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[Illustration: _Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek_]

THE CHINA OF CHIANG K'AI-SHEK:

A Political Study

by

PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

Duke University

Greenwood Press, Publishers

Westport, Connecticut

The Library of Congress has catalogued this publication as follows:

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony, 1913-1966.

The China of Chiang K'ai-shek; a political study.

Reprint of the 1943 ed. published by World Peace Foundation, Boston.

Includes bibliographical references.

1. China--Politics and government--1912-1949.

2. Chiang, Kai-shek, 1886- . I. Title.

DS774.L48 1973 320.9'51'042 73-725

ISBN 0-8371-6779-5

Copyright 1942 by World Peace Foundation

Originally published in 1943 by World Peace Foundation, Boston

Reprinted with the permission of World Peace Foundation

First Greenwood Reprinting 1973

Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number 73-725

ISBN 0-8371-6779-5

Printed in the United States of America

TO MY MOTHER

_With Love_

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Acknowledgments, for a work of this type, are always insufficient and

often ungracious. Today, political and military conditions forbid

mention of some of the persons to whom I am most indebted. Furthermore,

it is unfeasible to thank those teachers and friends who have prepared

me in years past for the present work. Nevertheless, courtesy and candor

demand that I indicate the extent of my obligation, and tender these

inadequate thanks.

For interviews, hospitality and other kindnesses shown me in Western

China I wish to thank Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek; Their

Excellencies, Sun K'ê, Yü Yu-jen, H. H. Kung, Wang Ch'ung-hui, Chang

Chia-ngau, T. F. Tsiang, Yeh Ch'u-tsang, Kan Nai-kuang, Ch'ên Kuo-fu,

Wang Shih-chieh, Ch'u Chia-hua, Hollington Tong, and Ma Chao-chun; Major

Generals J. L. Huang and Ch'u Shih-ming; Bishop Paul Yu-pin; and Messrs.

Foo Ping-shêng, Chên Ming-shu, Lo Chia-lun, Edward Bing-shuey Lee, Han

Lih-wu, P. C. Kuo, Ch'ên Chih-mai, Kinn-wei Shaw, James Y. C. Yen, Wang

Shen-tsu, Shuming T. Liu, Jen Shieh, Li Ch'in-shui, and Ma P'in-ho.

Among the foreign community, I wish to thank the American Ambassador,

Mr. Nelson Johnson, and Mr. E. F. Drumwright for their kind reception;

and to thank Mr. Tillman Durdin, Mr. Theodore White, Mr. George Fitch,

Dr. J. B. Tayler, Professor Frank Price, and Professor and Mrs. J. B.

Slocum.

I feel myself peculiarly fortunate in having three such good, loyal

friends as Drs. Chu Djang, Miao Chung-yi, and Yin Pao-yü, whose

kindnesses to me have continued ever since our student days together at

the Johns Hopkins.

Dean Shen Ch'un-lu, Mr. Tso T'ao-fên and their associates in the

National Salvation movement; Colonel Ch'in Po-k'u of the Communist

Party; Mr. Chang Peh-chuen of the Third Party; Dr. Carson Chang of the

National Socialist Party, and other spokesmen for minority and

unofficial groups were most generous with their time and information.

Messrs. You Shoo-tseng, Yang Chun, Wu Hsüeh-ping, Hawthorne Chen and

others translated Chinese materials for or with me. Save for their help,

so liberally and painstakingly rendered, this book would have been

delayed for months if not years. These gentlemen are not to be held

responsible for the selection of materials, nor for the translations in

their present form, since I have sought to check and revise this work as

far as time and my imperfect command of written Chinese have permitted.

The International Peace Campaign (China Branch), The People's Foreign

Relations Association, The Chinese-American Institute for Cultural

Relations, and other institutions in Free China were generous with their

hospitality and facilities. I owe particular thanks to the Central Bank

of China for the high courtesy shown me through the Chief Secretary and

the following gentlemen: Mr. T. T. Wang, Chief of the Engineering

Division; Mr. Ch'ên Yin-sung, Manager, Kiating Branch; and Mr. Yang

Hsia-tz'ŭ, Manager, Chengtu Branch. The officers of the Bank went to

enormous pains to ensure my timely, safe return to Chungking when I was

ill, hurried, tardy, and in danger of missing my prearranged bookings

back to America. Special acknowledgment must also be offered to Mr. C.

C. Chi, for his unfailing kindness in providing interviews and trips,

and to the China National Aviation Corporation for their unusual

courtesies.

In Hong Kong, I was assisted by Dr. Eugene Chen, Dr. Wên Yüan-ning, Dr.

Ch'en Han-seng, and Mr. Liu Yu-wan.

In Shanghai, Mr. T. Nakada of the Japanese consulate-general was most

helpful.

In Nanking, Messrs. Wên Chung-yao, Kiang Kang-hu, Tsu Min-yi, Lin

Pai-shêng, Li Shêng-wu, Hsü Liang, George Wên, P. C. Huang, T'ang

Leang-li, K. S. James Woo and L. K. Kentwell were most hospitable. Mr.

M. Kimura, of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, was kind and courteous. I

wish to thank these gentlemen for their friendliness to an alien scholar

who had just come from the other side of the war.

In Tokyo, Messrs. Yokachiro Suma, Yoji Hirota, Kaneo Tsuchida, and Nobuo

Fujimura of the Foreign Office were hospitable and informative.

Mr. Robert Kempton, Mr. George Giffen, and Dr. Louis Wilkinson showed me

great kindness on my journey.

In the United States, I am indebted for introductions and advice to Dr.

Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador; Professor George Taylor, of the

University of Washington; and Mr. Frederick V. Field, of the American

Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

My colleagues and friends at Duke University have been very helpful.

Professors Homer Dubs and Paul H. Clyde, my colleagues in the Far

Eastern field, read the manuscript and made invaluable suggestions;

Professor Dubs' command of Chinese has saved me from many predicaments.

Professor Robert R. Wilson has been unfailing in his encouragement,

sympathetic interest, and facilitation of my plans.

The Duke University Research Council has assisted me with annual grants

for the collections of documentary materials on Chinese politics. Save

for this, I have received no financial aid or subsidy from any

institution, person, or government whatever.

Mr. J. C. Yang, Mr. and Mrs. R. E. Hosack, Mrs. Freda Townsend, and Mrs.

Margaret Linebarger have assisted me with manuscripts and proof.

I wish to thank the Director, Dr. S. Shepard Jones, and the staff of the

World Peace Foundation for their patience, and helpfulness during the

preparation of this work for the press. Miss Marie J. Carroll has been

especially helpful.

All opinions and statements herein expressed are my own, unless clearly

indicated as quotation. These acknowledgments are a record of thanks. I

assume sole and complete responsibility for the contents of this book.

P. M. A. L.

_Durham, North Carolina

March 31, 1941_

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

[Illustration: Logo]

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GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, _President_

FRANK AYDELOTTE

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LEONARD W. CRONKHITE

STEPHEN DUGGAN

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CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

BRUCE C. HOPPER

MANLEY O. HUDSON

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CHARLES SEYMOUR

JOHN H. WILLIAMS

HENRY M. WRISTON

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The World Peace Foundation is a non-profit organization which was

founded in 1910 by Edwin Ginn, the educational publisher, for the

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CONTENTS

_Frontispiece_--Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek

PAGE

INTRODUCTION 1

The Chinese Political Inheritance: Some Continuing Aspects 1

China at the Outbreak of War 6

The Beginning of Active Hostilities 11

The Hankow Period 15

The Chungking Period 19

I. THE CONSTITUTION 21

The _Yüeh-fa_ of 1931 22

The Draft Permanent or Double Five Constitution 25

The Issue of Constitutional Change 31

II. THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 41

The Five-Power Constitution 42

The Supreme National Defense Council 46

The President of the National Government 52

The Council of State 53

The Executive _Yüan_ 56

The Military Affairs Commission 60

The Judicial, Legislative, Examination and Control _Yüan_ 65

III. CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS 69

The People's Political Council 69

The Administrative Pattern 79

The Political Ministries 81

Social and Cultural Agencies 83

The Economic Ministries 85

IV. PROVINCIAL, LOCAL, AND SPECIAL-AREA GOVERNMENT 98

Chart on Provincial and Urban Government facing 98

The Provinces 99

Local Government 103

The Communist Zone 111

Guerrilla Governments 116

V. THE KUOMINTANG 124

The Party Constitutional System 125

Party Organization 129

The Kuomintang Bid for Leadership 140

Intra-Kuomintang Politics 142

The New Life Movement and Other Affiliates 149

VI. THE COMMUNIST AND MINOR PARTIES 159

The Chinese Communists: Party and Leaders 160

Communism: Patriotism or Betrayal? 171

The National Salvation Movement 175

The Third Party 178

The Chinese National Socialist Party 179

Social Democrats and _La Jeunesse_ 181

VII. GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF THE JAPANESE AND PRO-JAPANESE 183

The Japanese Army as a Chinese Government 185

The Problem of Puppet States 188

The Provisional and Reformed Governments 192

The Reorganized National Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei 197

VIII. EXTRA-POLITICAL FORCES 211

The Foundations of Chinese Government 212

Mass Education 214

Rural Reconstruction 218

The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 223

Unorganized Pressure 234

IX. SUN YAT-SEN AND CHIANG K'AI-SHEK 239

Sun Yat-sen 240

The _San Min Chu I_ 250

Chiang K'ai-shek 254

Chinese Appraisals of Chiang 266

The Ideology of Chiang 269

CONCLUSION 273

The Chief Alternatives in China 274

The United States in Chinese Politics 277

APPENDICES

PAGE

APPENDIX I: GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 283

A. The Government Draft of the Proposed Constitution 283

B. The System of Organization of the National Congress 300

C. Act of the Legislative _Yüan_, April 31, XXVI (1937)

Governing the Election of Representatives to the

National Congress 302

D. The Program of Resistance and Reconstruction 309

E. An Outline of War-time Controlment 313

F. A Chart of the Control _Yüan_ from July 1937 to June

1940 318

G. Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various

Classifications of _Hsien_ 324

H. A Chart of Government Organization facing 330

APPENDIX II: DOCUMENTS ON PARTY POLITICS 331

A. A Chart on Kuomintang Organization facing 331

B. Constitution of the _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps, Year

XXVII (1938) 331

C. The Duties and General Activities of the _San Min Chu I_

Youth Corps (Ch'ên Ch'êng) 340

D. The _Hsiao-tsu_ (Small Group) Training Program 354

E. Party Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party 359

APPENDIX III: MATERIALS ON POLICY 371

A. Reply to Questions (Chiang K'ai-shek) 371

B. What I Mean by Action, or A Philosophy of Action (Chiang

K'ai-shek) 373

C. Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization

of the Various Classifications of _Hsien_ (Chiang

K'ai-shek) 388

Chart on _Hsien_ Classifications facing 388

D. A Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present

State of International Relations (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin) 403

E. China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation (Wang

Ch'ung-hui) 418

GLOSSARY 423

INDEX 435

INTRODUCTION

The National Government of the Republic of China, located at the

auxiliary capital of Chungking, is one of the most important governments

in contemporary world affairs. It has provided fairly effective

unification for the largest nation on earth, and has fought a great

power to a standstill.

The present work is an analysis of this government. Not a biography of

Chiang K'ai-shek, it is instead a delineation of the institutions, the

parties and movements, and the armies which today determine the Chinese

destiny. Free China, mutilated as it is, is still far more populous and

complex than the Soviet Union or Germany. Its political institutions

cannot be reduced to the terms of one man's caprice, and the personality

of Chiang--while brilliantly conspicuous--is not the entire picture of

China. Generalissimo Chiang works, perhaps because he wishes to,

certainly because he must, within the framework of a triune

organization: the National Government, the central armies and the

Kuomintang. These institutions have developed to their present efficacy

only by means of thirty years of war, preceded by almost thirty years

more of conspiracy. They have become the norm of contemporary China and,

whatever their particular future, significant determinants of China's

eventual development.

THE CHINESE POLITICAL INHERITANCE: SOME CONTINUING ASPECTS

Because of cultural and historical differences between China and the

West, the application of identical terms to both is probably either

wrong or meaningless. Nevertheless, Westerners can live in China, deal

with the Chinese, scrutinize their affairs, and transpose these to such

Western descriptions as may suit the purpose. In reading of China,

however, one should keep in mind the fact that the words are English,

freighted with special meanings, and are used not by scientific choice

but for lack of others. Part of this difference can be bridged if one

recalls the salient peculiarities of China as against the Western world.

No other society comparable in size, duration and extent has ever

existed; the Chinese Empire, from the beginning of the Ch'in (221 B.C.)

to the end of the Manchus (A.D. 1911), remains the greatest social

edifice mankind has yet brought forth. As such, its modern successor is

everywhere stamped with archaic catholic traits which are today both

obsolescent and futuristic. To these must be added the characteristics

of China as a special area--a cultural zone seeking national form;

fragmented economies working their way out of backwardness in technology

and helplessness in world economics; a people in quest of government

which will give them power without enslaving them. This modern "Chinese

Republic," a Western-form state only by diplomatic courtesy in the years

succeeding 1912, has been the widest zone of anarchy in the modern

world; the Japanese attack on its emergent institutions has helped

immeasurably to re-identify the Chinese-speaking people and the officers

who presume to govern them.

To understand Chinese government in war time, one might first check the

outstanding points of old Chinese development and their modern

derivatives.

Pre-eminently, China has been _pro forma_ Confucian ever since the tenth

century after Christ. This has meant an ordering of classes in society

based on the ideal of scholarship and public administration, rather than

on ideals of valor, piety or acquisitiveness. By setting the

requirements of the examinations, and through concealed but sharp

discouragement of heterodoxy or wilful originality, the governing

mechanism made of itself a vast machine of scholars which--because its

authority rested in tradition, in language, in social usages--was able

to ride out domestic revolution and foreign invasion, and was in a

position to ensure its own perpetuation despite political or military

interruption.

The traditions of scholastic bureaucracy working in a pluralistic

society have left the Chinese people largely independent of the routine

functioning of government. The Western state becomes the articulation of

society. The government of old China was pseudomorphic as a state,

having only some of the functions of the Western state, and its

governing power was the residual capacity of an organization devoted to

the ends of ceremony, exemplarization, education and the cultivation of

personality. Administration was confined chiefly to revenue collection,

flood control and defense. In the West, the most important purposes of

society are framed in law after discussion, and are executed as policy;

in China these purposes, defined by the Confucian ideology, were known

throughout the society, with scholar-officials as their expositors.

Fulfillment was by no means a prerogative of government alone. By

contrast with the Confucian standards, the Western states, whether

democracies or not, are capricious, despotic and nonmoral; by Western

standards, Chinese society was unresponsive, sanctimonious and

amorphous.

This political excellence and stability was accompanied by economic

phenomena which are, by modern standards, less desirable. Overcrowding

and a slow rate of progress have been fairly constant features of

Chinese society since the Han. Owen Lattimore has recently appraised the

economics behind the dynastic cycle in China.[1] Each community in old

China was cell-like, largely autonomous and autarkic. Hence, the

increase of wealth was sought within the cell, and not within a larger

framework of economic advance--such as commerce or invention would

provide--and the economically predominant class (the landowners)

possessed a vested interest in overpopulation (which cheapened

agricultural labor and maintained a high, even urgent, demand for food

products). Equilibrium was reached, and a cycle of diminishing returns

initiated, when population began to outrun the land's subsistence

maximum. This drop in returns, in the face of continued population rise,

led to peasant rebellion, distributism and a reinauguration of the same

type of state--made necessary by the monopoly of managerial expertness

(essential to water conservancy, land wealth and the familiar intensive

cultivation) in the ideographically literate class. Control of the

richest water-conservancy region meant the hegemony of China.

[Footnote 1: Lattimore, Owen, _Inner Asian Frontiers of China_, New

York, 1940, p. 45 and _passim_. The author, a noted geographer,

presents significant new analyses of the interconnections of Chinese

economics and culture.]

The impact of Western imperialism has struck China in the past century,

during the critical or revolutionary phase of this immemorial cycle.

Chinese politics took the color of a back-country struggle. The centers

of modern power were beyond Chinese administrative reach. The emergent

Chinese state, deprived of its foci of power in the metropolises, was

promised control thereof only when it had become an effective and

complete state--a condition largely unobtainable without control of

Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong.

In theory, the Chinese Republic was established January 1, 1912. In

practice, the name _Republic_ has masked a _mêlée_ of governments and

power-organizations, ranging from bandit gangs with pretentious

political color to authentic regional governments administering large

areas. This culminated in the National Government which, beginning as a

conspiracy, becoming the leading regional government, is now in the

position of _de facto_ government for virtually all Free China, the

Chinese dominions, and much of the occupied area. None of these

governments has ever held an election based on wide suffrage; none has

systematically subordinated policy to law; none has possessed a

treasury, fleet or air force worthy of a second-class power, until the

present war. Out of these unpromising materials the counter-attacking

Chinese state has arisen; only by legal formula is it the same Republic

as its predecessors; only by courtesy is this the Year XXX (1941) of the

Republic.[2]

[Footnote 2: Detailed descriptions of the political history of the

period are to be found, _inter alia_, in Holcombe, Arthur N., _The

Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge, 1930; MacNair, Harley F., _China in

Revolution_, Chicago, 1931; and, most popularly, Escarra, Jean, _China

Then and Now_, Peiping, 1940. Descriptions of the government are Wu

Chih-fang, _Chinese Government and Politics_, Shanghai, 1934; Lum

Kalfred Dip, _Chinese Government_, Shanghai, 1934; and Linebarger,

Paul M. A., _Government in Republican China_, New York and London,

1938.]

The governmental developments of the Republican era fall conveniently

into four periods: the period of establishment, 1911-1916; the period of

_tuchünism_, 1917-1926; the rule of the National Government, 1927-1936;

the period of invasion, 1937 to the present. The turning points between

these periods are, respectively, the fall of the Manchu Empire of China

(1911), the death of the dictator-President Yüan Shih-k'ai (1916), the

Great Revolution under Kuomintang-Communist leadership (culminating,

1927), and the Sian affair (December 1936) followed by full-scale

invasion (July 1937).

The present governments of China are accordingly the successors of a

wide variety of decaying imperial administration, experimental modernism

and outright confusion. Any change in China had to be made at the

expense of the _haves_--the Western powers and Japan. Japan, in seeking

the control of China, is fighting China and the Western powers; China,

in fighting back, must fight Japan, and behind Japan the whole structure

of imperialism. Most Chinese have abandoned hope of surviving as a

people without eventually triumphing as a state. In the past, they

absorbed conquerors whose bases were transferred to China; today, they

cannot accommodate invaders who come as transients from an overseas

base. The Chinese war of resistance is a revolution. It is a

continuation of the Nationalist revolution, begun against the Manchus,

continued against the imperialist powers, and now directed against the

Japanese and their Chinese associates. At the same time, this revolution

struggles to incorporate in its dynamics the drive of an endemic peasant

rebellion, Communist in its extreme phase. Nationalist in supreme

emphasis, the revolution finds its highest expression in the

articulation of an effective state--something not known in China for

twenty-two centuries.

CHINA AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Sun Yat-sen's legacy of doctrine included a program of revolution by

three stages:

(1) the military conquest of power by the Kuomintang;

(2) the tutelary dictatorship of the Kuomintang while democracy was

being instilled and adopted from the bottom up; and

(3) constitutionalism, requiring abdication of the Kuomintang in favor

of a popularly elected government.[3]

[Footnote 3: This is given in the _Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ (Outline of

National Reconstruction), of April 12, XIII (1924), particularly

points 3, 5, 6, 7, and 23. Translations are to be found in Hsü,

Leonard Shihlien, _Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals_, Los

Angeles, 1933, and Wu Chih-fang, work cited, p. 430 _ff._]

Upon coming to power in Nanking, the National Government had begun

promising a short period of tutelage and had made various gestures in

favor of experimental popular government. A Provisional Constitution was

adopted by a _Kuo-min Hui-i_ (commonly termed, National People's

Convention) in 1931, operating under complete government supervision; a

transition instrument, self-acknowledged as such, it anticipated a

Permanent Constitution upon the accomplishment of constitutional

government in a majority of provinces (Articles 86, 87).[4] Although the

Kuomintang has ruled parts of China for more than fifteen years, and is

by profession the party of democracy, it has not yet relinquished power.

The period of tutelage is still legally in force.

[Footnote 4: For the text of this constitution, see Wu Chih-fang,

cited, p. 430 _ff._]

In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war, this monopoly of

governmental power by the Kuomintang was not only an important political

irritant but also an obstacle to effective Chinese unity. Discontent was

aggravated by inelasticity of the Party. Overweighted with petty

bureaucracy, it offered too few up-channel opportunities for potential

leaders. Since Nationalists were the Ins, Kuomintang membership carried

privileges rather than obligations. Many distinguished and active

citizens either refused to join, or let their purely nominal membership

ride along. The Party was saved from complete decline because it

included most of the government personnel, and new recruits to

government service gave it some freshness, vigor and inward criticism.

The leading difficulty of both state-building and democratization had

been overcome by the creation of a government which was well-designed,

functioning _de facto_ and able to meet most of the specialized problems

of modern administration. The regime was far from being a crude

hierarchy of soldiers and taxgatherers, but had accrued about its

policy-making core the essential staff and line services of modern rule.

Inadequacies lay not in absolute lack of species of personnel or

structure, but in the relative weakness of many key functions. During

the third decade of the Republic the then Nanking Government, under

Chiang's leadership, gave China its first modern national government.

Despite this beginning, which--without the invasion--stood a very good

chance of evolving into a paternalistic oligarchy in democratic form,

such as Brazil, there were enormous difficulties still facing genuine

China-wide government. First among these difficulties was the question

of regional autonomy--lingering vestiges of _tuchünism_, reinforced by a

vigorous provincialism. Whole regions of China were under the merely

nominal control of the National Government.

The second difficulty was that of personal politics. Modern China has

had ample politics of principle. It is a rare ideological cult, of any

kind, anywhere, which does not have its Chinese affiliates. No other

nation has known such a wide choice of doctrines, each represented by

armed forces and by definite political leadership. At the same time,

this ideological struggle was and is paralleled by the politics of

individuals and cliques. This made the National Government function as

an oligarchy based on three patterns of control:

(1) ideological eminence, orthodoxy, appeal and timeliness;

(2) military or economic control of power in the form of soldiers or

cash, the two being for the most part interchangeable; and

(3) governmental incumbency.

A man like Hu Han-min could owe his importance almost altogether to his

past associations with the Party and with Dr. Sun, to his authority as

an exponent of the _San Min Chu I_, and to his appeal to the sense of

prestige, dignity and stability on the part of other people who did not

possess such power, which was exercised in the name of the Kuomintang

and its ideology. T. V. Soong, in money matters, or Chang Hsüeh-liang,

in military matters, were important because they had under their

immediate influence so much cash or so many troops, the availability and

mobility of which from day to day determined their actual share of

power. Lastly, these same men possessed political authority by narrowly

lawful means, i.e., by the governmental offices which they held.

Thirdly, the government was deeply out of harmony with an overwhelming

majority of college students, much of the professional and intellectual

classes, and a broad section of the articulate farmer and labor groups.

In the pre-war years of strain, unofficial persons could follow world

fashions in ideas associated with Leftism. Although the full Western

pattern of Right, Center, and Left was not imposed upon Chinese

politics, many of the most active publicists wrote in these terms. There

was, accordingly, a traditional China and a Leftist China; the latter

faithfully imported European concepts and did much to change the

language of Chinese political struggle. The government--itself Left from

the point of view of the pre-existent order, yet committed to modes of

thought and policy formally little more radical than the American New

Deal--was constantly recalled to the most cold-blooded of

_realpolitische_ considerations.

Fourthly, the student movement--in some phases a part of the general

Leftist drive--proved a constant source of difficulty and trouble.

Chinese students (both collegiate and secondary) are self-conscious,

frequently arrogant inheritors of the Chinese tradition of rule by

_literati_. Their influence over the masses is impressive; their

patriotism, however unreflective, is ardent; and their interest in

international affairs is violent.[5]

[Footnote 5: In particular, see Freyn, Hubert, _Prelude to War: The

Chinese Student Rebellion of 1935-1936_, Shanghai, 1939. Reference to

contemporary Left-liberal and Left publications in Europe and America

will disclose numerous sympathetic eyewitness accounts of the troubles

and the fortitude of the students. Some of these accounts now possess

a wry, inadvertent humor in their characterization of Chiang as a

willing accomplice of Japan.]

Fifthly, Chinese society, accustomed to acting independently of

government, urged varied foreign policies and sought wars. Almost every

kind of organization, from archaic guilds and secret societies to

business groups, sought to wage its own attack on Japan. Uncanalized,

counter-attacked, dammed up, these efforts might have undone the

government. Toward the end, the government raced frenziedly with time,

losing power through unpopularity, and increasing power through

rearmament and technical preparation. The vigorous extra-governmental

pressure of a populace accustomed to spontaneous mass action is a factor

which qualifies and will probably continue to qualify Chinese foreign

policy. It is often left out of account in Western comment on China.

Sixthly, in the winter and spring of 1936-37, the National Government

was under pressure from its own subjects to begin the negotiation of

national unity, starting with a Communist armistice and continuing with

the incorporation of as many regions as possible into the sphere of the

government; but despite such increasing pressure, the government took no

effective step in this direction until after the kidnapping of Chiang at

Sian.[6] As a result of this melodramatic affair, however, the National

Government revised policies which had become traditions ten years old

and agreed to an armistice with the Communists. The Kuomintang--bearing

full responsibility for an actual emergent state--found intra-Chinese

diplomacy as perplexing as foreign.

[Footnote 6: For the Generalissimo's own diary of the kidnapping,

together with a narrative by his wife, see Chiang, Mme. Mayling Soong,

_Sian: A Coup d'Etat_, bound with Chiang K'ai-shek, _A Fortnight in

Sian: Extracts from a Diary_, Shanghai, 1938. The Chinese edition of

this appeared as Chiang Wei-yüan-chang [Chairman Chiang], _Hsi-an Pan

Yüeh-chi_ [A Fortnight's Diary from Sian], Shanghai, XXVI (1937). A

first-hand Western account is Bertram, James M., _First Act in China_,

New York, 1938. Edgar Snow, in _Red Star over China_, New York, 1938,

p. 395 _ff._, gives an account sympathetic to the Left; Harold Isaacs,

in _The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution_, London, 1938, p. 445

_ff._, presents a penetrating Trotskyist critique. An excellent

factual summary of this crucial year, written by a well-known writer

who visited the scene at first hand, is to be found in Bisson, T. A.,

_Japan in China_, New York, 1938.]

Thus, at the outbreak of war, the National Government had reached a

higher level of actual political and administrative power than its

predecessors, but was faced with grave problems. In any other country

the government would presumably have been on the verge of ruin.

Controlling only major sections of its internationally recognized

territory; faced by autonomous provinces, half-legal military satrapies

and outright warlord despotism, all backed by vehement provincialism,

great distances, linguistic difficulties and mutual geographical

isolation; unpopular with its own student, intellectual and professional

elites; ridden by personal politics; just emerging from a ten years'

civil war--with these handicaps, a second-rate power undertook to

challenge the greatest power of Asia to an irreversibly fateful war. The

Chinese went further: they sought in the war not only victory, but

unity, democracy and prosperity as well! This background of purpose

makes China's internal politics richly meaningful in relation to the

world scene.

THE BEGINNING OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES

After nearly six years of military and political conflict, a full

quasi-war[7] broke out with the episode at Loukouchiao on the night of

July 7-8, 1937. It was the evident intention of the Japanese to end an

unsatisfactory state of affairs (i.e., Chinese control) in that area

once and for all, although they were perfectly willing to express

temporary amity and _ad interim_ non-aggression toward what was left of

China. The National Government, after a few days of uncertainty, began

real preparations for war. Since the government's appeasement policy had

accustomed many to think of resistance in terms of the Left, there was

an enormous inflation of Leftist sentiment, not deflated for about

eighteen months.

[Footnote 7: "War" used to mean the reciprocal application of violence

by public, armed bodies; private and informal homicide was termed

"murder" or was otherwise clearly designated. Today these distinctions

are less clear. The author must enter a _caveat lector_: no term is

employed in other than a general (i.e., literary) meaning, except upon

special notice. The Sino-Japanese hostilities differ greatly from war

in several interesting but technical respects; they are a very special

Japanese invention. Yet it would be cumbersome to refer to Chinese

changes in Conflict-time, or to speak meticulously of armies engaged

in an Incident.]

While new mass organizations were formed, the Chinese military command

framed a plan for a three-stage war:

(1) a period of resistance by heavy regular forces fighting

positionally;

(2) a period of stalemate wherein enemy forces, immobilized by opposing

regular armies, found lines of communication, supplies and business

harassed by guerrillas and saboteurs;

(3) a period of counter-attack in which the Chinese, having prepared

themselves technologically during the stalemate and having weakened the

enemy by a test of endurance, should drive the Japanese back into the

sea.

The strategy of this type of war was based upon the plan of retreating

in space in order to advance in time--that is, to yield area slowly and

purposefully, without too great cost to oneself, in order to outlast the

enemy and reach victory. In thus purchasing time by the mile, the

Chinese could not afford to yield intact cities, factories,

communications, mines, docks, warehouses and the other goods of

business; such cessions would only profit Japan: hence _the scorched

earth_ policy. The strategy was obviously suited to a country rich in

territory and population, but poor in _matériel_. It not only made both

regulars and guerrillas effective against Japan but made each truly

reliant upon the other. Without the Nationalist regular armies, who in

attempting to suppress the Communists had done almost everything which

the Japanese now had to do--guarding railroads, pacifying disaffected

and hostile rural areas, promoting industries and watching

agitation--the Japanese forces might disperse enough to enable Japan to

patrol and pacify enough of China to pay for the occupation. Chiang had

to hold the Japanese together, immobilize large bodies of their troops,

keep their war expenses up, and wait for the time to counter-attack.

Meanwhile the guerrillas, together with the Communist veterans, were to

prevent the Japanese from settling down, to worry them with agitation,

to sabotage their economic efforts and to wear them out for Chiang's

_révanche_.

One of the first governmental changes in wartime was the re-institution

of an effective propaganda service under the Political Department of the

Military Affairs Commission. In this Department, many of China's most

active controversialists, censored or exiled for years, found officially

sanctioned scope for their energies. Formal unity came slowly. Although

Shanghai was attacked on August 13, 1937, it was not until September 10

following that a fairly definitive arrangement was reached in regard to

the Communist-occupied zone in the Northwest.

The settlement transformed a pre-existing armistice into an

intranational alliance; technically it amounted to submission by the

Communists and their incorporation into the national government and

armies. The area of the Chinese Soviet Republic assumed the name Special

Regional Government of the Chinese Republic (_Chunghua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü

Chêng-fu_), which it had been using informally for months; the Chinese

Red Army became the Eighth Route Army (_Pa-lu-chün_); and the Chinese

Communist Party accepted the _San Min Chu I_ as the constitutional state

ideology of China, abandoning immediate measures of class war and

expropriation. The settlement was in the form of a Communist reply to

Kuomintang terms offered in February 1937 and the reply of the

Generalissimo as Chief of the Kuomintang to the Communist

declaration.[8]

[Footnote 8: See Council of International Affairs, _The Chinese Year

Book, 1938-39_ [Hong Kong], 1939; article by Chu Chia-hua,

"Consolidation of Democracy in China," Chapter IV; "Reconciliation

with the Communists," p. 339-40. This Council is an informal and

extra-legal offshoot of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

accordingly the annual, rich in official materials, provides

insufficient data on Communist, guerrilla, and unofficial activities.

See also, Epstein, I., _The People's War_ [Shanghai], 1939, p. 88

_ff._, for an excellent, clear account of this period.]

For the first few months the war kept its quasi-European pattern. The

greater part of the fighting was done in the Shanghai area, while

Japanese forces proceeded down from North China. The Japanese still had

some expectation of localizing the North China and the Shanghai

conflicts. At most, they expected the war to be a short one, not

extending beyond the capture of Nanking. Occupation of the capital was

counted on for the ruin of the central government, the end of Chiang and

the reversion of China to a condition of malleable anarchy.

December 1937 was the blackest month of the war for the Chinese. The

Japanese advanced toward Nanking, with Chinese resistance crumbling;

part of the armies withdrew in good order, but on occasion there were

hopeless, panicky routs. To this month the Japanese looked for victory,

and were so confident that they formed the pro-Japanese Provisional

Government of the Republic of China, in Peking on December 11.[9] Four

days later the Japanese forces entered Nanking, and the ensuing

fortnight set the record for atrocity in the modern world. The Japanese

forces were preoccupied with their own disorder. The National

Government escaped up-river to Hankow, where it promptly began to

function under the three-headquarters plan: some offices at Hankow, some

at Changsha and some at Chungking. The presence of the foreign affairs,

propaganda, and military agencies at Hankow made this the practical

capital of China, although Nanking was and is the constitutional

capital.

[Footnote 9: See below, p. 193. See also Taylor, George E., _The

Struggle for North China_, New York, 1940, in the Inquiry Series of

the Institute of Pacific Relations.]

THE HANKOW PERIOD

The greatest part of the year XXVII (1938) was spent in continuation of

slow retreat and heavy frontal resistance. Until October communications

with the outside world were wide open through the railroad to Canton.

Heavy supplies could arrive by the shipload. Hundreds of Japanese air

attacks on the railroad disrupted schedules but never led to serious

suspension of service. Leftist influence became overwhelming in

Hankow. That city had been the capital of the ill-fated Wu-han

Kuomintang-Communist government, which fell with the secession of Chiang

to Nanking eleven years before; its connotations still lingered. Even

conservative Kuomintang leaders, who had gone to lengths of appeasement

at which Neville Chamberlain would have blanched, tried to talk like

Negrin or Alvarez del Vayo.

In January 1938, two organizations were formed which, along with the

Communist zone in the Northwest, were to be among the most active

agencies of guerrilla leadership. The first of these was the New Fourth

Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), which emerged in the area just south of the

Japanese forces at the Yangtze mouth. It was composed of peasant and

student militia, of regular army fragments, and of some Kuomintang

volunteers, under the leadership of Communist remnants which had hidden

away, banditti-fashion, when the Red Army trekked Northwest. Its

emergence was recognized by legal order of the National Military

Affairs Commission.[10] The other organization was the Provisional

Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region

(_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_),

established by a conference at Fup'ing, January 8-15, and authorized by

central government mandate. This agency also sprang from Leftist

organizations--in this case, a bold, determined, student-peasant

guerrilla army--which had first developed despite government opposition.

It was designed to provide an emergency guerrilla government for those

portions of the three provinces which were under occupation by the

Japanese. Unoccupied portions of the provinces retained their existing

administrations.

[Footnote 10: See Epstein, I., work cited, p. 235 _ff._ and _The

Chinese Year Book 1938-39_, cited, article by the late P. C. Nyi,

"Plans for Political and Economic Hegemony in China"; this includes

a full administrative description of the Border Region, p. 254 _ff._

The North China zone is arbitrarily translated "Border Region," to

distinguish it from the quondam Chinese Soviet Republic in the

Northwest, translated as "Frontier Area."]

In the next month, February 1938, there was established an agency of

supreme importance, the Supreme National Defense Council.[11] This

replaced the Central Political Council,[12] which had exercised routine

functions of the Party's sovereign control over the government; like its

predecessor, the Supreme National Defense Council tended to act as the

supreme governmental organ, although it was technically a Party organ.

The Council provided and provides a unified civilian-military control

for the duration of the war; but the Kuomintang shares its power with

other groups only in the consultative organs of state, not in the

executive.

[Footnote 11: See below, p. 46.]

[Footnote 12: See chart on p. 47. Descriptions of the pre-war Central

Political Council are to be found in the texts cited on p. 5, n. 2,

and in the first two issues of _The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36_ and

_1936-37_, Shanghai, _passim_.]

March 1938 followed with another political step forward--the Emergency

Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress. The Party Congress had the

functions of a special constituent assembly in part, and in part those

of a restricted parliament; in this session two further actions were

taken. The first was the adoption of the momentous Program of National

Resistance and Reconstruction (_K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling_),[13]

which provides a plan for the war and commits the Kuomintang and the

National Government to a policy of victory, of industrialization, and of

economic reform as a means to war.

[Footnote 13: See Appendix, p. 309.]

The second step taken by this important Congress was the provision for a

People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_, also translatable

as People's Advisory Political Council). This was the first breach in

the Kuomintang monopoly of government since the establishment of the

Party dictatorship.[14] The government, through the constitutional

fiction of appointing members as representative individuals, provided a

rough, approximate, but fair representation of the active political

forces in China.

[Footnote 14: See below, p. 69. This is to be distinguished from the

various constitutional conventions, the proposed national congress

(_kuo-min ta-hui_) which exists only in contemplation of the

constitutional drafters, and the Kuomintang Party Congress.]

While the Emergency Session of the Party Congress took these steps for

further national defense, the Japanese were collecting a coterie of

ex-politicians, friends of Japan, and old men to serve as the Reformed

Government of the Republic of China at Nanking. They disregarded the

anomaly of having two "Chinese" national governments--the Provisional

Government in Peiping being undisturbed by these measures--and continued

to seek the division of China, even on the level of the pro-Japanese

States. The Reformed Government was established on March 27, 1938.

The autumn of 1938 brought another phase of discouragement. Relying on

the prestige of British power and the nearness of Hong Kong, the

Chinese were not watchful in the Canton area. The Japanese landed almost

unopposed. Chinese negligence, corruption, and a little treachery worked

in their favor. The landing forces performed almost superhuman feats of

endurance in forced marches overland; on several occasions Japanese

advance troops ran so far ahead of schedule that Japanese warplanes,

thinking them disguised Chinese, strafed them![15] Canton fell without a

major battle. Hankow, the great radical capital, scene of the 1926-27

Leftist upsurge and of the anti-Fascist enthusiasm of 1938, was entered

by the Imperial Japanese army, and the entire Wu-han area was lost to

China.

[Footnote 15: An engrossing first-hand account of this is to be found

in Hino, Ashihei, _Sea and Soldiers_, Tokyo, 1940. This, with its

three companion volumes, _Mud and Soldiers_, _Flower and Soldiers_,

and _Barley and Soldiers_, Tokyo, 1939 and 1940, forms an eloquent,

humane, sensitive narrative of a young Japanese writer serving with

the Imperial forces in China. The series ranks with the great

narratives of the European war of 1914-18, and expresses the

Japanolatrist devoutness, the naïveté, and bewildering courage of much

of the Japanese infantry, but does so through the medium of a literary

craftsmanship rare in any army.]

Not only was the Hankow period ended. By breaking the last rail

connection of the Chinese government and the outside world, and by

driving the Chinese leadership into the remote interior, Japan shut off

the ready play of international influence on domestic Chinese politics.

Foreign visitors became more rare. The government, moving to the

mountain fastnesses of Szechuan, found a home on the great

Gibraltar-like promontory of Chungking city, tiered along cliffs above

the Yangtze and Kialing rivers. The last withdrawal was a final test of

strength. Hankow, six hundred miles up-river, was commercially,

architecturally, and politically a coastal city. It was still an outpost

of world imperialism and of modern technology. With the next remove the

Chinese government found itself beyond tangible Western influence; for

the first time since 1860 the capital was out of the military reach of

Western powers, and in a city which had only slight traces of Western

influence.

THE CHUNGKING PERIOD

The Chungking period began with the transfer of further government

offices to the West, to join President Lin Shên, and marks a distinct

phase in the process of government-building in China. As the Chungking

regime, the National Government took new forms of temper and character.

Government, Kuomintang, Communists--all were in the position of an

inner-Asiatic state, without convenient access to the sea, seeking to

fight an oceanic nation whose trade reached every port in the world.

Foreign imperialism could no longer be blamed for the demoralizations of

the hour; foreign aid was too tenuous and remote to qualify the inner

play of Chinese political growth. Politically, the Chinese had to stand

on their own feet.

The second phase of the war had begun. Chinese armies stood

front-to-front against the Japanese, and kept hundreds of thousands of

invading troops immobilized. The guerrillas got to work. Most of all,

the machinery of modernization began functioning; all the programs had

been completed, and the task was clear. The international developments

of the time--the first American loan, $25,000,000 in 1938; the brief

Manchoukuo-Outer Mongol war of 1939, wherein Japan and Russia fought

each other through their respective dependencies; even the outbreak of

the European war--were remote from this far inland scene. Military

events had some effect, but nothing comparable to the Japanese victories

at Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, and Hankow recurred. The Japanese invaded

Kwangsi in the fall of 1939; they left a year later, when their drive

into French Indo-China made it unnecessary to cut those colonies off

from China. In South Hunan the Japanese suffered catastrophically when

they advanced boldly and contemptuously into non-modern areas and were

encircled by the Chinese. Even the flight and treason of Wang Ch'ing-wei

at the year's end of 1938, and his open cooperation with Japan in March

1940, did not change the general picture. The emphasis was no longer on

sudden changes, on personality, on dramatic shifts of power. It was on

construction--on the development of a modern, democratic, technically

equipped Chinese state out of the vast resources of China's hinterland.

The China which was to win had to be created before it could

counter-attack.[16]

[Footnote 16: The literature of the war and of the struggles of Free

China has already reached an enormous extent. The present work makes

no attempt to present a step-by-step account of the interplay of

personal politics, the progress of the armies, or to provide a

first-hand personal account. Observers other than the author have

presented these topics exceedingly well. A few of the outstanding

works may be mentioned, however; a Shanghai press line usually

signifies that the book was reprinted there from a British or North

American edition. Epstein, I., _The People's War_, London, 1939, is a

spirited, detailed account of development down to the spring of 1939,

particularly useful for the New Fourth Army and the Border Region.

