barracks at
the Castro Pretoris, and although they made repeated attempts to see
a member of the Yugoslav Committee or Dr. Bene[vs], who was in Rome,
they were told that this "delicate" question could only be solved by
the Premier himself; and when brought before him Dr. Bene[vs] had
departed. The delegates had entreated that he and Trumbi['c] should be
informed of their arrival, but in spite of various assurances nothing
whatever was done. It is suggested that the fleet would have been in
Slav hands two or three weeks earlier, which would very probably have
precipitated events on the Western front, if the Italians had not
acted in this inexcusable fashion.