THE BURDEN OF AUSTRIA'S SOUTHERN SLAV TROOPS_The Birth of Yugoslavia, Volume 1

Meanwhile Austria's Yugoslav soldiers and sailors had been continuing

their patriotic work. On February 2, 1918, a telegram was sent to the

Army High Command at Baden (near Vienna). [This message is No. 974. It

concerns itself with the Austrian navy, in whose ranks Sarkoti['c]

perceives agitation. The rest of the message consists chiefly of the

drastic remedies which the writer would apply.]

There follows a document, numbered 106,116, and dated May 5, 1918, in

which the disaffection of Slovene troops is described. Not only have

anti-dynastic ones been raised, but a N.C.O. has torn off his two

Austrian decorations and has stamped on them, while troops have worn

their national colours in their caps, though this is only authorized

when they are marching to a battlefield.

In a notice on the subject of Southern Slav and Italian propaganda in

Dalmatia, the military command at Mostar denounces the Southern Slavs,

officers and men:

IMPERIAL AND ROYAL ARMY: HIGHER COMMAND.

_Chief of the General Staff._

Op. No. 109,942.

BADEN, _August_ 5, 1918.

[After discussing various manifestations of disloyalty, the writer

says that he has observed how there is a kind of link between the Slav

officers, educated at the Academy, and their men. He finds that

Spalato is particularly given to these Southern Slav ideas, which he

believes is to be accounted for from the fact that Dr. Trumbi['c],

"the celebrated agitator," is mayor and deputy of that town.]

* * * * *

So much for the complaints with regard to Austria-Hungary's Southern

Slav soldiers. Two military courts of justice sat at Zagreb through

the War, the Imperial and Royal Court, and that of the Royal Hungarian

No. 6 (Croatian-Slavonian) Honved Division. No statistics are to hand

with reference to the various courts in Syrmia, and that one which

earned such an evil reputation in the fortress of Peterwardein. The

judgments of the two Zagreb courts, where Croat officers were able to

make their influence felt, did not appear to the authorities of Vienna

and Buda-Pest to be sufficiently drastic. No death sentences were

pronounced, although these had been demanded; and on June 24, 1918, it

was decided that any further trials for high treason or for offences

against the military authorities should be held in Pressburg

(Bratislava) and not in Zagreb. The following statistics, relating to

the two Zagreb courts, were compiled from the official books which the

Austrians did not remove. The figures shown opposite, which are

certified by Captain Sto[vz]ir, Provost-Marshal, show the increasing

determination to risk everything rather than to fight for Austria.

___________________________________________________________________________

| | IMPERIAL AND ROYAL COURT. | ROYAL HUNGARIAN AND |

| | | HONVED DIVISION. |

|------------|------------------------------------------------------------|

|Year. |1914|1915 |1916 | 1917 | 1918 |1914|1915 |1916 |1917 |1918 |

|------------+----+-----+-----+------+------+----+-----+-----+-----+------|

|of Persons |442 |2,730|4,790|11,275|25,095|632 |3,000|3,470|6,101|13,425|

|------------+----+-----+-----+------+------+----+-----+-----+-----+------|

|inflicted |233 |1,688|2,737|7,782 |19,838|154 | 779 | 926 |3,248|8,039 |

|------------+----+-----+-----+------+------+----+-----+-----+-----+------|

|Insults | 52 | 66 | 336 | 397 | 559 |257 |1,471|1,223| 727 |1,007 |

|------------|----+-----+-----+------+------+----+-----+-----+-----+------|

|with | 53 | 78 | 375 | 414 | 568 |730 |1,875|1,261| 839 |1,018 |

|------------|----+-----+-----+------+------+----+-----+-----+-----+------|

|convicted | 3 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 46 | 48 | 22 | 17 | -- |

|------------|----+-----+-----+------+------+----+-----+-----+-----+------+

|Offences | 11 | 6 | 7 | 3 | 4 |116 | 179 | 89 | 89 | -- |

|____________|____|_____|_____|______|______|____|_____|_____|_____|______|

It may be of interest to give some details of one of the regiments

whose composition was chiefly Slav. My informant, Dr. Ivo Yelavi['c],

served as telephone officer on the staff of the 37th Dalmatian

Regiment. At different times--at the fall of Gorica, in December 1916

at Sanmarco, and in June 1917 at Tolmein, three battalions went over

to the enemy; 170 officers (of whom 169 were reserve officers) gave

themselves up during the War. Some of them were Serbs, most were

Croats. With respect to the fall of Gorica, this was not--despite the

clamour that they made about it--due to the Italians, but to two

officers, Tolja and Salvi, who took over with them all the plans of

the underground forts and maps made to the scale of one step to a

millimetre. Among the accomplishments which the officers of this

regiment taught their men was how to surrender to the foe. Efforts

were made to bring about a different state of things: German and

Magyar regiments were placed behind it, with machine guns; the

regiment itself was filled up with Magyars. On some occasions the 37th

desisted from going over in order not to bring persecution upon their

homes. In 1914, opposite the Montenegrins at Gora[vz]da, all the plans

were worked out, but at the last moment Dr. Count Gozze (of Dubrovnik)