Among accounts of the war are Bertram, J. M., _Unconquered_, New York,

1939; Oliver, Frank, _Special Undeclared War_, London, 1939,

containing interesting accounts, in particular, of Japanese military

and political behavior in China. Andersson, J. G., _China Fights for

the World_ [Shanghai], 1939; Utley, Freda, _China at War_ [Shanghai],

1939, a significant personal account with special interest for the

Hankow period; Mowrer, Edgar, _Mowrer in China_, Harmondsworth

(England), 1938, published in America as _The Dragon Wakes_, New York,

1939; Booker, Edna Lee, _News Is My Job_ [Shanghai], 1940, a

reminiscent anecdotage; Lady Hosie, _Brave New China_, [Shanghai],

n.d., a far more informed work than most of the autobiographical

accounts, by the daughter and widow of two British Orientalists,

herself a distinguished literary writer on China. On the North China

situation, four popular works stand out: Snow, Edgar, _Red Star Over

China_, New York, 1938, the great "scoop" on the Communists; and three

other books based on first-hand reconnaissance: Bisson, T. A., work

cited above; Hanson, Haldore, "_Humane Endeavour_" [Shanghai], n.d.;

and Carlson, Evans Fordyce, _Twin Stars of China_, New York, 1940, the

work of the U. S. Marine Corps Observer in the guerrilla area, unique

in its value as professional military interpretation. Gunther, John,

_Inside Asia_, New York, 1939, contains much of great interest. Very

special viewpoints are represented in the account of a

National-Socialist German observer, Urach, Fürst A., _Ostasien, Kampf

um das Kommende Grossreich_, Berlin, 1940; the commentary of two

British poets, Auden, W. H., and Isherwood, Christopher, _Journey to a

War_, New York, 1939; and the reportage of a distinguished Soviet

fellow-traveller, Strong, Anna Louise, _One-Fifth of Mankind_, New

York, 1938.]

CHAPTER I

THE CONSTITUTION

The constitutional system, basic in most Western states, plays a

peculiar, subordinate role in China. Consideration of the issue of

constitutionalism high-lights the most practical aspects of the issues

of full democracy. Although the purely legal aspects of constitutional

development are still unimportant in the internal power politics of

China, further constitutional development involves a very real shift in

the domestic balance of power. The fullness of national unity, and

therefore the effectiveness of resistance against Japan, depend in part

on the successful solution or compromise of the problems of

constitutionalism.

Ever since the beginnings of political modernization in China, demands

for constitutional government have included a written constitution as an

imperative prerequisite. The formidable Empress Dowager was troubled in

her last days by the Imperial constitution, a rather unimaginative

plagiarism of the Japanese Constitution of 1889. Since the Republic

began in 1912, China has continued constitutional drafting, amendment,

replacement, and suppression; many of these constitutions have gone into

legal effect. Law being what it was, practical politics flowed on

untroubled.[1] Only with the establishment of the National Government

at Nanking did constitutional structure and actual government develop

similarities.

[Footnote 1: On the Manchu constitutional programs, see _Columbia

University Studies in Political Science_, Vol. XL, No. 1: Yen,

Hawkling L., "A Survey of Constitutional Development in China";

Vinacke, Harold Monk, _Modern Constitutional Development in China_,

Princeton, 1920; Cameron, Meribeth, _The Reform Movement in China,

1898-1912_, Stanford University, 1931; and Hsieh, Pao Chao, _The

Government of China (1644-1911)_, Baltimore, 1925. The earlier

constitutional developments under the Republic are summarized in

Escarra, Jean, _Le Droit Chinois_, Paris and Peiping, 1936, which

includes excellent bibliographies; Tsêng Yu-hao, _Modern Chinese Legal

and Political Philosophy_, Shanghai, 1934, Ch. VI, "The Law of Modern

Chinese Constitutions"; a characteristic proposal for a pre-Kuomintang

constitution is Bau, Mingchien Joshua, _Modern Democracy in China_,

Shanghai, 1927; and the works of Lum, Wu, and Linebarger, cited above.]

THE _Yüeh Fa_ OF 1931

In 1931, after three years' operation under an Organic Law, the National

Government adopted the _Yüeh Fa_ (Provisional Constitution),[2] designed

to cover the period between the first stage of the revolution, _military

conquest_, and the final one of _constitutional government_. This

intermediate period was formally labelled the stage of _political

tutelage_, although in fact the military unification of the country

continued. The Provisional Constitution, designed for five years' use,

has continued in force to the present (March 1941). It possesses the

merit of attempting to make actual practice and constitutional form

correspond. Grandiloquent, unenforceable provisions concerning elections

are omitted, and full exercise of the powers of sovereignty are frankly

entrusted to the tutelary Party, the Kuomintang. Such a constitution,

formally making the Kuomintang different from and higher than any other

party in China--and, for all that, in the world, since the Fascist,

National Socialist, and Communist parties are not formally the

constitutional superiors of their respective governments--and giving the

Party unrestricted authority, has provided China with government

realistic if not libertarian.

[Footnote 2: The text of the _Yüeh Fa_ is to be found in _The China

Year Book, 1932_, Shanghai, 1932, and in Lum, work cited, p. 161

_ff._, and Wu Chih-fang, work cited, p. 410 _ff._ The Chinese texts

of all outstanding Chinese constitutions, from the Imperial programs

down to the Double Five Draft of the _Hsien Fa_ are to be found in

Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, Shanghai, 1937, p. 699-796.]

The constitutional basis of the present Party-dictatorship in China is

well summarized by the distinguished constitutional commentator, Dr.

Wang Shih-chieh:

According to Sun Chung-shan's[3] _Chien-kuo Ta-kang_

[Outlines of National Reconstruction], China should pass

through a period of political tutelage under the Chinese

Kuomintang,[4] before the stage of constitutional government

be reached. The National Government is merely an

organization through which a true republic may be formed.

Hence, in order to demonstrate the structure of the National

Government clearly, we must first understand the meaning of

_tang chih_ [party government].

"Party government," so-called, signifies that the whole

system of government is under the control or dictatorship of

one political party only. The only difference between party

government and dictatorship is that the former is under the

dictatorship of an entire political party, while the latter

is under that of a single person. Party government is of

course different from democracy, inasmuch as with democracy,

all policies are to be decided by the entire body of

citizens, while with party government, policies are to be

decided by all the members of the particular party only. In

other words, the entire party as one man can exercise

political dictatorship, without taking into consideration

the opinions of those who are not the members of the party.

Any resolution passed by that party is considered a law not

only in fact, but sometimes even in name; moreover, the

party may cancel or change a law by a resolution passed in a

meeting.

The above-mentioned points are phenomena common to countries

under party governments.

After the Chinese Kuomintang has come into power, the system

of party government is not only a fact, but even prescribed

in laws. The _Laws Governing the System of Organization of

the National Government of the Republic of China_

promulgated for the first time on July 1, Year XIV (1925)

were originally formulated by the Political Council of the

Chinese Kuomintang. Article I in this code of laws provided:

"The National Government discharges all the political

affairs of the entire country, under the direction and

superintendency of the Chinese Kuomintang." The said code

has been constantly amended since its first promulgation,

but this article has always remained unchanged. By the

summer of Year XVII (1928), when the successful Northern

Expedition undertaken by the National Revolutionary Army

unified China under one government, the period of political

tutelage of the Chinese Kuomintang began with the

formulation and promulgation of the _Outlines of Political

Tutelage_ on October 3, Year XVII (1928). Article I of the

said "Outlines" provided: "During the period of political

tutelage of the Republic of China, the National Party

Congress of the Chinese Kuomintang will take the place of

the National Convention to lead the people and enforce all

policies." By the beginning of June, in Year XX (1931), when

the _Provisional Constitution_ for the period of political

tutelage was promulgated, the _Outlines of Political

Tutelage_ were again formed into a part of the _Provisional

Constitution_, thereby giving party government a

constitutional recognition. Besides the _Outlines of

Political Tutelage_, Article 72 ("The National Government

[Council of State] has a President and a certain number of

state councillors, appointed by the Central Executive

Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), and Article 58 ("The

Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang is

vested with the power of interpreting this Provisional

Constitution.") of the _Provisional Constitution_, and

Article 10 ("The National Government has a President,

twenty-four to thirty-six state councillors, a President and

a Vice-President of every _Yüan_, appointed by the Central

Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), and

Article 15 ("Before the promulgation of the Constitution,

the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination and

Control _Yüan_ will each be responsible to the Central

Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang.") of the

_Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National

Government_ (December 30, Year XX [1931]) now being

enforced, form the legal basis for party government.[5]

[Footnote 3: I.e., Sun Yat-sen; Chung-shan was a revolutionary alias,

which became a ceremonial posthumous name.]

[Footnote 4: The term "Chinese Kuomintang" is not a redundancy; the

original is _Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang_, "Central-Realm

Realm-people-association," and could be translated as the Chinese

Nationalist Populist Party, National Democratic Party, the Nation's

People's Party, etc. Several Japanese organizations have had

exceedingly similar names; hence the formal style for the Kuomintang

is always prefaced by _China_.]

[Footnote 5: Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, p. 649-50.]

Under Kuomintang trusteeship, demands have been heard within and without

the Party, for the promised abdication of the Party and for the

initiation of popular government. Since the Kuomintang, unlike European

one-party groups, established itself only for the formal purpose of

democratic training, and was pledged to tolerate multi-party government

as soon as possible, the continued monopoly of power was a frustration

of the Party ideology and programs. The frustration was serious;

involving much loss of popular sympathy for the government, this and

appeasement rather demoralized the Party in the years preceding the

invasion.

THE DRAFT PERMANENT OR DOUBLE FIVE CONSTITUTION

The Legislative _Yüan_ brought forth on May 5, 1936 (in Chinese

chronology, 5/5/XXV, or double-five twenty-five), the celebrated

_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_ (Draft Permanent Constitution), which was promptly

dubbed the Double Five Constitution. Ever since its first promulgation,

this document has formed the center of all Chinese constitutional

debate, and--with very minor modifications--still stands as the official

proposal for a permanent constitution, awaiting ratification by the

_Kuo-min Ta-hui_ (National [Constituent] Congress), when and if that

long-postponed body ever convenes.[6] The Draft Constitution is the

joint work of many outstanding legal scholars. A product of collective

research and study, it thereby resembles collective private

codification of municipal and international law in the West more than it

does the creation of a deliberative assembly. The celebrated Chinese

jurist, Dr. John C. H. Wu, prepared the first informal draft,[7] and the

5/5/XXV version represents the fourth draft of the Legislative _Yüan_.

The preparation of the various drafts has not, from the scholastic point

of view, been secretive or private; but broad popular participation has

neither been offered nor solicited.

[Footnote 6: The Double Five Draft Constitution is to be found in

Chinese in Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, and in English in Council of

International Affairs, _Information Bulletin_, Vol. III, No. 10 (April

11, 1937), Nanking; Hsia, C. L., "Background and Features of the Draft

Constitution of China"; in Legislative _Yüan_, "Draft of the

Constitution of the Republic of China," Nanking, 1937; in _The China

Year Book_, Shanghai, and _The Chinese Year Book_, Shanghai and Hong

Kong, _v.i._ and _v.d._ The latest version of the Draft Constitution

is reprinted below. Appendix I (A), p. 283; the latest Chinese

annotated version of this is the Legislative _Yüan_, _Chung-hua

Min-kuo Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an Shuo-ming-shu_ (An Elucidation of the Draft

Permanent Constitution of the Chinese Republic), [Chungking], XXIX

(1940).]

[Footnote 7: For a critique and appreciation of the final Draft

Constitution, see Wu, John C. H., "Notes on the Final Draft

Constitution" in _Tien Hsia Monthly_, Vol. X, No. 5 (May 1940), p.

409-26. (Dr. Wu is one of the most extraordinary personages of the

modern world; he has taken all knowledge--East Asiatic and

Western--for his province. He writes a spirited, graceful English and

is capable of discussing anything from modern politics or abstruse

points of Anglo-American law to ancient Chinese hedonism or the

philosophical implications of the _Autobiography_ of St. Thérèse of

Lisieux. Dr. Wu, in a bomb-shelter, possesses much of the moral poise

and profound personal assurance for which such Westerners as T. S.

Eliot seek in vain.) See also Hsia, C. L., "A Comparative Study of

China's Draft Constitution with That of Other Modern States," in _The

China Quarterly_, Vol. 2, 1936-7, No. 1 (Summer), p. 89-101 and Hoh

Chih-hsiang, "A History of Constitution Making in China," the same,

Vol. 1, 1935-6, No. 4 (Summer), p. 105-117.]

The Constitution consists of eight Chapters, comprising one hundred and

forty-seven articles. Chapter I defines the Chinese state as "a San Min

Chu I Republic" (_Art._ 1), declares sovereignty to be "vested in the

whole body of its citizens" (_Art._ 2), defines the territories of the

republic, specifies racial equality for the "races of the Republic of

China," designates the national flag, and declares Nanking to be the

capital. Chapter II covers, in nineteen very specific articles, the

entire field of private rights and of the civic privileges of

individuals. Most specifications carry the qualification, "in accordance

with law" or "except in accordance with law." Since law is defined

further in the Constitution as "that which has been passed by the

Legislative _Yüan_ and promulgated by the President," the qualification

impresses many persons as sinister rather than encouraging. Except for

this point, the specific constitutional guarantees exceed in number and

specificity those of almost any other modern constitution.

The _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ (either "National Congress" or "People's Congress")

is the subject of Chapter III. This body has a function unlike that of

any Western agency; the nearest equivalent is the National Assembly of

the Third French Republic. This Congress is an electoral and constituent

body with fundamental legislative powers. It is not intended to usurp

the functions of the Legislative _Yüan_ by fulfilling the role of a

United States Congress, French Deputies and Senate, or a British

Parliament. Meeting once every three years for a one-month session, it

will be manifestly unable to act as a routine Western-type legislature.

The Central Government is the topic of the fourth Chapter. The first

section of the Chapter describes the Presidency; the remaining five, the

five _Yüan_. This applies the five-fold separation of powers. Sun

Yat-sen held that a three-fold separation of powers, as known in the

West and applied to American government, was efficacious; he also

considered that the Imperial Chinese separation of powers (an implicit

one only) was also desirable. The West had executive, legislative,

judicial; old China combined these three into the governing power, and

joined thereto the examinative power and the _chien-ch'a_[8] power. (The

_chien-ch'a_ power involved the functions of the traditional Chinese

censorate; overt and active expressions are found in auditing and in the

lodgment of impeachment charges. The term is fundamentally

untranslatable, but if the tribunician connotations of _Censor_ or the

emergency meaning of _Control_ be recalled, either of these terms will

serve.) Sun Yat-sen combined the Western and the old-Chinese

separations, developing a theory of the five powers. The Draft

Constitution, like its two working predecessors, is a five-power

constitution, with five great _Yüan_ (Boards, Presidencies, or Courts),

each headed by a _Yüan-chang_ (_Yüan_ President). The fourth Chapter, by

including the President and all five _Yüan_, almost covers the full

reach of Chinese government.

[Footnote 8: For a more extended discussion of this point, see the

author's _The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the

San Min Chu I_, Baltimore, 1937, p. 218 _ff._, and also p. 96 _ff._]

This Chapter contemplates the creation of a strong President. In the

Organic Law of 1928, the five Presidents of the _Yüan_ were relatively

less strong, and the Chairman of the _Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_

(National Government Council; or, Council of State) was the key figure

in the government. Most of this time, Chiang himself was Chairman. In

the 1931 Provisional Constitution, now in force, the Chairman of the

National Government--termed President by courtesy--is an officer

comparable to the President of the Third French Republic; the President

of the Executive _Yüan_ is a more active officer: Chiang K'ai-shek is

President of the Executive _Yüan_. The new President, under the Draft

Constitution, is one of the world's most powerful officers. Holding

office for six years, eligible for re-election, commander of all armed

forces, declarer of war, negotiator of peace, treaty-maker, chief

appointing and removing officer of the state, holder of an emergency

power greater than that conveyed by Article 48 of the German Weimar

Constitution, and superior to the executive, legislative, judicial,

examinative and control branches of the government--such a President is

fully responsible to the triennial People's Congress, and to that only!

Since the proposed President may be recalled at any time by the People's

Congress, he is in that respect similar to parliamentary chiefs of

state.[9]

[Footnote 9: See Sun Fo [President of the Legislative _Yüan_, and son

of Sun Yat-sen], "The Spirit of the Draft Permanent Constitution," in

_The China Quarterly_, Vol. V, No. 3 (April 1940), Shanghai, p.

377-84.]

The President of the Executive _Yüan_, together with his subordinates,

is to be appointed and removed by the President of the Republic. The

_Yüan_ includes Cabinet Ministers--appointed to their posts from among a

special group of Executive Members of the _Yüan_, thereby providing a

simple, rational equivalent of Cabinet and Privy Council, as in Japan or

(less similarly) in Great Britain.

The Legislative _Yüan_ is an interesting semi-cameral legislative body,

which seeks to embody the better features of legislative research organs

and of representative bodies. The Judicial _Yüan_ rationalizes the

structure and administration of courts and of judicial process.

The Control [or Censor] _Yüan_ is, like the Legislative _Yüan_, a

quasi-cameral body, with indirect election of members by the People's

Congress from territorial electorates. Its functions are audit, inquiry,

and impeachment, with such ancillary powers as practice to date has

already indicated.[10]

[Footnote 10: See Appendix I (F), p. 318-24, below.]

Chapter V of the Draft Permanent Constitution deals with local

government. The institutions of provincial government are wittingly

minimized, because of recent trouble with provincial satrapies and the

dangerously centrifugal effect of provincial autonomism. In contrast to

this, government at the district (_hsien_) level is designed in strict

accordance with the realities of twenty-odd centuries' experience. It is

probable that no other constitution in the world provides for such

careful guarantee of district, county, canton, or _Kreis_ autonomy. The

old Imperial Chinese system was a loose pseudo-centralized federation of

two thousand near-autarkic and near-autonomous commonwealths; the Draft

Constitution attempts to reinstitute (at the political level) this

vigorous cooperative independence of the _hsien_. The _hsien_ meeting,

extrapolitical, unsystematic, and occasional in the past, is made the

foundation for the new legal structure. (These proposed reforms are now

being anticipated under the Provisional Constitution and current

statutory changes.[11])

[Footnote 11: See below, p. 106 _ff._, and Appendix I (G), p. 324.]

Chapter VI provides that the economic system shall rest on Sun Yat-sen's

principle of _min shêng_ (_q.v._, below). Willing to apply whatever

worked best, Sun himself had no theoretical objections to capitalism,

communism, state socialism, or any other economic doctrine. Hence,

proletarian ownership of the means of production is not guaranteed; yet

state ownership is not restricted, and is specifically required in the

case of "all public utilities and enterprises of a monopolistic nature"

(_Art._ 123). Henry George's influence on Sun is shown by mandatory

taxation of unearned increment (_Art._ 119). Room for free future

adaptation from corporative economic techniques successful in the

outside world is assured (_Art._ 125): "Labor and capital shall, in

accordance with the principles of mutual help and cooperation, develop

together productive enterprises." It is likely that any imaginable

economic system would be constitutional on this basis, provided that it

was initiated by due legal procedure and without hardships irresponsibly

imposed.

Chapter VII, on Education, opens: "The educational aim of the Republic

of China shall be to develop a national spirit, to cultivate a national

morality, to train the people for self-government and to increase their

ability to earn a livelihood, and thereby to build up a sound and

healthy body of citizens" (_Art._ 131), and continues, "Every citizen of

the Republic of China shall have an equal opportunity to receive

education" (_Art._ 132). State, secular control of educational policy is

assured. Articles 134 and 135 provide for tuition-free elementary

education for children and free elementary education for previously

non-privileged adults. (The constitutional guarantee concerning tuition

is indicative of the scholastic traditions of the Chinese, of the

modern educational revolution, and is reminiscent of _Art._ 12 of the

1931 Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic: "The Soviet Government

in China shall guarantee to all workers, peasants, and the toiling

masses the right to education. The Soviet Government will, as far as

possible, begin at once to introduce free universal education.")[12]

[Footnote 12: This constitution is available in Yakhontoff, Victor A.,

_The Chinese Soviets_, New York, 1934, p. 217-21, and in Kun, Bela

[prefator], _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, New

York, 1934, p. 17-24. The writer has been unable to secure the Chinese

text of this document.]

Chapter VIII deals with the interpretation and enforcement of the

Constitution. It was a labor of love by shrewd legal theorists, and

defines terms with great clarity. Interpretive power is vested in the

Judicial _Yüan_.

THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Nowhere in China is there outright denial of a need for constitutional

change. The need exists; the Double Five Draft is the government's

answer. Yet there are few patent demerits in the existing constitutional

system; the present political structure is more realistic, more broadly

national, more expressive of effective opinion than any other in modern

China. The question arises from commitments (dating back to the Empire)

promising to create actual constitutional government. The National

Government was established on the basis of this pledge. The democratic

ideology, whatever sects it may include, has a clean sweep of the field

of doctrine in China. No one seriously advocates monarchy, separatism,

or permanent dictatorship. The only question is: how and when?

At the close of the third session of the advisory People's Political

Council, Chiang K'ai-shek replied to demands for immediate broadening of

popular control over the government by reaffirmation of his adherence

to the democratic dogma of Sun Yat-sen, together with the following

warnings:

The democracy which _Tsung-Li_ [The Leader, i.e., Sun

Yat-sen] wished to establish was of the purest kind without

the slightest vestige of make-believe or artificiality.

Unfortunately, the Chinese people, having inherited all the

evil practices handed down throughout the numerous dynasties

of autocratic rule, were then at a low ebb both in

intelligence and in vitality. The people were used to

disorganization and selfishness....

We have to wait until our lost territories have been

recovered and domestic disorders liquidated before we can

have political tutelage and prepare ourselves for

constitutionalism....

People at that time [the inauguration of the Republic in

1912] made the mistake of neglecting the necessary

procedures and instead they rivalled each other in talking

about democracy.... As a result, democracy has remained an

ideal....

We must make it clear to our people that democracy is not a

synonym for lack of law and order, or for anarchy.

The public opinion on which democracy is based must be

sound, collective, and representative of the majority of the

people's wills. The freedom which democracy endows on people

should not conflict with public welfare, nor should it go

beyond the sphere as marked by laws of the State. With our

nation facing the worst invasion in history, we must teach

the people to respect the absolute authority of laws of the

State.[13]

[Footnote 13: China Information Committee, Chungking, _News Release_,

No. 351 (February 25, 1939), p. 2269-71.]

The clamor for a constitution continued. The difficulties of introducing

mass suffrage to Western China were apparent to everyone, but many

leaders felt that the advantages of constitutionalism would outweigh the

inescapable loss of efficiency, and would mobilize public opinion behind

the war and further democratic progress. The Generalissimo found this

view hard to reconcile with his military, direct notions of doing first

things first, as he saw them, but he yielded in the fourth session of

the People's Political Council and accepted the demand. He stated:

In China ... [democratization] is a tremendously heavy task

which cannot be completed within a few days. I think that

the Constitution and laws may as well be promulgated at an

earlier date. But, gentlemen, please do not forget the

_Tsung-li's_ painful consideration ... [of the necessity of

an intermediate stage of real democratic training].

Political tutelage does not end with the training of the

citizens by the government. It requires training of the

citizens by themselves.

Today we should understand our object: to start the building

of a constitutional government. This means laying a

permanently sound basis for the nation. We are not concerned

with the time of starting constitutional government. Whether

to start it early or later does not matter much. What we are

really concerned with is, do we have a real intention of

forming a constitutional government? If we are truly so

minded, we might as well promulgate the Constitution before

the labor of political tutelage is completed.[14]

[Footnote 14: [Chiang K'ai-shek], _Tsung-ts'ai Chien-kuo Yen-lun

Hsüan-chi_ (The Party Chief's Utterances on Reconstruction),

Chungking, 1940, p. 237-43. The Generalissimo concluded his speech

with a homiletic touch which is so characteristic that it may be

included here; it also explains his relative lack of interest in the

Constitution: "Lastly, I have another point to tell you gentlemen. I

have already repeated this, again and again, many times. Desiring to

complete our revolutionary work and national reconstruction, and to

have a constitutional government as seen in many modern states as soon

as possible, I often study the causes of the weakness and disorder

which exist in our country.... [He cites the traditional political

vigor and excellence of the centuries before the time of Christ, with

the "degeneration" and "departure from order" of the following

centuries.] The departure is not simply due to the failures in

politics and education and to the deprivation of the popular rights by

a few tyrannical kings and lords since the Ch'in and Han periods. It

is due to the fact that before the Chou, we had government by law

[_fa chih_] as a mere supplement to government by social standards

[_li chih_, also translatable as ideological control, or control

through moral indoctrination]. We had social organization as the

foundation of political organization. Everything was then

well-organized and well-trained. Everywhere, in schools, in armies, in

families, in society, order and the forms of propriety [i.e., social

standards] were regarded as most important. No citizen could evade his

duty and obligation."]

Chiang thus reconciled the beginning of constitutionalism and the

continuance of political tutelage, although implying acquiescence, not

recommendation. A theorist holding all men to be driven by "a perpetuall

and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in

Death,"[15] might consistently suppose that Chiang merely dissimulated

an inward lust for authority; more plausible is the postulation that a

man who has for years lived with and for a doctrine, giving his life and

future reputation to the fulfilment of a program, would incline to

prudence and realism in climaxing that doctrine and program. In Chiang's

case this is Sun Yat-sen's _San Min Chu I_. Chiang's reluctance to apply

democracy then and there is understandable whatever the inmost motive;

so, too, is his yielding to a widespread demand.

[Footnote 15: Thomas Hobbes, _Leviathan_, New York and London, 1934

(Everyman's Edition), p. 49.]

The convening of a special _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ as a national constituent

assembly was set for November 12, 1940; this day was chosen because it

was traditionally the seventy-fourth birthday of Sun Yat-sen.

Administrative machinery for preparation of a hall, secretariat,

publications, and other necessities was established and set in motion.

Following the severe fires of August 19-20, and the subsequent

large-scale demolition of above-ground downtown Chungking by raids,

indefinite postponement of the Congress was announced on September

25--on the grounds that military hazard prevented adequate assembly of

delegates, and no reasonably safe place for such a meeting could be

found.

Meanwhile, recent years have seen an uproar of constitutional debate.

This may be summarized briefly, with the case against the Constitution

stated first:

Constitutionalization would lead to the legalization of other parties,

instead of a mere condition of non-prosecution; this would disrupt the

orderliness required of a people at war. Why add discord in war time?

_Reply_: legitimization of other parties is not a struggle for power but

an act of union. It would widen the periphery of cooperation.[16]

[Footnote 16: The writer is indebted for much of the material in this

chapter to Dr. Djang Chu, of the New Life Movement Headquarters,

Chungking, who supplied it to him in the form of a lecture and other

memoranda. Dr. Djang is, of course, not responsible for any

reinterpretations here made.]

Sun Yat-sen required three stages of the revolution: conquest, tutelage,

constitution. China is not ready for mass suffrage. The majority of the

people are not yet literate. Public opinion is just developing. The

nation is, in fact, still in the period of military recapture of

national territories. _Reply_: Sun Yat-sen must not be interpreted

mechanically. If this is done, tutelage will never end, and Sun's

cherished democracy will remain forever in the future. Furthermore, the

guerrillas, the Border Region, and other instances have shown that the

Chinese masses can and will practice democracy right now. Again, the

issue has already been decided; the government has been committed to the

immediate inauguration of the Constitution. First it was to be 1939; the

elections were held in part, until the war finally stopped them on

August 13, 1937. It is too late to raise the issue: is China ready?

Everyone--government, Kuomintang, independent groups--has decided that

China is.

Why change constitutions? The present one is satisfactory. If a war-time

amplification of the _Yüeh Fa_ is needed, it can be found in the

_Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_.[17] If a convocation of the

talents is needed, the People's Political Council is already there. What

is the use of a constitutional change in war time? _Reply_: the

constitutionalist movement is no new development. The _Program_ was a

democratic advance. "Besides, formation of the People's Political

Council was a step toward democracy. The constitutional movement was

not forced on the government, but was an outgrowth of the war; it has

not appeared overnight, but has a clear historical background. As soon

as the Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out, it was evident that more

democratic rule was necessary. As the war became prolonged, the

preliminary steps proved inadequate. A more perfect constitution,

whereby the whole people can be mobilized, is imminent. This fact was

duly recognized by the people and is the motive power of the present

constitutional movement." (This is the comment of an independent

writer.)[18]

[Footnote 17: See Appendix I (D), p. 309.]

[Footnote 18: Liu Shih, "Chung-kuo Hsien-chêng Yün-tung-ti Chi-ko

Chieh-tuan" (Stages of the Chinese Constitutional Movement) in _Li-lun

yü Hsien-shih_ (Theory and Reality), Vol. 1, No. 3, November 15, 1939,

p. 13 _ff._]

A pointed question is raised and answered by Tso Tao-fen, one of the

Seven Gentlemen (_Ch'i Chüntzu_) who led the National Salvationists:

Some say that as a matter of fact, the people themselves do

not want a constitution. And--to put it more bluntly--that

the people do not know what a constitution is. Therefore,

the constitutional movement represents the desires of only a

minority of the people, not the majority. You have a certain

element of truth if you say that most of the people do not

know what a constitution is, but it is not true that they do

not want a constitution. In the present war period, the

burden on the people is enormous. They should not be denied

any privileges to which they are entitled. All the proposed

constitutional stipulations concerning the duties, rights,

economic status, and education of the people have an

immediate effect on and relation to the people. Why do they

not want a constitution? If you proceed to ask one of the

common people, say a peasant, and you talk with him,

professorially as though you were in a classroom, about the

constitutional movement, he may be at a loss. But if you

bother to ask him about his daily life--the work he is

doing, his hopes, his bitterness, the cruelties inflicted on

him by unscrupulous officials and landlords and gentry--and

if he enjoys the freedom of speech, he will give you a good

talk!... If you say that the people do not know what a

constitution is, you should enlighten them about the close

relationship between themselves and the constitution, not

discontinue the constitutional movement.[19]

[Footnote 19: From Tso Tao-fen, "A Few Questions Regarding the

Constitution" in Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê [The United Front Club],

_Hsien-chêng Yün-tung Lun-wên Hsüan-chi_ (A Symposium on the

Constitutional Movement), Chungking, 1940, p. 1 _ff._]

Other questions relate to specific points in the Draft Constitution. In

the opinion of some, the phrase "according to law" which follows every

guarantee of popular rights is a dangerous phrase, particularly in view

of the neat but arbitrary definition of "law" (_Art._ 139). Others,

remembering the Weimar Article 48, mistrust the emergency power of the

President. The President's sharing of the budgetary, pardoning, and war

powers with the Legislative _Yüan_ seems illogical to some critics, who

feel that these powers should be within reach of a more popular body,

not a technically legislative organ.

Further discussion deals with the competence of the _Kuo-min Ta-hui_.

Many of the critics, particularly those of the Communist and independent

Left group, believe the long-heralded epoch of democracy would open

badly if it began with mechanical ratification of a dictated

constitution. A Communist leader said, "We want a Constitution, a

democratic Constitution--a _real_ democratic Constitution!" and pointed

out that the first Congress was too large, not truly representative of

the common people, and not given enough time to work out a constitution

by its own action; its task, as he supposed the government intended,

would be to rubber-stamp the Double Five Draft. In his opinion, this

Draft had many defects--chief of which was unresponsiveness of the

central government to popular control. The proposed Congress could not

do much with a mere triennial check; the five-power system as projected

was unsatisfactory. Democratic rights were insufficiently assured. He

added that the Communist Party of China was for a democracy, but that

the Double Five Draft was not "the constitution of a democracy."[20]

[Footnote 20: Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u at the Chungking office

of the 18th [Communist] Army Corps Headquarters, on July 29, 1940, to

the author.]

Furthermore, the representativeness of the proposed

constitution-adopting _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ is called into question. The

present plan calls for 665 delegates from geographical constituencies,

380 from occupational, 155 "by special methods," 240 by government

appointment, and a large number of Kuomintang Party-officers _ex

officio_ (241 by a recent count).[21] The present administration would

obviously have a whip hand over all proceedings. The division into

groups has been criticized. A demand, for example, for 120 women members

has been made. Under the circumstances, with 1681 members already

scheduled, mere additional size could be no handicap.

[Footnote 21: _China at War_, Vol. IV, No. 5 (June 1940), p. 79 _ff._]

The question of qualifications has also been raised. About 900 of the

representatives had been elected when war broke out. These include men

who have since died, or have changed their opinions, or are reported

missing, and even a few traitors. Are all the available elected

representatives to be gathered together, years later? or is a new

election to be held? Whatever occurs, the supreme agency on

qualifications is the Election Committee for Representatives to the

People's [Constituent] Congress, attached directly to the Council of

State.

The constitutional issue in China is no simple problem of reaction

versus progressivism. The vast majority of the population is not

literate, and is unprepared to deal with a complicated machinery of

opinion and election. Wire-pulling, corruption, adherence to form

instead of deed--these are all widespread in China. Democracy abruptly

established might frustrate further improvement, since sham-democracy

would have established itself. The opponents of sudden action also

press the telling point that the common people do not know they want

immediate democracy, although believing in the term as a symbol and

approving its trial application. The Generalissimo remains clearly

mistrustful about creating new organs of opinion, or using new political

processes; he would prefer to wait until the nation is unified, better

administered, and more literate. Hence his and the Kuomintang's

insistence on indirect elections, remoteness of policy-making

authorities from the electorate, and self-sufficient government.

China did have, it is argued, an excellent democratic constitution in

1912, many more in the warlord years. All had admirable balances of

power, guarantees to the individual, libertarian and progressive

provisions. Like Chinese social legislation, they lifted China to the

level of the rest of the modern world--_de jure_, and that only! These

elevated documents remained elevated; life went on beneath them, and the

tragic gap between law and life was so enormous that no one thought of

bridging it. The nation would have been humiliated by legislation which

limited the working day to fourteen hours, prohibited the mutilation or

slavery of children, or required that torture be administered in the

presence of a physician. Hence it had eight, ten, or twelve-hour laws,

good child legislation, and absolute prohibition of torture for any

purpose; these were unenforceable.

To counsels of caution, advocates of immediately responsive institutions

reply that the Chinese common people are better democrats than their

rulers, citing concrete cases in proof. They mention the general

strikes, strong peasant cooperation, the startling phenomena of

coordinate mass action--tens and hundreds of thousands strong--in

political protest, boycotts, or civic immobility. (In past years many a

warlord has been stopped by empty streets and closed houses: no

business, no traffic, no talking, no meetings--only the silence,

and somewhere, conspicuously inconspicuous, a committee of

plenipotentiaries!) They refer to the Frontier Area, the Border Region,

the New Fourth Zone, the guerrillas, the industrial cooperatives, and

the wealth of leadership called up from the millions by the war. They

quote to the Kuomintang its own professions of democracy, and the words

of its late Leader. Told that the masses do not understand modern

administration, modern economics, modern war, and that the peasantry and

workers would proceed to arbitrary class legislation, economic

levelling, and social revolution, they reply, "What do you

want--democracy?" It is most unlikely that the Communists would sweep

the country under free elections, but they and other dissidents, as the

political Outs, would be free to criticize the incumbents in a way sure

to bring support and involve new alignments of power. Some Kuomintang

leaders wish to shut out any group with foreign connections; the Chinese

face--despite their definite movement toward constitutionalism--the

question of the limits of democratic toleration.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

By constitutional stipulation, and by dogma legally established, the

National Government of the Chinese Republic is a Kuomintang

Party-dictatorship over the Chinese nation. This rule is formally

dictatorship by a minority democracy over the absolutely governed

majority, since the Party constitution requires intra-Party democracy.

No pretense is made of further formal democracy. Actual experience of

the past ten years has shown the government to be a broad, loosely

organized oligarchy in which the Party, the Government, the Army and

regional military, and independent leaders (such as bankers, college

professors and presidents, secret society chiefs, community spokesmen)

have shared power. The center of gravity has stayed somewhere near

Chiang K'ai-shek, who as co-leader and then formal Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_,

"general ruler") of the Party and creator of the central army has

combined two of the chief sources of influence. Variety in the sources,

nature, and incidence of political power in recent Chinese affairs has,

however, not destroyed the constitutional theory: Party-dictatorship

pledged to national democracy.

The state machinery--as it has been since promulgation of the

Provisional Constitution, 1931--is among the most elaborate in the

modern world, but is nevertheless effective. One may justly regard the

present government as the most efficacious, generally powerful, and

growing Chinese government since the mid-eighteenth century. This

government is pre-eminently the creation of the Kuomintang, and of

Kuomintang leaders. A war which threatens China's national existence

accordingly threatens the leaders as government officers, as Party

members, as patriotic citizens, and as members of the Chinese race. At

the time that they fight an alien enemy, they must simultaneously

increase state power and diffuse it so that a democracy may emerge and

survive.

China's leadership is therefore posed a two-fold problem: to perpetuate

a regime, successful in one period of relative peace, through years of

invasion to a period of even deeper peace; and to permit popular access

to policy-forming agencies, allowing freer operation of pressures,

without endangering resistance and reconstruction thereby. To the

Western political scientist, it is amazing that they have carried into

the years of catastrophic war a unique, complex constitutional system,

treasuring it like an ark of the covenant. This is the five-power

system.

THE FIVE-POWER CONSTITUTION

The five-power constitution (_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_) is a legacy of Sun

Yat-sen, and is one of the cardinal dogmas of the _San Min Chu I_.

Distinctively, two new powers are added to the familiar three: namely,

the examinative and the control powers. Westerners might question the

importance of segregating the impeaching, auditing and critical powers,

unifying them into a new agency of government, along with a glorified,

independent civil service system. Yet the five-fold division is to China

a key point of governmental development.

The five-power system is based on the notions Sun Yat-sen had of

democracy. He anticipated by a generation the need of strengthening

democratic machinery to compete with Caesarian techniques. Merely to

have qualified the suffrage, or to have narrowed the limits of

popular action, would not have sufficed, for it was authentic

democracy--government both representative and popular--which he desired,

not an empty shell of nominal republicanism. In an effort to solve this

dilemma, he employed the concepts _ch'üan_ and _nêng_,[1] which may be

translated "power" and "capacity," although the rendering would

necessarily vary in accordance with the connotations to be

encompassed.[2] He felt that it was a major discovery to apply in modern

politics a distinction between the power which the people should have

over government and the capability they had of operating the machine of

state. Abandoning the state to the vagaries of public opinion, allowing

the citizens free access to the powerful, complex controls of modern

governance, or assuming that anyone and everyone had an expert's

qualifications on all political subjects--this would, in Sun Yat-sen's

opinion, wreck the government. Nevertheless, the people had to reserve a

final power over policies and personnel of government, although they are

themselves unqualified to operate the state mechanism. Hence the people

were to exercise _the four powers_ over the government: initiative,

referendum, election, and recall. Compensatingly, the government was to

possess the _five rights_ over the people, based on the new separation

of powers. To Sun, as a Chinese, the state was not the hand of the

people; it was a separate institution above other institutions,

democratic only in allowing access to itself and in justifying its

authority by the ultimate sanction of popular vote. The new government

could not be kept clean, prompt, and high-minded by the freak, casual

operation of popular censure, nor staffed by whomever a mass fancy threw

into office. It was, instead, to be a traditionally Chinese

self-perpetuating bureaucracy, differing from the past only in being

controlled and revised by popular instead of imperial will.

[Footnote 1: See Sun Yat-sen, _San Min Chu I_, Shanghai, 1927,

henceforth cited as "Price translation," p. 296 _ff._; or d'Elia,

Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, Wuchang, 1931,

p. 348 _ff._]

[Footnote 2: An attempt to correlate Sun's democratic theory with

Western concepts is made in the present author's _Political Doctrines

of Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 107-9. The notion is clearly put in

_L'Esprit des Lois_, Book 11, ch. 2.]

Accordingly, the ideal toward which the Chungking government strives may

be epitomized as _perfect bureaucracy subject to complete popular

control_. The two powers new to the West--examination and control--are

to replace public opinion at levels of obscurity, technicality, and

persistence where outside criticism could not reach; the plan of Sun

Yat-sen provides for as much use of power through voting as is found in

any Western state. This attempted solution strikes near the core

problems of any modern government, wherever it may operate and whatever

its conditions.

The five-power constitution posits a government of educated, expert men,

in which qualifying examinations will precede election for

administrative posts, and in which the examination and control _yüan_

will--professionally, officially--replace the haphazard play of

sentiment, anger, fancy, envy upon which Western peoples count to keep

their democracy healthy and intact. The United States Government is the

most complex and important institution in the United States, possessing

inquisitorial powers wider and deeper than those of any private person

or institution. Yet the Americans have no unceasing, professional,

expert investigation of their government by their government, nor does a

merit system extend to offices where it might have the drastic effect of

thwarting operation of public opinion locally or temporarily debased.

This function, specializing power to strengthen it, explains the

war-time survival of the five-power system as a fundamental theory of

state. The Chinese have suffered from weak government for decades.

Absence of dictatorship was largely owing to an inability to designate a

dictator. The five-power system was preceded by a Nationalist

government which employed the soviet form of organization--the one

instance outside the Soviet Union of such application.[3] This had been

set up for rapid, decisive action; thirteen years' preliminary

application of the five-power system has shown this to be no less swift

and effectual. Even the Communist leaders in China today are reconciled

to the retention of the five-power system, although they would certainly

like to modify its present organization.[4]

[Footnote 3: See Holcombe, Arthur N., _The Chinese Revolution_,

Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1930, passim, for the outstanding

elaboration of this curious experiment, and for a lucid delineation of

the genesis of the National Government.]

[Footnote 4: Statement to the author by Col. Ch'in Po-k'u, interview

cited, p. 38, n. 20, above.]

Reference to the general chart of government organization (see p. 330)

shows the intricate pre-democratic system of government now applied.

Consideration of the sources of policy in such a structure have,

therefore, to appraise not merely two agencies--executive and

legislative, with only a glance at the judiciary--as in America, but to

examine a whole hierarchy of Party, general governmental,

military-governmental, and autonomous policy-making agencies. Were it

not for the thousands of miles, the unrelatedness in cultures, the

complexities of language, and the inescapable awareness of race,

Americans might long since have looked to China as the decisive, fresh

political experiment of our times.

One further trait of the Chinese, which in Japan has been carried to the

point of a national mania, is the respect for the constitutional (or

Imperial) system as a symbol of purity and order. Western governments

are like machines in common use; they operate for the general

convenience and subject to the criticism of their members. Even

dictatorships try to seem practical. The Confucian traditions of

government by indoctrination, and particularly that of government

indoctrinating through conspicuous example, motivated heavy

ceremonialization of state functions. This often led a Chinese Emperor

to become more and more majestic and aloof, to strive for archetypal

perfection, until he became so much a model that he disappeared from

public sight altogether, swilling and carousing himself to death in the

gardens of the Forbidden City; his successors, if they came from the

people, would seem practical and workable for a few generations, until

they too succumbed to their own majesty. Some atrophy through majesty

occurs even in the relatively new Chinese National Government, arrested

but not eradicated by war-time vigor.

THE SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL

The highest political agency in China is the Supreme National Defense

Council (_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui_).[5] This is not a part of the

government, _de jure_, since it is the war-time replacement of the

Kuomintang Central Political Council (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih

Wei-yüan-hui_), the high Party organ charged with exercise of the

Party's sovereign powers in government. The liberalization of the

policy-framing agencies in war-time cannot be better illustrated than by

the fact that this new Supreme National Defense Council reportedly

includes non-Party members, and acts in fact as a central board or

council of government, superseding not only the Kuomintang Central

Political Council but its governmental counterpart, the Council of State

(_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_) as well. Reference to the chart below

will clarify the relationship of these agencies:

The KUOMINTANG, as a Party,

exercises sovereign powers through

[The CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL, superseded in

war-time by]

The SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL,

which transmits commands

to

The COUNCIL OF STATE, highest governmental agency,

which transforms these commands into government

orders applicable

to

NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, or LOCAL

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,

in the form of

ORDERS, ORDINANCES, and LAWS

[Footnote 5: The names of agencies and offices in the discussion of

government and Kuomintang organization are taken from K'ao-shih _Yüan_

[Examination _Yüan_], _Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao_ [Charts of

Government and Party Development and Organization], Chungking, XXIX

(1940), _passim_. This work has not yet been published, since it is a

draft printing, to be revised and re-edited before formal publication.

The author was allowed to consult a copy through the courtesy of the

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, and the kind

assistance of Mr. C. C. Chi of the Party-Ministry of Publicity. These

charts, provisional as they are, are by far the most systematic

presentation of modern Chinese government structure which the author

has ever seen. For a brief commentary on the Council, see the

one-paragraph section, _The Supreme National Defense Council_ in

Tsiang Ting-fu, "Reorganization of the National Government," _Chinese

Year Book 1938-39_, cited, p. 356. Dr. Tsiang, whose other writings on

Chinese government have been models of clarity, candor, and

concreteness, is obliged to state: "As its major functions are

involved in the prosecution of the war, military necessity compels

the writer to withhold the details of its organization and work for a

later issue."]

The power of the Kuomintang is exercised by its Chief [_Tsung-ts'ai_]

and its Central Executive Committee, Central Committee, and their

respective Standing Committees (discussed below, p. 125 _ff._).

Secretiveness in a nation's highest policy-making organ is somewhat

unusual in the modern world. In most states the invisible government of

practical acquaintance and association between leaders provides a

meeting ground, and traditions require a formal, open exercise of public

authority. As a matter of fact, a few generally accepted data concerning

the Supreme National Defense Council are readily apparent to the

observer in Chungking. In the first place, it is what its title

implies--the highest agency of political control. Its meetings are the

constant source of new policy and tangible control. Secondly, one finds

a universal belief that the Generalissimo, who attends these meetings in

the multiple capacity of Chairman of the Council, Party Chief of the

Kuomintang, President of the Executive _Yüan_, Chairman of the People's

Political Council, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces,

etc., faithfully employs Council meetings for very real debate and

discussion of government and Party policy, and for the conduct of the

war. He is not believed to take any important step arbitrarily, without

consulting the Council. (In the past, he has been known to act with

dramatic and concealed swiftness, opening his mind to no one before the

crucial consummation of his plans, but at the present time this has

apparently disappeared.[6])

[Footnote 6: For a biased but bitterly graphic portrayal of Chiang's

tiger leaps in politics, see Isaacs, Harold, work cited, _passim_. Mr.

Isaacs' portrayal of Chiang shows him as ambitious, able, and

villainous in his need for power and his hostility to the proletariat.

The Trotskyite viewpoint is a usefully different one from that

obviously adopted by the present author.]

Third, the Council, while extending beyond the men who are primarily

Party leaders and including military and political figures who

(irrespective of nominal Party membership) are independent, has

transformed the arcanum of Party power into a body more representative

of the entire nation. Fourth, significant in connection with the

Japanese charge of Chungking Bolshevization, the Communists and other

Leftists, while fairly represented in advisory and even in military

bodies, are presumed to have no representation whatever on the Supreme

National Defense Council, nor is such representation regarded as

probable in the near future. Chiang K'ai-shek has at hand a counselling

and co-governing body whose fundamental purposes are completely one with

his own.

A nice consistency would demand that the Supreme National Defense

Council (as a Party agency) should transmit its commands to the Council

of State (its government counterpart) for transformation into law. This

is actually done, whenever possible, but the frequency of crises and of

needs for immediate action have--in the period of hostilities--led to

the occasional issuance of commands direct to the Ministry or other

governmental organ concerned.[7] To the degree that the Supreme National

Defense Council does so, it becomes a directly governing authority, and

instead of perpetuating Party authority _over_ government, it is itself

government.

[Footnote 7: Statement to the author, August 1, 1940, in Chungking, by

Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary-General of the People's Political

Council and Party-Minister of Publicity.]

Since a cloud of military secrecy covers the functions of the Council,

some notion of its operation and working authority may be found by

analogy with the role of the Central Political Council, which it has

displaced. According to the leading Chinese constitutional writer on the

subject, the Central Political Council (also called [Central] Political

Committee)--for which read Supreme National Defense Council today--acted

as follows:

According to Article IV of the _Principles Governing the

Organization of the C. E. C._ [of the Kuomintang] passed ...

December 6, XXIV (1935), "the Central Executive Committee

organizes a Political Committee, composed of a Chairman, a

Vice-Chairman, and nineteen to twenty-five members,

appointed by the Central Executive Committee, from among the

members of the Central Executive Committee and the Control

Committee." ... "During a session of the Political

Committee, the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Central

Standing Committees, the President of the National

Government, the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Five

_Yüan_, and the President and Vice-President of the Military

Affairs Commission should be present, while the leading

members of the special technical committees under the

[control] Political Committee, and other higher officials of

the National Government may be notified if necessary to

attend the sessions." [The author explains that, on the

basis of actual experience, "may be notified" signifies

"shall attend if matters relevant to their functions

arise."] ...

It was originally fixed that the Political Committee should

meet once every week, but since December XXIV (1935), it

holds meetings either weekly or fortnightly. The number of

members required to constitute a forum is not fixed, and

resolutions have never been put in the form of motions

requiring formal vote. Regarding the proposition of a

motion, and the discussion of motions proposed _ex-tempore_,

the Political Committee has never fixed any rigid

regulations; moreover, even if a rule had been established

at one time, it has not been followed closely later. Before

being put to a decision, a motion is either studied and

examined beforehand, or it is not. There is no definite rule

as to whether every motion should be so studied or not, but

the Committee possesses the power to decide this point _ad

hoc_. The entire wording of a motion passed in a meeting is

rarely fully read, and is then read in the following session

as the minutes of the previous session. _Hence the Chairman

and the Secretary-General have a certain liberty in the

framing of the wording of resolutions. Judging from above

circumstances, important resolutions passed in the Political

Committee must actually represent the opinions of the

Chairman and a small number of influential members...._

[Italics added in translation.][8]

[Footnote 8: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited above, p. 658

_ff._]

Many of these features may reasonably be conjectured to have continued

in the Supreme National Defense Council, although the regular

meetings--whatever others there may be--seem to be considerably less

frequent, occurring presumably about once in five weeks.[9] In the

matter of authority, again, some continuity may be supposed between the

earlier agency and the later. Wang Shih-chieh continues:

The authority of the Political Committee (or the Political

Council) has undergone very few changes since its

establishment. To speak concisely, the Political Committee

is the highest directing organ of all governmental policies.

Putting it in more detail, we may say that this Committee

has the power to decide the basic principles of legislation,

of governmental policies and their execution, and has also

the power to appoint and dismiss governmental officials....

[A footnote adds the following detail.] According to the

outlines of organization now being enforced, there are still

five kinds of affairs that should be discussed and decided

by the Political Committee: (1) the basic principles of

legislation, (2) the general plans of executing government

policies, (3) important plans concerning military affairs,

(4) financial plans, (5) the appointment of officials of the

Especially Appointed category and of other governmental

officials, and (6) [_sic_] cases submitted for discussion by

the Central Executive Committee. The first four may be

collectively classified under the two names of execution and

legislation.[10]

[Footnote 9: For example, the date of the law given in Appendix I (G),

p. 324, below, is given as August 31, 1939, and it is stated to have

passed the Council on that date at the _14th_ Regular Session; since

the Council had been established seventeen months previously, some

notion of the frequency or length of sessions may thus be derived.]

[Footnote 10: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 662. The

author adds that though the Central Political Council possesses ample

authority to interfere in the specific work of the Judicial,

Examination, and Control _Yüan_, such authority was rarely exercised,

the Executive and Legislative _Yüan_ constituting the prime objects of

its attention.]

Only from such description by analogy may the foreigner penetrate to the

inmost source of Chinese policy. This ambiguous and all-powerful agency,

a Party organ which controls government, a committee constellated about

its charismatic Chairman, is the heir both of the Grand Council of the

Manchu Empire and of the soviets established by Nationalists during the

entente with Soviet Russia. Should the fortune of war remove the

Generalissimo from the scene, this Council would become the storm center

of power; under his guidance and leadership, this agency above all

others distinguishes China from an outright dictatorship. Chiang, unlike

many other national leaders, has consistently shrunk from the regalia of

arbitrary power. In the highest matters, and at the ultimate control,

his action is veiled in the Supreme National Defense Council. The

actual play of personalities and power is hidden from us, his

contemporaries. Only the future may discover the exact degrees and

_modus operandi_ of his authority.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The term National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu_) is employed in two

senses. In the broad sense, it refers to the entire central government

of China. In the narrow sense, it is a synonym for National Government

Committee (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_), commonly translated as

Council of State. The highest governmental officer of China is the

_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_--literally, the Chairman of the National

Government. Since this officer is the formal head of the National

Government in both senses of the term, his office may with equal

appropriateness be described as Chairmanship of the Council of State and

as Presidency of the National Government. The latter has been most

commonly accepted, although it obscured the clarity of the Chinese

governmental pattern. It is essential to note, however, that in the

National Government period there has been no _President of the Chinese

Republic_; the highest officer has been the _President of the National

Government of the Chinese Republic_, and as such the titular head of the

Chinese state for international purposes. This officer possesses

prestige rather than power, and is roughly analogous to the President of

the Third French Republic.

In his official capacity, the President acts as chairman of the meetings

of the Council of State, performs the ceremonial functions entailed by

his office, and serves as the custodian of the symbols of continuity and

legitimacy. Wang Shih-chieh writes: "... the Chairman more or less

occupies a nominal position. At most, he can give occasional advice,

only within certain limits, to the Executive or other _Yüan_, with no

power at all to decide or to reject the policies adopted by the _Yüan_.

As a matter of fact, from the end of the Year XXI (1932) down to the

present, since the man filling the office of Chairman [President] of the

National Government is very calm and law-abiding, he has never

interfered in the activities or policies of the various _Yüan_."[11]

This officer has been the veteran Kuomintang leader, Lin Shên, long a

resident of the United States, a key man in overseas affairs of the

Party, and a person of much dignity, charm, poise and prestige. With a

long beard and a humane, scholarly demeanor, President Lin has fulfilled

most admirably the requirements of his office.

[Footnote 11: The same, p. 666.]

Generalissimo Chiang regularly reports on government activities to Lin

_Chu-hsi_, addressing him attentively and respectfully. This is no

perfunctory sham, but appears to be a very real search for advice and

guidance. The two men are close associates and have been such for many

years; the Generalissimo gives every indication of regarding his

venerable colleague with affectionate esteem. During the Chungking

bombings, the President has commonly resided in a secure place outside

the city. He is not needed for the daily prosecution of the war, but

both the office and its incumbent are strongly stabilizing factors in

the National Government. (The Japanophile Wang Ch'ing-wei, establishing

his duplicate regime in Nanking, left the Presidency open for many

months, pirating Lin Shên's name. Finally Wang gave himself the title,

although he patently would have preferred Lin.)

THE COUNCIL OF STATE

The Council of State (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_, National

Government Committee) is the formal governmental core of the Chinese

Republic. Even in peacetime, however, its importance was seriously

undermined by the vigorous activity of the Central Political Council.

The members of the State Council are commonly persons who do not hold

other important office; hence the Council does not include the most

effective leaders. Although its sphere of activity is wide, its role as

ratifier of the decisions of the Supreme National Defense Council

reduces its plenary powers to a shadow. Amnesties, general appropriation

bills, appointments and removals, solemnification of legislation adopted

by the Legislative _Yüan_, and inter-_Yüan_ problems are all within the

scope of the State Council's authority, but except for the power of

organizing and supervising the central independent agencies, subordinate

only to itself, there has been little practical power for it to

exercise.[12]

[Footnote 12: The same, p. 667-68. The following materials on the

independent agencies are also adapted in general from Wang

Shih-chieh's work, although interviews, other materials, and the

practical experience of the author have been taken into account. From

1930 to 1937 the author's father, Judge Paul Linebarger, was Legal

Advisor (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Fa-lü Ku-wên_), directly subordinate to the

Council of State, and throughout this period the author served as

Private Secretary to the Legal Advisor, being authorized by the

Council of State to take charge of the American office of the Advisor

during the latter's absences from the United States.]

The independent agencies under the Council of State, together with the

latter's relation to the _Yüan_ and the Military Affairs Commission, are

best shown on the chart on p. 55.[13]

[Footnote 13: Adapted from the Examination _Yüan_, _Tang Chêng Chien

Chih T'u-piao_, cited; various issues of _The Chinese Year Book_,

Shanghai and Hong Kong; and [The China Information Committee] _An

Outline of the Organization of the Kuomintang and the Chinese

Government_, Chungking, 1940.]

Minor agencies are thus attached directly to the Council of State, which

also serves as a link and common formal superior to the five _Yüan_ and

the Military Affairs Commission. Authority of the Council is directed

primarily upon these agencies which, while minor, serve useful needs.

The Offices of Military (_Tsan-chün Ch'u_) and of Civil Affairs

(_Wên-kuan Ch'u_) are transmission and ceremonial agencies, charged with

the formal correctness of state documents and ceremonies; the military

office was originally designed to carry on more important functions,

including an independent inspectorate of troops, but now seems to be

restricted to matters of protocol. Chinese government has for centuries

operated on the basis of a two-way current of written materials:

memorials, petitions, and other communications come from the provinces

and dominions to the metropolis; orders, laws and other commands flow

outward in response.[14]

[Footnote 14: For a description of this function in the T'ang dynasty,

see des Rotours, Baron Robert, _La Traite des Examens_, Paris, 1932,

_passim_; and see Fairbank, J. K., and Têng, S. Y., "Of the Types and

Uses of Ch'ing Documents," _Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies_, Vol.

5, No. 1 (January 1940), particularly p. 5 _ff._, for the Manchu

empire.]

THE SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL

|

|

President of the National Government

THE COUNCIL OF STATE

| | |

Election Committee on } | | | { Office of the

Representation in the } | | | { Comptroller-General

People's Congress } | | | {

} | | |--{ Office of Civil Affairs

Academia Sinica } | | { (Transmission)

} | | {

Commission for the }--| | { Office of Military

Disciplinary } | { Affairs (Transmission)

Punishment of Public } |

Officials } |

} |

Planning Committee for } | { THE MILITARY AFFAIRS

the Western Capital } | { COMMISSION

|--{ The Chairman

THE PEOPLES POLITICAL | { The Military Departments

COUNCIL |

| { THE EXECUTIVE _YÜAN_

|--{ The Executive Ministries

| { ("the cabinet")

|

|--{ THE LEGISLATIVE _YÜAN_

|

|--{ THE JUDICIAL _YÜAN_

| { The court system

|

|--{ THE EXAMINATION _YÜAN_

|

|--{ THE CONTROL _YÜAN_

The other four agencies directly dependent on the Council of State are

all of important character, but likely to be impaired by a period of

crisis. The Academia Sinica (_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_) serves

scientific and educational work through its own research bureaus,

through systems of extended aid, and through a program of publications;

despite war, it has continued, making heroic efforts to preserve the

national cultural vitality and continuity. The three remaining agencies

are of less importance, although the Planning Committee for the Western

Capital (_Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui_) found its work considerably

extended when, on October 1, 1940, Chungking was formally denominated an

auxiliary capital of the Chinese Republic, and a long-standing

anomaly--that of the city's uncertain status--was removed.

The Council of State could be regarded, therefore, as a mere excrescence

upon the design of government were it not that ceremonial and formal

functions, indispensable to any government but particularly salient in

China, can be delegated to it, and the actual policy-making agencies

thereby stripped down to maximal utility and efficacy.

THE EXECUTIVE _Yüan_

The Executive _Yüan_ is the political organ which includes the

ministries, and is therefore roughly analogous to a cabinet, just as the

Council of State is in loose parallel to a Privy Council. Together with

the Supreme National Defense Council and the Military Affairs

Commission, it exercises actual control over the National Government in

war time. Its growth involves executive giantism, and atrophy for the

remaining _Yüan_. The President (_Yüan-chang_) of the Executive _Yüan_

(_Hsing-chêng Yüan_) is the highest executive officer of the government.

This post has not always been held by Chiang K'ai-shek. At various times

Wang Ch'ing-wei (now in Nanking) and H. H. K'ung (now Minister of

Finance and Vice-President [_Fu-yüan-chang_] of the _Yüan_) have held

this office.

The Executive _Yüan_ may be compared to a parliamentary cabinet in

respect to its relations to the President of the National Government,

but it possesses no authority whatever over the Supreme National Defense

Council, nor over the Kuomintang C. E. C. and the Kuomintang Congress.

It cannot ask for its own dissolution, nor demand the dissolution of the

higher policy-making agency whose will it executes.[15] It resembles a

cabinet, therefore, in its service as a consultative and unifying agency

for the entire executive, but differs in its lack of controlling

interdependence with a broad parliament. Again, the _Yüan_ is unique

among national executive agencies in the modern world with respect to

its division of the task of policy-making and policy-supervising. Most

cabinets consist of meetings of the heads of executive ministries or

departments, with the chief executive officer presiding, but have no

elaborate secretarial or administrative machinery interposed between the

cabinet and its direct subordinates (departments or ministries). The

Executive _Yüan_ is peculiar in possessing two elaborate staff agencies

which handle as much routine work as possible, act as a clearing house

for policy and general administration, and pre-digest a maximum of

problems. The outline on p. 58 illustrates the difference.

[Footnote 15: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 671.]

All matters short of the most critical moment are referred to one or the

other of the two staff organs (_Mi-shu Ch'u_ or Secretariat, under a

Secretary-General; and _Chêng-wu Ch'u_, or Office of Political

Affairs,[16] under a Director of Political Affairs), which are nominally

separate but actually almost fused, with the Director serving as a sort

of assistant Secretary-General. All official business (other than

crucial matters raised by the members of the Meeting) comes to these

agencies, where it is studied, assorted, and usually settled

provisionally, pending only formal ratification by the Meeting of the

Executive _Yüan_.

[Footnote 16: Not to be confused with the Office of Civil Affairs

(_Wên-kuan Ch'u_), adjunct to the Council of State, described above.]

THE PRESIDENT OR PREMIER

|

THE CABINET

_______________________________

| | | |

Ministry Ministry Ministry etc.

(secretarial and administrative staff

usually concentrated at this level)

THE EXECUTIVE _YÜAN_ PRESIDENT

|

THE _YÜAN_ MEETING

_______________________________________________________

| (composed of officers of ministerial rank |

| and presided over by the President) |

| |

Office of Political Affairs: Sections Secretariat: Sections

| | | | : :

| | | | : :

..|.............|............|...|..................... :

: | : | : | |________________:__________ :

: | : | : | | : |:

Ministry Ministry Ministry Ministry etc.

The Executive _Yüan_ Meeting occurs once weekly, most commonly on

Tuesday.[17] Each Meeting is presented with a formidable agenda,

prepared by the Secretary-General, and divided into three categories:

reports, matters for discussion, and appointments. The membership of the

Meeting consists of the _Yüan_ President and Vice-President, the

Ministers heading the executive Ministries, and the Chairmen of

Commissions having the rank of Ministry.[18] The work of the Meeting is

carried on in a business-like fashion. The Generalissimo, as incumbent

_Yüan_ President, takes great interest in the work of the _Yüan_, and

makes faithfulness and punctuality in attendance a matter of high

importance. Because of the Japanese air raids over the capital, the

exact place and hour of the weekly meeting are not announced, nor are

the proceedings public.

[Footnote 17: A brilliant and informative discussion of the practical

work of the Executive _Yüan_ is to be found in Tsiang Ting-fu,

"Executive _Yüan_," The Chinese Year Book 1936-37, cited, p. 241-6.]

[Footnote 18: For these Ministries and Commissions, see the following

chapter. These are not to be lumped with the Party-Ministries and

Commissions which, if anything, are even more complex in structure,

but whose titles follow the same scheme of terminology as that of the

government.]

In giving effect to the decisions reached by the _Yüan_ Meeting, the

_Yüan_ itself issues orders in its own name for matters which are of

general interest, or which cannot be handled by any single Ministry or

Commission. If the problem is within the province of a particular

agency, the _Yüan_--through its Secretariat--addresses the appropriate

form of intragovernmental communication, and the decision is then set

forth as the order or act of the agency involved. The following subjects

are within the jurisdiction of the Executive _Yüan_:

(1) laws or legal problems submitted for promulgation by the Legislative

_Yüan_;

(2) the budget, also passed _pro forma_ by the Council of State and put

into legal form by the Legislative _Yüan_;

(3) declarations of war and peace, on the motion of the Legislative

_Yüan_;

(4) appointment and discharge of the higher ranks of officials;

(5) matters which cannot be settled by a single Ministry or Commission;

(6) other matters which the _Yüan_ President sees fit to introduce for

discussion or decision.

The Executive _Yüan_ has far outstripped all other _Yüan_ in war-time

growth. Its central position, the urgency of most government business,

and the need for speed have led to this. Executive exercise of the

ordinance-making power has led to the gradual desuetude of the

Legislative _Yüan_, which has found ample work in the preparation of the

Draft Permanent Constitution and the attempt to systematize legislation

in view of rapid territorial and administrative change. The Executive

_Yüan_, by controlling personnel, usually short-circuits the functions

of the Examination and Control _Yüan_; and the Judicial _Yüan_ has never

had practical political parity. Hence, the five-power system must be

regarded as a system with strong executive, weaker legislative,

examinative, and censoral, and dependent judicial divisions. Above the

five powers, the Supreme National Defense Council exercises its august

authority; within them, the Executive stands forth; and to them, in the

course of the war, a new agency, almost comparable to a sixth _yüan_,

has sprung forth with an elaborate bureaucracy of its own: the Military

Affairs Commission.

THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION

Some sense of the perpetual urgencies underlying Chinese government in

the past decade may be obtained by consideration of the Military Affairs

Commission.[19] A similar agency was one of the political wheels on

which the Nationalist-Communist machine rolled victoriously North in the

Great Revolution of 1925-27. After the organization of a relatively

stable government at Nanking, the separate military commission was due

for absorption into the coordinate pattern of government; instead, it

has lingered under one form or another for almost twenty years, growing

great in recurrent crises, while the Ministry of War (which was to have

absorbed it) has become its adjunct. War led to sudden distension of

the Commission, and the creation of an agency comparable to a sixth

_yüan_, if not to a duplicate, shogunal government in the Japanese

sense. The Commission had its own head, its own _Pu_ (Ministries or

Departments), its own staff and field services. Duplicating the regular

government on the one side, and the party administration on the

other, it flowered into bureaucracy so lavishly that a fourth

agency--co-ordinator for the first three--began to be needed.

[Footnote 19: _Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_. _The Chinese Year Book_,

_v.d._, cited, and most of the official publicity from Chungking

translates this term as "National Military Council," which is far from

the original, literally "military-affairs-committee." "National

Military Council" is also easily confused with the Supreme National

Defense Council. Hence the present translation is employed, following

Tsang, O. B., _A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English Dictionary_,

Shanghai, 1937, and the original.]

Simplicity of government structure has not been a part of the Chinese

tradition; the quasi-state of the Empire had been as elaborate as its

more potent European counterparts; and the foliation of government at

war cannot be taken as _prima facie_ proof of inefficiency. Personnel is

provided by giving each officer two, five, even ten jobs; the work is

done--delegation and counter-delegation frequently cancel out--and the

creation of new agencies does not inescapably involve confusion.

The Military Affairs Commission consists of a Chairman--the

Generalissimo (_Tsung-ssŭ-ling_), who is Chiang K'ai-shek--and seven

to nine other members, all appointed by the Council of State upon

designation by the Supreme National Defense Council.[20] The key

officers of the armed forces are _ex officio_ members, and the

Commission is charged with the military side of the prosecution of the

war. Its power has been liberally interpreted. New agencies have been

attached to it as they arose; now it deals with social work, relief,

education, agitation, propaganda, espionage, government-sponsored

"social revolution," and many economic matters in addition to its

narrowly military affairs.

[Footnote 20: See Ho Yao-tsu, "The National Military Council," in _The

Chinese Year Book, 1938-39_, cited, p. 361-3; Carlson, Evans Fordyce,

_The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency_, New

York, 1940, p. 26 _ff._; and frequent references in _China At War_ and

the _News Release_ of the China Information Committee, both

semiofficial, particularly the issue of the latter for July 15, 1939.

A list of the highest military personnel and brief outline of the

General Staff may be found in Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, _The China

Year Book 1939_, Shanghai, n. d., p. 216-17, and p. 225.]

The work of the Commission falls into two parts. On the one hand, it is

the supreme directing agency for all the armies; on the other, the

managing agency for a variegated war effort away from the combat lines.

The Commission's work in theory covers all armies, but in practice

confines its supervisory powers to the forces in Free China and--less

clearly--to the major guerrilla units in the occupied areas.

The Commission's governmental structure coordinates military and

political functions. The Chief of the General Staff serves as assistant

to the Chairman of the Commission. The Main Office serves to smooth

interdepartmental affairs and to act as a central clearing point for

orders and other transmissions. Beneath the Commission and the main

office, there are twelve divisions with the rank of _Pu_. The Department

of Military Operations (_Chün-ling-pu_) serves as a military planning

and strategic agency. The Department of Military Training

(_Chün-hsün-pu_) supervises training facilities, military schools, and

in-service training.[21] The Directorate-General of Courts-Martial

(_Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu_) and Pensions Commission (_Fu-hsüeh

Wei-yüan-hui_) are explained by their titles; the pension program is

probably behind that of every Western power, and the personal grants

made by the Generalissimo under his own extra-governmental arrangements

are more effective than governmental pensions. The Military Advisory

Council (_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_) acts as a research and consultative

body, in no sense cameral. An Administration of Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü

T'ing_) applies some principles of the merit system. A Service

Department (_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_) is in charge of transportation,

supplies, and sanitation. The National Aviation Commission (_Hang-k'ung

Wei-yüan-hui_) has won world-wide fame for its spectacular work in

procuring a Chinese air arm, and in keeping Chinese air power alive

against tremendous odds of finance, transportation, equipment, and

personnel; Mme. Chiang's association with and interest in its success

has been of material aid. Finally, on the strictly military side, there

is the Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (_Hai-chün

Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_), formerly the Naval Ministry, controlling the

up-river remnants of the navy. The War Ministry (_Chün-chêng-pu_)

occupies an anomalous position in this scheme. Subordinate to the

Executive _Yüan_, it is also subordinate to the Commission, so that in

effect it is a Ministry twice over, and is even shown as two ministries

on occasion.[22] General Ho Ying-chin, as Minister of War, is

subordinate to the Generalissimo as _Wei-yüan-chang_ (Chairman) of the

Commission.

[Footnote 21: Descriptions of the subordinate organs of all these

agencies but the Pensions Commission and the War-Area Commission will

be found in Ho Yao-tsu, cited immediately above. The translations of

the titles here given, however, are those of the author.]

[Footnote 22: As an instance, see _Outline of the Organization of the

Kuomintang_ ..., cited above, p. 54, n.^{13}.]

The two remaining agencies of the Commission are of considerable

interest. A system of having political commissars in the army, a Soviet

device, was adopted by the Kuomintang forces when first organized under

Chiang K'ai-shek, and political training accounted for much

of that success of the Northward drive (1926-27). After the

Nationalist-Communist split, political training as such fell into

considerable disuse, and was replaced by ethical training provided by

the Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps.[23] With the renewed entente, and

war of national union for defense, a Political Department

(_Chêng-chih-pu_) was established. A graceful tribute to Communist skill

in combining war and agitation was paid when Chou En-lai, the celebrated

Red general, was designated Vice-Minister of this Department. One of the

Generalissimo's most orthodox and able subordinates was made Minister.

The Political Department extends its function in an enormous sweep

across China, and renders aid in military education within the armies,

in civilian organization, and in war propaganda. Active and omnipresent,

it is an excellent instance of functioning national unity.

[Footnote 23: This is a semi-official agency sponsored by the

Generalissimo. See below, p. 149. The new war-time change is well

illustrated by the following statement: "Special commissioners were

assigned to every group army, and political departments in the

divisions were augmented. Enough political directors were assigned to

every company of troops withdrawn from the front for reorganization,

and to Chinese forces behind the enemy lines. In addition, political

corps were formed to organize and train civilians. Because of the lack

of personnel, so far there have been no political officers in units

engaged in military operations.

"Conscious and hard-working, the political officers have done much to

remove irritations which used to occur between the commanding officers

and the political men....

"Political work in the army formerly consisted in a weekly or

fortnightly talk by the officers, whereas now well-planned lessons on

political subjects, reading classes, discussion groups, individual

conversations and twilight meetings are conducted with clockwise

regularity. Singing, theatricals, cartooning, sports, are promoted

among the soldiers so long as they do not jeopardize their discipline.

Among the civilians, the political officers have also been active. The

organization of people's service corps, self-defense units in areas

close to the war areas and money contributions to the war chest from

people in the rear are a few of their accomplishments." China

Information Committee, _News Release_, October 2, 1939.

The comment of Generalissimo Chiang in the interview on p. 371 is,

despite its laconicism, relevant to this topic. A further discussion

is available in Chên Chêng, "Three Years of Political Training Work,"

_The China Quarterly_, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1940), p. 581-5.]

The Party and Government War Area Commission (_Chan-ti Tang-chêng

Wei-yüan-hui_) is a coordinate agency for propaganda, relief, and

social, economic and military counter-attack within the war area (the

occupied zone), rather unusual in being a formal amalgamation of

Kuomintang and government administration. Through this agency most of

the guerrilla aid is extended, and the Nationalists seek to rival the

Communists and independents in the number of Japanese they can destroy,

or the amount of damage they can do. The more active branches of this

Commission are a part of the Party structure, but the dual function of

the Commission enables it to coordinate Party and Army work. The very

role of the Commission is indicative of the fact that the Kuomintang is

trying to meet rivalry by patriotic competition and not by suppression.

Its integration with the military makes it a perfect example of the

triune force which Nationalist China is bringing to bear on the

enemy--army, government, and Party all seek to reach into the occupied

zone, to articulate spontaneous mass resistance, to maintain the

authority of the central government pending the _révanche_, and to

uphold the existing political system, canalizing social change into

evolutionary rather than class-war lines.[24]

[Footnote 24: The official view of this work, silent on the

competition of the Communists and independents, is found in Li

Chai-sum, "Chinese Government Organization behind the Enemy Lines,"

last citation above, p. 595-600.]

THE JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXAMINATION AND CONTROL _Yüan_

The appearance of an actual three-power administration--army,

government, Party--has led to the sharp relative decrease in importance

of the four further _Yüan_. The Judicial _Yüan_ (_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_) was

even in peace time the least important of the five divisions of the

government, failing to display--as an American might expect--a tendency

toward effective judicial independence to counterweight the executive

and legislative. The Legislative _Yüan_ (_Li-fa Yüan_), while

exceedingly active in the years between the Mukden and Loukouchiao

incidents, has been reduced in importance by the coming of hostilities.

Its work has been confined largely to drafting the Permanent

Constitution, and continued codification of administrative

law--particularly for coordination of central government and war area

(occupied China) affairs.[25] The Examination _Yüan_ (_K'ao-shih Yüan_)

has attempted to continue in the field of civil service reform, and the

Control _Yüan_ (_Chien-ch'a Yüan_) has maintained war-time efforts.

[Footnote 25: Statement to the author by Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), President

of the Legislative _Yüan_, Chungking, July 17, 1940. A summary of the

work of the _Yüan_ will be found in various issues of _The Chinese

Year Book_; in Escarra, Jean, _Le Droit Chinois_, cited above,

containing bibliographies; and in Tyau, M. T. Z., "The Work and

Organization of the Legislative _Yüan_," _The China Quarterly_, Vol.

2, No. 1 (Christmas Number, 1936), p. 73-88.]

The Legislative _Yüan_, under the _Yüeh Fa_ of 1931, consists of a

_Yüan-chang_, a _Fu-yüan-chang_, and forty-nine to ninety-nine members

(_Li-fa Wei-yüan_), appointed by the Supreme National Defense Council

for a two-year term upon nomination by the _Yüan_ President. The term's

shortness increases the dependence of members upon the President, and

transforms the _Yüan_ to a legislative study institute. Furthermore, the

newly-developed People's Political Council has assumed the function of

representation. The President of the _Yüan_ retains sole and arbitrary

power over the agenda, the final decision, and the allocation of

personnel, although the incumbent, Dr. Sun K'ê, is one of China's

leading moderates and an exponent of constitutional process, not likely

to exercise arbitrary power.

Apart from its significant constitutional powers, which remain

unimpaired, the _Yüan_ finds much of its work performed at present

through ordinances of the Supreme National Defense Council,

administrative action of the Executive _Yüan_, or commands by the

Military Affairs Commission. The jurisdiction retained includes:

(1) general legislation;

(2) the budget;

(3) general amnesty;

(4) declaration of war (never exercised);

(5) declaration of peace;

(6) "other important matters" (which, in practice, has

referred to the more open and solemn aspects of

treaty-making, and whatever topic may be assigned the _Yüan_

by the highest Party agency).[26]

[Footnote 26: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 676

_ff._]

The Judicial _Yüan_ serves as an administrative and budgetary agency for

four agencies. The Ministry of Justice (_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu_) is,

obviously, the prosecuting agency, attached to the executive in the

United States, but made a part of the general judicial system in China.

The Administrative Court (_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_) is an agency only

potentially important; so is the Commission for the Disciplinary

Punishment of Public Officers (_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh

Wei-yüan-hui_). The _Yüan_ President is _ex officio_ chief magistrate of

the Supreme Court (_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_). Wang Shih-chieh says of this

_Yüan_:

Because of the fact that the Judicial _Yüan_ is itself not

an organ of adjudication, and since all affairs concerning

prosecution at law are handled by the Ministry of Justice,

the actual work to be performed by the Judicial _Yüan_ is

very simple and light. In addition to framing the budget for

the _Yüan_ itself and approving the general estimates of the

organs under it, the Judicial _Yüan_ has only three further

duties to perform: (1) to bring before the Legislative

_Yüan_ legislative measures connected with the Judicial

_Yüan_ and its sub-organs; (2) to petition the President of

the National Government with respect to such cases as

special pardon, commutation of sentence, and the restoration

of civil rights; and (3) to unify the interpretation of laws

and orders, and changes in judicial procedure.[27]

[Footnote 27: The same, p. 691.]

With peace, reconstruction and prosperity, the Judicial _Yüan_ might

acquire importance through its control of the administrative and

technical aspects of the court system. Meanwhile, courts are more

closely associated with their respective levels or areas of government

than with one another in a unified judicial system.

The Examination _Yüan_, with a President and Vice-President, is composed

of a central _Yüan_ office, which supervises two organs: the Ministry of

Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü Pu_), operating a selective promotion system, and

the Examinations Commission (_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_). In absolute

numbers, few examinations have been held. In practice, standard

recruitment technique continues to involve introduction, influence, or

family connections. The familiarity of such devices in China at least

gives them a high polish, and precludes utter inefficiency. Under the

circumstances, the Examination _Yüan_ finds scope for valuable, creative

work in the preparation of administrative studies and analyses of very

considerable importance.

The Control _Yüan_ is of interest to Westerners, because of the novelty

of its functions. Through the courtesy of the _Yüan_ President, a full

official memorandum on the structure and procedure was prepared,

surveying the work of the _Yüan_ during the course of the war. This is

reproduced as Appendices I (E) and I (F) below.[28] Some of the

unofficial observers, both Western and Chinese, felt that the _Yüan_

possessed further enormous possibilities of activity, and that the need

for controlment was very great indeed. In general, the _Yüan_ resembles

its legislative, judicial and examination coordinates, in that the

war-time executive growth has relegated it to a secondary position.

[Footnote 28: See p. 313 and p. 318.]

Decrease in the importance of the _yüan_ system during hostilities

cannot be taken, by a too simple cause-and-effect argument, as proof of

the unwieldy or impractical character of this five-power system.

Measured on a scale of other world governments, success is slow; but it

is enormous in contrast to other Chinese central political institutions.

At present, it is most improbable that the form of government will be

changed, save in the event of catastrophe beyond all reckoning.

CHAPTER III

CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS

The outbreak and continuance of war has left the fulcrum of power

relatively untouched. The highest organs of state are primarily in

Kuomintang hands; the Party Chief of the Kuomintang is, even at law,

governmentally more important today than in 1937; and the constitutional

monopoly of power remains under the Kuomintang. Even changes in the

highest organs--such as establishment of the Supreme National Defense

Council and the Military Affairs Commission--have left very little

impress on the sources of power. Reforms have altered only the mode of

power, not its tenure.

Modifications have, however, been introduced at the level of government

just below the apex. These are important in two remarkable ways. The

People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_) admixed an

ingredient of representation which (save for the Party) had been lacking

since the dubious, betrayed, inaugural years of the Republic.

Furthermore, sweeping administrative reorganization and reinvigoration

made possible the vitalization of the central government in the course

of the war, so that despite Japanese pressure and rising Leftist

rivalry, the National Government is, on any absolute scale, becoming

more powerful year by year.

THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL

The People's Political Council was established by order of the Emergency

Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress held in Hankow, March 1938. Its

creation was a compromise measure between the proposal for a

European-type United Front government, based on popular elections to a

National Convention, and a continuation of the Kuomintang monopoly of

government hitherto prevalent. Like many similar compromises in other

countries, the institution has proved its viable and useful character.

Without exaggeration, it may be stated to be the closest approximation

of representative government which China has ever known. Simple,

improvised, legally an instrument promising little independence or

_élan_ in its work, the Council demonstrates the effectiveness of the

Chinese when purpose accompanies design. Formally the least

representative of the Chinese constitutional parliaments, congresses, or

conventions, the Council is the first to get down to business

and--almost unexpectedly--to represent!

Membership, originally set at 150, was raised before the First Session

to 200, and again in the autumn of 1940 to 240.[1] The number, unlike

the 1681 tentatively projected for the People's Congress, is small

enough to allow genuine discussion and to avoid unwieldiness.

Attendance, considering war-time hazards, has been very good, with

between two-thirds and four-fifths of the members usually present.

[Footnote 1: China Information Committee, _News Release_, Chungking,

September 30, 1940; and the same, December 30, 1940.]

Although the Council was designed to meet quarterly by its fundamental

Statute,[2] it soon changed to semi-annual sessions and has actually met

at intervals running from six to eight months. Each session lasted for

ten days (legislative, not calendar).[3] As the Council sessions

recurred, the Council became more and more free and representative.

Despite the narrowness of its legal foundations, the Council has

provided invaluable exercise in the arts of democratic discussion.

[Footnote 2: Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," _The

Chinese Year Book 1938-39_, cited, p. 346-55; the same, _The People's

Political Council_, [Chungking], [1939?], pamphlet, reprinted from

_The China Quarterly_, Vol. 4, No. I (Winter 1938-39). Dr. Wang's

contributions, brief as they are, worthily supplement his pre-war

constitutional studies, and provide the most carefully annotated data

on the Council which the present author has found. The list of members

given in the first article, above, is one of the most interesting

documents of our time, giving, as it does, the residence, profession,

and age of each Councillor. Beside "Former Prime Minister" one finds

"Living Buddha attached to the Panchen Lama," "Reserve Member,

Executive Committee, the Third International," "Professor, National

Peking University" and "Head of the Mêng Clan, Descendants of

Mencius."]

[Footnote 3: Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, _The China Year Book, 1939_,

Shanghai, n. d., Ch. IX, "The Kuomintang and the Government," contains

a detailed summary of the first two sessions of the People's Political

Council (p. 231-7). Quigley, Harold S., "Free China," _International

Conciliation_, No. 359 (April 1940), includes a judicious appraisal of

the work and meaning of the Council in its first two and one-half

years (p. 137-8).]

As a technique of representation, the Council's recruitment system is

novel. The membership was, while the Council's total was at 200, divided

into the following four categories:

_Group A_: representatives of the Provinces and Special

Municipalities--88;

_Group B_: four representatives for or from Mongolia and two for or

from Tibet--6;

_Group C_: representatives for or from the overseas Chinese--6;

_Group D_: representatives of cultural, professional, and economic

bodies, or persons who have been active in political

leadership--100.

There were no elections. In the case of Group A candidates, nominations

were made by municipal or provincial governing bodies in joint session

with the Kuomintang Party organ of corresponding location and level.