said he had just thought of what would happen to their families, and

they refrained. After the battalion had gone over in 1916 General

Seidler told them he would do his best to have the regiment dissolved

and the men divided among other regiments, but that not all the

officers would go. This was an ominous hint that he intended to

decimate them, after the fashion of Field-Marshal Liposcak. A

fortnight later, in the presence of Field-Marshal Boroevi['c], General

Wurm and General Seidler, they were highly praised; and when they, in

company with a Magyar regiment, took Hill No. 166, it was announced

that this had been achieved by the "fame-covered regiment," which was

done to throw dust in the eyes of the Italians and the Entente.

Various other methods were used to escape service at the front. A Slav

doctor, whose hospital at Konjica could hold 400 patients, used to

have 4000-5000 on the books; those whom he was unable to keep he gave

convalescent leave. In this way he saved a great many of the Dalmatian

_intelligentsia_. He and another Dalmatian doctor would send the men

backwards and forwards, now to one hospital, now to another. One

ordinary method for avoiding the front was to bribe the company

commander and the N.C.O. who made out the lists. Yet sometimes there

was no help for it. When, for instance, in September 1914 they were at

Banjaluka, the enemy advanced to Pale, very near Sarajevo. My

informant has a vivid recollection of the way in which a Viennese

captain, the leader of the contingent, trembled. In a Bosnian valley

they met a woman with five small children, one of whom was at her

breast. The captain told my acquaintance (who was then a N.C.O.) to

stay behind with some men and shoot her, but not to let him hear

anything. He said that the General at Sarajevo had commanded that

everything Serb that goes on two legs must be cut down. Yelavi['c]

refused to carry out this order, whereupon the captain told Dr.

Gozze, whom he greatly disliked, that he must do it. Gozze stayed

behind, fired a few shots in the air and informed the captain that

everything was over.

What the Austrian command really thought of the 37th Regiment, and of

others, may be seen from a report dated December 2, 1916, and signed

by the Archduke Frederick:

"... Certain events that have occurred can be explained only as the

consequences of the weak attitude of the authorities towards the

traitorous propaganda. On July 21, five soldiers of the 23rd Regiment

deserted near Pogger, and gave the Italian Command important

information regarding movements of troops and the course of the

fighting near Gorica. Quite recently a lieutenant, two reserve

officers, two N.C.O.'s and two soldiers deserted from the 37th

Regiment, as did three soldiers from the 23rd Regiment. Since April,

244 desertions have taken place from the two regiments. Inquiry shows

that these desertions occur regularly and immediately after the return

of the soldiers from leave. Unless effective counter-measures are

adopted it will be impossible to utilize these Dalmatian regiments."

It was not always an easy operation to surrender, even after one had

reached the Italian lines. A friend of mine went over with another

officer and eight men. In the first-line trenches they could see no

one and felt uncertain what to do. However, they proceeded, and from

the second-line trench their whispered calls were answered. They were

made to pass in single file, holding up their hands, and with all the

available weapons held in readiness against them. My friend, at his

request, was conducted to the colonel, and the first thing that he did

was to make a formal complaint against the way in which this army, of

which he considered himself an ally, manned its front-line trenches.

The Yugoslavs who managed to escape to Russia volunteered for service

and, after being organized by General Zivkovi['c] at Odessa, formed

the two Divisions which, as is well known, did remarkable work in the

Dobrudja. One only has to hear what the Bulgars say about them. In the

battles round Constanza, during the campaign of 1916, one of these

Divisions was so frequently engaged in the most arduous positions and

had such enormous losses that it was regarded as having been wiped

out. When the Roumanian troops retreated these Yugoslavs found

themselves encircled by the Bulgarian and German armies; they hacked a

way out with their bayonets. The higher officers had come from Serbia,

the rest of them had previously been enrolled in Austria's army.

Thirty-two officers out of 500 were killed, while 300 were wounded;

and of the 42,000 men 1939 were killed and more than 8000 were

wounded. Nevertheless the _morale_ remained excellent and there was no

lack of new volunteers. "Verily," as the Serbian proverb says, "it

does not snow to kill the beasts, but in order that they may leave

their traces."