Group B candidates were nominated by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs

Commission. Group C candidates were nominated by the Overseas Chinese

Affairs Commission in the Executive _Yüan_. Group D candidates, which

included the representatives of the Communists and independent Left,

were nominated by the Supreme National Defense Council. Two candidates

could be presented for each seat on the Council. Subject to a minor

detour or two on qualifications or for other reasons,[4] the final

selection or election was made by the Central Executive Committee of the

Kuomintang.

[Footnote 4: Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," cited,

p. 346 _ff._ The new system, inaugurated early in 1941, provided for

90 members to be directly elected by Provincial and Municipal People's

Political Councils.]

Thus, an independent or Leftist, whose life had been more or less in

danger for years, because of his hostility to the Kuomintang and its

policies, might find himself nominated for the Council by the

Kuomintang's highest government-supervising agency, and elected by the

Kuomintang's highest Party agency. Leaders of the hitherto suppressed,

still technically illegal parties and factions--which meant all save the

Kuomintang--were designated representatives through the fiction of

selection for individual merits. They might take an active share in

hammering out policy, and--on the same day--find themselves legally

debarred from overt public expression of their own party work. By this

device, the Kuomintang provided a safety-valve for opposition without

touching the apparatus of its own power.

Had the Kuomintang leaders been obtuse and made the Council something

less than a genuine sounding board for public opinion, or had they

picked unrepresentative members of the other groups, the whole

experiment would have failed. In practice, the compromise worked and

gave China a focus for the national concentration of will.

The Council did not elect its own Speaker (_I-chang_) and Deputy-Speaker

(_Fu I-chang_); these were elected for it by the Central Executive

Committee of the Kuomintang. Down to 1940, the Council elected a

Resident Committee of fifteen to twenty-five members from its own

membership; under a recent reorganization, this and the Speaker and

Vice-Speaker are to be replaced by a Presidium, to be elected by but not

necessarily from among the Council, to consist of five members and to

hold the authority of designating presiding officers. This would amount

to a further step in the independence of the Council. In both cases, the

Secretariat (_Mi-shu-ch'u_) of the Council is to be under a

Secretary-General (_Mi-shu-chang_) and Deputy Secretary-General (_Fu

Mi-shu-chang_) and to include services of correspondence, general

affairs, Council affairs, and police.[5]

[Footnote 5: _Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao_, cited, chart of the

_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_.]

With respect to competence, the Council is possessed of three powers:

(1) the right to deliberate on all important measures, whether of

domestic or foreign policy, before these are enacted into law by the

Central Government (but not, however, the right of making such law);

(2) the right to submit proposals to the government (but since the

Supreme National Defense Council is the highest government-directing

agency in China, its concurrence is patently necessary);

(3) the right to demand and hear reports from the _Yüan_ and the

Ministries, and to interpellate the officers of state.

The distinguished Chinese constitutional scholar, Wang Shih-chieh,

Secretary-General of the People's Political Council (Generalissimo

Chiang himself being the Speaker) writes of its functions:

From the foregoing description, the peculiarities of the

People's Political Council may be clearly seen. It is not an

advisory body of the Government in the ordinary conception

of the term, because the Government is bound, except in

emergency cases, to submit to it for consideration all

important measures before they are carried out. The Council

possesses not only the power to advise, but also the right

to be consulted. Nor is it a legislative organ, as all its

resolutions merely embody broad principles of legislation or

administration, i.e., lines of policy which, even after

being assented to by the Supreme National Defense Council,

will still have to go through the ordinary legislative or

ordinance-making process in order to become laws or

administrative ordinances.

As regards the representative character of the Council, it

rests not so much with the method by which the Councillors

are chosen, as with the fact that, being composed of men and

women most of whom enjoy wide popularity or respect in one

way or another, the Council can really speak for almost all

the articulate group-interests of the nation. In the less

than 30 years of China's experience in republican

government, numerous experiments had been attempted at

representative government before the convention of the

People's Political Council. Few of these were deficient in

theoretic grandiloquence, but none of them was found to be

serviceable in practical applicability.

Theoretically, the Council is not a popular assembly; but,

as I remarked elsewhere,[*] "it is open to question whether

any form of election by popular suffrage can result in so

truly representative a body." Even with reference to the

limited scope of the Council's powers, I submit that the

provision represents a progressive step in that any

alternative that is less realistic would impede rather than

facilitate the contributive work of the Council.[6]

[Footnote *: _Chinese Year Book, 1938_, Chap. 17. [Wang Shih-chieh's

note.]]

[Footnote 6: Wang Shih-chieh, _The People's Political Council_, cited,

p. 5. Obvious misprints have been corrected.]

The author adds that the resolutions have tended to be of an

extraordinarily practical character, and that bombast has remained

conspicuously absent.

The procedure of the Council has been kept very simple. A quorum

requires only a simple majority (101 members), and a simple majority of

a quorum (51) is all that is needed to pass a resolution. To ensure the

proper spacing of the calendar, all resolutions initiating new business

must come within the first four days of the ten-day session.

Introduction may not be completed by the action of a single member; a

petition of 20 members, one proposing and 19 endorsing, is necessary for

introduction. Reference may then be either to the plenary session or to

the committees. (There are five standing committees--military, foreign,

civil, financial and economic, educational and cultural affairs--which

provide further facilities through subdivision into subcommittees, or

through the addition of special committees.) Reports by the government

are introduced during the first three days of each session.[7]

[Footnote 7: The author is indebted for some of these facts to an

interview with Dr. Wang Shih-chieh in Chungking on August 1, 1940.]

Members cannot waste time over the pork-barrel, log-rolling, riders, or

minor fiscal questions. Since they all have the same constituency at

law, and that constituency--the C. E. C. of the Kuomintang--asks nothing

of them except representation of their moral constituencies--the groups

and areas from which they derive, Councillors are untroubled by

constituents or appropriations. The budget is submitted by the

government to the Council for approval, not enactment. Salaries of the

Councillors are nil. Each is given Ch. $350.00 (about U. S. $20.00) per

mouth for expenses, without regard to mileage, and even overseas Chinese

representatives receive no further emoluments. Since government

officials are excluded from membership, use of a Council seat for

purposes of preferment is precluded.

A liberalization of representation and of procedure occurred early in

1941. A new Council--involving the first turnover in membership since

1938--was elected. Educational and other unofficial representatives

obtained an additional twenty seats on the Council. The changes were

scarcely sufficient to compensate for the further postponement of the

promised Constitution, but they indicated a willingness of the

government to meet demands for democratization. Procedural changes

increased the effectiveness of individual members. A minor but

characteristic feature was the increase in number and importance of

women members.

Partisan organization in the Council, although elementary, has begun to

function. Each clique has informal caucuses; careful scrutiny discloses

the presence of whips from these caucuses on the floor. The groupings in

the Council are so fluid that they can be variously classified by

persons with different viewpoints. (Formally, of course, everyone is

either Kuomintang or non-Party, even though _The Chinese Year Book_,

under informal Chungking government sponsorship, proudly lists the high

rank of the Communist members of the Council--"Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming),

[age] 33, [province] Anhwei, [remarks] Member, Presidium, Central

Executive Committee, the Third International.")[8] The popular

classification of the Council cliques, commonly seen in the press, is

based on the Four Parties (_Ssŭ Tang_) and the Four Cliques (_Ssŭ

P'ai_). The four parties are the Kuomintang, National Socialist,

Communist, and _La Jeunesse_.[9] The Four Cliques, which according to

popular credence, formed soon after the first meetings of the Council,

are based on intellectual sympathy and the interplay of temperaments,

and not on dogma.

[Footnote 8: _1938-39_ issue, p. 351.]

[Footnote 9: Described below, p. 159 _ff._]

The most Leftist clique is believed to be the _Hua-chung P'ai_ (Central

China Clique), with the National Salvationists' Seven Gentlemen at their

core. Deeply sympathetic with the masses, and violently patriotic, this

group helped to bring about the war by opposing appeasement.

Like-thinking Council members, however affiliated, are believed to fall

under the legislative leadership of the Central China Clique. Near to

this, still far to the Left of the government, is the _Tungpei P'ai_

(Northeast Clique). The Northeastern Manchurian Chinese officers,

exiled in the Northwest, were the first bridge between the Communists

and the rest of the country. Since their native provinces and kinsfolk

have had almost ten years' Japanese domination, the Northeast group is

emphatic in demands for national unity. Communists circulate from one

group to the other, always cooperative in offering their leadership on

the basis of a United Front, which the Comintern still decrees for the

Far East after jettisoning the Popular Fronts of Europe.

The two relatively Rightist cliques are the _Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai_

(Vocational Educationists' Clique) and the _Chiao-shou P'ai_

(Professors' Clique). Composed of men still so far from attaining office

that they possess perfect freedom of criticism, they therefore stand

Left of the government in daily comment, although they may be Right of

it in theory. The former group stresses simple, direct problems: it

seeks to attack the opium problem, disease, illiteracy, and so forth,

without necessarily fighting the social revolution against the

landlords. It derives its name from two distinguished leaders of the

vocational education movement who have abstained from active political

work until finding a forum in the Council. The Professors' Clique is

reputedly led by the group of young professors who were eminent in their

fields before the outbreak of war, opposed to the government's

appeasement policy, but tactful enough not to rebel. They are considered

to stand as far Right as anyone on the Council--that is, to discuss

politics in terms of soundness of public policy, budgetary

reasonableness, immediate practicality, and other common-sense

standards, which appear conservative beside the fervid idealism of their

colleagues.

The description of the _Ssŭ P'ai_ just given is one which exists in

the popular credence. A more authoritative source placed the groups in

the Council under the following four headings:

(1) the Kuomintang and non-Party majority;

(2) the _La Jeunesse_ Party and the National Socialists;

(3) the Communists;

(4) the "Popular Front" group, including the intellectuals and the

National Salvationists.

On this basis, the Kuomintang would retain its working control of the

Council, which appears to be the case, in terms of work performed. The

unaffiliated majority, selected by their local governments and

Kuomintang offices and elected by the Kuomintang C. E. C., would in

doubtful cases be inclined to turn to Kuomintang leadership. The _La

Jeunesse_ Party, despite the fact that it is a Western-returned student

organization, is strong in Szechuan; its influence could be expected to

run with that of the National Socialists. Both parties, while minute,

are decidedly averse to Communist fellow-travelling and not at all

disposed to alter the _status quo_, except to carve modest niches for

themselves and to advance their programs in an agreeable way. The

Communists stand alone, although they offer their cooperation to the

independents.

The Popular Front group is a category widely recognized in China--the

Left Kuomintang, the discontented idealists, the irrepressible patriots,

the minor parties, the indefatigable conspirators of Chinese hopefulness

who are always on the scene. For years they have been unforgotten

witnesses to the ferocious integrity of ideals which (in individuals

scattered at random at all levels of society) call Chinese out of the

lethargy of being very practical.

The Popular Front leaders, more than any other in China, have withstood

perennial temptation for years and have kept their activities, under

whatever name undertaken, intact. They can be distinguished from other

Party leaders, both Nationalist and Communist, by the facts that they

have never set up a government, with jobs in it for themselves; have

never controlled a government, save through lacunae in power politics;

and have never preserved a government which they did control.

Warm-hearted, philanthropic, patriotic, their shrill zeal has been

audible in China for many years. Without formal organization, they have

stood behind others who sought real power, and today--between the cold,

realistic leaders of the two opposing Parties--are assembled,

ever-hopeful, and advocating a Popular Front.

The Secretary-General stated to the author that he regarded three of the

Council's contributions as of history-making importance. First, the

Council openly expressed a Chinese national unity unprecedented in

modern history. Forms apart, never before had a crisis found all Chinese

so united; the Council gave a symbol to that unity. Second, the Council

raised the probability of successful democratic processes in China.

Failures under the Peking parliaments had reduced democratic discussion

to a sham. The Council erased this discredit, making many people believe

that democracy promises a real value to the country--not merely as an

ideal, but as a practicable means of government. This contribution was

reinforced by a third: the Council actually served to make definite,

serious, concrete improvements in government and Kuomintang structure,

through criticism and through the issues aired.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PATTERN

Central policy-making is complicated by a trifurcation of organs--Party

Headquarters, Military Affairs Commission, and Executive _Yüan_. For

example, the nation's publicity and broadcasting services, as well as

direction of the official news agencies, are under the (Kuomintang)

Party-Ministry of Publicity, while the Foreign Office possesses its own

publicity organs for the international relations field, and the

Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission handles much

domestic propaganda and agitation. The strictly governmental, permanent

administrative agencies are simplified from their pre-war complexity, as

the following list will show:

EXECUTIVE _Yüan_

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of the Interior

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Economic Affairs (to be reorganized)

Ministry of Social Affairs (pending)

Ministry of Education

Ministry of Communications

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs

Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs

National Relief Commission

Ministry of War (also under the Military Affairs Commission)

Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry

(pending; status uncertain)

JUDICIAL _Yüan_

Ministry of Justice

CONTROL _Yüan_

Ministry of Audit

EXAMINATION _Yüan_

Ministry of Personnel

Examination Commission

The Ministries outside the Executive are well adapted to their

respective _Yüan_, although Americans may think the Ministry of Justice

misplaced. The Executive Ministries form the heart of the administrative

system, immediately below the cabinet (Executive _Yüan_ Meeting). The

Party scaffolding is to be torn down with constitutionalization; the

military scaffolding, with peace. The administrative organs at the

center will then bear the real burden of nourishing and protecting the

nation which now they help to create.

Despite strong Chinese imprints, the central administrative agencies are

organizationally more Westernized than the policy-making agencies. For

this reason, and because administrative emphasis is on matters economic

(outside the scope of the present work), the reader is referred to other

sources for a detailed appraisal of the work of the ministries.

Particularly fortunate is it that _China Shall Rise Again_, partly

written and partly edited by Madame Chiang K'ai-shek,[10] has been

published, including authoritative statements by the leading ministers

on the work of their respective ministries.

[Footnote 10: May-ling Soong Chiang (Madame Chiang K'ai-shek), _China

Shall Rise Again_, New York, 1941. Chinese economic developments are

the subject of careful study by the Institute of Pacific Relations,

whose _Far Eastern Survey_ follows contemporary developments closely

and whose _Inquiry Series_ offers a monumental collection of linked

works on Pacific affairs, with particular stress on the economic

background to politics. The volume in this series on Chinese political

development, by Lawrence K. Rosinger, may be expected to fill an

important gap in the literature on China today.]

The Ministries (_pu_) may be classified into three groups, according to

the major tenor of their work: political, social and cultural, and

economic. Military defense through economic development and social

reconstruction remains their common goal, however divergent the

approaches.

THE POLITICAL MINISTRIES

Senior and most famous of all Chinese ministries is that of Foreign

Affairs (_Wai-chiao Pu_). It inherits the splendid traditions of Chinese

diplomacy, dating back to the redoubtable Pan Ch'ao, who almost

single-handed conquered Central Asia in the first century A.D. by

unsleeping guile and consistent boldness. Modern Chinese diplomacy has

made the best of a hundred years of defeat, successfully exploiting the

mutual suspicions of the imperialist powers. The morale and

professional cohesion are high. Despite incessant political changes,

the foreign office and diplomatic service have preserved their

continuity from the Empire to the present. The Chungking government

probably possesses a foreign office superior to the Gaimusho of

Tokyo.[11]

[Footnote 11: For the latest description of the organization of the

_Wai-chiao Pu_, see Wang Ch'ung-hui, "China's Foreign Relations during

the Sino-Japanese Hostilities 1937-1940," Chapter XIII of Chiang,

May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, cited, p. 139-40.]

The effectiveness of Chinese international statesmanship has aroused an

almost superstitious dread among the Japanese, publicists, officials,

and others. Japan consistently complains that China is superior at

propaganda, and sees, behind the world-wide mistrust of Japan, occult

forces from the Comintern or vile Chinese guile. After they perpetrated

the Nanking horrors, insulted neutral men and women in Tientsin,

machine-gunned a British ambassador, sank an American gunboat, and

violated all available international law, the Japanese believed that

British and American lack of sympathy was mostly due to the machinations

of Chinese diplomacy. The recent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang

Ch'ung-hui, a former Judge of the Permanent Court of International

Justice (World Court), is one of the modern world's greatest legal

scholars. Eminent in political leadership ever since the first

foundation of the Republic, he has always urged moderation, legality,

and intelligence in government.

The Ministry of the Interior (_Nei-chêng Pu_) forms the apex to China's

constitutional system of provincial and local governments. In accordance

with Sun Yat-sen's teaching, the National Government has consistently

sought to reduce the importance of the provinces and to foster direct

local-central intergovernmental relationships. The importance of this

ministry is reduced somewhat by the fact that other agencies possess

their own field services, and are therefore not obliged to route policy

through it, but it remains significant because of its control and

supervision of China-wide administrative development. The National

Health Administration (_Wei-shêng Shu_), formerly separate, is now a

department of this Ministry.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL AGENCIES

The Ministry of Education (_Chiao-yü Pu_) has continued active despite

the war. The heroic marches of the Chinese universities to their new

homes in the West have become a world-famous epic. Students, faculty,

and staffs moved out of the sinister zones of enemy occupation, usually

travelling on foot, until they found new homes hundreds or even

thousands of miles from their original locations. Some colleges have

found homes in old temples or in caves where, with a minimum of

equipment and library material, they continue their work. Others, more

fortunate, have become guests of West China institutions. West China

Union University in Chengtu has four other universities on its campus,

all using the same facilities for the duration of the war. Still other

institutions have been consolidated.

The Ministry of Education has subsidized education as generously as

possible, and fosters progress despite the war and because of it. In

spite of all handicaps, institutions of higher learning have risen in

number from 91 in 1937-38 to 102 in 1939-40, with a corresponding rise

in enrollment of 31,188 to 41,494.[12] The entering class for 1940-41

was about 12,000, indicating a continued rise.[13]

[Footnote 12: _China at War_, Vol. V, No. 2 (October 1940), p. 37.]

[Footnote 13: The same, Vol. V, No. 4 (November 1940), p. 78. See also

Wu Yi-fang and Price, Frank W., _China Rediscovers Her West_, New

York, 1940; Chapter VII, "Holding the Educational Front" (p. 69-76) is

by Y. G. Chen, President of the University of Nanking. The entire work

edited by Messrs. Wu and Price is of value; written from the

missionary point of view, it presents first-hand statements of affairs

on Western China, and continues with liberal and socially conscious

appraisals of the needs of Christian work.]

In addition to the accredited institutions, there are innumerable

volunteer agencies, some of which are patriotic but educationally

elementary schools for saboteurs, agitators, and guerrillas. Education

is propaganda, but such is its immediate appeal that Left schools obtain

capacity attendance. A few students are disappointed. One wrote, "The

most unpleasant thing to me was that, as soon as I entered the

Resist-Japan University, I was deprived of my liberty. I was not free in

speech; I was not allowed to say anything outside of Marxism-Leninism

..." and went home.[14] The total attendance remains high; if added to

that of the accredited institutions operating according to government

standards, it would swell the sum enormously.

[Footnote 14: Wang Wên-hsiang, "K'ang-jih Ta-hsüeh yü Ch'ing-nien

Fan-mên" ("The Sorrows of Youth and the Resist-Japan University") in

the symposium entitled So-wei "_Pien-ch'ü_" (The So-called "Frontier

Area"), Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 30 _ff._]

In addition to formal aid to institutions of higher learning, and

administration of the National Government colleges, the Ministry

sponsors the mass literacy movement. In this it has had the benefit of

the work of Dr. James Y. C. Yen and his associates.[15] The war, moving

vast masses of people and shifting the modernized city-dwellers from the

coast to the interior, has proved a stimulus to the rise of literacy and

the demand for popular literature.

[Footnote 15: See the discussion of the mass education problem, below,

p. 218.]

The Ministry is headed by Ch'ên Li-fu, whose brother, Ch'ên Kuo-fu, is

head of the (Kuomintang) Central Political Institute. Together they

stand at the Right center of the Kuomintang, exerting enormous influence

on the Party and on the country. Both have been very close to the

Generalissimo, and took a large share in revitalization of the

Kuomintang before and during the war.

The two Commissions serve important needs. The Commission on Overseas

Chinese Affairs (_Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui_) is the informal Chinese

equivalent of a colonial office. The Commission looks after the welfare

of the overseas settlements of the Chinese, fostering language schools,

hospitals and the like. It acts through Chinese community associations,

rarely through official channels. Practices of hyphenated citizenship,

so offensive to one Western nationality when undertaken by another, are

unobtrusive and necessary in the case of the Chinese. With the outside

states putting Chinese in a special economic, legal, and political

category--through immigration laws, administrative practice, and

extra-governmental pressure including lynching--the individual Chinese

who deracinates himself is indeed a lost soul. Few Chinese worry about

overseas Chinese _irredentas_. The Commission fosters no _putsches_ and

mobilizes no fifth columns, but does help to keep Chinese, whatever

their nationalities, still Chinese.

The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (_Mêng Tsang

Wei-yüan-hui_) is the supreme agency for the dependencies. It has a

record of considerable success in fostering a good-neighbor policy

toward the half-autonomous dominions of Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang,

also called Chinese Central Asia),[16] Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. Outer

Mongolia is under indirect Soviet control, and Eastern Inner Mongolia

under the Japanese. The Chinese have utilized every device of courtesy

and diplomacy in retaining their precarious grip on these areas. The

Commission includes dominion members.

[Footnote 16: Among the recent books on Sinkiang, one, unusual because

it is by a Chinese author, stands out: Wu, Aitchen K., _Turkistan

Tumult_, London, 1940. The travel books of Sven Hedin, Ella Maillart,

Peter Fleming, and Sir Eric Teichman also contain material of

political interest.]

THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES

The Ministries dealing in economic matters bear the ultimate burden of

resistance. Upon their success depend China's tools of war. If

artillery, aircraft, machine-guns, munitions, food, clothing and other

necessities are not available to the central armies, the opportunity for

counter-attack may come and go, and China be lost--not through the power

of her enemy, but through her own weakness. Unless economic mobilization

succeeds, the guerrilla warfare in the occupied area will be frustrated,

since its purpose is merely to prepare for a _révanche_ from Free China;

history affords few examples of guerrillas defeating mass armies,

fighting positionally, without the intervention of other mass armies.

The Ministry of Finance (_Ts'ai-chêng Pu_) is the leader of the Economic

Ministries. Headed by H. H. K'ung, successor to the celebrated T. V.

Soong, it has performed fiscal miracles in maintaining the credit of the

National Government. Chief among its accomplishments has been the

institution, within the past decade, of a managed currency on the

gold-exchange standard. Specie had been the immemorial medium of

exchange, and Chinese experience with paper money--from the earliest

times to the present--had been unfortunate. Starting with the 1860's,

China had undergone one paper-money inflation after another.

Governmental currency was frequently a receipt for silver on deposit, in

which case it amounted to no more than a commodity warehouse

certificate, thereby subject to discount for transportation charges, and

fluctuating meanwhile with the world price of silver; otherwise it was

fiat money, guaranteed by stranglers' cords and long knives. Fractional

coins passed by metallic weight; the shifts in the price of copper in

New York and London determined the number of pennies which farmers

received for their silver dollars, even on the threshold of Tibet.

By putting private bank notes, both Chinese and foreign, out of

circulation, systematizing note issuance to four government banks and a

limited number of carefully supervised provincial agencies, the

National Government made the change with far less difficulty than

anyone, even optimists, dared to hope. Until the outbreak of war

subsidiary coinage was copper and aluminum; this has been replaced by

fractional paper, circulating decimally without discount for exchange

into larger bills. Simple peasants, who used to hide a slug of silver in

their fields, now conceal a Bank of China, Bank of Communications,

Central Bank of China, or Farmers' Bank of China _fa pi_ (legal tender)

note in roofs or walls.

Other noteworthy reforms include the standardization of levies in the

provinces, now proceeding to some degree, and the imposition of direct

taxes, a revolutionary step for China. Income and inheritance taxes,

previously thought to be uncollectible in a pre-modern area such as

China's hinterland, are yielding substantial sums. War borrowing is done

almost entirely through domestic loans. These are issued in the form of

patriotic contribution bonds, and are available in denominations as low

as Ch. Nat. $5.00 (about 28 U. S. cents). Further support has come in

the form of American, British, and Soviet fiscal aid, and--until the

outbreak of the European war--additional credits, both private and

intergovernmental, from continental Europe. The Ministry has moved with

a financial prudence which promises to maintain China's domestic and

foreign credit for further years of war.

The Ministry has engaged in direct conflict with the enemy through

bank-note rivalry. Throughout the occupied area, National Government

currency is in conflict with the issuances of the Japanese army and the

pro-Japanese governments. The Chungking policy has been to hold back the

invasion currencies, on the assumption that continued circulation of the

national currency maintains a continued popular stake in the government.

Many guerrilla leaders believe that the occupied areas should use

nothing of value to the Japanese, and therefore encourage the issuance

of local emergency currency.

Under the Ministry of Finance, numerous efforts have been made to keep

foreign trade alive. With war-time pressure on transportation

facilities, foreign trade has become a virtual monopoly of the

government; few major transactions are made by wholly private interests,

since in addition to monopolizing the highways, government-owned

corporations also have access to differentials in foreign exchange

(which often mark the difference between great profits and none). In the

matter of the governmentalized Sino-American trade, correlated with the

American credits, the Foo Shing Corporation (export) and the Universal

Trading Corporation (import) control the current both ways. The

Ministries of Communications and of Economic Affairs also have a share

in this state-capitalist business.[17]

[Footnote 17: _The Far Eastern Survey_ keeps effectively up to date

with all new developments in this field. An authoritative but

understandable explanation of the work of the Ministry is found in H.

H. K'ung, "Holding China's Financial Front," Ch. XI, work by Mme.

Chiang K'ai-shek, cited above.]

Subdivisions in the Ministry of Finance include sections for customs,

salt gabelle, internal revenue, general taxation, public loans,

currency, national treasury, accounting, and general affairs. Efforts

are now in progress to consolidate all intragovernmental fiscal

services, so that the budget shall cover the entire government, and

separate agencies will no longer be able to make half-controlled

collections and disbursements.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs (_Ching-chi Pu_) is in general

responsible for the industrialization of an area half the size of Europe

with well over two hundred million inhabitants. No non-industrial state

can defeat an industrial state unless it has access to the industrial

resources of third parties. The Chinese, realizing this, have launched a

modernization process unparalleled in modern history. The two greatest

migrations of the twentieth century have occurred, most probably, in

China: the first the settlement of Manchuria, and the second the flight

to the West. In each case more than twenty million persons have been

involved. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has transformed this rout

into a pioneering advance. Refugees have been taught to bring their

tools with them; when they had no tools their skills have been sought

out and utilized. As the national armies and government retreated up the

Yangtze and inward, they brought along the personnel of a modern

economic system, and set an industrial society down in a world

technologically backward.

West-China modernization will probably be the most durable economic

consequence of the war. Cities near the edge of Tibet have underground

electric power and automatic telephone systems. Primitive salt-drying

areas have been modernized; in one instance, steel pipe being lacking,

bamboo pipelines, plastered and cemented for reinforcement, run

cross-country. Filthy, tax-ridden, vicious little cities which had been

the haunts of opium-sotted militarists are now given the double blessing

of fair government and a business boom. (The author felt, when he

returned to America in September 1940, that he was going from a new

country to an old, leaving the hope, zest and high spirits of the

Chinese frontier for the comfortable melancholy of American

half-prosperity.)

On the government side, the stimulation to technological advance has

consisted of broad, experimental use of government personnel, subsidies,

and part-ownership, together with some outright state socialism. Four

types of encouragement appear with particular frequency: the

government-controlled movement of private industries from the endangered

areas to the West, government sponsorship of brand new industrial

enterprises, official encouragement of cooperatives, and state

ownership-management of enterprises.

Many industries were saved for China through compulsory movement.

Thousands of tons of industrial equipment were moved up to the West,

floated on barges and river-boats, or dragged by hand over macadam

highways, dirt roads, and mud footpaths. One single enterprise, the

Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration of Honan, successfully transferred

one hundred and twenty thousand tons of equipment, now applied to coal

mining in the Southwest.[18]

[Footnote 18: Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economic Affairs,

"Industrialization of Western China," Ch. XIV, work by Mme. Chiang

K'ai-shek, cited above, p. 142.]

Government sponsorship of new enterprises covers the entire field of

modern industry. Investors wait in line before opportune undertakings.

Electric light bulbs, safety matches, automobile parts and tools,

clothing--everything from machine-shop tools to luxury goods is being

produced in the West. Bottlenecks do occur in new industries competing

for priorities in imported machinery.

In the field of cooperatives, the C. I. C. (China Industrial

Cooperatives) stand out as truly important social and economic

pioneering. (See below, p. 223.)

Government ownership has not been niggard or timorous. In most cases it

has followed American patterns and appeared in the form of

government-owned corporations, but there are also a considerable number

of frankly state-operated enterprises, such as municipal food stores,

ferries, and heavier industrial undertakings. The munitions and motor

fuel trades are, so far as the author could find, entirely a matter of

government ownership. In the air communications and airplane production

field, government ownership is relaxed to the point of a senior

partnership in joint companies with foreign corporations; the latter

provide the supplies and trained personnel.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs is under the control of Wong

Wen-hao,[19] whose career was first distinguished in geology and

educational administration. His scientific outlook stands him in good

stead, since the exploitation of West-China resources requires

scientific as well as business application. Subdivisions of his Ministry

include those of mining, industry, commerce, water conservancy, and

general affairs.

[Footnote 19: He also spells it Oung Wen-hao; by the Wade

transliteration, Wêng Wên-hao.]

A Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (_Nung Lin Pu_) was set up in

1940 as the third economic ministry. Industrialization's dependence on

farm products makes this an invaluable coordinate to the other two

Ministries. The Chinese are in many cases proceeding directly from

pre-industrial to the latest chemico-industrial techniques, and skipping

the phase of reliance upon subsoil minerals. Gasoline is being mixed

with fuel alcohol derived from grain; plastics are appearing.

Agriculture also involved China's greatest social problem--that of

encouraging freehold or cooperative farming at the expense of

sharecropping. Much of the agricultural reform is undertaken by the new

local government and provincial government plans, but the problems of

farm prices, general farm planning, and utilization of agricultural

products fall on the Ministry. It is headed, not by a farm leader or

expert, but by the General Chên Chi-tang, former governor of Kwangtung

Province.[20]

[Footnote 20: China Information Committee, _News Release_, Chungking,

July 1, 1940.]

A proposed Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry (or

Ministry of Economic Warfare), based approximately upon the British

Ministry of Supplies, is in process of organization.[21] The Ministry

may be kept independent of either the Executive _Yüan_ or Military

Affairs Commission, since it is to coordinate a group of industrial and

commercial agencies which are now independent. Upon its establishment,

the Ministry of Economic Affairs will become one of Industry and

Commerce, and a central agency for economic war work will be available.

[Footnote 21: The same, December 23, 1940.]

The National Relief Commission (_Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui_) supervises the

general relief work of the government, which is performed in part by the

extragovernmental war and Party agencies and in part by local and

provincial authorities. The immensity of the relief problem in China has

always been such that organized relief can do no more than stir the

misery of the masses. Opportunely for the National Government, the

Imperial Japanese Army is securely in possession of the world's greatest

relief problem, and unable to relinquish it. Chungking is more

fortunate. (The author never dreamed that prosperity such as he saw in

West China could exist in Asia. Prices are extremely high, but wages and

farm prices tend to follow, and unemployment--always low in China

because of the work-sharing role of the family--is almost completely out

of sight. Skilled labor commands remuneration fantastic by pre-existing

scales.)

All these agencies, and much of the rest of the government, depend upon

the Ministry of Communications (_Chiao-t'ung Pu_). The invasion struck

at existing communications lines; Japanese are now in control of the

mouths of all major Chinese rivers, most of China's railway mileage, and

the coastal system of modern highways. A glance at the map of China will

show that Japanese forces have hugged modern communications lines,

whether steamship, railway, or highway. Whenever the Japanese ventured

far from these lines, they met with disaster.

The Ministry of Communications has used existing facilities to draw new

networks. The short stretches of railway in Free China are still

operated; _matériel_ from the occupied zone was brought West on them,

and they are undergoing rapid development. Roadbeds are being

constructed in anticipation of future imports of steel rails. Steamship

enterprises, under government subsidy, operate extensively, and new

reaches of river have been opened to service.

Three lines of reconstruction have proved very fruitful: motor

communications, telecommunications, and the rationalization of

pre-modern facilities already at hand.

Motor communications, both highway and aerial, have shown enormous

progress. Air service is maintained by the China National Aviation

Corporation and the Eurasia Company, both owned by the Chinese

Government, the former jointly with Pan American Airways and the latter

with German interests. Through connections from New York to Berlin are

available by the combined services of the two companies.

The highway system can be thought of as spider-like. Three enormous legs

reach to the outside: the Chungking-Kunming-Lashio route, famous as the

Burma Road; the trans-Sinkiang route, finally connecting with the Soviet

Turksib Railroad beyond thousands of miles of desert and mountains; and

the due North route, now being developed, reaching the Trans-Siberian

Railroad. The body of the system is a tight, well-metalled skein of

roads interconnecting the major cities of Free China. Most highways are

all-weather, and well-engineered, but niceties of surfacing have been

postponed.

Truck and bus service is regular, but very crowded, with inescapable

confusion as to priority. The majority of the operating firms are

government-owned, either by the central government or the provinces.

Complaint has arisen over the restrictions to private enterprise in this

field. Since gasoline costs about U. S. $1.00 per gallon and is

available only under permit, further official obstructions to highway

use seem unnecessary.

Telecommunications have been maintained and extended. Telegraph service

has reached into hitherto untapped areas, and wireless is extensively

employed. Radio services operate under the Kuomintang, not the

government; stations XGOX and XGOY reach North America and Europe with

propaganda in the world's leading languages. The telephone has come to

be a regular part of Chinese official and business life, and is to be

seen, far off the beaten track, as one of the heralds of

industrialization.

All these modern services would, however, be grossly insufficient for

the needs of the whole nation at war. They have been supplemented

through the use of every available type of pre-modern transportation.

Most of these rely on man-power, and have had their own elaborate

organization for many centuries: boatmen's guilds, unions of transport

coolies, carters, muleteers and camel-drivers. It has been possible to

ship heavy freight through country consisting of mountains traversable

only by stone-flagged footpaths or torrential streams. The Ministry has

regimented this complicated pre-modern world, with impromptu

modernizations as startling as they are efficacious. Where once couriers

trotted, they now speed by on bicycles or motorcycles; the squealing

wooden-axled wheelbarrows of the Chinese countryside are yielding to

pneumatic-tired carts which resemble American farm trailers. Three to

eight men can drag one cart, with half a ton of freight, over any

terrain, making up to forty miles a day. Provision can be made,

therefore, for moving a quarter-million tons of raw materials across

territory lacking even the most elementary roads. The roughness of the

country, which bars the Japanese army, is no obstacle to huge coolie

gangs, drafted sometimes, but more usually hired.

The Minister of Communications gave the following written answers to

questions put by the author:[22]

1. In view of the political interruptions to commerce

through British and French territories south of China, will

efforts be maintained to keep communications on the same

schedules southward that they had before?

Yes, because commercial and export traffic is still being

carried on southward, and there is a large accumulation of

important materials to be moved from the frontier inward.

2. Will the restriction of gasoline lead to the abandonment

of certain truck and bus routes, and the maintenance of

others, or do you expect to restrict all routes evenly?

We expect to restrict all important routes evenly if the

motor fuel situation becomes really acute.

3. Is a motor road running through Inner and Outer Mongolia

directly north to the Trans-Siberian Railroad a feasible

project?

Yes, it is a feasible project.

4. For all practical purposes, is the Soviet route as it

exists an adequate although expensive channel for the import

of high-class American machinery, such as trucks?

Yes, the Soviet route as it exists is adequate though

expensive for the purpose.

5. Is there evidence that mail between the United States and

China has been censored or tampered with while in transit

past Japan?

No, there is no such evidence so far.

6. How extensive a foreign personnel do you have in the

varied agencies under your Ministry?

Postal Service: 28

China National Aviation Corporation: 15

Eurasia Aviation Corporation: 13

Railways: 8

7. What developments of the last three years do you regard

with most pride, as evidence of China's power to cope with

the emergency?

The timely completion of the Yunnan-Burma Highway may be

considered as evidence of China's power to cope with the

emergency and as an important development in the field of

war-time communications. The Highway is 960 kilometers long

from Kunming to Anting on the frontier. Construction began

in October 1937. Eleven months later, the road was opened to

through traffic. At one time during its construction, as

many as 100,000 laborers were employed on the road.

The highest point on the Highway is 2,600 meters above the

sea level, yet the road has to pass two deep valleys, the

Mekong and the Salween, where the Highway dips a few

thousand feet within a distance of several miles in order to

reach the river bed, and rises precipitously again in the

same manner just beyond the suspension bridges over the two

turbulent rivers. The scarcity of local labor, the

enervating climate, and the wild and sparsely populated

country traversed, all combine to make the construction work

difficult. But now, anyone may take a motor car and cover

the distance between Chungking and Rangoon in two weeks, as

Ambassador Johnson did soon after the Highway was completed.

[Footnote 22: Communication of August 12, 1940; in the present

author's possession.]

The Minister Chang Kia-ngau (Chang Chia-ao) is one of the most eminent

bankers in China. His Ministry is a model of business-like organization

and systematic routines; he has a great reputation for getting things

done in the American fashion--quickly, and without ceremony.

In addition to these major ministries, there are the _Pu_ of Justice

(part of the Judicial _Yüan_, sharing its war-time somnolence), of War

(affiliated with the Military Affairs Commission), of Audit, of

Personnel, and--in process of establishment--of Social Affairs,

supplementing the Party-Ministry of Social Movements (_Shê-hui Yün-tung

Pu_) now under the Kuomintang Headquarters.

All Ministries are headed by a Minister (_Pu Chang_), seconded by a

Political Vice-Minister (_Chêng-wu Tzŭ-chang_) and Administrative

Vice-Minister (_Ch'ang-wu Tzŭ-chang_). Since almost all officers are

political appointees, and few of the new career men have touched the

higher levels of the bureaucracy, this duplication prevents a job famine

and keeps personnel levels high; the utility of a large administrative

staff depends, obviously, on the nature of the executive. Some of the

most crowded ministries seem permanently under-staffed because of the

intense activity they maintain; others, with skeleton staff, appear to

have far more civil servants than service. The over-all picture of the

Ministries, however, leads inescapably to the conclusion that they are

really functioning today. Long-transmitted vices of sloth and sinecures

are on the wane. The war, high-lighting every demerit into treason, has

created optimum conditions for administrative progress in China.

CHAPTER IV

PROVINCIAL, LOCAL, AND SPECIAL-AREA GOVERNMENT

China consists of twenty-eight provinces, varying in size about as do

the European nations. Of the twenty-eight, fourteen are wholly under

Chinese control, or are so slightly touched by invasion that normal

governmental processes continue. Ten provinces are under dual or triple

government--by the Japanese and pro-Japanese Chinese, by guerrilla and

other semi-independent groups, and by the usual constitutional

authorities. The remaining four are under firm Japanese domination,

under the name _Manchoukuo_.[1] Well over half of China's population is

under the National Government, and about one-ninth under unchallengeable

Japanese control; the residuum is the subject of sharp political

competition. The war is not merely a war between governments: it is a

struggle for the creation of government.[2]

[Footnote 1: For an excellent definition of Free China, see Quigley,

Harold S., "Free China," cited, p. 133-35. The most readable geography

of China is Cressey, George B., _China's Geographic Foundations_, New

York, 1934.]

[Footnote 2: For further development of this problem, see below, p.

185. The present author considered this question in relation to the

Chinese political heritage, in _Government in Republican China_,

cited, p. 2-12, 69-74, 188-89. Professor George Taylor, in _The

Struggle for North China_, cited, relates this problem to the broad

issues of world discussion, in a most acute analysis of "The Problem

of China," p. 8-16, and gives a clear answer to the questions thus

posed, p. 197-201.]

This problem would be immense even if there were no war. Under the

successive Imperial dynasties of the past millennium, China developed

extreme regional autonomy. Despite absolutist theory, the provinces

under their governors or viceroys were practically as independent as

states of the American union in the early nineteenth century.

PROVINCIAL AND URBAN GOVERNMENT

National Government -------------+ Kuomintang

| | | |

Military Affairs Executive ..Other _Yüan_ |

Commission _Yüan_ : |

| | : |

| The Provincial Government[B] |

| _Shêng Chêng-fu_ |

| | |

| +-----------------------------+ |

| | Chairman | |

| | _Chu-hsi_ | |

| | | |

| +-----| The Provincial Government |...... |

| | | Committee | : |

| | | [_Shêng Chêng-fu_] | : |

| | | _Wei-yüan-hui_ | : |

| | +-----------------------------+ : |

| | | Standing | : |

+--------------+ +--| Committee | +-------------+ +----------+

| Pacification | | | _Ch'ang-wu | | Provincial | | Party |

| Commissioner | | | Wei-yüan_ | | People's | | Agencies |

| _Sui-ching | | +------------+ | Political | +----------+

| Chu-jên_ | | | | | | Council | |

+--------------+ | | | | | _Shêng | |

| | | | | | Ts'an-chêng | |

| | | | | | Hui_ | |

| | | | | +-------------+ |

| | | | | |

| | | | +-------------------+ |

| | | +----------------+ | |

| | | | | |

| | Reconstruction | | |

| | _Chien-shê Committees: | |

| | T'ing_ Industry | |

| | _Shih-yeh | |

| | T'ing_ | |

| +------------------------+ Secretarial |

| | | | Department |

| Civil Affairs | | _Mi-shu Ch'u_ |

| _Min-chêng T'ing_ | | | |

| | | | |

| Finance | +------------------+ |

| _Tsai-chêng T'ing_ | | The Municipal | |

| | | Government[B] | |

| Education | _Shih Chêng-fu_ | |

| _Chiao-yü T'ing_ +------------------+ |

| | |

| +------------------+ |

| | Mayor | |

| | _Shih Chang_ | |

| +-------------------+ | | |

| |Municipal Advisory | |Municipal Council | |

| |or People's Council|...|_Shih Chêng Hui-i_| |

| |_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_ | | | |

| +-------------------+ | Councillors| |

| | _Ts'an-shih_| |

Local +----------------------------------------------+ |

Military | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |

Other Bureaus | | | | | | | | |

as Needed | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Bureau of Public | | | | | | | |

Utilities[A] | | | | | | | |

_Kung-yung Chü_ | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |

Bureau of Local | | | | | | +----------+

Government[A] | | | | | | | Party |

_Ti-chêng Chü_ | | | | | | | Agencies |

| | | | | | +----------+

Bureau of Health[A] | | | | | |

_Wei-shêng Chü_ | | | | | |

| | | | | |

Bureau of | | | | |

Engineering | | | | |

_Kung-wu Chü_ | | | | |

| | | | |

Bureau of | | | |

Finance | | | |

_Tsai-chêng Chü_ | | | |

| | | |

Bureau of Public | | |

Safety | | |

_Kung-an Chü_ | | |

| | |

Bureau of Social Affairs | |

_Shê-hui Chü_ | |

| |

Secretariat |

_Mi-shu Ch'u_ +----------+

| | Party |

Urban Local | Agencies |

Government +----------+

[Footnote A: optional]

[Footnote B: legal, not administrative, entity]

With the advent of war, the position of the provinces has become more

precarious, truly new political devices in the form of novel regional

governments have appeared, and the concrete problems of reform in the

village communities have become as imperative as military measures.

THE PROVINCES

The war-lord period was ushered in by the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai,

dictator-President and commander-in-chief, in 1916. He had inherited a

tradition of dual government--civil and military--no less sharp than the

Japanese distinction, and had continued it by placing his military

henchmen in power as provincial satraps. After his death, each province

had a military governor (_Tuchün_), who sometimes tolerated a civil

governor (_Shêng-chang_) and sometimes held both posts concurrently. The

various _tuchün_ rivalled one another in a vain turmoil until the rise

of the National Government suppressed or incorporated them. Even today

some of these men hold remnants of their power, but it is still

declining. The power of the National Government has increased almost

every year for over fifteen years, and its programs, bequeathed by Sun

Yat-sen, call for the constant diminution of provincial authority, until

in the end the province shall be little more than a postal link between

the central government and the districts (_hsien_).

Continued vitality of the provinces as a form of political life is shown

by the chariness with which the government approaches the problem of

re-subdividing the nation, by the continued effect of provincialism

through the influence of geography, botany, ecology, economics and

spoken language, and by the manifest utility of the provinces in the

prosecution of the war. It is impossible to discuss any aspect of

Chinese affairs for very long without entering into distinctions between

provinces.

In mild, modified, and controlled form, the pattern of civil-military

contrast in provincial government still prevails. The civil governor,

now in almost all cases the weightier official, is legally termed

Chairman of the Province (_Shêng Chu-hsi_), but he frequently possesses

a military colleague amiably designated Pacification Commissioner

(_Sui-ching Chu-jên_).[3] The war has eradicated almost the last

vestiges of provincial militarism. No Chinese army is in a position to

make peace with Japan through the negotiated treason of its commander,

although small groups occasionally change sides both ways.[4] On the

other side of the picture, it is not altogether certain how far the

National Government could go in replacing local leaders; more has been

done than ever before, but the Generalissimo has tried to work honestly

with all leaders, provincial or independent, subsuming their power under

his and the Government's without destroying it. Four provinces still

show traces of autonomy.

[Footnote 3: Tsang, O. B., _A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English

Dictionary_, Shanghai, 1937, p. 267. The older, standard dictionaries

do not include the term. Lieutenant H. S. Aldrich, in his _Hua Yu Hsü

Chih: Practical Chinese_, Peiping, 1934, gives _Sui-ching

Ssŭ-ling_ as Pacification Commissioner (Vol. II, p. 74).]

[Footnote 4: An apt, grisly story is reported in the semi-official

English-language journal of the Nanking regime. The "Peace Movement"

is, of course, the Japanophile movement of Mr. Wang Ch'ing-wei. This

is the way it was given in _The People's Tribune_, Vol. XXIX, Nos.

7-10 (October-November 1940), p. 305:

"In response to President Wang Ch'ing-Wei's peace appeal to the

nation, Mr. Tan Shih-Chang, member of the Chungking Air Force, flew to

Hankow by his own plane on June 10 to join the Peace Movement. Upon

his arrival in Nanking, Mr. Tan was warmly received by the

re-organized National Government. Later, he was sent to Macao on an

important mission, but upon his arrival there, he was instantly killed

by desperadoes in the employ of the Chungking regime.

"It is learned that the plane he left in Hankow has now been repaired

by the Japanese Air Force and brought to the Capital. Following its

arrival, the plane was immediately handed over to the Military

Commission by the Japanese military authorities."

(This would need further corroboration before it could definitely be

accepted.)]

Largest of the four is Sinkiang (Chinese Central Asia), under the

military leader Shêng Shih-ts'ai; it is subject to very strong Soviet

influence, since it is more accessible from the Soviet side of the

border, via the Turksib Railroad, than from China. Its trade naturally

flows out through the Soviet Union. The provincial authorities have been

harsh toward Christian work, and casually cruel to occasional

travellers. Since the National Government is exceedingly anxious to

maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, and obtains much of its

supplies from that country across Sinkiang province, it has made no

attempt to interfere. The province has cooperated enthusiastically in

war efforts; it is strange to see Central Asiatics with European

features marching with Chinese troops. Many of the independent Leftist

leaders have been welcomed in the area, although simon-pure Marxians are

rare, and the province, with a new university, new air bases, new

industries, and a trans-Asia highway, is undergoing rather spectacular

development. The British and the Soviets are mutually so suspicious that

the Chinese are likely to keep control, but the Chinese central

government, taking no chances, cooperates rather than commands.

Yünnan, under General Lung Yün, is the second province with special

features. Relatively isolated from the rest of China until the

completion of the Kunming-Chungking stretch of the Burma Road, it has

never been occupied by large National Government forces. The provincial

chairman submitting in form and cooperating in fact has been left

unmolested in his position. The province is becoming modernized by a

great deal of commerce and development; it is likely that this vestigial

autonomy will fade away unnoticed.

Kwangsi province possesses as leader General Pai Chung-hsi, one of the

ablest military men in China. A Kuomintang leader of long standing, he

followed, in conjunction with the leaders in Kwangtung (Canton), a

policy of _de facto_ autonomy down to the very outbreak of war. He and

his associates even had an independent air force, which was promptly

merged into the National air service. During the war, he has fought in

central China. The economic ruin of Kwangtung and the occupation of

Canton city by the Japanese has quenched Cantonese autonomy, but Kwangsi

has been relatively untouched. No whisper of suspicion has imputed

separatism to General Pai, but should he desire it, he is one of the few

men left in China still to have the means.

In Fukien province, General Ch'ên I serves as Chairman. He studied in

Japan and has a Japanese wife. He remains loyal to the National

Government, and he has fought the Japanese along the coast. No Chinese

observer has criticized him, but Westerners have observed that Fukien is

remarkably quiet; the Japanese have done little beyond blockading the

coast and seizing the major ports, and the Chinese have launched no

counter-attacks. It is possible that some unexpressed sense of

understanding between the Governor and the Japanese prevents further

conflict, while the Generalissimo--content to leave well enough

alone--lets matters stand as they are.

Provincial government, as outlined in the chart at p. 98, is very simple

in structure. The Commission plan, similar in many respects to the

Galveston plan in American municipal government, reduces the Provincial

Chairman to the status of _primus inter pares_. The departments of the

provincial government are headed by members of the province's committee.

The presence of provincial offices of the Kuomintang, military services,

and war agencies makes a provincial capital a place more important than

it seems in theory. A valuable innovation in provincial administration

has been the inauguration of the Provincial People's Political Councils

(_Shêng Ts'an-chêng Hui_). These are being taken seriously by the

administrations. Although they occasionally pass visionary,

impracticable, or bombastic resolutions, their work has for the most

part been concrete. They have aided a great deal in transforming the

atmosphere of government, and act as competent outside critical bodies

to check the administrative officers.

Provincial government has been significantly transformed by the war. Dr.

T. F. Tsiang (Chiang T'ing-fu), a distinguished historian who served on

a central inspection commission to the Southwest in 1940, stated[5] that

provincial government has improved in two outstanding ways: first, there

is a real desire to understand the common people, and to do something

for them. This was unheard-of a few years past. Second, all--or almost

all--of the officials work very hard. There is far more work than there

are men. Money is frequently available but unexpendable because there

are not enough experts to go round. Hence, the provincial governments

find their need is for men rather than funds, and the war is bringing

new levels of actual accomplishment. Although most of the governors have

military titles, many of these are like Kentucky colonelcies, courtesy

titles from time past. The over-all effect is of hard work and little

bombast.

[Footnote 5: In an interview with the author, Chungking, July 31,

1940; the interview was unfortunately terminated by the raid alarm. It

might be noted at this point that proposals for the reinstitution of

strong provincial executives have been postponed from year to year

since 1932. See _The China Year Book 1939_, cited, p. 217 n.]

Special Municipalities, most of which are now under Japanese occupation,

are directly subject to the National Government and only incidentally a

part of the provinces in which they are located. Ordinary Municipalities

are under their respective provincial governments, but not under a

_hsien_ (district or county) administration; in some cases they include

several former hsien. The Municipality is headed by a Mayor

(_Shih-chang_), advised by a City Council (_Shih-chêng Hui-i_) composed

of the chiefs of the administrative sections, several supplementary

counsellors, and representatives from the Municipal Advisory Assembly

(_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_), if one exists. Below the _Shih_ the urban pattern

of local government differs somewhat from the rural, but otherwise city

government displays no features peculiarly Chinese.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Chinese local government has been the ever-fertile soil out of which

successive Empires grew. To no other level of government has the

Republic reached so poorly. Since China is constituted of about half a

million villages, several thousand market towns, and a few hundred major

cities, the bulk of the population is rural, but rural in a way foreign

to the West. Congestion imposes upon agrarian China many problems and

evils known as urban in the West. Corruption in government, extortion in

economics, demoralization in social and family life--these start with

the village and the _hsien_. Inconspicuous in any single village, each

evil summed to its China-wide aggregate becomes tremendous.

Government has not been beloved by the Chinese farmer. Governmental

benefits--for the continuance of scholastic culture, the protection of

the realm, the creation of grandiose public works--were remote, but

taxes were not; government meant the taxgatherer. Fêng Yü-hsiang, one of

the great war-lords and now a Kuomintang general, says of his own

childhood:

The people, except for paying their taxes, had nothing to do

with the government. The government never paid any attention

to the conditions under which the people lived, and the

people never bothered themselves about what the government

was doing. One party collected the taxes; the other paid

them. That was all there was to it. Although Paoting city

was only about two _li_ [less than a mile] away, the

inhabitants of Kang-k'ê village showed no interest in city

civilization; instead, they rather looked down on that sort

of thing. No discussions of politics were heard, and nothing

about the encroachments of the foreign powers on China. All

the big changes seemed to have taken place in another world,

and very seldom affected this place.

When the government was about to collect taxes, the _Li

Chêng_ [a petty local officer] would ring a gong from one

end of the village to the other, shouting:

"Pay your taxes! Four hundred and sixty coins to the _mou_

[about one third of an acre] for the first harvest!"

When the people heard the gong, they did not go and pay

their taxes immediately. They would walk listlessly to their

doorways, only to withdraw after having taken a nonchalant

look at the _Li Chêng_--as though they had heard nothing.

They would wait until the very last minute, until they could

not put it off any more, and then go, group by group, to the

city to hand in money they had earned by sweat and blood.

They were industrious and miserable all through the year

...[6]

[Footnote 6: Fêng Yü-hsiang, _Wo-ti Shêng-huo_ (My Life), Kweilin,

1940, p. 22.]

This basic level of Chinese society is not easily susceptible to

standardization, or the imposition of ready-made bureaucracies. Even in

the United States, it would be almost impossible to impose a uniform

plan for community organization from Bangor to San Diego and Walla Walla

to the Bronx. Sun Yat-sen once said to Judge Linebarger, "China is a

land of autonomy from the smallest village upward. Who shall dictate to

the sub-governments of China the form and manner in which they shall

express their local governmental needs? Of course, we must have a

minimum of uniformity for both economy and efficiency in government, but

the will of the people must be followed."[7] By seeking to remedy

political abuses the National Government apparently hopes that economic

inequalities will be ironed out by the people themselves.

[Footnote 7: As reported by Paul M. W. Linebarger in his

_Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_ [as yet unpublished; in the author's

possession]. Book II, Chapter V.]

The Chinese land problem cannot be understood except at the

politico-economic nexus, where low political morale exposes the farmers

to the unrestrained power of the gentry, acting in the triple capacity

of officials, landlords, and money-lenders. The cycle, familiar in the

West, of freehold farmers or yeomen first mortgaging their land, then

becoming tenants, and finally ending in utter economic helplessness, has

been familiar in China. In China's past, the cycle had another phase:

agrarian insurrection sweeping the land with banditry and innumerable

rebellions, thereby increasing the fiscal burden on the remaining land,

leading to worse exploitation, until the slate was swept clean by

dynastic collapse, general civil war, and a new Imperial house, whose

administrative decline began another cycle. The peasantry never won

completely, and never lost utterly. Today, if one judges by past

experience, rebellion or reform seems long overdue.[8]

[Footnote 8: The author has sought to trace the political and military

aspects of this cycle in _Government in Republican China_, cited.

There are numerous works on the subject from the economists' point of

view. Outstanding are the books by John Lossing Buck, R. H. Tawney, J.

B. Condliffe, Karl Wittfogel, Ch'en Han-seng, and the articles by

Norman Hanwell (chiefly in _Asia_, _Amerasia_, and _The Far Eastern

Survey_).]

The detailed legislation adopted by the National Government in war time

is given in Appendix I (G), and Chiang K'ai-shek's own explanation of

the new system in Appendix III (C).[9] One might explain the general

plan quite simply in terms of inter-connection between the central

government and the millions of households. The _pao-chia_ system is one

of mutual aid and mutual responsibility between households and groups of

households, under government supervision. It has appeared in China from

time to time since the Ch'in dynasty (221-203 B.C.). If used for

welfare purposes, it amounts to a recognition of the pluralistic

character of Chinese society by the government, and the happy

utilization of the family pattern. Applied for police purposes, it is

well suited to repression and terror. Thus, today the National

Government is applying the _pao-chia_ system (in relation to its whole

scheme of local government) as a measure of progress and reform, while

the Japanese encourage the same organizations in occupied China as a

device for despotism and exploitation.

[Footnote 9: Below, p. 324, and p. 388.]

Expressed in law, now being applied in fact, the _chia_ is a group of

six to fifteen families (households), and the _pao_, a group of six to

fifteen chia. The hsiang is formally composed of six to fifteen pao;

actually it approximates what is loosely termed a community in the

United States (_e.g._, a city ward, a single suburb, part of a rural

election district). The _ch'ü_ is the rough equivalent of a township.

The _hsien_ (district; county) is the fundamental unit of the

traditional China-wide bureaucracy. Hence the missing steps are not

those between the _hsien_, near to two thousand in number, and the

central government. The gaps occur between the half-billion Chinese and

their two thousand _hsien_. The following chart shows the broad outlines

of the system:[10]

HSIEN

("county")

^

|

Militia Elected | Schools, Kuomintang

| ^ CH'Ü | |

| | ("township") | |

| | | | |

and Police Representative | Secondary and Party

| | HSIANG | |

| | ("community") | |

| | | | |

| | PAO | |

| | ("neighborhood") | |

Organs Assemblies | Elementary Organizations

| | CHIA | |

| | ("a group of households") | |

| | | | |

| | \/ | |

| |--------->THE PEOPLE | |

| ^ | |

|____________________________|_____________|______________|

[Footnote 10: A detailed chart will be found in Appendix III (C), at

p. 388.]

This is the official government plan. If ever put into complete effect,

China will consist of hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of

self-governing units, arranged on seven levels (the five local levels;

provinces; nation), and the world will wonder at a massive new

democracy. In practical politics, what seems to be happening is that the

system extends to the National Government areas, involving less than

three hundred million people. Much of the application is purely formal,

and signifies no more than did the grant of an imaginary suffrage under

the first Republic. Elsewhere the new system is installed with telling

administrative effect, improving the bureaucracy, strengthening the

state, but not arousing much popular participation or enthusiasm. And in

the remainder the program is beginning to work as is intended with

genuine elections and popular participation in government.

The three chief devices which have been applied to the reform of local

government are: instruction, mandate, and other remote controls;

inspection systems; and training courses. First are the attempts to

change local government by transmission from the capital of voluminous

instructions, manuals, etc., supplemented by similar Kuomintang action

for Party reform. In the second case, central officials go to the

provinces. During the summer of 1940, a number of such groups of

officials divided China between themselves, each group taking a number

of provinces for its inspection zone. The presence of a central

delegation in the field led to some housecleaning, provided an incentive

for immediate work, and informed the National Government of the

condition of the country. Some junketing was observable, but not enough

to vitiate the work of inspection. By the third device, local officials

are called to training centers. The Generalissimo is very fond of this

method. He encourages the selection of younger men, who thereby feel

that their careers are given a boost. They are taught modern

governmental practice while living, in most cases, a disciplined but

comfortable half-military life. Some training conferences are convened

_ad hoc_ in a promising area; others continue from year to year under

the government or related organizations. Many thousand men and women

undergo some form of training. The program has clearly discernible

effects in improving local government. The selection of persons who

either hold office or are likely to hold office provides a practical

self-interest motivation. Further minor devices of local government

reform include the grants in aid to the provinces, the establishment of

model _hsien_, the military eradication of banditry, the reclamation of

farm land and forests, some resettlement, and much planned modernization

with small-scale projects. Town after town has received the stimuli of

modernization from one of these sources.

Estimates--nothing more could be found--concerning the effectiveness of

this program varied considerably. Since two equally skilled observers,

considering the same institution at first hand, can differ sharply in

their value judgments of efficacy or integrity, this is not surprising.

A few Westerners and Leftists have insisted that the program was almost

altogether sham. A few formal, optimistic officials have insisted that

it has succeeded almost everywhere. One competent foreign observer told

the author that he believed the _pao-chia_ system to be installed in 90

per cent of Free China, and to be actually working in 50 per cent.

Another agreed more or less with these figures, but suggested that there

were enormous differences between the provinces, some being genuinely

transformed and others remaining unaffected. A Chinese official, himself

a social scientist, who had been intimately connected with local reform,

stated that 50 per cent application for all Free China would be much too

high an estimate, except for the holding of token elections. Only in

Kwangsi province was the new self-government structure working over

half of the countryside; elsewhere, the ratio was about one-fifth

effective as against four-fifths nominal.

Most of all, genuine application consists in making institutions

available, and thereupon letting the people help themselves. If local

government is of practical use to the common people, they can be counted

on to discover its utility promptly. If it is of no practical use, they

will know that too. Whatever the present degree of success, obstacles

still confront the program. Local extragovernmental institutions possess

enormous vitality. If superficial or slipshod reforms are made, the new

local governments will be merely operated as screens for secret

societies, landlords' unions, or other narrow cliques.

Contrastingly, a tradition of discussion and public action makes it

equally possible that the rural masses, familiar with cooperative

action, will operate the new institutions successfully. The difference

between success and failure is not to be measured in terms of wholly new

achievement; it is determined by the choice of existing institutions

which, transmuted and fitted, fill the pattern of the rationalized local

government system. If narrow, class-bound or unprogressive groups assume

the regalia of a novel legality, using their position to obstruct

further development, the program will fail. If the town-meeting,

cooperative potentialities of the entire adult population are aroused,

and if the ordinary farmer or coolie can see that he has the opportunity

of bettering his livelihood through political action, the success of

democracy will be assured.

Potentialities in the field of local autonomy are enhanced by the fact

that the National Government has competitors. The Japanese have an

opportunity which, instead of utilizing, they have done their best to

destroy: conquest through prosperity. If they and their Chinese

associates offered low prices, easy marketing, and fair taxes, in the

place of arson, rape, thievery and bluster, their failure would become

less certain. As a third side to the triangle of competitive power, the

Communists and independent Left, while allied to the National

Government, rival it in winning the loyalty of the population. Huge

areas in Communist and guerrilla sections are sampling reform of a

drastic and immediate kind: the lowering of taxes, the democratization

of government, the abolition of usury. With the traitors on its Right

and the Communists or guerrillas on its Left, the National Government

does not abandon its chief politico-economic weapon by disregarding land

and labor reform. None of the three parties has anything to gain by

inaction. None has an interest which binds it to self-dooming reaction.

THE COMMUNIST ZONE

Three new governmental areas which are neither provinces nor local

governments have come forth out of unification and war. Their

relationship to Chungking is strange, perhaps unique. They are not

states members of a federal union, since China is a unitary republic.

They are not new regional commissions, creatures and extensions of the

central government, because--whatever the theory--they were

independently initiated. They are not allies, because they profess

national unity. They are not rebellions, because they fight a common

enemy, only occasionally coming into conflict with government troops.

Yet they possess some of the features of each of the following: federal

states, regional subgovernments, allied states, and rebellions. They cut

across the pattern of the National Government. Two are governments; one

is an army. The army and one government are largely Communist; the other

government is a genuine United Front of the parties. Two are North

Chinese; one is Central Chinese. But all three have this in common: they

are Leftist, actively revolutionary; they are objects of patronizing

suspicion to the central authorities, who are glad of the help but worry

about its post-war cost.

The first and most famous of these areas is the Communist zone in the

Northwest. Formally it includes eighteen _hsien_; the Communists claim

inclusion of twenty-three. After being termed the Special Administrative

District of the Chinese Republic (_Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü

Chêng-fu_), and then Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area (_Shan-kan-ning

Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu_), the zone assumed the much more modest style of

Administrative Area of North Shensi (_Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü_).[11]

This Frontier Area is in personnel and Party life a direct continuation

of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Leftist and Communist circles talk as

though it were a wholly autonomous state, resting on its own military

power, but cooperating with the National Government for national

resistance and reconstruction. This is largely true--at any rate, more

realistic than the opposing view, which avers that no change has taken

place in the Northern part of Shensi province, and that the Communists

are interfering with the proper processes of government. The following

is a characteristic statement of the latter position:

At present the name "Frontier Area" seems to be very common

because it is so called in false propaganda about the

"independent sovereignty" [_tzŭ-li wei-wang_]. But if we

agree that the so-called "Frontier Area" is a part of the

territory of the Chinese Republic, the name ought to have

been issued in conformity with the decrees of the central

government. According to central government decree, it is

only a "Supplementary Recruitment Area for the Eighth Route

Army," but not an area of civil administration. [The author,

in an extended discussion, challenges the re-division of the

provinces as a matter not to be undertaken casually, denies

the legal foundation of the term "Frontier Area," and then

examines its practical justifications. He finds that the

Communists have two: the regime is now a _de facto_ system,

its existence is a _fait accompli_ and further discussion

must proceed from this point; also, the regime is founded in

popular opinion, and the government should not violate the

wishes of the people. He disagrees with both of these and

seeks to refute them, insisting on lawful procedure and

constitutional government. He concludes with a peroration to

the Communists themselves.] ... this problem is really quite

simple, unlike the Sudeten problem. Was it the Communist

Party of China which called the Sudeten Party of

Czechoslovakia violators of the unity of their own country

and running dogs of Fascism? Therefore, I think that they

would never imitate what the reactionary Sudeten party did.

And was it the Communists who originated the "United Front"?

Hence they must understand very clearly what unification

means to China, and must never utter things which they do

not really believe. Therefore, with the rising tide of

national unity and concentration, I suppose that the odd

name "Frontier Area," which is contrary to the real sense of

unification, will soon pass away and be a mere historical

term.[12]

[Footnote 11: See above, p. 13. The last term is literally Executive

Area (or District) of North Shan (Shensi). In the text, Frontier Area

is used throughout as the simplest English equivalent.]

[Footnote 12: Chin Chi-yin, 'Pien-ch'ü' ti Ming-ch'êng' (The Name

"Frontier Area"), in _So-wei "Pien-ch'ü_," cited above, p. 3-6.]

In practical terms this implies the informal reconciliation of two

claims constitutionally and legally incompatible. The Chinese Communist

leaders operate under the national law codes as much as they are able.

They employ the national currency. They use the nationally standard

system for local government. They profess unity. At the same time they

maintain, as a hard reality, a separate regime in which the Communist

Party is supreme, the Party Line is gospel, and dissidents are dealt

with as "pro-Japanese traitors" or otherwise. Transit between National

Government territory and Communist territory is not altogether easy.

Leftists are reported to have died on their way to the Northwest, and

Nationalists are equally well reported to have disappeared after they

got there.

The Area itself is an unpromising piece of land. "From 36° N. Lat. on

up, South of the Great Wall and West of the Yellow River, there lies a

vast, desolate tract of yellow plateau, inhabited by half a million

people. The plateau slopes from North to South; the further South it

runs, the lower the land lies, but it is still 1000 meters above

sea-level at the lowest place. This is what we have already known as

Northern Shensi. In this region, the ground is always covered with a

layer of yellow dust ... Furthermore, rainfall is scarce and no

irrigation has been introduced, so that agricultural products are

extremely scant. Under such geographical limitations, Northern Shensi

has become a region notorious for its poverty."[13] For a Chinese to

call an area notoriously poor implies a degree of destitution which the

American mind cannot grasp. In such an area, the welcome to Communism is

obvious, and the problems of Communism, once settled, are equally

obvious. The probability of mineral resources opens up opportunities for

development under Red rule, but these are distant.

[Footnote 13: Ts'ui Yün-ch'ang, _Shan-pei Lun Kuo-hua_ (A Brief Sketch

of Northern Shensi), Kweilin, 1939, p. 4-5. This author concludes that

Communist rule worsened the economic status of the area. "Then there

occurred the campaigns for 'the extermination of landlordism' and for

'division of the lands.' The result of such proletarian disturbances

was an astonishing decrease of population, caused by massacre and

emigration, and the devastation of much land." (p. 6.)]

Interpretation of the achievements of the Communist regime vary with the

political standpoint of the observer, just as they do in the case of the

Soviet Union. Sympathetic observers, both Western and Chinese, report

enormous improvements in agriculture, fair land taxes, new cooperatives,

brilliant experimental democracy, bold education, and great

enthusiasm.[14] No unsympathetic Western visitors have been reported

admitted, and a few neutrals came away enthusiastic; but critical

Chinese have found as much to question as one might find in a similar

Western situation: terrorism, puppet elections, murder both judicial and

plain, sham education, and immorality are charged.

[Footnote 14: See the works cited above, p. 20, n. 16. It is possible

to find a contradictory interpretation in Chinese sources for almost

every point cited by Western visitors as meritorious. Since the

Nationalists are not interested in promoting the international

reputation of the Frontier Area, and at the same time are unable to

launch any counter-propaganda (for fear of alienating Leftist

sentiment in the West, because it would give the Japanese a propaganda

advantage, and would disturb the appearance of the United Front), very

little criticism--sound or otherwise--of the Chinese Communist area

has appeared in the West. Even in a case such as the issuance of paper

money, universally regarded as a clever move by the Communists and

guerrillas, Chinese writers have charged that the issuance is fiat

currency imposed by Communist force (e.g., Wang Ssü-ch'êng,

_Ju-tz'ŭ Pien-ch'ü_ [So this is the Frontier Area!] Chungking,

1938, p. 38 _ff._) Within China, Communism is just as open to

interpretation as the Soviets are in the Western world. Western data

now available seems to cover only one side of the case, which is

doubtless well-founded; but there must be another. There always is.]

The position of the Frontier Area is clear in a few respects.[15] In the

first place, it is not declining. Communist strength is believed to be

growing, by persons of almost all forms of political belief; differences

arise only over the rate and probable maxima of that growth. The

Communist strength in the Northwest is far less than it was in South

Central China seven years ago, but much of that loss of power has been

compensated for by increased relations with sympathetic guerrillas.

Secondly, the Communist area is strategically poorly located. The land

itself is poor; the adjacent large cities are completely under

Nationalist control; and the general military-political locale is

something like northern Arkansas in the United States. This explains the

willingness of the Nationalist commanders to avoid friction with the

Communists, and the positive zest with which they suggest further

consolidation of Communist forces around the one center at Yenan. It

soothes the impatience of Communists who wish unrestricted rights of

agitation, organization, and propaganda throughout the country. Although

the Communists make little visible headway against the Japanese in the

great urban slums of the coast, they are anxious to obtain freer access

to city workers. Thirdly, the Communist area displays no structural

peculiarities of government. Its profound difference from the rest of

Free China is not a difference in institutional forms, but in the forces

operating behind and through those forms. The Chinese Communists have

achieved very considerable success in working within the legal limits of

another state philosophy, and have done it with a minimum of violence;

this augurs well for the perpetual continuation of the truce. Their

practical accomplishments are extensive and novel; their leadership,

brilliant; that their government should be so orthodox in form is all

the more significant. By remaining within orthodox limits they challenge

the National Government on common ground; the gain is theirs and

China's.

[Footnote 15: Since the author has neither extensive acquaintance with

Chinese Communists, nor has visited Yenan, he offers these conclusions

more tentatively than he would others, concerning the Kuomintang.]

GUERRILLA GOVERNMENTS

The special area second in importance is the Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border

Region (_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_).

Widely publicized in the Western world as the Hermit Government, this

regime functions altogether within the Japanese lines. A number of

competent Western observers have visited this area, among them Major

Evans Fordyce Carlson, Mr. Haldore Hanson, and Professor George Taylor.

All have come away most enthusiastic about the work of the government.

The governmental picture which emerges from their and other accounts is

one of a highly flexible mechanism, working with great efficacy and

superb morale.[16] The driving power behind the regime is social

revolution as a means to national resistance, made easy by the flight of

many former local bureaucrats, and by the treason of some

ultra-conservatives, who affiliated themselves with the Provisional

Government established by the Japanese in Peiping. The personnel is as

genuinely United Front as may be found anywhere in the world; the

position is eased by the circumjacency of the Japanese, and the formal

recognition of the area by the Military Affairs Commission and the

Executive _Yüan_.

[Footnote 16: Professor George Taylor's _The Struggle for North China_

presents a full and clear picture of the Border Region and the Peiping

regime in startlingly apposite juxtaposition. He concludes by pointing

out the significant paradox that the Japanese established a

reactionary regime designed to keep China agrarian, backward, and

exploitable, but that they had not managed to extend their affiliate

beyond the cities. The country, which they had hoped to capture,

escaped them through the political resurgence of the Border Region. P.

C. Nyi, article cited above, p. 16, n. 10, presents an outline of the

regime which supplements the first-hand materials Professor Taylor

appends to his work. Major E. F. Carlson's works, which describe this,

are _Twin Stars of China_ and _The Chinese Army_, both cited above;

the latter, a valuable contribution to the _Inquiry Series_ of the

Institute of Pacific Relations, includes Wang Yu-chuan, "The

Organization of a Typical Guerrilla Area in South Shantung" (p.

84-130), a brilliant survey which reveals, sometimes unwittingly, the

values and dangers of a Communist-Nationalist-popular union. Mr.

Hanson's work is "_Humane Endeavour_," cited above; as a personal

account, it is the most engrossing of the group.]

The Border Region, like smaller guerrilla areas elsewhere in occupied

China, is scarcely a domestic political problem because it is enfolded

by the Japanese armies. Even a United Front area, such as the Border

Region, would lead to far greater difficulties in political adjustment

if established in Free China. The tension and balance between the

Parties is such that this strain might not be borne. Behind the Japanese

lines, where the central armies cannot do anything even if they wish,

the Border Region finds Chungking's acquiescence to be stimulated by

Chungking's impotence. What could or will happen if the Japanese leave

the dividing area, and the Border Region has to settle the issue of

_status quo_ v. _status quo ante bellum_ with the central government,

no one knows. The Generalissimo told the present author that he did not

fear the encroachments of the guerrilla groups, because he and they were

all working for democracy.

Following from this involuntarily protective and insulating role of the

Japanese forces is the constitutional theory of the Border Region.

Unlike the Frontier Area, where it is exceedingly difficult to gloss

over the autonomy of Communist rule, the Border Region is definitely

established as a war-time agency, controlling territory beyond the reach

of the provincial governments. The provincial governments still

function, in unoccupied corners of their provinces, or in exile, and the

openly provisional (_lin-shih_) nature of the Border Region makes it

palatable even to Kuomintang conservatives.

The pattern of government is one of devolution from an Executive

Committee, which was established by a meeting of officials, volunteers,

mass organizations, and others at Fup'ing in January 1938. The area is

divided into provincial districts which are able to function with

economy of personnel. The following outline illustrates the structure of

this area:[17]

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Secretariat

Civil Affairs Department

Financial Affairs Department

Education Department

Industry Department

Justice Department

Inspectorates of the Seven Provincial Districts

_Hsien_ Governments or Joint _Hsien_ Governments or

Sub-_Hsien_ Governments

_Hsien_ Districts

Village Committees

[Footnote 17: P. C. Nyi, article cited in _The Chinese Year Book

1938-39_, p. 255. Reading between the lines will illustrate much of

the Chungking attitude.]

A very high degree of direct popular government has been achieved. Over

wide areas, the average age of the _hsien_ magistrates is in the

twenties. Recruitment to the Region of numerous professors and students

from Peiping has helped to fill the need for trained personnel, and has

assisted in maintaining the area as a genuine multi-group affair rather

than a Communist front. Communists, although present and highly

esteemed, do not hold the highest formal offices. (For further

consideration of the United Front problem, see below, p. 123.)

The New Fourth Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), third of the special zones,

was formed by re-consolidation of the small mutually isolated Soviet

areas left behind when the main Communist forces made the celebrated

Long March. When first assembling under the truce, these Red units faced

a certain amount of difficulty from the provincial military who did not

grasp the United Front idea, but the Military Affairs Commission

recognized them. The Army did not establish a government except through

its Political Department, which coordinated political work of the

volunteer village committees.[18]

[Footnote 18: On the New Fourth Army, see Epstein, I., _The People's

War_, cited above, p. 260 _ff._ Agnes Smedley, the well-known

pro-Communist writer, has lived among the New Fourth recently. Another

foreign visitor has been Jack Belton, of the Shanghai _Evening Post_.

Publicity for the New Fourth Army, reduced to an absolute minimum by

Chungking, is handled by an independent agency, the New China

Information Committee (not to be confused with the semi-official China

Information Committee) in Hong Kong. The China Defense League, in

which the moving spirit is Mme. Sun Yat-sen, also in Hong Kong, acts

as an agency for receiving gifts, etc., for the Army.]

According to available reports, the Army stands far to the Left of the

Border Region. Formally United Front, its proportion of Communists is

much higher and Communist control more telling. Operating in East

Central China--the Anhwei-Kiangsu-Kiangsi-Fukien-Chekiang area--which

provided the base of ten years' Communist insurrection and was long the

home of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the New Fourth Army Zone represents

a recrudescence of Soviet activities under different names and with a

different military objective. This fact has caused intense

dissatisfaction among some Kuomintang generals, who spent half their

careers trying to root out Communism in that same area. They do not mind

the Communist zone in the Northwest, where an effective informal _cordon

sanitaire_ can be drawn, but renewed Communist activity in the Yangtze

valley impresses them as an evil not much less than pro-Japanese

treason.

The New Fourth Zone, the Border Region, and the Frontier Area--together

with a wide scattering of guerrilla areas and governments individually

of less but collectively of equal importance--are the military

step-children of the Chinese government. They all receive subsidies for

their work, varying in amount. Usually this is calculated on the number

of _hsien_ actually occupied as bases, so that the sum provides for a

far smaller number of villages than those directly affected. In the case

of troops, the salary allowances are based on the permitted size of the

units, in almost all cases below the actual numbers. The money is paid

to the commanders or other leading officials, who then set salary rates

incomparably lower than those of the central forces. The money thus

saved is applied to the general budget of the forces. Corruption, while

occasional and inescapable, seems to be more sharply punished in the

guerrilla than in the government areas.

In January 1941, the New Fourth Army was officially abolished, following

a clash with regular National Government forces. The clash arose from a

fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and the New Fourth

leaders concerning the nature of the Chinese government. The Communists

and their sympathizers held that the unity of China was a political

union between separate groups. When the Generalissimo ordered the New

Fourth Army to move North, and oppose the Japanese forces above the

Yangtze, the New Fourth countered with a demand for arms and funds.

Treating this as military insubordination in war time, the central

forces attacked the New Fourth--each side claiming that the other opened

hostilities--capturing Yeh Ting, the commander. The rest of the Army was

officially abolished, although its main forces were within the occupied

zone and outside the Generalissimo's reach. A full Communist-Nationalist

clash was avoided, however, and the Red leaders unwillingly acquiesced

in the Generalissimo's interpretation of the episode as a military and

not a political affair. The conflict brought forth the fundamental

Communist question: are the Chinese Communists loyal first to the

Chinese government, or first to the Communist Party? No answer was

forthcoming, although the Communists failed to rebel elsewhere. The

Generalissimo, by military swiftness and political acumen, had triumphed

in one more particular instance.

With the parsimonious policy of the central government keeping them in

fiscal extremity, the more Leftist guerrilla units make up their lack of

funds with direct economic measures. These include suspensions of rents

to landlords, regulation of share-cropping, lowering of taxes on the

poorer farmers, and creation of cooperatives. The Communists have

strained every point to avoid actual class war, and the economic reforms

of the guerrilla and special areas are smoothed by the usual absence of

the landlords. The political necessity of a bold economic policy remains

important, if the special areas are to continue their activity against

Japan or--in the Frontier Area case--their independence. Political

development thus is inclined to stress the use of popular machinery of

government, not for the creation of systematic, modern, responsible

bureaucracy, but for pushing vigorous mass action, direct popular

government, and socio-economic reconstruction, revolutionary by

implication if not by immediate content.

Not all the guerrilla areas fall into the Left pattern. The Kuomintang,

so long habituated to control of the state mechanism that its

revolutionary background is somewhat dimmed, is bringing Kuomintang

guerrilla work into action. The Party and Government War Area Commission

is the chief supervisory agency for this work, and an enormous amount of

planning has been done. Actual application of mass-movement work seems

as yet to lag behind that of the Left. Meanwhile, in most areas except

the Communist Northwest, Kuomintang officers, officials, teachers, and

volunteers are active. The guerrilla groups all accept the same flag,

hail Chiang as their leader, recognize the _San Min Chu I_ as the state

ideology, and maintain the cherished symbols of unity.

The Government and the Kuomintang were reportedly seeking a settlement

of the whole special-area problem, in anticipation of the close of war,

by urging the movement of all Communist or Communist-infiltrated forces

Northward, so that a more or less continuous Left corridor would run

from the Border Region to the Frontier Area. This precipitated the clash

with the New Fourth Army; in March 1941 no settlement has been reached.

Part of this is owing to the Communist desire to have unrestricted

agitational rights, and to official Kuomintang insistence that no Party

other than itself is constitutionally legitimate. The special areas

meanwhile prepare fighters in the anti-Japanese war, and are helped by a

government which is proud of them as Chinese but mistrustful of them as

Leftists. And they develop vigorous applications of democratic formulae

which challenge the reality and sincerity of everything the National

Government does behind the lines.

Despite recurrent clashes, it is likely that the areas and the

government will continue their present relations. In part this is owing

to the genuineness of the universal hatred of Japan and the devotion to

the long-cherished unification now achieved; in even greater part the

wrangling, acrimonious, but effective cooperation of the government and

the guerrilla Left depends on their equal and great desire for such

cooperation. The highest Kuomintang leaders--above all others,

Chiang--have pledged themselves to unity and cooperation, and are

determined to eschew civil war in the midst of invasion; the higher

Communist leaders are equally determined. In three years of

collaboration, the highest officers on each side have developed very

genuine respect for each other's sincerity. Quarrels are provoked by the

men in-between, overbearing Nationalists or the doctrinaire Communists,

who cannot forget 1927-37. (The author talked to one Communist leader

who had an odd, not unattractive muscular tic in his face: the

consequence of Kuomintang torture a few years past. Yet he collaborates,

and so do his Kuomintang equivalents, men whose parents lie in unknown

graves.) The common people on both sides want peace above all else,

internal peace between factions, and peace--after victory, and then

only--with Japan. The juxtaposed and competitive forces watch one

another, compete in the development of institutions, and engage in an

auction of good government: whoever wins the deepest love and esteem of

the Chinese people wins China in the end. Few institutional reforms in

the West have had such fateful stimuli.

CHAPTER V

THE KUOMINTANG

The Kuomintang, a Chinese political party, was formed by federation of

old anti-Manchu secret societies, and has become the vehicle for the

will of its Leader, Sun Yat-sen: constitutionally and legally it is the

superior of the Chinese National Government; administratively, one of

the three chief organs of policy execution for the regime; politically,

the only legal political party in Free China. It has had undisputed

primacy, but not monopoly, in domestic Chinese politics for fourteen

years. Despite revolutionary purposes, and idealistic obligations, the

Kuomintang is responsible for the welfare of the government which it

created. Its interest is therefore superior to and identical with the

government's; the party of a one-party state has no business criticizing

the government, since the party at all times possesses the means of

correction or change.

By its constitution and organization the Party is democratic. In

practice it has been a loose oligarchy, similar to the machinery whereby

American presidential candidates are nominated. In composition it is by

its own statement a cross section of China, composed of persons who

qualify as a political elite by their zeal in seeking and obtaining

entrance to the Party. Administratively, the Kuomintang possesses a

group of Ministries (_pu_), closely similar to the governmental

ministries, and executing quasi-governmental policy, plus an additional

group of separate or affiliated organizations having common purposes. In

power politics, the Kuomintang claims supremacy in all unoccupied China

and legitimate power over the occupied areas; in practice it yields

frequently to the demands of dissidents. In function, its highest

purpose--bequeathed by Sun Yat-sen--is to destroy its own monopoly of

power when the time for democracy shall come; like medicine, it is

committed to the eradication of the reason for its own existence.

THE PARTY CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

The Kuomintang adopted a Party-Constitution after thirty-odd years of

activity when, at the suggestion of Soviet advisers, it reorganized on

January 28, 1924 as a formal party, with membership books, regular dues,

etc. Up to then it had operated through techniques intermediate in

formality between American major-party looseness and Chinese

secret-society formality. In twelve chapters, the Constitution dealt

with Membership, Organization, Special Areas, the Leader (Sun Yat-sen,

_Tsung-li_), the Highest Party Organs, Provincial Party Organization,

_Hsien_ Organization, District (_ch'ü_) Organization, and Sub-district

(_ch'ü-fên_, roughly equivalent to the _pao_ in local government)

Organization, Terms of Office, Discipline, and Finance.[1] The actual

application of this Constitution is best described in the words of Wang

Shih-chieh, who wrote before the current hostilities:[2]

The system of organization of the Chinese Kuomintang is

based upon the _Constitution and Bye-laws of the Chinese

Kuomintang_ [_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Hsien-chang_] which was

passed in the First Party Congress [_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao

Ta-hui_] on January 28, Year XIII [1924], and amended in the

following two Party Congresses on January 16, Year XV

[1926] and on March 27, Year XVIII [1929]. No amendment of

any sort was made in the Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses

held in the Years XX [1931] and XXIV [1935] respectively.

According to the above _Constitution and Bye-Laws_, the

Kuomintang has five divisional organizations, _viz._: one

for the whole country, one for each province, one for each

_hsien_ (or governmental district), one for each district,

and one for each district subdivision [_ch'ü-fên-pu_]. The

organ possessing the highest authority in the Kuomintang is

the Party Congress of the Kuomintang. When this Congress is

not in session, the Central Executive Committee is the

highest authority. The organization of the Congress and the

method of electing the Delegates are fixed by the Central

Executive Committee, while the members of the Central

Executive Committee are elected by the Party Congress.

Moreover the number of these members is also fixed by the

Congress. Article I of the "Outlines of the Organization of

the Central Executive Committee," passed in the First

Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee Meeting, on

December 6, Year XXIV [1935], provides: "The Central

Executive Committee appoints nine standing members of the

Committee, to form a Standing Committee which shall

discharge the duties of the Central Executive Committee when

the latter is not in Session. The Standing Committee is

provided with a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, elected from

among the nine standing members." Hence it can be said that

when the Central Executive Committee is not in session, this

Standing Committee represents the highest authority of the

Kuomintang. The offices of the Chairman [superseded by the

Party Chief, _Tsung-ts'ai_] and the Vice-Chairman have been

provided for since December, Year XXIV [1935]. Whether the

Chairman can be the representative of the highest authority

of the Kuomintang or not, under the tacit consent of the

Standing Committee, still depends upon the changes in

circumstances. The said "Outlines of the Organization" does

not state clearly the rights and duties of the Chairman and

the Vice-Chairman. Hence, the highest authorities of the

Kuomintang as prescribed by various written laws are (1) the

Party Congress, (2) the Central Executive Committee, and (3)

the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee.

When the larger organ is not in session, the next following

organ represents the highest authority of the Kuomintang.

But this only applies in theory. As a matter of fact, when

the lower organs are exercising their power, they can not

but be limited by certain restrictions. Whenever important

questions arise which may cause fierce disputes among

members or among the people, the lower organs which have the

authority to decide when the upper organ is not in session

usually reserve the questions for discussion in the meeting

of the upper organ. The resolutions passed by the upper

organs--the Party Congress down to the Central Executive

Committee Meeting--are usually elastic so that the lower

organs--the Standing Committee up to the Central Executive

Committee--do not experience great difficulties or

restrictions in facing various troublesome situations.

According to the _Constitution and Bye-Laws of the Chinese

Kuomintang_, there is, besides the Central Executive

Committee, a Central Control Committee for the Kuomintang.

Its organization is similar to that of the Central Executive

Committee, though with fewer members. It occupies the same

rank as the Central Executive Committee, and its duty is to

superintend and inspect the personnel of the Kuomintang.

The names and organizations of the various organs directly

controlled by the Central Executive Committee have

unavoidably undergone some changes, though in principle

their structures have remained the same. According to the

"Outlines of the Organization of the Central Executive

Committee," the organs under it are divided along three

lines: organization, publicity, and popular training, with

various committees. These organs are to discharge all

affairs of the Kuomintang. Besides these, there is a

Political Committee [superseded by the Supreme National

Defense Council], to "act as the highest directing organ in

all governmental policies and to be responsible to the

Central Executive Committee." Although these organs are

authorized by the Central Executive Committee and formed in

the Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, the

Standing Committee can still exercise authority over them

when the Central Executive Committee is not in session,

because in accordance with the _Constitution and Bye-Laws_,

the Standing Committee takes the place of the Central

Executive Committee. As a matter of fact, since the

activities along the lines of organization, publicity, and

popular training are the internal activities within the

Kuomintang, these organs are usually under the rigid

control of the Standing Committee. As the Political

Committee discharges various political affairs, its position

may be said to be independent. Any resolution passed by this

Committee is sent to the government for execution, and the

Standing Committee has no power to restrict its activities.

Hence under the party government of the Chinese Kuomintang,

the Political Committee is in reality the highest directing

and supervisory authority in matters concerning governmental

policies.

[Footnote 1: The text of this Constitution is given in Arthur N.

Holcombe's invaluable study of the Great Revolution, _The Chinese

Revolution: A Phase in the Regeneration of a World Power_, Cambridge,

Massachusetts, 1930, p. 356-70.]

[Footnote 2: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, Shanghai, XXVI

(1937), p. 651-3.]

The Emergency Party Congress of the Kuomintang, Hankow, March 29-April

1, 1938, provided for two further amendments to the Party Constitution.

It abolished the system of reserve members, and, far more significantly,

it created the post of _Tsung-ts'ai_, here translated Party Chief, which

was indistinguishable except as a matter of terminology from the post of

_Tsung-li_, held in perpetuity by Sun Yat-sen. Chiang K'ai-shek was

elected Party Chief, and the powers of his office were stated to be

duplicates of those given originally to the _Tsung-li:_ a general

provision that "all members shall follow the direction of" the

_Tsung-li_, which was not implemented; chairmanship of the Party

Congress and of the Central Executive Committee (_a fortiori_, of the

Standing Committee of the C.E.C.); and a veto over the acts of the

Congress and the C.E.C. Furthermore, the Political Committee (Central

Political Council) was replaced by the Supreme National Defense Council,

of which Chiang was also elected Chairman.

Since Chiang had been Chairman of the Standing Committee, it follows

that the change of formal labels did not much alter the constitutional

organization of the Kuomintang, nor materially change Chiang's position.

Chiang does not help to create machinery of power in order to lurk

behind it, thus proclaiming it a mere façade. He, as a public servant

reared in the Confucian tradition, possesses sufficient respect for

words to let them mean what they are publicly declared to mean. The

post of _Tsung-ts'ai_ is more than ample in providing Chiang with the

power he feels necessary to accomplish national unification, mitigate

social injustice, and promote serious representative government. He

accepts the full measure of his power; doing so publicly, his subsequent

actions appear relatively modest. By Western standards, Chiang is naive

enough to be honest.

A point brought out in connection with the National Government (p. 46,

above) is worth reiteration. Neither by Party action nor by governmental

change has the Kuomintang monopoly of political power been modified by

law. There is no United Front, Popular Front, or any other kind of front

in the legal system; even in practical administration, the entrance of

non-Party men has been at Party direction; and it is only in the Special

Areas, the special war services, and the military organization that the

Kuomintang has relaxed its control of power. Other groups are sharing in

the work of the People's Political Council. The prudence of such a

policy may appear open to question; its consistency is not.

PARTY ORGANIZATION

Organizationally the Party is bipolar, with the power concentrated in

the entire membership at the base, and in the Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_) at

the apex. The highest authority of the Kuomintang is the Party Congress

(_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui_), which could also be translated as

All-Nation Convention of Party Delegates. Party Congresses have been

held as follows: I, Canton, 1924; II, Canton, 1926; III, Nanking, 1929;

IV, Nanking, 1931; V, Nanking, 1935; and the Emergency Party Congress,

Hankow, 1938. Wang Ch'ing-wei organized a rump Kuomintang on the basis

of a "Sixth Party Congress" held in 1939; the legitimate Sixth Congress

has not yet been called.

The Party Congress is the highest agency of the Kuomintang, and thereby

the highest legal authority in China--a position which it now shares

with the Party Chief, _ex officio_ its Chairman. The Kuomintang Party

Constitution provides that the Congress should ordinarily meet every

other year (_Art._ 27), but permits the C.E.C. to postpone a Congress

for not more than one year. This provision has frequently been violated.

In actual effect the Congress is neither an effective governing body,

nor, at the other extreme, a completely helpless tool. No Party Congress

has led to a drastic shift of actual political power.

The barometer of influence functions outside the Congress, and the

Congress ratifies and establishes what has actually occurred. The high

authority of the incumbent C.E.C. in matters of accrediting delegates,

plus its power to appoint delegates from areas not represented (a

feature taken from Soviet practice), gives the political Ins a

formidable weapon with which to bludgeon down opposition, but since the

value of the Party Congress is that of a legitimizing agency, overt

interference with Party functions would destroy the utility of the

Congress. Its level of freedom and efficacy may be compared with

American party conventions. Unwieldy, improvised agencies are not able

to meet the challenges of well-knit executive groups, but their very

unmanageability preserves to them a freedom of incalculable action. The

Party Congress could not in practice exercise its formal, legal power of

overthrowing the entire Party leadership and starting the Party off on a

new tack; it could, however, so humiliate the incumbents by subtle but

obvious political gestures familiar to all Chinese, that the leadership

would retire for reasons of health, or because of a yearning to

contemplate the cosmos.

The elaborate structure of the Kuomintang is shown on the chart of

organization (p. 331). Abstraction of the most essential features of

this chart reveals the following:

-------------KUOMINTANG PARTY CONGRESS-------------

|| Chairman: The Chief ||

|| || ||

\/ \/ \/

CENTRAL CONTROL CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SUPREME NATIONAL

COMMITTEE Chairman: The Chief -----> DEFENSE COUNCIL

|| || ||

\/ \/ \/

the _control_ power Party administration The National Government

over the Party through subordinate organs of China

|| || ||

\/ \/ \/

supervisory system Party Branches, the political system

agencies and affiliates

The Central Executive Committee (_Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui_)

is a relatively large body with one hundred and twenty members. The

Party Constitution requires that it meet every six months or less. These

sessions, the Plenary Sessions of the C.E.C., are by far the

best-established political processes in the Chinese state. Actual shifts

in power are here fought out, since the C.E.C. possesses authority ample

for almost any emergency. The expulsion of Wang Ch'ing-wei was effected

through C.E.C. action, and did not require the work of any higher body.

The Central Control Committee (_Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui_) is

an agency which the Chinese adapted from two sources, the Bolshevik

pattern of an independent intra-party control system, and the native

_chien-ch'a_ power. Similar in function to the Commission of Party

Control employed by the Communist Party in the Soviet Union rather than

to the Organization Bureau, the Central Control Committee (also termed,

in another common translation, Central Supervisory Committee) is in

charge of an inspective system. Because of the relative laxness of

Kuomintang organization, the work of this Committee is far less than one

might expect. It has not been adequate to ensure rigidly strict Party

efficiency, diligence, or honesty; neither has it become a terrorist

agency inflicting an inviolable Party line. Few faults in politics fail

to be virtues as well; inefficiency has its minor compensations. In

times of secure power, rigid Party discipline might let the Kuomintang

grow into a genuine and full-fledged tyranny; nevertheless, in times of

stress, such as the present, the Party stands in need of stiffening and

control.

The third agency, the Supreme National Defense Council, is the Party's

agent in charge of government. (See above, p. 46 _ff._)

Immediately under the Central Executive Committee there are three

agencies of vitality and importance. The first of these is the _San Min

Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan_ (usually translated _San Min Chu I_ Youth

Corps, or Kuomintang Youth Corps). A war-time addition to the Party, it

became politically possible when the abandonment of appeasement

re-aligned government and youth. The Communist Youth Corps (_Kung-ch'an

Ch'ing-nien T'uan_) provided a model and rival. The Constitution of the

Corps, together with an appraisal (from the official point of view) of

its work, is given below in Appendices II (B) and II (C). In terms of

practical political effect, the Corps is significant, although far less

important than its organization scheme would indicate. It combines some

of the functions of a military training system with social and

propaganda work. Leftists have complained against it bitterly as an

agency of espionage and repression within student groups; others have

acclaimed it as a meeting of the Kuomintang and the youth, fruitful in

terms of national unity. The importance of the Corps lies in its

organization of a broad group of young men, one or more steps up from

the bottom of the economic scale, and in the fact that the government

and Kuomintang--after years of overriding youth opinion--now find it

feasible to organize their own affiliate. Few charges of corruption have

touched the Corps, which lies particularly within the purview of the

Generalissimo. A minor but active element in the political scene, it

stands for the Kuomintang's bid for permanence, and, in the event of

internal dissension, would be a valuable prop to the _status quo_. The

political indecision and laxness of China in general has kept the group

from becoming either a _Hitlerjugend_ or a frankly democratic C.C.C.

(Civilian Conservation Corps) on the American plan; the Corps is at best

a laggard bid to young men, and a belated competition with the Left and

the Communists.[3]

[Footnote 3: See _China at War_, Vol. V, No. 3 (October 1940), p.

77-8, for a recent official account of the Corps.]

The Party Affairs Committee (_Tang-wu Wei-yüan-hui_) supplements the

work of the Central Control Committee in investigating Party personnel

and acting as a supplementary housekeeping agency for intra-Party

organization.

The third of these agencies is the [Central] Training Committee

(_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_). To this Committee has fallen the labor of

invigorating the Kuomintang under conditions of strain, from war, from

the Wang schism, and from new domestic competition. The Generalissimo

has put the most vigorous efforts into the work of this agency, and has

organized under it a Kuomintang Training Corps (_Hsün-lien T'uan_) which

is providing extensive new resources of leadership to the Party.

Enterprising or promising young men are gathered together in training

meetings, and given intensive work in Party doctrine, propaganda and

organization methods, local administration, etc. The Corps has tended to

accept youths and some men of middle age from positions of

responsibility, and to equip them with the knowledge and the discipline

necessary to continuation of pre-democratic government. In the constant

race between government activity as a positive force and government

apathy combined with outside anti-governmental revolution as negative

forces, the training agencies are doing as much as any single enterprise

to stabilize the regime.

The Central Political Institute (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao_)

tops the entire program, as a training agency combining features of a

university, a camp, and a Party office. Under the personal control and

leadership of Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu, one of the Generalissimo's intimates and

the elder of the celebrated Ch'ên brothers, the Institute stands high

for its selection of students, the discipline and instruction it

imparts, and its practical political effect. The Kuomintang, pronounced

moribund by competent foreign observers ten years ago, today is in a

better position for leadership and development than it has been for many

years. (The author, who visited the Institute during the summer of 1940,

found the student body as well disciplined as any he has seen outside of

Germany, the staff highly competent [mostly American-trained], and the

physical facilities unsurpassed.) Admission to the Institute is open to

graduates of Middle Schools (secondary); students who are married may be

admitted, but single students may not marry while in attendance. The

courses of study are in general the equivalent of American undergraduate

work, although some graduate study is offered. The curriculum includes

such subjects as military training, Japanese language and politics, and

Marxian thought (in connection with _min shêng chu-i_). The general

course is supplemented by two special courses--the Civil Service

Training Corps and the Advanced Civil Service Training Corps--which are

set up in collaboration with the Examination _Yüan_. Graduates are

organized into alumni associations, to which the faculty are admitted as

supervisory members. It is a matter of success and distinction to

undergo the training of the Institute, which is the equivalent of a West

Point for political and governmental work. The Generalissimo visits the

Institute and speaks before it as much as possible, frequently as often

as bi-weekly, but with occasional gaps of months.[4] In addition to the

Central Political Institute, there is a [Kuomintang] Northwest Academy

of Youth, which has been even more active in training young men for

Party and government service. Proximity to the Red training center at

Yenan makes its work urgent; training, according to report, is briefer,

cruder, and more vigorous than in the central agency. The sub-surface

possibility of renewed class war by the Communists makes the Academy

peculiarly necessary.

[Footnote 4: Information given the author by Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu and

members of his staff, at the Central Political Institute, August 18,

1940. Few places are more beautiful than the valley in which the cool,

spacious buildings of the Institute are set. Landscaped for centuries,

and celebrated as a beauty spot, the area is filled with carved

shrines, severely simple monuments, and flagstone walks. A river runs

through a forested gorge; waterfalls feed the stream.

Dr. Ch'ên supplemented his hospitality in Western China by

transmitting to the author a series of statements in reply to

questions which were put to him in writing. Of these, the two most

interesting refer, first, to the economic status of the Institute's

students, and secondly, to the Kuomintang training plan in the

Northwest: "Judged by functions and economic levels, students of the

Central Political Institute represent all economic strata of Chinese

society. Those of peasant origin are most numerous, forming over 40%

of the total number."--"For the purpose of educating young men and

women in the border provinces, the Central Political Institute has

established a School for the Border Provinces, of which branches were

established at Powtow (Suiyuan province), Sinin (Chinghai province),

and Kangting (Sikong province) in October 1934. Another branch was

established at Shuchow (Kansu province) in August 1935, this being the

school sponsored by the Kuomintang in the Northwest. The Powtow branch

was suspended in 1940, and those in Sinin and Kangting were handed

over to the Provincial Governments concerned at the same time. So the

only Kuomintang school in the Northwest at present is the one at

Shuchow. It is subdivided into three parts: namely, a Normal School, a

Middle School, and a Primary School. Its annual budget is one hundred

thousand dollars Chinese national currency." (Letter to the author,

March 10, 1941.)]

Apart from the Youth Corps, the training agencies, and the Party Affairs

Committee, but also directly underneath the Kuomintang C.E.C., come the

coordinated and uncoordinated agencies of Party administration. Their

organization is as follows:

C.E.C. OF THE KUOMINTANG

STANDING COMMITTEE

|||| ||||||||

_San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps-|||| ||||||||- Central Secretariat

||| |||||||

Training Committee-----------||| |||||||-- Party-Ministry of

Training Agencies || |||||| Organization

|| ||||||--- Party-Ministry of Publicity

Party Affairs Committee-------|| |||||

| |||||---- Party-Ministry of Social

Affiliates-------------------- | |||| Affairs

||||----- Party-Ministry of Overseas

||| Chinese Affairs

|||------ Party-Ministry of Women's

|| Affairs

||------- Special Committees:

| Revolutionary Achievement

| Investigation Committee

| Pension Committee

| Party History Committee

| Revolutionary Loans

| Committee

| Overseas-Chinese

Party Field Contributions Committee

Agencies

The Party-Ministries[5] constitute a part of the governing machinery of

China. The Organization Party-Ministry is important because of its

intra-Party work; the Minister, Dr. Ch'u Chia-hua, a German-educated

student, is one of the most active Party leaders, and deeply suspect by

the Left. His work is the field of Kuomintang Party administration. The

Party-Ministries of Social and Overseas Chinese Affairs combine the

functions of government with those of the Party; the former is a bureau

of protocol, and the latter acts as an extra-governmental colonial

office. The Secretariats provide study agencies for the governmental

system. They perform functions which are in the United States both

governmental and private (e.g., the work of the Brookings Institution,

the Public Administration Clearing House, the various Presidential

research and advisory committees, and intra-departmental housekeeping

agencies). The system of local government reform is sponsored by the

Central Kuomintang Secretariat (_Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u_), even more

than by the Ministry of the Interior in the government, under whose

jurisdiction it falls. The Secretary-General is a benign revolutionary

veteran, Yeh-Ch'u-tsang; the Deputy Secretary-General, Dr. K'an

Nai-kuang, is a Party official of almost twenty years' standing, who

studied in the United States and visited Europe in quest of data on

administration. Boundlessly energetic, he is typical of the younger

scholars who combine the academic and the political and impart to the

Kuomintang a large share of its present energy.

[Footnote 5: The term _pu_ is usually translated Board, but the

_pu-chang_ (_pu_ chief) is given as Minister. Since the identical

terms are rendered Ministry, Minister, Vice-Minister, etc., in the

case of the government, the term Party-Ministry is here adopted as

both distinct and descriptive.]

Internationally, the most important Party-Ministry is that of Publicity

(_Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu_), which carries out most of the Chinese

propaganda program. Headed by Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, a very outspoken man,

its functions are distributed between Sections of General Affairs,

Motion Pictures, Newspapers, Advisory, Consultation, and International

Publicity, together with services such as China's leading semi-official

news service (the Central News Agency), the Party newspapers, the

Central Motion Picture Studios, and the official broadcasting system.

Because of the difficulties of language, travel, and passports, the

International Department supplies most of the news which reaches the

world press from Free China. The function of the Western newspapermen

consists largely in editing and supplementing this news from whatever

independent source they can find, or, occasionally and at the cost of

considerable hardship, to attempt to discover the facts for themselves.

In general, the Chinese follow the policy of giving the favorable side

of the news, simply omitting anything that could conceivably be

unfavorable. Their publicity services are no more guilty of positive

_suggestio falsi_ than the services of the British or Americans.

Nevertheless, Chinese notions of dignity and public policy differ widely

from Americans'; news would be hard to obtain or valueless when

obtained, except for the fact that the staff of the International

Section is almost entirely American-trained and well-acquainted with

American notions of news. The very able and active Hollington Tong, one

of China's most successful newspapermen, who was in press work long

before he became a Party official, has led in the supply of ample news

in the face of great difficulties. He is esteemed by Westerners to be,

along with Mme. Chiang, one of the Generalissimo's most effective

publicity advisers.

The Party-Ministry of Publicity also attends to the needs and interests

of Western newspapermen and other visitors, arranging appointments,

schedules, etc., and even boarding many of them at a Press Hostel. These

attentions, while from time to time irritatingly restrictive, are in the

end almost always appreciated as invaluable. Only the Leftists shun the

Publicity Ministry; they do so unsuccessfully, and to their loss. No

other Asiatic, and few Western, states can boast as alert and effective

a system of propaganda. In the troubled shifts and crises of world

politics, the Chinese have managed to retain the sympathy of the most

diverse audiences--from American church people to Soviet agitation

squads, and from British conservatives to Nazi clubs in Germany. The

American traditions of frankness, zest, liveliness in news are

transplanted; while they have suffered a sea-change, they still operate

with telling effect.[6]

[Footnote 6: Visitors to Chungking owe much to the Foreign Affairs

Section of the International Publicity Department. Its chief, the

affable Mr. C. C. Chi, a well-known economist from Shanghai, has acted

as host to almost every visitor to Hankow or Chungking. He has

fulfilled endless requests--many of them irrational--with unfailing

patience, good humor, candor, and intelligence. Few books on

contemporary China fail to bear the imprint of his help; the present

one is no exception.]

The Ministry of Women's Affairs, decreed in 1940, is in process of

organizing women's work for the Party. Previously, most women's

organizations had been knit together in the affiliated New Life

Movement. The minor committees of the Party--historical, pensions,

etc.--lie outside the scope of war activities. Although they continue,

their functions are subordinate to the purposes of resistance and

reconstruction.

Formal field organization follows seven patterns:

-----------------------PARTY CONGRESS

| |

Central Party Chief

Control |

Committee Central Executive Committee

Standing Committee

|

Party Secretariat

|

------------Central Party Administrative System----------------

| | | | | | |

| Overseas- | | | | Provincial

| Chinese | | | | Party

| Party | | | | Organ

| Organ | | | | |

| | | | | | |

| | | Special | | |

| | | Party Organ | | |

| | Special for Army | | _Hsien_

Direct | Party Navy, | Special or

Overseas- | Organ Air Forces | Municipal Municipal

Chinese | for and | Party Party

Party | Railwaymen Military | Organ Organ

Organ | and Schools | | |

| | Seamen | | | |

| | | | Direct District District

| Branch District District District Party Party

| Party Party Organ Party Organ Party Organ Organ

| Organ | | organ | |

| | | | | | |

Sub-organ Sub-organ Sub- Sub- Sub- Sub- Sub-

[_Pu-fên_] | district district district district district

| | Party Party Party Party Party

| | Organ Organ Organ Organ Organ

| | | | | | |

Small Small Small Small Small Small Small

Group Group Group Group Group Group Group

[_Hsiao-tsu_]

Much of this exists only on paper. After the break with the Communists

in 1927, and the transformation of the Kuomintang from a

government-destroying to a governing agency, the functional and

agitational groups were allowed to slip into desuetude. Under the

pressure of war, and the encouraging political situation, which puts a

premium on action, the Kuomintang has adopted a variety of policies

designed to maintain its position.

THE KUOMINTANG BID FOR LEADERSHIP

Chief among the new devices is the reintroduction of the Small Group, or

Party Cell (_hsiao-tsu_). A comprehensive plan for small-unit

organization has been proclaimed; the text is given below, Appendix II

(D). This cell system, as explained by the Deputy Secretary-General of

the Kuomintang, Dr. K'an Nai-kuang, will provide the roots of the Party

with new vigor.[7] The small group provides for further diffusion of

Party work, and introduces novel principles of political organization to

the Party. Self-criticism, airing of opinion, mutual personal

examination--these are expected to stimulate Party work. The war

provides the Party with the opportunity to do with ease things which

seemed insurmountably slow and difficult before Japanese bombers helped

unification. Opium-suppression, bandit-eradication, and similar work of

organization and improvement challenges the Party to further effort. The

imminence of democracy requires more intensive preparation in discussion

and in self-organization for small groups. The _hsiao-tsu_ system is

designed to bolster Party morale, improve the Party work, and spread the

teaching of Sun Yat-sen.

[Footnote 7: Statement to the author at Kuomintang Central

Headquarters, Chungking, July 16, 1940; Dr. K'an also supplied the

facts for the new organizational features of the Party. The following

interpretations are the author's alone.]

The new governmental pattern of local government is to be reinforced by

the corresponding development of Kuomintang agencies. In the

government's plan, rural development operates on four levels: the

militia; the school system; the agricultural and industrial

cooperatives; and the political organization. The same person in each

village or hamlet would be responsible for all four. If he is to be a

Party man, he must be effective to be of service and a credit to the

Party.

In order to eradicate undesirable personnel, the Kuomintang has

increased its Party-purging facilities with what is known as the Party

Supervisor's Net (_Tang-jên Chien-ch'a Wang_). By action of the C.E.C.

on June 13, 1940, the sub-district Party organs are to elect one to

three members each to serve, with a six months' term, as Control

Members. With a power of report on Party discipline, and responsibility

for Party conditions, this change was expected to drive undesirables

more effectively out of the Party.

Three years from 1940 was set as the final date for the installation of

the new system. While the fractionization of a Party may seem to be of

minor importance, it actually is a major factor in the potential

development of the Kuomintang. In the period of Party government, the

more popular organs of Party members tended to slough off, leaving large

_Tangpu_ (Party Headquarters) in the _hsien_ or cities. These quite

often fell into the hands of local machines, with the consequence that

they interfered with government, and promoted the usual evils of party

machines. The diffusion of Party work, by letting individuals

participate more freely as individuals, may help to break the monopoly

of these bureaus, and restore the Party effectiveness with less reliance

on supervision from above.

The Kuomintang, in addition to these reorganization devices, is meeting

competition from the Left by increasing its membership. Membership

figures are not available in war time; the total is probably over two

million. In some instances the new members are no particular improvement

on the pre-existing group, but in the majority of cases the Party

broadens its base of popular support.

INTRA-KUOMINTANG POLITICS

The years which saw the rise of the Kuomintang to power, and its

subsequent period of authority, showed a diminution of the disparateness

of Party fractions. For a long time the adherents of Wang Ch'ing-wei

stood formally Left; those of Hu Han-min, formally Right; while various

older Party alignments preserved their outlines more or less clearly

(e.g., the Kuomintang Western Hills Group). With the consistent rise of

Chiang K'ai-shek to Party and national leadership, and the steady influx

of non-Party or merely nominal Party men into the government, Party

distinctions lost their cogency in practical affairs.

In terms of influence, patronage, and effective policy-making, the

Kuomintang is a conglomeration of innumerable personal leaderships knit

together by a common outlook, a common interest in the maintenance of

the National Government and formal Party power, and a common loyalty to

the Party Chief. The clearest groups are those which are out of the

current political stream; most notable among these is the Wang schism,

and a few scattered irreconcilables of half-forgotten Party struggles.

Within the regime, Kuomintang groups tend to coalesce as the leaders

meet, negotiate, and govern together in the councils of state.

So completely in the ascendant that they have lost their general

character as groups are the _Erh Ch'ên_ (literally "the two Ch'êns";

also termed "C.C. group" by English-speaking Chinese), led by the

brothers, Ch'ên Li-fu, Minister of Education, and Ch'ên Kuo-fu, head of

the Central Political Institute, and the _Huangpu_ (Whampoa Academy)

groups, led by the Generalissimo himself. The Ch'ên brothers have been

close adherents of Chiang throughout his career. Brilliant, vigorous,

sharp in the retention of power, they have made themselves anathema to

the Left. They are effective reorganizers of the Kuomintang, keenly

aware of its position as monopoly Party, and their protégés and trainees

are omnipresent through government and Party. Their military counterpart

is the _Huangpu_ group. It includes officers either trained by Chiang

himself or under his close supervision. With the passage of each year,

the proportion of Whampoa (or daughter-institution) graduates in the

national armies rises. The officers include a high proportion of

technically qualified men, whose capabilities and interests are chiefly

military. Builders of the new army, they look to the Generalissimo and

the Party for dicta on social, economic, and political policy; they

provide China with the unpolitical army which has been an American

ideal, although rejected by Soviet and South American practice. The

officers are not encouraged to assume decisive roles in local politics,

but to refer such things back to Headquarters. In consequence, although

the danger of a new _tuchünism_ has almost disappeared, the army staff

does not readily adapt itself to a _levée en masse_, or to the problems

of a social-revolutionary army. The very factors which make of the army

a tool and not a practice-ground of government also make it somewhat

rigid in dealing with guerrilla situations.

Both the C. C. and Whampoa groups are instilled with notions of Party

and military discipline which trace back in the first place to the

instruction given by Russians from the Soviet Union. While they follow

Sun and Chiang in accepting the promises of democracy, their notion of

democracy is as different from that of the Left as Washington's was from

the Jacobins'. They are interested in sound, disciplined, powerful

national government, representative, republican, and stable; they see

the revolution as largely complete in the power-destroying phase, and

are beginning to think in the reconstruction phase. After ten years of

strain and terror in fighting the Communists, they look with suspicion

on political changes which would open the nation to opportunist

Communist agitation, or make Chungking the helpless diplomatic

dependency of the Narkomindel. The bitterness of internecine conflict

has made them deeply suspicious of sudden or radical reform, although

they themselves profess a genuine interest in social welfare. The actual

reforms which have been accomplished are, in the scale of political

reality, already stupendous: opium eradication, tax collection,

diffusion of national authority, communications, industrialization,

military advance, etc. To the Kuomintang center, a demand for sharp or

shocking change is suspect. They desire to amplify what they have, and

to let changes wait on the ability of trained personnel--not entrusting

progress to the vagaries of mass movements with incalculable force and

direction.

While the National Government was at Nanking, there was a _Fu-hsing Shê_

(Regeneration Club), organized by a few hot-headed members of the

Kuomintang center. Its activities in support of the Generalissimo and

the government, under the further sobriquet of Bluejacket or Blue Shirt

group, earned it the reputation of a Chinese _Schutzstaffel_. The

comparison was at best fanciful, but any comparison at all was heartily

desired by the Europocentric Chinese Left and by the world press.

Magnified beyond recognition, the Club was identified with almost every

agency in the government and Party, not excluding the New Life Movement.

As applied, the name _Blue Shirt_ covered a wide scattering of unrelated

agencies which had the common features of a Kuomintang-center position,

an inclination to effective action (including violence) and some

secrecy. Effective political-police work is led by one T'ai Li, whose

name is whispered by dissidents; but counter-espionage and supervision

of suspects is also performed through Party agents, the regular

military, and governmental agencies.

Around the Kuomintang center there are other groups, some closely

related to Chiang, some remote. The Political Scientists (_Chêng-hsüeh

Hsi_) owe their name to a society which once existed in Nanking. They

include many of the administrators, men with American training who are

interested in industrial and fiscal development. The clarity of this

group has faded by its absorption into the governing center. The

Cantonese are represented by two levels of politics: those who based

their power on Canton province and those who remained within the

government. President Sun K'ê of the Legislative _Yüan_ has been

outstanding in his willingness to cooperate with the Communists and

Left, and is on cordial terms with relatively independent progressives,

such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen. Further groups within the Kuomintang are

constituted by the loyalist followers of Wang Ch'ing-wei, who now attach

themselves to other leaders, and by other personal or regional

followings (e.g., the _Tungpei_ followers of Chang Hsüeh-liang,

ex-_tuchün_ of Manchuria and ex-Vice-Commander-in-Chief, still "retired"

as a result of the Sian kidnapping). Finally, a number of elder Party

leaders remain because of their seniority or connection with Sun

Yat-sen; they do not need to attach themselves to any particular clique

in order to retain their position. These include such men as the

venerable Secretary-General of the Party, Yeh Ch'u-tsang; the President

of the National Government, Lin Shên; and the President of the Control

_Yüan_, Yü Yu-jên.

What has been said about the groups in the People's Political Council

(see p. 76 _ff._) applies to these. It is possible, as in American

congressional or administrative circles, to distinguish blocs of

leaders with differing interests or policy; but clarity fades upon

scrutiny. The orientation, even by the participants, is subjective.

Lacking continuous institutional form, clustering of leaders is

transient, shifting with political events.

It is difficult to appraise the role of the Kuomintang without at the

same time assessing the position of the government. The two are

inescapably connected. Although the Communists profess recognition of

the government, and pledge it loyalty, they offer only comradeship--on

their own terms--to the Kuomintang. This arrangement may last for a

considerable length of time, but the National Government is a Kuomintang

creation; short of violent revolution, Party control will scarcely break

in war time. Upon the Party, therefore, depends much of the efficacy of

the Government.

Many well-known Leftist writers on China--such as Edgar Snow--make the

comment that whereas the National Government is deserving as a

government, and worthy of support, the Kuomintang is hopelessly corrupt,

a creature of landlords and capitalists, or, of even worse, "feudal

elements." Such a distinction, based on strong moral urges and a desire

to achieve historical parallels, is untenable in practice. Kuomintang

power has weathered more than a decade of adversities. The Generalissimo

depends upon it. Analysis of the Kuomintang as the party of the Chinese

national bourgeoisie, and ascription of a mass character to the

Communists alone, is a fallacy, comparable to a consideration of Earl

Browder as the real leader of the American working class.

In point of fact, neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party in

China is a mass party. Neither ever has been, although each sought mass

character in the Great Revolution. Still largely apolitical, the Chinese

masses are organized socially, culturally, and economically into a

village and guild system which functions through most of the country.

The Kuomintang includes a very high proportion of shopkeepers, returned

overseas-Chinese, Chinese still resident overseas, Christians,

landlords, and Western-returned students. The class composition of the

Kuomintang is largely incidental to its functional character. Since the

Kuomintang was the party of Westernization, it gathered in revolutionary

days Chinese of all classes who were sufficiently modernized to be

interested. Naturally the poorest peasants and the coastal proletariat

did not constitute a large proportion of such membership. The men who

entered did so as Christians, as travellers, as temperamental rebels,

rather than as representatives of the bourgeoisie. When the Communists,

whom a recent writer[8] with unconscious humor calls the party of the

Chinese proletariat, came on the scene, the same social elements

contributed to its membership. Once the Communist Party abandoned the

Trotskyist line of urban revolt for the leadership of endemic peasant

rebellions, its composition changed somewhat, although the Communist

leaders of today are socially much like their Kuomintang equivalents.

The men who are class-conscious are, like Lenin, historically,

philosophically, and morally so; it is a matter of literary necessity,

not of fact.

[Footnote 8: For a Marxian analysis of the Kuomintang, carefully

stripped of frank Marxian verbiage, see "Wei-Meng-pu," "The Kuomintang

in China: Its Fabric and Future" in _Pacific Affairs_, Vol. XIII, No.

1 (March 1940), p. 30-44. The author _a priori_ defines the Kuomintang

as the party of the national bourgeoisie in China, in effect exhorting

it to fulfill its historic mission of completing the national

democratic revolution, whereupon socialism [i.e., Stalinism] may

historically follow. Nevertheless, its comment on personalities is

informing in terms of practical politics.]

The Kuomintang is in power; the Communist and Left parties are not. As

the governing group, the Kuomintang naturally attracts those persons who

would seek to enter any government. Since it has not and does not

promote rural class warfare, pre-existing class relationships continue.

The Party and the Government have sought, not always efficiently or

faithfully to the _n_th degree, to carry out the programs of land

reform, democratization, etc., to which they have been committed. The

Kuomintang has tolerated widespread sharecropping, land destitution,

usury, and rural despotism--because it found these in existence, and was

preoccupied with building a national government, a modern army, adequate

finance, and with eradicating some of the worst evils, such as opium,

bandits, and Communists (who, whatever their ideals, nevertheless helped

to impoverish a poor nation by merciless civil war).

If the Kuomintang were out, it too could point to existing evils.

Whoever controls government bears the responsibility. A class element is

to a certain degree inescapable in any government; illiterate,

unqualified persons do not assume leadership even in the Soviet Union

until they have escaped their handicaps through training. But to make of

the Kuomintang the party of the Chinese landlords and merchants alone is

as fallacious as to make the Republicans or Democrats solely the

instruments of American capitalism. A comment such as this would be

unnecessary in the case of the United States; but persons who are not

Marxian with respect to the analysis of current American events often

assume a Left approach to China because of impatience with evils which

they see but cannot understand.

The final appraisal of the Kuomintang must be based on the practical

work of the government and the Party. In 1940, their effective control

was wider and deeper than ever before. The Chinese state was more nearly

in existence. The armies were undefeated. The growth of China in the

past ten years, and the stand made by China at war, has been made under

the unrelaxed control of the Kuomintang monopoly of constitutional

power, together with its clear primacy in more tangible power--schools,

finance, armies, and police.

THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT AND OTHER AFFILIATES

The important New Life Movement (_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung_) is, strictly

speaking, not a Party organization; but Chiang is its Chairman, and in

purposes and personnel it interlocks with the Party. Convinced that

institutional and economic reform required accompanying moral and

ideological reform, the Generalissimo founded an Officers' Moral

Endeavor Corps as early as 1927. This organization was placed, soon

after its initiation, in the hands of Colonel (now Major-General) J. L.

Huang, a graduate of Vanderbilt University and an experienced Y.M.C.A.

secretary. The Corps' purposes were comparable to those of a Y.M.C.A.

with American armies, but Chinese morality in general, not Christian

sectarian teaching, was stressed. With Chiang's encouragement, the Corps

came to include a high percentage of the officers. Teaching cleanliness,

truthfulness, promptness, kindness, dignity, etc., it helped build

morale.

In 1934, after seven years of war against the Communist-led agrarian

insurrections in South Central China, the Generalissimo decided to

extend to the whole people the type of work done by the Corps. On

February 19, 1934, he made his first speech announcing the New Life

Movement and on the following March 11, a mass meeting of about one

hundred thousand people, representing five hundred organizations,

signalized the formal inauguration of the movement.[9] From then on the

Movement was continued as a regular phase of anti-Communist

reconstruction. It elicited praise for its attempt to reach the roots of

China's political demoralization, and its intent to remedy the everyday

life of the people,[10] although there was skepticism as to its

effectiveness in removing troubles deeply ingrained in the economic

system.

[Footnote 9: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, March 4,

1940. English translations of names such as the New Life Movement,

Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps, National Spiritual Mobilization, etc.

are often awkward or jejune where the original is not.]

[Footnote 10: Young, C. W. H., _New Life for Kiangsi_, Shanghai, 1935,

is a missionary work which praises the New Life Movement highly. The

book includes interesting, first-hand, unfavorable accounts of the

rule of the quondam Chinese Soviet Republic, and explains some of the

opposition to the Communists. The interconnection between

Communist-suppression and the New Life Movement is consciously and

clearly demonstrated.]

The type of evil against which the New Life Movement struggles is

well-illustrated by Mme. Chiang's enumeration of the seven deadly sins:

self-seeking, "face," cliquism, defeatism (_mei-yu fa-tzŭ_, the

Chinese _nitchevo_), inaccuracy (_ch'a-pu-to_), lack of self-discipline,

and evasion of responsibility.[11] In addition to these sins of social

and political behavior, there are others such as filthiness,

carelessness of infection, indecent or sloppy dress, bad manners,

unkindness, etc. The Movement, easily understood in view of the

traditional Confucian emphasis on personal conduct, seeks to reach

individual behavior. The West European and North American peoples have

been disciplined by technology itself: timeliness, cleanliness,

regularity, have come to be a part of daily life. Any nation which seeks

to shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy discovers that

amiable defects become ruinous flaws: machinery cannot wait; a machine

society requires a discipline of its own. The New Life Movement is

attacking the points of social behavior which strike the newcomer to

China most immediately and most unfavorably.

[Footnote 11: Chiang, May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, New

York, 1941, p. 38 _ff._ Mme. Chiang's work also includes a full

account of the enterprises of the New Life Movement and of its

affiliates.]

The positive virtues of the New Life Movement were formulated by the

Generalissimo. Four in number, they are _li_, _i_, _lien_, and _ch'ih_.

_Li_ is the fundamental Confucian virtue, and is based upon _jên_. _Jên_

being humane self-awareness, or consciousness of membership in society,

_li_ is the application of this awareness to conduct; it thereby

signifies proper behavior, not in the superficial sense of empty

formality, but in the sense of behavior which is _human_: the full

expression of man's moral and ethical stature. The traditional

translation of _li_ is _rites_, _ceremonies_, or _etiquette_--terms

which, because of their connotations of an empty ceremonialism, are

inadequate as a rendition of the original. The Generalissimo writes of

_li_: "It becomes natural law, when applied to nature; it becomes a

rule, when applied to social affairs; and signifies discipline, when

applied to national affairs. These three phases of one's life are all

regulated by reason. Therefore, 'li' can be interpreted as regulated

attitude of mind and heart."[12] Chiang thus reconciled, for his own

thought, the naturalistic ethics of Confucius, wherein man and nature

were parts of an inseparable ethical structure, and the pragmatism of

Sun Yat-sen.

[Footnote 12: Chiang K'ai-shek, _Outline of the New Life Movement_,

Chungking (?), n.d. p. 8. This is the translation, by Mme. Chiang, of

_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung Kang-yao_, Nanking, n.d., originally

published in May 1934.]

_I_ is the element in man which makes him observe _li_: ethics or

justice. _Lien_ is "clear discrimination (honesty in personal, public,

and official life): Integrity." According to the lexicographer,[13] it

is "pure, incorrupt, not avaricious." The fourth principle is _ch'ih_,

given by the dictionary as "to feel shame,"[14] and rendered by the

Generalissimo and Madame Chiang as "real self-consciousness

(self-respect): Honor."[15] From this the Generalissimo evolved his

formulation of a theory of action.[16] That he is not unaware of

criticisms directed against him for talking about morality when people

are fighting and starving is shown by his spirited counter-attack:

There are two kinds of skeptics:

First, some hold the view that the four virtues are simply

rules of good conduct. No matter how good they may be, no

benefit to the nation can be derived from them if the

knowledge and technique used by that nation are inferior to

others.

Those who hold this view do not seem to understand the

difference between matters of primary and secondary

importance. From the social and national point of view, only

those who are virtuous can best use their knowledge and

technique for the salvation of the country. Otherwise,

ability may be abused for dishonorable purposes. "Li," "i,"

"lien," and "ch'ih" are the principal rules alike for a

community, a group, or the entire nation. Those who do not

observe these rules will probably utilize their knowledge

and ability to the disadvantage of society. Therefore, these

virtues may be considered as matters of primary importance

upon which the foundation of a nation can be solidly built.

Secondly, there is another group of people who argue that

these virtues are merely refined formalities, which have

nothing to do with the actual necessities of daily life. For

instance, if one is hungry, can these formalities feed him?

This is probably due to some misunderstanding of the famous

teachings of Kuan-Tze, who said: "When one does not have to

worry about his food and clothing, then he cares for

personal honor; when the granary is full, then people learn

good manners." The sceptic fails to realize that the four

virtues teach one how to be a man. If one does not know

these, what is the use of having abundance of food and

clothing? Moreover, Kuan-Tze did not intend to make a

general statement, merely referring to a particular subject

at a particular time. When he was making broad statements,

he said: "'li,' 'i,' 'lien,' and 'ch'ih' are the four

pillars of the nation." When these virtues prevail, even if

food and clothing are temporarily insufficient, they can be

produced by man power: or, if the granary is empty, it can

be filled through human effort. On the other hand, when

these virtues are not observed, there will be robbery and

beggary in time of need: and from a social point of view

robbery and beggary can never achieve anything. Social order

is based on these virtues. When there is order, then

everything can be done properly: but when everything is in

confusion, very little can be achieved. Today robbers are

usually most numerous in the wealthiest cities of the world.

This is an obvious illustration of confusion caused by

non-observance of virtues. The fact that our country has

traitors as well as corrupt officials shows that we, too,

have neglected the cultivation of virtues, and if we are to

recover, these virtues must be adopted as the principles of

a new life.[17]

[Footnote 13: Giles, Herbert, _A Chinese-English Dictionary_, Second

Edition, Shanghai and London, 1912; ideograph No. 7128.]

[Footnote 14: The same; ideograph No. 1999.]

[Footnote 15: Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 7.]

[Footnote 16: Reprinted as Appendix III (B), p. 373, below.]

[Footnote 17: Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 6-7.]

Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang both work actively in the Movement,

inspecting its branches and enterprises, speaking at its meetings, and

supervising its functions. The Movement possesses a small but very

active central staff, with Major-General Huang as Secretary-General and

Dr. Chu Djang, a Johns Hopkins political scientist, as his assistant.

Efforts are made to improve the daily life of the people. Shops are

encouraged to join the Movement, on conditions requiring cleanliness,

uniform prices, etc. Thus in addition to the work of a Y.M.C.A. for all

ages and classes, the Movement attempts the role of a municipal health

campaign agency, a better business bureau, and a civic service club.

Marriages have traditionally depleted family budgets; many a Chinese

farmer or worker has fallen into usurious debt because of the social

necessity of extravagant feasting and celebration. The Movement

accordingly organized inexpensive mass marriages, collectively

celebrated under official auspices; the purpose is not to increase the

population, but to circumvent a wasteful custom. Peep-show operators

have been given displays which are patriotic instead of mythical,

chivalric, or licentious. Story-tellers are taught new, public-spirited

stories to tell. The New Life Movement seeks to reinvigorate Chinese

society by adapting existing institutions or businesses to new needs.

In addition to attempting change in traditional life, the Movement has

introduced innovations. The only cafeteria in Chungking serving cheap

but dietetically sound meals is operated by the New Life Headquarters.

Chinese foods were hard to preserve and unpleasant to eat in the

darkness of air raid shelters; China has had no sandwiches, crackers, or

equivalent preparations; the New Life Movement concocted a cheap but

tasty and nutritious wheat and soy biscuit, and scattered the recipe

broadcast. News is distributed to the illiterates through lantern-slide

lectures in market-places. Mass singing, virtually unknown in China

until now, is making enormous strides with the war; the New Life

Movement is diffusing this, along with calisthenics.[18]

[Footnote 18: Most of these and the following facts, but not the

interpretations, are based on interviews which the author had with the

hospitable Major-General J. L. Huang in Chungking, on July 14, 1940,

and subsequently.]

A group of minor New Life agencies are clustered about the Headquarters.

These, like the Movement, are not financed by popular subscription,

membership fees, or collection drives. All administrative expenses are

borne by the Generalissimo and his closest associates, who contribute

from their private funds or from available contingent funds of their

offices, and from contributions by local governments. Since part of the

program is distribution of cash gifts to all wounded soldiers, the

budget runs into fairly high figures, but the Generalissimo realizes

that in China there is no better way to create mistrust of an enterprise

than to collect money for it. The leading agencies affiliated with the

New Life are:

(1) the War Area Service Corps, designed for propaganda, instruction,

spreading of cooperatives, relief, etc., in the occupied and combat

zones;

(2) the Rural Service Corps, designed to perform the same functions

behind the lines, and to aid in rural reconstruction;

(3) the New Life Students Rural Summer Service Corps, an organization

which organizes students from the colleges during their summer

vacations, and sends them out on the land for service work, along with

new agricultural information, hygienic teaching, literacy drives, etc.;

(4) the Wounded Soldiers' League, a self-help organization for disabled

veterans, who are assisted and encouraged to set up their own

cooperatives; they have done so with particular success in

cigarette-making, printing, and shoe-weaving;

(5) the Friends of the Wounded Society, wherein volunteers become

friends to veterans who are in hospitals, or who return to civil life as

cripples (each Friend contributing money, transmitted direct to the

veteran; Friends are also encouraged to write or visit the veterans);

(6) the New Life Secretaries' Camp, virtually a summer undergraduate

college, with an academic curriculum, strict discipline, and ample

organized recreation; and

(7) the Women's Advisory Council, which in turn tops another pyramid of

war-time activity in the hands of women's organizations.[19]

[Footnote 19: For an excellent outline of the role of women in the

war, see Chiang, May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, cited, p.

287 _ff._]

In addition to these major activities, there are innumerable further

enterprises, including another industrial cooperative system, a really

extensive chain of orphanages for war orphans, schools for girls,

training camps for young women, etc. It is no uncommon sight to stand on

a city street in West China and see three-fourths of the young people

wearing the uniforms of various war activities, most of which--outside

the army--are affiliates of the Party or the Movement.

These activities have not received much praise from Leftists or foreign

visitors. They begin at a level so far below American requirements of

social service that they seem ineffectual. The author once saw, in

China's _tuchün_ years, old people dying in the streets while

pedestrians walked by, uncomfortable but aloof; he saw children with

burnt-out eyes whining for alms, to the profit of a beggars' syndicate;

he watched soldiers rotting alive on the flagstones of temple

courtyards. The Kuomintang, the New Life, and their affiliates cannot

relieve the general poverty of China, nor alter the fundamental economic

faults and continuing maladjustments of class functions. These agencies

do, however, eliminate evils so bad that the ordinary American would not

remember them for his schedule of social reform. In the vast reaches of

Free China, these organizations--like many others--almost disappear in

the perpetual routines of ancient, enduring institutions: the

market-place, the hucksters' streets, the tea-house. But their influence

is felt. In contrast with the entire American New Deal, they are nothing

at all; in contrast with the Y.M.C.A., Komsomol, or similar

organizations, they are agents of one of the greatest practical social

reforms ever undertaken in Asia, and a step bound to have political

repercussions.

Popular non-participation still stultifies them. The leadership of the

agencies parallels government personnel. Women leaders are in many

instances the wives of officials; an exceptional person, such as Mme.

Chiang or her celebrated sisters, may be a leader in her own right, but

this is no usual rule. In many agencies, such as intended mass

organizations for reform, instruction, health, etc., the mass character

is entirely lacking. The masses are the beneficiaries of Kuomintang

action, but not often participants in that action. The Communists and

the independent Left hold an enormous leverage in popular interest;

ignoring class lines, illiteracy, or lack of preparation, they draw the

common people into a real share in government and social reconstruction.

The Kuomintang has ignored this opportunity--in part because of the

Confucian cleavage between scholars and the untutored which made the

scholar, however benevolent or philanthropic, a being apart from the

commonalty.

Two further organs--the National Spiritual Mobilization (_Kuo-min

Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan_) and the Mass Mobilization--are Kuomintang

devices for mass participation. The former, developed as an antidote to

defeatism engendered by protraction of the war, rising prices, and the

treason of Wang, actually consists in a propaganda machine, which holds

torchlight vigils, national fealty ceremonies, and similar festivals in

the larger cities; it has adapted some of the stagecraft of the German

National Socialists, but lacks a broadly popular character. The Mass

Mobilization is under the Training Department of the Military Affairs

Commission; useful as a military device, its political character is

slight in Free China. In the guerrilla and occupied zones, a genuine

_levée en masse_ has been accomplished; in the free areas, safeguards

which hedge Mobilization have robbed it of utility save that which is

strictly military. As an adjunct to the army, this is useful; otherwise

it has been ineffectual, despite the competitive success obtained by the

guerrilla zones in equivalent organizations.

The over-all picture of the Kuomintang and its activities is hard to

bring into focus. One general contrast will point some of its strength

and weakness clearly: as a governing agency, which created and

maintained the government, the Kuomintang has been more effective than

any other group in China. The Party has met and overcome obstacles in

practical politics, international relations, working administration,

internal unification, and national defense. The Party has succeeded well

enough to remain in power, which none of its predecessors or competitors

have managed to do. As a social and political force, its governing

character colors its work. More has been done by the government for the

people than in any comparable situation in East Asia. But Kuomintang

rule, however excellent when measured by the standards of authoritary or

colonial government, still falls far short of even elementary

application of democratic techniques. The flexibility of the Party, and

a continued ability to yield power in order to retain power, are the

most hopeful factors in the view of the Kuomintang future.

The Kuomintang could not be overthrown by any force--mere force--on

earth, unless the Party betrayed itself. Attacked by a major power, it

has emerged unscathed. But the Communists or other opponents may find

their most useful weapons in the weaknesses of the Kuomintang itself: in

the slowness of its change, or in its unadaptability to rapidly changing

conditions; or in an extra-Party resentment arising from severe economic

dislocation which, though consequent to war rather than to governmental

policies, was not swiftly enough controlled by a slowly-moving

Kuomintang. By contrast with 1935, however, the Kuomintang has gained

much power; the Communists have lost some. Regional and half-separatist

regimes, often corrupt, have almost altogether disappeared. Along with

the Kuomintang, the independent Leftists have also profited.

No prediction, to be plausible, can assume the early demise or collapse

of the Kuomintang. The Party has obtained power; its organization is one

of the three policy-executing branches of the new national organization.

Ruin of the Kuomintang implies ruin of the emergent Chinese state, so

laboriously constructed; though a successor might arise, too much of the

work would have to be done over again. Many Chinese, of all classes,

realize this. Kuomintang rule is the _status quo_; despite demerits, it

is the first stable government modern China has had, and China's chief

tool of defense today.

CHAPTER VI

THE COMMUNIST AND MINOR PARTIES

The party politics of Republican China fall into two periods: the early

period of competitive, pre-parliamentary parties, 1912 to the Great

Revolution; and a later period of struggling monopoly-power parties,

from the Great Revolution to the present. In the earlier period the

Kuomintang and its rivals tolerated one another's existence; each

regarded co-existing parties as natural, desirable, and useful. But the

sham democracy of the prostituted Republic disheartened the Kuomintang,

which thereupon bid for the complete conquest of power, brooking no

legitimate competitors; its rivals did likewise. The first coalition

(1922-27) of Kuomintang and Communists was therefore not the democratic

competition of two parties with different stresses upon a common

ideological foundation, but a war-time alliance of basically

incompatible forces. After the 1927 break, the Kuomintang became the

only legal party in most of the country, while the Communists--with a

rebel army, an unrecognized government, and a territory of their

own--enjoyed legality within the limits of their own swords. The

Kuomintang, embraced by all major groups save the Communists, became the

foremost vehicle for Chinese political life. Minor parties enjoyed

precarious, ineffectual existences, underground or expatriate.

With the outbreak of war in 1937, Nationalists and Communists adopted a

truce, formally a Communist surrender of armed rebellion, subversive

ideology, and separate government. In actuality it was an alliance of

deadly enemies against the Japan which threatened them both. Today,

Chinese party politics revives in the People's Political Council, and to

a slight degree in public opinion. The legal prohibition of minor

parties, including the Communists, remains in effect. Chinese party

politics, in the Western sense of a friendly subdivision of common

opinion, remains vestigial. The only guarantee of party rights is an

unstable toleration extended by the Kuomintang in the negative form of

non-prosecution. The Kuomintang is the Party for most of China. The

Communist Party is the party for a separate fraction of China. The minor

parties, holding neither territory nor armies in the game of power,

maneuver between and about the two, struggling to attain legal

existence.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS: PARTY AND LEADERS

Literary Marxism runs back to the Ch'ing dynasty, but the first formal

organization of a Chinese Communist Party occurred with the first

Congress of the Chinese C.P., in Shanghai, during July of 1921.[1] The

Soviet-Kuomintang entente was, strictly speaking, not a union between

the Kuomintang and the Communist parties, although it came to be such in

fact; it was collaboration between the Third International, which agreed

that Communism was unsuited to China, and the Kuomintang. The

development of a Chinese Communist Party, and open Communist debate

concerning the assumption of power, made the Kuomintang mistrustful,

repressive, and finally hostile. The suppression of the Communists by

Chiang in 1927 has become world history; Vincent Sheean and André

Malraux have preserved aspects of it in moving literature.[2]

[Footnote 1: Miff, P., _Heroic China_, New York, 1937, p. 14. This

valuable pamphlet is by one of the Comintern's leading expounders of

Marxism as applied to China. Trotskyist Marxism is represented by a

far fuller, more careful work by Harold Isaacs, cited, together with

the following, cited on p. 20, n. 16. Edgar Snow, the distinguished

American journalist, operates on the basis of an independent,

unacknowledged type of Marxism, which shows itself in consistent

prejudice against the Kuomintang, and in a soul-hungry search for a

dialectical, inner meaning of things with which to supplement

common-sense observation; his "Things that Could Happen," _Asia_, Vol.

XLI, No. 1 (January 1941), employs Hegelianism at tenth-remove to

analyze the future. It leads to a frequent implication of motives and

to subjective interpretations which rearrange fact as it ought to be

in terms of a rational economic dialectic (i.e., an occult pattern

which provides a uniform key to all human experience). Thus, in his

_Red Star Over China_, p. 306, he ascribes the massacre of Reds by

Kuomintang officers to the fact that the officers were the sons of

local landlords, enraged by expropriation of the land.

Land-expropriation is a class motive; a moment's reflection would

reveal that previous massacre of the officers' families by Communists

would be a better common-sense motive for blood-thirstiness. This

feature of diluted Marxism would not be worth mentioning were it not

common to so many books about Communists written by self-proclaimed

"non-Communists" habituated to the dialectic. It is found in the

writings of Agnes Smedley, Victor Yakhontoff, Anna Louise Strong, and

I. Epstein, to mention but a few.]

[Footnote 2: Sheean, Vincent, _Personal History_, New York, 1937;

Malraux, André, _Man's Fate_, New York, n.d.]

In the period 1927-37 the Chinese Communists operated the Chinese Soviet

Republic (_Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo_),[3] primarily in Kiangsi,

but also in the Ao-yü-wan (Hupeh, Honan, Anhui) area. In the Long March

of 1934-35 the main forces of the Communists, in the most spectacular

military move in China since the great Northern raid of the T'aip'ing,

marched a distance of some six thousand miles, and established their new

area in North Shensi (see above, p. 112 _ff._). Not only did the Chinese

Red Army remain intact; through great and successful effort, the

Communists transplanted schools, banks, and other institutions intact.

The Long March was comparable to the celebrated Flight of the Tartars,

in that it amounted to the transplanting of an entire people, their

worldly goods, and their most highly treasured institutions and

traditions.

[Footnote 3: _Kung-ho-kuo_ is the Western-type term for Republic; the

Kuomintang uses _Min-kuo_ or Folk-realm. _Su-wei-ai_ is a phonetic

representation of "Soviet"; the characters, not intended to have

meaning, are unconsciously humorous in that their lexicographical

signification is "Revive (and) maintain dust!"]

Despite Kuomintang theory, the Frontier Area is a one-party _imperium in

imperio_, and its unchallenged party is the Communist. Under conditions

requiring great fortitude, the Chinese Communist leaders have

consolidated power, and use their base to spread Marxism through the

guerrilla movement. They are thus in the best possible political

position; their strategic excellence makes them welcome in precisely

those zones wherein their doctrines can best take effect. Their party

organization controls the Frontier Area through formal appointment of

the leading officials by the National Military Affairs Commission, and

through formulae of election for the subordinate officials.

The hierarchy of the Chinese C.P. is much like that of the Kuomintang,

which also copied Soviet models:[4]

|---

| CENTRAL PARTY<--COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

| COMMITTEE

|

|--| NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS-----------------

| |---------------| /\ |

\/ | || |

Executive Bureau | \/ |->Central Control

Political Bureau | National Party Committee

Special Departments: | Convention

Organization | /\

Publicity | ||

| \/

| Provincial Council of Party Delegates

| Provincial Party Committee

| Standing Committee----------|

\/ /\ |

Communist Youth Corps || |

\/ \/

_Hsien_ Councils of Municipal Councils

Party Delegates of Party Delegates

_Hsien_ Party

Committee

/\ |-------->Municipal Party

|| | Committee

\/ \/

Party Members' Mass Meetings

District (_ch'ü_) Councils of Party Delegates

District Party Committees

/\

||

\/

Branch Party Organs (cells)

Branch Party Organ Executive Committees

[Footnote 4: Based on the Party Constitution, _Kung-ch'an-tang

Tang-chang_ [Party Constitution of the Communist Party], [Chungking?],

XXVII (1938), p. 1-21. The entire Constitution is reprinted below as

Appendix II (E), p. 359.]

The shibboleth of Democratic Centralism applies to the Chinese as well

as to other Communist Parties; in practice this means the high and

unqualified concentration of power at the top of the hierarchy

following action by the democratic, or mass, element of the party

through the Party Council or Congress. In effect, nothing is decided at

such elections, since the plebiscites, according to the familiar

authoritarian pattern, concern questions to which only one answer is

reasonably possible: the answer decided by the party rulers. The free

use of meaningless elections characterizes Communist activity in

governmental as well as party matters. The voting act gives the

impression of concurrence, improves morale, and ceremonializes the

approval of the majority for the minority. The purpose which elections

serve in democracies--that is, of providing a decision to issues not

previously ascertained--appears very rarely in Communist elections,

where a near unanimity is constructed to indicate popular support, and

contested elections, disunity.

In terms of personnel, the Communist hierarchy has been consistently

compliant with world Communist policy as made in Moscow. This is a

tribute to the high international unity and uniformity of the ecumenical

Communist movement, but raises, in China, problems of intra-national

Communist policy. Revolutionary veterans of the party, who fought,

suffered, studied, and worked for their cause through ten, fifteen, or

twenty years of effort, often find themselves displaced, dictated to, or

expelled by the clique of younger men who have lived comfortably in

Moscow studying the dialectic mystagogy and acquiring an inside track in

Stalinist cliquism.[5] The Chinese Communist Party has been shaken by

violent schisms, casting off many once highly-valued leaders.

[Footnote 5: Harold Isaacs, in the work cited, has many passing

references to this phenomenon; his caustic indictment of Ch'en Shao-yu

(Wang Ming), p. 438 _ff._, is a case in point. Note Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li

Li-san, Chang Kuo-tao--in China, as in Russia, most of the founders

and early leaders of the Communists have been set aside.]

No sooner does a man become suspect to the ultimate authorities than

his previous record, hitherto praised, is re-examined and captious

criticism proves that he was a traitor from the beginning, like Trotsky,

Bukharin, Chicherin, and Zinoviev. The profound vitality of the Chinese

Communist movement as a quasi-religious, self-sacrificial organization

is demonstrated by the fact that it has weathered these storms. The

terrible hunger for a guidance in life, an insight into the ethical

meanings of things, and an absolute which asks nothing but acceptance

and obedience--these factors call for courage, humility, abasement,

fortitude. They do not favor imagination, individual integrity of

thought, or the examination of fact. There has been no indication

whatever, despite the wishful thinking of Western liberals, that the

mentality of the Chinese Red leaders is one whit different from that of

Western Communists. They talk practical democracy, moderation,

collaboration with the Kuomintang; they do so because this is the

Comintern's China policy, just as they have fought the National

Government in the past when the Soviet authorities disliked Chiang more

than they did Japan.

Their all-China collaboration is no doubt sincere; but the sincerity is

based not on the wish to collaborate, but on what, in their special

phrasing, is termed the "objective" analysis of the situation. If the

Soviet Union, the chief "proletarian" force in the world, turned against

Chiang, the Communist _ipso facto_ would be against collaboration. The

war of China against Japan would no longer be a war of "national

liberation" but an "inter-imperialist" war in which the true interests

of the "working classes" would be against _both_ sides. This provides to

Marxians, under the name "science," an absolute, infallible guide to

ethics in practical politics, because it presumes to reveal the

inescapable long-range meaning of human affairs. The supposition that

daily affairs may in fact possess none but short-range meaning, outside

of slow, general, nearly impalpable changes in ecology, demography, and

genetics, etc., is anathema to the Marxians. A humanism trained to deal

directly, pragmatically, and simply with events is as far beyond the

Chinese Communists as it is beyond other Marxians.

This orthodoxy, so complete that it enthralls the leadership to Moscow

and paralyzes Marxian heretics in the very act of dissidence, reaches

throughout the upper levels of the party. This fact does not mean that

the Chinese Communist movement is in no wise different from other

national Communist movements. The historical basis of the Chinese

Communism, ever since Chiang smashed the urban unions in 1927, has been

that of an exotic faith imposed upon a native _jacquerie_, in which the

exoticism is unwittingly traditionalist. Peasant revolts of the Chinese

past have operated with the counter-ideocratic leverage of a

superstition, normally Taoist in derivation. The heads of the Yellow

Turbans (ca. 200 A.D.) and the Boxers (ca. 1900) were all magicians; the

T'aip'ing (ca. 1850) leader was a Christian in communication with God

Himself. These heresies against the all-pervading order of Confucian

common sense disappeared after their high-pitched dynamics died down in

social readjustment.

Marxism provides an element of faith, devotion, and irrational

submission which has operated in past Chinese history. The frugality,

honesty, and integrity of the Chinese Red leaders are celebrated by

foreign visitors and even by Nationalist officials; such revolutionary

virtues seem new in China, whereas they are the twentieth-century

manifestation of a common enough phase of Chinese political activity.

However, one cannot herefrom conclude that the Chinese Communist

movement is destined to disappear with its predecessors, for it has

three things which they did not have: an extra-Chinese application,

which not only supports it, but proves its concreteness and relative

realizability; a modern system of education, and thereby a class of

counter-ideologues to compete with the post-Confucian Nationalists; and

leaders with revolutionary experience greater than any in the world, not

excepting that of the great Soviet leaders themselves. Ancient peasant

uprisings revealed a final cleavage between dervish-type organizers and

the peasants, once infuriated, who finally sought normalcy. If the

Chinese Communist leaders can, through the example of the Soviet Union,

or by education, or by dexterous leadership, make Communism into

normalcy, they may retain their hold on such sections of the peasantry

as their leadership has captured.

Two men stand forth above all others in Chinese Communism. Both would be

remarkable individuals in any historical setting. Their partnership has

led them to be described by one hyphenated phrase: _Chu-Mao_: Chu Tê and

Mao Tse-tung. Chu Tê, the military genius of Chinese Communism, was born

of a gentry family in Szechuan, and attended the Yünnan Military Academy

at the time that Chiang was in Japan; he entered the years of his early

maturity as an aide to a provincial _tuchün_. According to Edgar Snow,

he was at this time sunk in vice, enjoying wealth, opium-smoking, a

harem, and the amenities of a war-lord existence.[6] Chu felt an urge

within himself to escape this rut. He abandoned his worthless existence,

leaving his harem provided for, and went to the coast, where he could

become acquainted with the revolutionary movement. On the way he broke

himself of the drug habit. He went to Europe, living in France and

Germany, and in the latter country joined the Chinese Communist branch

established among the students. He returned in 1926 during the Great

Revolution, and served as political officer in the Kuomintang forces.

Later he was instrumental in the creation of the Chinese Soviet

Republic, and was the prime military leader of the Communist forces in

the long civil war. He led the trek to the Northwest, and is esteemed as

a military hero of Arthurian proportions. Friendly, candid, interested

in specific tasks, he is characteristic of the superb leadership which

preserved Communism in China. He is the only Chinese military leader who

was not defeated by Chiang, although Chiang pursued him six thousand

miles. Major Evans Carlson, the American Marine officer, compares him

with Robert E. Lee, U. S. Grant, and Abraham Lincoln--drawing on the

best features of each for the purpose.[7]

[Footnote 6: Snow, Edgar, work cited, p. 348 _ff._]

[Footnote 7: _Twin Stars of China_, cited, p. 66. Major Carlson adds

to this description in his _The Chinese Army_, cited, p. 35 _ff._ Most

enthusiastically, he attributes to the Red Leaders honesty, humility,

selflessness, truthfulness, incorruptibility, and a desire to do what

is right. He praises their superb tactical abilities, their efficiency

as organizers, their competence as leaders. He accepts the statements

made by the Communist leaders as matters of good faith, and does not

question their sincerity. Since he is the only qualified military

visitor to put his impressions on record, these appraisals are

valuable.]

Mao Tse-tung was born in Hunan in 1893 of a well-to-do farmer family.

His autobiography, dictated to Edgar Snow, is a classic of Western

literature on China.[8] His history was that of many other restless

young Chinese intellectuals, struggling for education amidst turmoil,

and adjusting their sense of values to the chaotic early Republic. He

was caught up by the Marxism of the literary Renaissance after 1917,

served in the Kuomintang during the Great Revolution, and worked as head

of the All-China Peasants Union. During the Soviet period, in which he

first became a colleague of Chu Tê, he stood forth as the chief

political leader. He and Chu between them formed a team to rival

Generalissimo Chiang, although Mao shared his political leadership with

various others, particularly Chang Kuo-tao. Mao is an expert

dialectician, skilled in rationalizing the policies of the Communist

International, and keenly critical within the limits of his Marxian

orthodoxy. Less genial than Chu Tê, he is nevertheless an inspiring

leader. His political skill, in following the lurches and shifts of the

Stalin party line while simultaneously leading an enormous Chinese

peasant revolt, is monumental. His earlier rivals and colleagues are in

most cases dead or forgotten. He survived both ideological and practical

ordeals.

[Footnote 8: Snow, Edgar, _Red Star Over China_, cited, p. 111-167.]

A third Communist leader, Chou En-lai, is of importance because he acts

as liaison officer between the National Government and the Frontier

Area. The Communist quasi-legation in Chungking is maintained as a

purchasing and communications office of the Eighteenth Army Corps

(formerly Eighth Route Army). Chou, who studied abroad in Japan, France,

and Germany, served at the Whampoa academy under Chiang, and in the

period of civil war he was one of the chief political officers, twice

Chinese Communist delegate to Moscow. He is an old acquaintance of many

Kuomintang leaders from Chiang on down, and appears to be one of the

most successful diplomats in the world. Despite acrimony from secondary

leaders on both sides, Chiang and Mao seek to maintain their alliance

against Japan, and Chou is their chief intermediary. At Chungking he is

seconded by the alert, brilliant Ch'in Po-k'u, a veteran of Communist

political-bureau work.

The difficulties and conditions of Communist collaboration with the

National Government are well illustrated in the life of Chang Kuo-tao.

One of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai, in 1921,

Chang was of the upper classes, like Chu Tê; and like Mao, he was a

radical student in Peking. Just before his departure from the party in

1938, he had been chairman of the Northwestern Soviet, taking precedence

over Mao himself; but with the coming of national unity, Chang wished

to cooperate fully with China's leader, government, and legal Party, the

Kuomintang. He adopted subterfuges to get out of the Communist Area.

Arriving in Hankow, he announced his desire to form a genuine United

Front on the basis of a candid and sincere acceptance of the _San Min

Chu I_, which would mean the actual abandonment of Marxian dreams of

Communist "proletarian" dictatorship in China, even for the future. He

did not renounce Communism, but simply took his colleagues at their

words, and announced his intention of cooperating honestly, and not

through compulsion of the Moscow dialectic. He wrote:

According to the views of the Chinese Communists, the

present United Front is only a temporary union of many

political groups, which are entirely different from one

another in nature. These political groups have their own

social bases, and they represent the interests of different

classes. "The Kuomintang," so they believe, "represents

landlords and capitalists, while the Communist Party

represents the working class." No [ultimate] compromise can

be made between the two parties.

Now we often hear such slogans of the Chinese Communists as,

"Let's lead the people _together_," "Let's _all_ take

responsibilities," "Let us _both_ be progressive," and

"Let's act under the _same_ principles." These represent the

old ideas of striving for leadership. These show that they

do not have the foresight to work unselfishly for the nation

and the people. They want to retain their military forces.

They want to maintain the Frontier Area and special,

privileged positions in certain occupied areas. They keep

these in order to await future developments....

I hope they [the following suggestions] will receive the

consideration of the Chinese Communists:

(1) the Chinese Communists should always remember that the

benefits of the nation and the people go before everything.

They should support the movement of Resistance and

Reconstruction under the leadership of Mr. Chiang K'ai-shek.

They should carry out the _San Min Chu I_ without

hesitation. What they do must agree with what they say;

(2) there should be complete coordination of governmental

and military operations, under all conditions.... I hope the

Chinese Communists will not think that the Eighth Route Army

is one privately owned by the Communist Party.... The

Frontier Area [where Chang Kuo-tao had so recently been

leader] should not be made a Communist base, nor made into

an isolated place where Communist-made laws are executed and

prejudice, together with political persecution, prevails....

(3) with a view to working for the nation and the people,

the Communists should follow the foreign policies adopted by

the central government.[9]

[Footnote 9: Chang Kuo-tao, _T'ou-li Kung-ch'an-tang Mien-mien-kuan_

[An Impartial Survey of (My) Departure from the Communist Party],

Kuangchou [Canton], 1938, p. 27 _ff._]

Chang demanded that the Communists react more sincerely, that they

accept the full implications of a united China, and abandon their

long-range dialectic for power.[10] For this he was denounced, his years

of service were reappraised, and he was dropped from the Communist

Party.[11] He was accused of hurting the United Front, because he urged

a more nearly perfect union. The chief Communist leaders challenged him

in open letters, revealing their continued adherence to an ideology

which made an eventual struggle for power inescapable.

[Footnote 10: The same, p. 10.]

[Footnote 11: The Resolutions of the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of

the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of China

comment as follows: "The danger of the 'Right' opportunists lies in

the fact that they execute the tactics of an anti-Japanese National

United Front at the expense of the independence of the party,

politically and organizationally distorting the policy of the

proletariat [_sic_] in building an Anti-Japanese National United Front

so that _the working class and the Communist Party become tails of the

bourgeoisie rather than the vanguard_." (Italics inserted in

translation.) New China Information Committee, _Resolutions and

Telegrams of the Sixth Plenum, Central Committee, Communist Party of

China, November 6, 1938_, Hong Kong [1939?], p. 9. The demand for

vanguard position from a minority party still technically illegal, and

the damning of the Government and Kuomintang as "bourgeois," are

continuous features of Communist policy. Their concept of cooperation

is, as in Germany, Spain, and elsewhere, cooperation _under_ Communist

leadership.]

The Communists have, therefore, cooperated as far as they are able,

without emerging from the infallibilities of their cult. They retain the

Marxian rationalization apparatus, and the linkage with Moscow. As such,

they are welcome but not completely trustworthy allies. Their presence

is undoubtedly the greatest check to the development of democracy in

China; the presence of a totalitarian party, respecting no rules but its

own, jeopardizes the entire experiment. The Communists want democracy,

but they want it quite frankly as a step toward "working-class"

(Marxist) power; they accept the _San Min Chu I_ on the condition that

it be read as elementary Marxism. They do not insist on the term

Communism, but employ the terms "working-class" interests for their

party, "scientific objectivity" for their ideology, and "a people's

movement" for radical, arbitrary reforms to rip Free China open with

social revolution. The Kuomintang leaders are fully aware of the support

in name plus subversion in fact which the Communists offer, and complain

bitterly about the principles of Sun being twisted about to Marxism as

in the form of "'independent' nationalism, 'free' democracy, and

'beneficent' livelihood," the qualifying terms sufficing for the

alignment.[12] They understand that the Communists are incapable of

sincere extra-class democracy; the Communists are hurt by the

Kuomintang's unwillingness to admit that it is not a Party of patriots,

but the Party of a transitional, historically doomed middle class.

[Footnote 12: Ch'ao Shê [The Morning Club], _Niu-wu Yen-lun Chien-t'ao

Kang-yao_ [A General Review of Fallacious Utterances], Chungking, XXIX

(1940), p. 7. The work is a Kuomintang reply to Communist theses in a

debate on the nature of national union.]

COMMUNISM: PATRIOTISM OR BETRAYAL?

If the Communists were as inflexible, disciplined, ferocious, and

intransigeant as they like to appear to themselves, China would have

had a three-sided war long ago. In practice, however, the Chinese

Communists yield amazingly. The Communist International is not goading

the Chinese Communists into the sabotage of Chiang and of national

resistance. Whether Moscow could do so is a standing question of Chinese

politics. The answer cannot be known except by practical test. One

might, however, plausibly suppose that an attempt by Stalin to

consummate a Moscow-Tokyo pact (possibly in accordance with pressure

from Berlin, which would require immediate protection of the proletarian

fatherland) would create a deep schism in Communist ranks; but it is

unthinkable that all the Chinese Communists would abjure their faith.

Moscow would not be naive enough to require the Communists to cease

fighting Japan _in form_. Such a Kuomintang-Communist break would

probably weaken the National Government; it would not destroy the

Chungking regime unless the Generalissimo ignored the chance offered by

a Leftward turn, to retain some of the peasant-radical and guerrilla

forces in his own ranks. It would, however, enormously strengthen Japan,

and be a severe blow to China. The greatest danger of a

Kuomintang-Communist break would lie in an American defeat of Japan. By

removing the necessity of Soviet support of Chiang, and increasing the

power of the National Government, American aid would lessen the

opportunities of Communism in China.

At present, however, the Chinese Communists welcome American aid, even

though the effect of such aid is to strengthen the China of Chiang as

against the China of Chu-Mao. The Communist spokesman, Ch'in Po-k'u,

told the author that American aid was not feared in China, but was

_welcome_, emphasizing the word. He even stated, in response to a

far-fetched hypothetical question, that actual American troops would be

welcome at Yenan, and stated that inter-party trouble was to be expected

only in case of defeat.[13]

[Footnote 13: Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u to the author, Chungking,

July 29, 1940.]

The final picture of the Communist position which emerges in China is

about as follows:

(1) the Communists are gaining ground because of their helpfulness and

vigorous leadership in organizing the guerrilla areas; wherever the

Japanese forces go, the Communists (thus shielded from Chinese National

armies) increase their influence;

(2) the Communists are benefiting politically by a genuine popular

movement in both Free and occupied China, particularly in the latter,

where spontaneous mass action is providing a base either for

Sunyatsenist democracy or for Communism in the future;

(3) in view of their belief that time is on their side, because of the

present direction of Soviet foreign policy, the Chinese Communists are

very cooperative in the alliance against Japan, patiently postponing

demands for "democracy" (i.e., unrestricted rights of organization and

agitation);

(4) they have superlative leadership, rich in practical experience,

which represents the super-orthodox residuum of years of schism and

purging; such a leadership is not likely to abandon the fundamentals of

Communism, such as the dialectic, the class-outlook on all history and

politics, and belief in the inescapable universality of future

"proletarian" rule (Communist world conquest); therefore, it is almost

unthinkable that they would fail to do Moscow's bidding, if the party

line demanded national treason in war time;

(5) the interests of the Soviet Union run parallel with those of

non-Communist China for a long time in the future, unless the European

balance of power forces the U.S.S.R. to appease Japan; under such

circumstances, the Soviet Union will be very anxious to maintain the

foothold of Communism in China, and will not be likely to ask the

Chinese Communists to commit candid treason;

(6) lastly, the Kuomintang possesses the opportunity of rivaling

Communism, of overtaking its rate of growth in political power, by a

bold policy of freeing speech, constitutionalizing the government,

reforming the land tenure system, and pushing cooperative industrialism;

the base of Communism has been widespread peasant revolt. If the

conditions of peasant revolt are eliminated, Communism will not be much

more of a threat to China than it is to the advanced countries of

Europe. (Wisely or not, the Kuomintang has not consented to meet the

Communists in open ideological competition. If it did so, and won,

Kuomintang morale would be strengthened. At present the practical aims

of Party policy toward Communists are about as follows: restriction and

isolation of the Frontier Area and of the Border Region, so far as

agitation is concerned, before ingestion by the constitutional national

system; military precautions, balancing Communist forces with

Nationalist; standardization of Red military practice by national rules,

and the elimination of peculiar political features; eventual dissolution

of fellow-travelling organizations, and their absorption into the

corresponding officially sponsored movements; supervision of Communists

and channels of Communist propaganda; courtesy toward Communist leaders,

strictness toward Communist subordinates, and harshness toward the

Communist laboring class following. A corresponding policy toward the

Kuomintang is pursued by the Communists.)

Finally, the deepest element eludes political analysis: the moderation

of the Chinese character, and the heritage of Confucian common sense.

The Chinese language and the Confucian inheritance of ideological

sophistication lead to clarity, pragmatism, and practicality. The

Chinese have long delighted in ingenious formulae with which to meet _de

jure_ impasses, while proceeding _de facto_ in quite another direction.

The Chinese are perhaps the only people in the world with enough finesse

about "face" to save the Communist face. The Generalissimo is in theory

consciously anti-Marxian; but when he was asked whether it is possible

that Communists or Leftists might exploit democratic rights for

unscrupulous power politics, he answered quietly by writing: "No,

because democracy in itself has the ability to work out the solutions

for those problems if there are any." A Communist leader said, the

Generalissimo would have nothing to fear from the Communists if he won

the war. His prestige would be unassailable. Chiang and the Communists

both know this.

THE NATIONAL SALVATION MOVEMENT

The National Salvation (_Chiu Kuo_) movement is third in point of size

and influence, and has been largely instrumental in assisting national

unification and resistance. The movement began in 1935 with the

organization of a number of professors, students, and young

intellectuals who were influenced by the student anti-appeasement

movement in North China. It had a simple, and very clear program: stop

civil war; stop appeasement.[14] Unlike the Kuomintang or the

Communists, the National Salvationists never developed formal dogma, or

a comprehensive ideology. Genuinely a movement, it had no membership

books, no formal or systematic organization, no minorities, and no

schisms. The movement spread like wildfire, across the length and

breadth of China as well as overseas; and, because of its lack of formal

hierarchy, was ignored by the National Government. Its loose

organization, consciously based on the middle class of clerks, students,

business men, professors, etc., followed functional lines familiar to

the Chinese.

[Footnote 14: An early statement of National Salvation views is found

in Wang Tsao-shih, "A Salvationist's View of the Sino-Japanese

Problem," _The China Quarterly_, Vol. II, No. 4 (Special Fall Number,

1937), p. 681-9. The author is one of the Seven Gentlemen.]

When the National Salvationists began the creation of a structure,

however rudimentary, by forming an inter-professional federation for

National Salvation, and when they followed this with the national

congress for National Salvation, the government took action, which

resulted in the celebrated trial of the Seven Gentlemen (_ch'i

chün-tzŭ_). The term (_chün-tzŭ_) is the Confucian word for

superior or upright person, without reference to gender, and was applied

in affectionate derision by the press. One of the _chün-tzŭ_ was a

lady. The seven, who included a celebrated and popular law school dean

(Shên Chun-lu), a banker, and authors (Tso Tao-fên, the spokesman among

them) were tried and imprisoned late in 1936. Demands for their release

figured in the Sian kidnapping.

The movement was financed very simply through volunteer contributions.

Most of the work was done by volunteers who asked no pay, travelling and

working at their own expense. About Ch. $5,000 (then about U. S. $1,000)

sufficed to cover the whole expenses of headquarters. Despite the

imprisonment of its leaders, the movement gathered momentum. Funds were

collected to support guerrillas opposing Japan in transmural China. Most

literate persons not already committed to formal Kuomintang or Communist

membership fell under the influence of the movement. General Shêng

Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang offered the movement a home, and many of its

workers went to the West.

In practical terms, the National Salvationists often work with the

Communist Party, although they are strictly Chinese and do not have an

elaborate dialectic. A strain of economic determinism runs through their

thought, but this is not systematized. The leaders of the movement were

released after the outbreak of war, but their organizations continued to

be suppressed, and work is largely suspended. The leaders told the

author that they had no means of estimating the actual number of their

adherents; they had no formal membership roll, and they were still

legally suppressed in Chungking areas. The quest for policy and

principle instead of power is new to Chinese politics, and the National

Salvation leaders are esteemed almost universally and hated by none.

Nevertheless the Kuomintang has not admitted the legality of the

movement, which continues to exist in non-public fashion. Some of the

leaders were recognized to the extent of being put on the People's

Political Council. In addition to standing with the Communists in

matters of practical domestic reform, the National Salvation leaders

demand two fundamental policies: continuation of the war, and unity of

the country above all party considerations.

The National Salvation leaders are able, modest, and patriotic. They

represent the older non-political sentiment of China, infused with

modern Leftist content. Dean Shên of Shanghai, the senior of the

movement, is an elderly man of almost dainty gentleness, keenly

intelligent demeanor, and serious but charming good humor. Mr. Tso

Tao-fên, an author, is a world traveller. Their colleagues are of the

student, publisher, author type: intellectual, patriotic, common-sense

in outlook.

The National Salvation movement looks forward to constitutionalism. It

has become almost universal in the guerrilla areas. The leaders have

faith that the Constitution and liberalized public life are developing,

although they expected in the summer of 1940 that the Convention would

be postponed until 1941, to allow the Communists and Nationalists

further opportunity for balancing and adjusting power relationships. The

National Salvationists are past masters in the techniques of indirect,

almost invisible pressures. Their disinterestedness, high principles,

and patriotism put them in an admirable position to act as a determined

moderating force between the two major Parties. As such they are the

third party of China, although another, smaller group bears this name.

THE THIRD PARTY

The party commonly called The Third Party (_Ti-san Tang_) was organized

by dissident Communists and Left Kuomintang members who wished to keep

on collaborating after the major parties broke apart in 1927, thus

ending the Great Revolution. Led by the indomitable Têng Yen-ta, who was

finally shot to death in Shanghai, the party began illustriously with

the participation of Mme. Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ching-ling) and the Left

ex-Foreign Minister, Eugene Chen. The formal names of the party varied.

From 1927 to 1929, and again from 1930 to 1937, it was the Revolutionary

Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang (_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang

K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_); in 1929-1930, the Chinese

Revolutionary Party (_Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang_); and after 1937, the

Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China (_Min-ts'u

Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_).[15] The party is at present led

by Dr. Chang Pai-chün, a returned student from Germany and lieutenant to

the late Mr. Têng. It suffers from the official ban on minor parties,

but retains, by its own statement, a formal organized membership of

about 15,000. (This estimate would, in the opinion of independent

observers, need to be discounted.)

[Footnote 15: Statement by the head of The Third Party, Dr. Chang

Pai-chün (Chang Peh Chuen), to the author, Chungking, August 2, 1940.

The translations were also supplied by Dr. Chang.]

The Third Party is a _San Min Chu I_ party. It accepts the legacies of

Dr. Sun, in their Left-most phase as they were at the time of his death.

The party is strongly anti-imperialist, socialist, and land-reform in

its teaching. Its socialism is of an independent kind; the party neither

seeks nor wishes collaboration with the Third International, although it

is willing to cooperate with the Communists as well as the Kuomintang.

It finds its chief political dogma in the last policies of Sun, executed

in the period just before his death: (1) a pro-Soviet orientation in

international power politics; (2) a Nationalist-Communist entente; and

(3) immediate aid for the peasants and workers. It is therefore more

like the old Left Kuomintang than the Communists.

At the present time, the party seeks to promote collaboration between

the two major parties, thus becoming the second third-party to that

friendship, and urges constitutional government. Eventually it would

prefer a representative government of the whole people (_p'ing min_),

with the executive agencies composed 60 per cent of peasants and

workers, 40 per cent of others, chiefly intellectuals. (The proportion

is believed to be Mme. Sun's contribution.) In past practical politics,

The Third Party took part in the Foochow insurrection of 1933-34, but

has on no other occasion obtained power. It is not expected to attain

major status.

THE CHINESE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY

The elder brother of Chang Kia-ngau, who is the enterprising Minister of

Economic Affairs, has organized a political party after the fashion of

the traditional pavilions of learning and patriotism. In China's past,

Confucians frequently developed an institution which admixed the

features of a perpetual resort camp, a library, a seminar, and a club.

Living together amid scenically beautiful and scholastically adequate

surroundings, they made their influence felt through their writings and

their example, whenever one of their number returned to public life. Dr.

Carson Chang (Chang Chia-shêng) has organized an Institute of National

Culture at Talifu in Yünnan, in the mountains just below Tibet. There

he associates with kindred souls to attempt a restoration of traditional

values in the traditional manner.

The confusing and unhappy similarity of the name of his party to Adolf

Hitler's party is explained in the following communication:

To give to the world in a clear and unambiguous way the

principles our party stands for and the platform we wish to

adopt should we have the chance to serve our country, I have

written a book, entitled _What A State Is Built On_. In

formulating my political philosophy, though I have drawn

freely upon the wisdom of the West, I have kept my eye

steadily on the needs of my people and the circumstances of

my country as the guiding and controlling principles in

shaping my own thought. In view of the possibility of

distortions you have suggested in your letter, an extract is

now being prepared in English, with the idea to facilitate

the understanding of our movement and to present to the

intellectual world of the West our principles and policies

...

The accidental similarity of names between our party and

Hitler's is indeed an endless source of misunderstanding,

but the similarity is truly "accidental." In Chinese the

name of our party runs "Kuo Chia She Hui Tang," which may be

literally translated into "Nation (Kuo Chia) Society (She

Hui) Party (Tang)," a name we adopted long before Hitler's

party became known, embodying principles widely different

from what Hitler's party stands for. The suspicion abroad of

our connection with Hitler's National Socialist Party may be

traced to an incident two years ago at Hankow when

Kuomintang first came to recognize the legal status of minor

political parties. The foreign correspondents, in reporting

my exchange of letters with Generalissimo Chiang with regard

to the recognition of our party, referred without a second

thought to our party as "Nazi," thus creating all

distortions which might have occurred even without such

mischief. I shall be more than grateful to you if you would

undertake to clear the suspicion on us and pave the way for

lasting understanding between us and your people.[16]

[Footnote 16: Letter to the author, dated October 24, 1940.]

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND _La Jeunesse_

These two minuscule parties are both expatriate groups organized in

Paris. The Social Democratic Party was organized in 1925. It has no

connection with the Socialist Party of the pro-Japanese Kiang Kang-hu,

but is simply the Chinese affiliate of the Second International. The

Social Democratic Party may unite with the Third Party, in view of the

close similarity of aims and ideology; its leader, Mr. Yang Kan-tao, has

been recognized by being seated in the People's Political Council.

The party called _Kuo-chia Chu-i Pai_ (_La Jeunesse_, or _Parti

Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine_) was organized in 1923 in

Paris, by a Mr. Tseng Chi, with whom is now associated Mr. Tso

Shen-sheng, the most active worker for the party. It survived for years

as an expatriate organization, joined by successive generations of

Chinese students in France. Its policies are strongly democratic and

social-minded. A functional legislature, the cooperative movement and

state capitalism have suggested a similarity to Fascism in the minds of

some observers; of Trotskyism, to others.[17] The party, through

accident and the family connections of its founder, has connections in

Szechuan, and the transfer of the National Government to Chungking was a

corresponding aid to the slight influence of the party. Long in exile,

it is known by one of its French names even in China; all it does is to

help diversify opinion. Mr. Tso occupies a seat in the People's

Political Council.[18]

[Footnote 17: E.g., John Gunther in his _Inside Asia_, New York, 1939,

p. 272.]

[Footnote 18: By far the most complete summary of the minor and

minuscule parties is to be found in two articles by a young Chinese

newspaperman: Shen, James, "Minority Parties in China," _Asia_, Vol.

XL, no. 2 (February 1940), p. 81-3; and a second installment, in the

same periodical. Vol. XL, no. 3 (March 1940), p. 137-9.]

The National Salvationists are an operating force in China, and the

Communists, while a minority party, are not a minor party in the

American sense. Unhappily, the existence of minuscule parties among both

patriots and pro-Japanese elements suggests that multi-party

constitutionalism is likely to degenerate into innumerable party

fractions, splinter parties, and novel, unstable groups. The Kuomintang

and the Communists possess their respective monopolies of power; the

National Salvationists have a popular and sincere cause. The other

parties exist in part because they obtain recognition. As long as

Chinese political processes depend on leadership by personality,

individuals will be free to form their own parties, while the

geographical, cultural, and economic diversity of the country holds out

little hope for the appearance of two or three China-wide democratic

parties. Far more likely is it that, with the presumable advent of

constitutionalism, the Kuomintang-Communist alignment will continue,

while the present minor parties will gain some ground, and innumerable

new parties will appear in order to profit by democratic guarantees of

minimal representation, or to fulfill functions exercised by fraternal

societies in the United States.

CHAPTER VII

GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF THE JAPANESE AND PRO-JAPANESE

Facing the National Armies, and encircling the guerrillas, lie the

Imperial Japanese forces. Frank agents of Imperial policy, they--unlike

the Hitler-Mussolini contingents in Spain--make no pretense of

subordination to their Chinese allies. Publicly and legally instruments

of the Japanese state, their function is to destroy the Chinese

government, to control and bend Chinese society to the Imperial

purposes, and to protect Chinese who come forth as allies. The Japanese

Empire is accordingly itself militarily extended to China; occasional,

half-hearted attempts to deny the ensuing international complications

have been sternly rejected by other great powers. The United States is

not alone in insisting on full Japanese responsibility for everything

that happens within the zone of Japanese control.

The position of the Japanese army as a governing engine, unacknowledged

colonial machinery of a vast unassimilable colony, is not one relished

by the Japanese people or by their leaders. Even in the case of

Manchoukuo, the Japanese played a half-deception on themselves by

pretending that they were extending the area of their influence, not the

extent of their responsibilities. In part this distaste for overt

control is based on the ease, cheapness and irresponsibility of indirect

rule, employed in varying degrees by the British in Malaysia, the French

in Indo-China, and the Soviets in Outer Mongolia. The Japanese like to

think that they are aiding China, and incidentally themselves, to a New

Order in East Asia--autarkic, stable, racially independent of the

Whites, militarily secure. They do not like to contemplate the slaughter

of innocent people for sheer conquest, or to consider the hopeless

immensity of trying to overwhelm China. This complicates their

position.[1]

[Footnote 1: An excellent bibliography, providing further references

to the Japanese side of the war, is found in Borton, Hugh, _et al._,

_A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan_, Washington, D. C.,

1940. An outstanding short discussion is Colegrove, K. W., _Militarism

in Japan_, Boston (World Peace Foundation), 1936.]

For if the status of the Japanese army in China is clear, its purposes

are not. The war aims of the Japanese are confused. Japan's goal is

defined by overtones of the inexpressible--in economic motivation, once

valid, no longer meaningful; in rationalizations so long reiterated that

they become genuine; in the toss and push of world affairs, tempting

Japan's leaders to this opportunism or that; in sheer sentiments of

Japanolatry, Emperor-worship, racialism, archaic resentment against

China, fellow-feeling for the Chinese orientals, and plain fear. A few

Japanese know exactly what they want. The policy as a whole, the policy

of the Imperial state, encompasses ill-assorted economic, political,

strategic, racial and purely ideological objectives.

Even at the simple level of institutional control, the Japanese aim in

China has been ill-defined. The restoration of the Manchu monarchy in

Manchoukuo was an appeal to monarchist legitimism, to the Chinese past,

and to common Confucianist values. When the Japanese came further into

China, it was at first expected that they might install Mr. Chin P'u-yi

as Emperor of all China, and rehabilitate him in the Palace-museum he

left when a youth. Instead, they apparently attempted to create a chain

of linked, reactionary, agricultural Chinese states, mixed in form--a

federation of princes in Inner Mongolia, an Empire in Manchoukuo,

republics elsewhere. They began by going as far as to create a dozen or

more ephemeral pro-Japanese agencies--for a while one might legitimately

have expected that a Nanking government follow a Peking government, a

Hankow government, a Canton government, _ad infinitum_. But the trend

was reversed when the Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government of

Mr. Yin Ju-kêng was merged with the Peking regime, and--as pressure rose

in Japan for a settlement of the China affair--a China-wide Japanophile

government was first contemplated, and then established. The

establishment of these institutions has not meant the abdication of the

Imperial Japanese forces from the government of China. The pro-Japanese

governments were and are civil auxiliaries of the Japanese army; their

influence has in no case extended beyond the immediately effective reach

of the Japanese infantry. Even in planning the long-range permanent

settlement of Chinese affairs--on her own terms--Japan does not propose

to withdraw all her troops from China.

THE JAPANESE ARMY AS A CHINESE GOVERNMENT

The Japanese army is the effective military government of occupied

China. The Japanophile Chinese have a few troops, who function in close

proximity to Japanese, and are in no sense a military counterweight to

the invaders. The Japanese army is a large force, modern by somewhat

second-rate standards, which requires the use of an effective

communications system, modern economic auxiliaries such as shops, banks,

post offices, and a variety of other services including hospitals,

shrines, brothels, and crematories. These do not exist in China in forms

suited to Japanese needs, nor could Japan afford to trust Chinese with

the railways, the air services, the river commerce, the telegraphs, the

food warehouses, and other most vital services. Thus, all over occupied

China, the Japanese have installed a military government.

This government assumes direct responsibility for administering whatever

seems necessary or profitable. Thus, in the city of Nanking, the best

buildings are occupied by the Japanese, and the Wang government is

profoundly gratified to be allowed to share some of them, obtaining

second choice. The Japanese military, through protected corporations,

supervises the operation of the railroads and airlines, but it does not

even rely on the corporations to provide military transport, which is

under direct army control. If a Chinese who has gone over to the

Japanese and occupies a high position in their protected governments

wishes to ride on a Chinese train between Shanghai and Nanking, he must

buy a ticket from a Japanese clerk, show it to a Japanese conductor

under the eyes of a Japanese guard, with Japanese detectives standing

about, order a Sino-Japanese or pseudo-European meal in a Japanese

dining car with Japanese waitresses from a menu printed in Japanese, and

must pay, not in his own puppet-bank currency, but in special Japanese

currency not acceptable in Japan.

To govern China, the Japanese Army has not developed beyond the usual

devices of military rule. There are several reasons for this, primary

among them the difficulty of governing Chinese at all. In a pluralistic

society, such as China, command is largely superseded by negotiation,

and the issuer of a command must be prepared for oblique thwarting. A

Japanese who tells a Chinese to do something needs a bayonet with which

to gesture; otherwise the Chinese, accustomed to circumventing,

avoiding, or mocking authority, will disregard him. The Germans may

order the Danes to make a two-way street a one-way street, and the

Danes, accustomed to authority, will concur. When the Japanese

promulgate a regulation, nothing short of massacre could ensure its

absolute, unconditional obedience.

The language difficulty is another obstacle to direct Japanese

government. A cultivated Japanese and Chinese may write classical

Chinese to one another, and even the barely literate can scribble a few

characters, the meanings of which may coincide; but the spoken languages

differ from one another almost as much as English differs from either.

To govern China directly would involve an enormous feat of language

training, or an overnight re-shaping of the Chinese national character.

Non-violent resistance, wilful but concealed negligence, lurking

impertinence, consistent sloppiness, obsequiousness mingled with

hatred--these Chinese tools of resistance, added to the language

barrier, prevent any early Japanese hope of direct government. In years

to come, if such come, Japanese trained in the Chinese language could

supersede every Chinese above the level of foreman. A strong tendency in

that direction is observable in Manchoukuo.[2]

[Footnote 2: Bisson, T. A., _Japan In China_, cited, _passim_, for

many instances.]

The Japanese have abandoned direct government for the present. They

would defeat their own purposes by assuming a task for which they have

insufficient personnel, which would be very costly, and for which their

army is ill-equipped in morale or technical ability. Difficult though it

may be to employ pro-Japanese Chinese associates, it would be even more

difficult to find Chinese now ready to profess direct loyalty to Japan.

The only Chinese thus far Japanized are a number of Taiwanese

(Formosans), whose island was ceded to Japan forty-six years ago.

Chinese by blood and language, many of them have been reared in the

third generation of Japanese rule. Some are fighting with the Chinese

forces, but others, loyal to their lawful superiors, betray their

fellow-Chinese. The Formosans are insufficient in number to govern

China, or to provide Japan with even the most elementary foothold. The

Japanese have hence turned to the peculiar form of indirect rule

identified by the popular appellation, _puppet states_.

THE PROBLEM OF PUPPET STATES

Lawful, well-established indirect rule is a familiar feature of colonial

practice. Constituting an internationally recognized legal relationship

between the paramount power and the encompassed state, it has been

applied extensively by the European powers in Africa and Asia. The

Indian and Malay states, under Britain; Cambodia and Annam-Tonkin, under

France; the East Indian sultanates, under the Netherlands--these offer a

rich repository of precedent.

Unacknowledged intervention involving no legal relationship is also a

known feature of modern politics. The practices of the United States in

the Caribbean and Central America, particularly during the 1920's, are

familiar, but the leading case of intervention without responsibility

occurred in the relationship between the Soviet Union (first the

R.S.F.S.R.) and the Outer Mongol People's Republic. Four features of

what has since come to be called political puppetry are here made fully

manifest: first, the establishment of the subordinate through the

military aid of the superior; second, the continued effective control,

unacknowledged in law, of the subordinate by the superior, coupled with

economic coordination of the two; third, bilateral insistence upon the

formal independence of the subordinate state; fourth, the claim

of the superior that it _has not_ intervened, coupled with

international non-recognition of the new relationship. The four

features--establishment, coordination, fictitious independence and

international nonentity--were clearly defined by Soviet political

practice in Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva long before Manchoukuo was

created.

In addition to this neighborly example, the Japanese had another source,

commonly ignored in current Western comment on the Far East, on which to

draw: the quasi-familist Confucian international system which prevailed

down to the time of men now living. Successive Chinese Empires developed

a clear, viable scheme of senior-junior relationships controlling their

intercourse with other organized governments. The other, smaller states

acknowledged China to be the senior realm, conceding that the Chinese

Emperor was lord of the world. They paid formal tribute to China; their

envoys were not ambassadors but tributary agents, while Chinese envoys

came as high commissioners, superior in rank to the courts to which they

were accredited. This relationship (awkwardly termed "dependency,"

"vassalage," "tributary" status, or subjection to "suzerainty," in

Western terms) could not be fitted into the Western state system.

Involving the assertion of Chinese power without concurrent admission of

Chinese responsibility, it was rejected by the Western states, and

lapsed following the French seizure of Indo-China, the British

occupation of Burma, and Korean independence under Japanese compulsion.

Today, Japan's moral effusions concerning the New Order in East Asia and

her digressions from Western patterns of international law in dealing

with Manchoukuo and Wang Ch'ing-wei both indicate that the Japanese move

freely, sincerely, and unconsciously in a frame of reference which,

obvious to them, is invisible to Westerners. The Japan-Manchoukuo or

Japan-Wang relationship could be aligned with the relationship which Li

Hung-chang wished, sixty years ago, to maintain in Korea, and found

significantly similar. The Japanese understood the position of

juniority in international relations: to their intense humiliation, they

confessed themselves China's junior during the Ashikaga period.[3]

[Footnote 3: It is unfortunate that work on the nature of old Far

Eastern international relations has no more than just begun.

Descriptions from the viewpoint of Western international law often

possess the unreal lucidity of dialectical materialism or of

theosophy, since it is necessary to read into Chinese and other Far

Eastern political institutions the characteristic features of a

European invention--the juridical, omnicompetent, secular,

territorially limited state. See Djang Chu, _The Chinese Suzerainty_,

unpublished doctoral dissertation, the Johns Hopkins University, 1935;

Nelson, Melvin Frederick, _The International Status of Korea,

1876-1910_ unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1939,

particularly Part I, "The International Society of Confucian

Monarchies" and Part II, "Korea in Conflicting Societies of Nations";

both attempt to reconstruct the working Asiatic theory in terms

comprehensible to the West. Clyde, Paul H., _United States Policy

Toward China_, Durham, 1940, Section XXIV, gives a succinct statement

and relevant American public documents.]

A third meaningful context for Japanese practice is found in the basic,

factual scheme of current international relations. No nation in an

interdependent world is independent except by legal fiction; none could

maintain its present level of civilization without the existence of the

others. In these terms, legal independence fades as time passes, and

cross-national power becomes more evident. Western imperialism was

described by Sun Yat-sen as reducing China to a hypo-colony. More

recently, first the Communists and then the Japanese have accused Chiang

K'ai-shek of being the puppet of imperialism,[4] while occasional

Leftists regard Chiang as even now a puppet of Japan[5] and a few

citizens of imperialist states see him as a Communist puppet. The

Germans treat Churchill as the puppet of Roosevelt, and Roosevelt as a

puppet for international Jewry, while the present Stalinist line

attributes puppetry to the entire catalogue of world political

institutions save those made quick by its own infallibility. The

fundamental point of such appraisal depends upon the _attribution_ of

power relationships. Dependence is indisputable only if one government

functions within the military framework of another, or if the personnel

of the subordinate is drawn from the superior, or if clear and immediate

causal relationships can be proved between the continued fiscal or

military action of the sustaining government and the actual existence of

the sustained government--although even this last leads to subjective

interpretation.

[Footnote 4: Taylor, George, _The Struggle for North China_, cited, p.

66.]

[Footnote 5: Statements to the author, by persons not in Chungking.]

The term _puppet_ is not clear or apt, except in its most concrete

sense--that of a person who is almost literally a marionette, whose

utterances public and private are not his own, whose actions are

supervised, and whose personal choice or opinion is not merely thwarted,

but left out of consideration. Not all the Chinese who work with Japan

are ventriloquists' dummies. The author talked freely with men who

staked their careers on the inescapable success of the Japanese

military, and who functioned in absolute conformity to general limits of

policy and publicity laid down by the Japanese; these general limits

were wide enough to permit a considerable degree of latitude of manners,

and to allow variance in power and policy between the various Chinese

under Japan. Use of the term _puppet_ in such cases is not clear. It

implies a higher degree of effective Japanese control, and a greater

pliability of Chinese cooperators, than can be shown to exist.

Since, however, the National Government is recognized, both by the

majority of the Chinese people and by _all_ powers (including Germany

and Italy) except Japan, to be the legitimate government of China,

representing the Chinese nation, action against that government may

properly and strictly be denominated treason; a person so acting may be

called, formally, a traitor and, less formally but more descriptively, a

Japanophile. Juridically the Chinese Soviet leaders were also traitors,

but they were never Japanophile. This term gains by specificity what it

loses through awkwardness.

THE PROVISIONAL AND REFORMED GOVERNMENTS

The Japanese have determined, assisted and promoted establishment of a

number of friendly Chinese governments. Huapeikuo, a North China

separatist state, went the way of the Francophile Rhineland Republic; it

never got off the drafting board. The East Hopei Autonomous

Anti-Communist Government of Mr. Yin Ju-kêng provided, within the North

China demilitarized zone, a vast gateway for smuggling; when the

National Government withdrew its forces from North China, the Japanese

sought more pretentious aids to conquest. The Provisional Government was

the first of these, following an Inner Mongol federation (_Mêng-liu

Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu_), affiliated with Manchoukuo; it was soon

rivaled by the Reformed Government; and in March 1940, both were

incorporated into the Reorganized National Government of Mr. Wang

Ch'ing-wei. Other governments, sponsored by various quarreling

departments of the Japanese military, or organized by Chinese confidence

men, have appeared transiently and then disappeared.

Three points concerning Japanophile governments contribute to assessment

of their chances; their origin and structure; their ideological

(narrowly, propagandist) position; and their personnel. These points

illustrate a significantly ambivalent trend: the Japanese have found

their degree of freedom of action less than they had expected in Chinese

politics, and to that extent have been defeated; they have also yielded

to the demands of the situation, and have won, in part, in that their

chances of success appreciate with realism.

The Provisional Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo

Lin-shih Chêng-fu_) was formed at Peking on December 14, 1937, and ended

by merger into the Wang Ch'ing-wei government on March 30, 1940,

perpetuating a high degree of separatism under the subgovernmental

style, North China Political Council. Like its predecessors and

successors, it was created by a self-proclaimed committee organized with

the consent and knowledge of the Japanese military, if not by the

Japanese directly. The members of the Provisional Government were old,

weak men, mostly adherents of the Anfu clique which had been Japanophile

during and after the War of 1914-18. A few were even brought forth from

more archaic strata, lonely adherents to the abandoned monarchy. The

youngest were in their fifties and the leading officers were extreme

conservatives--men of some intelligence and reputation, but obsolete.

The structure of the _Lin-shih_ Government was interesting in that it

formed a republic of three committees, as follows:[6]

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT (Committee)

|

|---Political Council

|

|--------Administrative

Executive Division (Committee)-----| Ministries and

| Boards

|

|---Secretariat

Legislative Division (Committee)---|

|

Judicial Division (Committee)------|

[Footnote 6: Nyi, P. C., "Plans for Economic and Political Hegemony in

China," cited, p. 239. Compare this with the chart in George Taylor,

work cited, p. 204. Professor Taylor's study covers the entire history

of the Provisional Government, significantly aligned with that of its

rival, the guerrilla Border Region.]

Structurally important features are: the absence of any method of

election, direct or indirect, or of any ultimate source of "sovereign"

personnel--the government having borne itself out of chaos,

constitutionally a remarkable feat; the elimination of even nominal

party control of government, or cameral legislation, or constituent

assembly, these being hated vestiges of the Chinese and Western, but not

Japanese, notion that popular sovereignty is to receive genuflections if

not credence; and, most startlingly, the absence of a head! There was no

President, Protector, Chief of State, Leader, or Dictator; the highest

officer was the Shanghai banker, Mr. Wang K'ê-min, Chairman of the

Executive Division (literally, _yüan_, but not in the Nationalist

sense). The scope, succession and competence of this Provisional

Government were as much in doubt as its origin.

Under the Provisional Government there flowered a new political

philosophy, the _Hsin Min Chu I_ ("Principles of the Renewed People,"

"People-Renewing Principles," or "Principles of the New People"). The

similarity of this principle to the _San Min Chu I_ is striking, but is

no more than verbal. Propaganda under this credo resembled the

Japanese-prepared state-philosophy of _Wang Tao_, the _kingly_ (as

opposed to tyrannous and unnatural) _way_ of the Confucian canon,

which--revered throughout the Far East, even by Sun Yat-sen--had been

slanted to suit Manchoukuo through a Concordia Society (_Hsieh-ho-hui_).

Each of the Sunyatsenist principles was refuted in detail, Pan-Asian

racialism was encouraged, a class-war _between_ the nations was

emphasized, and conservatism in thought, manners, and morals

recommended. The Peking propaganda machinery was well-financed; the

_Hsin-min-hui_ became the only tolerated political group. This _hui_ was

headed by Mr. Miao Ping, a Kuomintang Party veteran whose

political-bureau experience dated back to the days of Borodin. His

renegation, never publicly explained, enabled Japan to issue a careful

parody of the _San Min Chu I_. His assistant was a Japanese. Business

associations, student groups, and educational administration were fitted

into the pattern. The principles were not logically or systematically

developed, but the key terms sufficed to coordinate opportunist appeals

justifying the invasion, and opposing resistance, guerrillas,

modernizations, and democracy. The _Hsin Min Chu I_ received no credence

through conversion, faith, or loyalty. Operating on sound advertising

principles, however, they served well even if they failed to command

obedience but did unsettle allegiance to the other side, and ubiquitous

iteration muddied thought.

The personnel of the Provisional Government included no actively

important political leader. Many had been important long before; some

were conspicuous in fields other than politics, and had even served on

the semi-buffer Hopei-Chahar Political Council which was Chiang's last

compromise with Japan. Japan's failure to obtain an effective political

leader is important, for this lack eventually led to the acceptance of

Wang Ch'ing-wei. The old age, past misfortunes, the motley reputations

of the Provisional Government leaders attested a national sentiment

sufficient to enforce unity beyond the reach of national law.

The Reformed Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo

Wei-hsin Chêng-fu_) was established March 28, 1938. It lapsed

simultaneously with its rival and colleague, the Provisional Government.

There were several suggestive points of difference, although the chief

difference was the fact that the Provisional Government operated from

Peiping and the Reformed from Nanking. Both were national in form, a

difficulty which was solved by the creation of a United Council to speak

for all occupied China. This Council had only the power to issue news

releases, which it did. Despite duplication of capitals and national

form, the Nanking government revealed a slipping in the Japanese

insistence on conformity to their ideas.

In structure, the Reformed Government was a mutilated copy of the

National Government. It possessed five _yüan_, thereby continuing the

Sunyatsenist constitutional system which Japan first sought to destroy.

In doctrine, it took over the North China-Manchoukuo pattern, under the

name _Ta Min Chu I_ (Principles of the Great People), with a party under

the name _Ta-min-hui_. The walls of Nanking were covered with the emblem

of the party, a red circular shield with a yellow crescent moon

enclosing a white star. Quasi-educational work approximated that of the

North; but the Japanese found the Yangtze sympathetic to the National

Government and Kuomintang, and hence employed devices reminiscent of

Chungking.

For Reformed Government personnel, the Japanese found individuals who

were in most instances either as old as their Peiping colleagues, but

less famous, or much younger, and relatively unknown. With the city of

Shanghai only partially under its control, because local opportunists

reached the tax offices first, the Reformed Government provided an

outlet for persons who had felt themselves unjustly denied office, or

slighted by the Kuomintang, or who had wrecked careers, once promising,

by some ghastly misstep or crime and now saw a miraculous chance to

return.

These new governments could not on principle claim the allegiance of

their own clerks. The personnel, disloyal and of poor morale, was often

so corrupt that no government services--needed by Japanese civilians and

army alike--could be entrusted to them. Multiple taxes blocked Japanese

trade in the area Japan had occupied. The Japanese realized that the

United Council and the senescent politicians were not enough. Instead of

abandoning interventionist governments, they tried a leader of genuine

importance, considerable ability, and some following. His treason was

Japan's last chance to govern China without assuming the task herself,

risking a premature undertaking. To understand the moves and motives of

Wang Ch'ing-wei it is necessary to regard his character and political

history.

THE REORGANIZED NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF WANG CH'ING-WEI

In contrast to Chiang, who receives the obloquy which goes with power,

Wang Ch'ing-wei has spent the greater part of his life as a political

Out. He began brilliantly. While in his twenties, he became a

revolutionary hero by a bold attempt to assassinate the Prince Regent,

and after the establishment of the Republic followed the unhappy

meanders of the Nationalist movement. His association with Sun in the

years before Sun's death was very close, and he has as good a title as

anyone to the apostolic succession. (His title is not necessarily much

better than that of various other Kuomintang leaders; a score or so of

elder statesmen of the Party could claim a longer service of Party

leadership and equality or seniority to Wang in Party rank.)

In 1927 Chiang and Wang had different regimes for the first time, and

Wang went into exile; he tried again in 1930, and went into exile; and

he is trying now. His cooperation with the Japanese must not be regarded

as the sudden prostitution of a worthy figure, nor as the culminating

criminality of an utter rogue. As in a Greek tragedy, Wang, blinded by

self-esteem and goaded by political frustration, has chosen his unsavory

course from understandable motives. Several lines of continuity lead up

to his establishment of the Reorganized National Government at Nanking,

and condition the nature of this government.

Primarily, Wang has been an in-and-out schismatic in Kuomintang ranks.

It is quite possible that in terms of a head count, he may have had the

immediate support of a greater portion of the membership than did Chiang

in the first break in 1927, but his proportion has fairly steadily

declined ever since. There have been a large number of men who accepted

him as leader, just as in the preceding decade there were men _Wu mi_

("infatuated with Wu [Pei-fu]"). In 1930-31 his organization paralleled

the Government-supported Kuomintang in all parts of the world. Today he

has some followers who follow even to Nanking. These men are bound to

him by ties of long, habitual obedience, by blood kinship, and by

generously offered loyalty: the distinguished and vigorous Ch'en

Kung-po, now Mayor of Shanghai; by Chou Fu-hai, who--before his

proscription--was the most popular commentator on the _San Min Chu I_;

Lin Pai-sheng, who had served Wang well as spokesman; and the

entertaining T'ang Leang-li, a Javanese-Chinese writer of international

fame, who has probably written more books on China in English than any

other Chinese.

On the other hand, he has lost office-holding followers by the scores,

many of whom hold positions ranging up to Vice-Ministerships in

Chungking, and he seems to have lost almost all of his rank and file

followers. The chief defection was that of Messrs. Tao Hsi-shêng and Kao

Tsung-wu, who fled from Chungking to Shanghai and Nanking, and then fled

back again, bringing with them sensational copies of Wang's secret

preliminary agreements with the Japanese. Dr. Tao, a historian, served

Wang temporarily as Party-Minister of Publicity; Dr. Kao had been in the

foreign office while Wang still collaborated with Chiang.[7] His

following consisted almost entirely of politicians, ranging from the

rank of scholar-bureaucrat down to hooligans. The masses which he led

in 1927 have dwindled to hundreds, and the replacements are of distinct

unworthiness--persons, already cooperating with the Japanese, whom he

must lead for lack of better. He has lost followers with almost every

move he has made, whether rebelling, going into exile, accepting

government post under Chiang, or working with Japan. The Wang clique may

be represented by a consistently declining curve.

[Footnote 7: _The Japan-Wang Ch'ing-wei Secret Agreements,

1938-1939-1940_, Shanghai, 1910; these also appeared in the _China

Weekly Review_, January 27, 1940, p. 318; February 3, 1940, p. 341.]

In the face of this, it is unexpected to find that Wang has been

reasonably honest and consistent, as were Trotsky and Röhm. His

consistency may be described as a perfectly regular spiral, which

maintains unchanging direction but never goes in a straight line. Wang

has always favored not-fighting, peace, civilian and constitutional

government, and making friends with any nation which professes

friendship for China. The loftiness of his motives might be impugned by

pointing out that each is the antithesis of one of Chiang's

characteristics; but the ultimate test of Wang's sincerity lies with the

psychiatrists rather than with political scientists. Assuming sincerity,

how did these consistent standards lead him to Nanking?

In 1927 Chiang broke with the Communists quite a while before Wang did.

Wang was willing to yield a doubtful point here, to credit the other

side with good motives there, and to keep the Wuhan government going as

long as he could. His difficulties were the difficulties of a

constitutionalist willing to maintain the constitution at the cost of

some appeasement. In the following years of exile, he upbraided Chiang's

machine-boss tactics within the Kuomintang; the name "Reorganized

Kuomintang" which he selected for his schismatics, is indicative of his

desire to promote regularity in party elections and free democratic

discussion in party congresses.

A striking instance of repetition may be seen in contrasting the

Nanking of 1940 with the Peking of 1930. In 1930 Chiang K'ai-shek had

been threatened by military attack and had found a great part of China

wrested from him by superior forces, those of the _tuchün_ Feng

Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan; but the National Government maintained its

position in the capital. In 1940, the capital had moved to Chungking and

the armed enemies were Japanese; Hu Han-min (the great Rightist leader)

was dead, a new Communist alliance was in effect, and the outside world

was in a turmoil more profound than China's. Despite the supervening

changes, Wang Ch'ing-wei was found in 1940 in precisely the role of

1930. Again he was the front for a military regime. In 1930 he had been

a Left-liberal front for native militarism; in 1940, he was the

appeasing, conservative front for the Imperial Japanese army. In 1930 he

had his own "Reorganized" Kuomintang; he had his "Orthodox" again in

1940. In 1930 he usurped the National Government offices, titles, and

regalia; he did this again in 1940. In 1930 his career ended with

military defeat and he went into exile, later bargaining his position

back into Chinese politics.

Wang appears to have become the victim of an _idée fixe_: he believes

that if he impersonates government devotedly enough, and with careful

enough detail, he will become government. Brilliant, sincere, adroit, he

is burdened by a pathological self-esteem and is so much the victim of

his own past rationalizations that he is no longer inventive. Obviously

such a character, in the face of recurrent failure, cannot assume the

blame for it. Wang's demon is the Generalissimo.

Another characteristic of Wang appears clearly at this point: the belief

of the appeaser that he can outsmart the appeased; he no doubt thought

that his _tuchün_ colleagues would become victims of the government

which they let him create. On his way out of China after Chiang's armies

and Chang Hsüeh-liang's intervention had settled this affair, he

stopped over in Canton to take part in an even more transitory and less

successful rebellion.

The next round of Wang-Chiang rivalry displays the consummate political

strategy of the Generalissimo and the ruin of Wang by his own virtues.

For three full years, 1932 through 1935, Wang was President of the

Executive _Yüan_ and second only to Chiang. After a little more than a

year out of office--owing in part to a gunshot wound--he returned in the

crucial months of 1937 just before the outbreak of general hostilities,

and stayed with the National Government through the first year and a

half of the war--until December 1938. In fifteen more months he reached

terms with the Japanese; eight months after he set up a government with

their consent and sponsorship, they recognized that government.

Throughout this period Wang advocated peace, non-aggression to the point

of non-defense and surrender, and universal conciliation. These

attitudes made him very useful to Chiang when Chiang needed him, and

made him dispose of himself when he was no longer helpful to Chiang.

Wang was ruined by the long, agonizing appeasement of which Chiang was

the leader, in the six years between the Japanese invasion of China's

Manchurian provinces and the outbreak of undeclared war in July 1937.

Throughout this period the forces of Leftist reform, of Communist

pressure (both military and political), of student sentiment, of

overseas-Chinese patriotism, and finally of national self-respect

itself, fed the opposition to Chiang, who knew that, whatever the cost,

China was not militarily or politically ready to fight Japan. Wang

Ch'ing-wei, who when out of office had espoused some of the most

genuinely popular and necessary reforms, found himself civilian leader

of a government following an intensely unpopular policy, and unable to

profit by the rise of opposition. The Generalissimo needed someone to

replace Hu Han-min, with whom he disagreed and whom he temporarily

incarcerated. Wang provided a counter-balance to the Hu Han-min group,

undermined his own popularity, and helped shield Chiang from

anti-appeasement criticism.

Wang Ch'ing-wei, in this period, feared war and grasped at the

conciliation which the Japanese offered between successive invasions. In

1937, Wang worked for the localization of the war at the cost of North

China, on the theory that the Japanese could take what they wished. He

reiterated his old point that the Chinese could not possibly whip the

Japanese on the fields of battle, but that they might outmaneuver them

over the tables of diplomacy. The advent of war was a disappointment and

source of worry to him.

In the course of the celebrated retreat from Nanking to Hankow, and from

Hankow to Chungking, Wang lost no opportunity to work for peace. When

the Germans offered themselves as intermediaries in the Hankow period,

Wang sought the opening of negotiations. There was a violent uproar in

the People's Political Council, not then reported in the press. When the

government moved to Chungking, Wang was even more despondent: victory

seemed remote, the Communists worried him as much as did the Japanese,

and the Generalissimo swept opposition aside with the slogans of

resistance. Like other peoples in war time, the Chinese began to confuse

peace and treason. Wang and his closest supporters felt that they were

being deprived of freedom of speech; their known inclination to

surrender and negotiate had supplied Chiang with a weapon which might

even prove personally dangerous to them. The death by firing-squad of

General Han Fu-ch'u showed that treason, or the charge of it, had become

serious. Wang and his followers rationalized their own fearfulness

concerning the war into the belief that they were expressing the will of

the peace-loving masses. In December 1938 he got out of China by a

surprise flight to Indo-China. His followers had previously been

filtering down to Hong Kong. The Konoye statement,[8] just issued, gave

him an opening to treat with the Japanese.

[Footnote 8: Statement of the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro

Konoye, December 22, 1938, Jones and Myers, _Documents on American

Foreign Relations, 1939-40_, Boston (World Peace Foundation), p. 299.]

Throughout the negotiations, Wang behaved as though he were himself the

legitimate Chinese government. He did not accept the minimum Japanese

conditions, but held out for an agreement which would preserve the

fictions of Chinese independence, allow him to fly the national flag,

establish his version of the Kuomintang, and attempt every kind of

linkage with the past. One of his followers asked the author in Nanking,

"Do you think we were traitors when we spent more than a year getting a

fair peace agreement from the Japanese?" This agreement, released by

Messrs. Tao and Kao, consisted of the cession of broad military,

foreign-relations, and economic rights over China to Japan. The Chinese

were to lose no territory _pro forma_, and were to keep a minimum of 35

per cent interest in major economic enterprises.

The regime is sufficiently well known so that there is no need to detail

its history: the long dickering with the two Japanophile "governments"

already established in Peking and Nanking, since they were the third

parties to the Japan-Wang negotiations, the installation of the

government in March 1940, and its recognition the following November.

The more significant problem is--what part can this Nanking

establishment play in the actual contest for power in East Asia?

In the first place, the Reorganized National Government (_Chung-hua

Min-kuo Ts'an-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu_) of China is not a puppet

government in the sense that the Manchoukuoan government is. The

Japanese have a very loose surveillance of the officers of state.

Interviews with officials indicate pretty conclusively the absence of

dictaphones or of Japanese Special Service agents. The leaders in the

government at Nanking are not watched or hounded in any intimate way.

One of them said: "Why should the Japanese watch us? They know that we

cannot do anything to them, and they know that their only chance of

success lies in our becoming a real government."

Secondly, the personnel of the Nanking regime is not sufficient to cope

with the problems which face it. The Nanking regime has no diplomatic

officer who has regularly represented any other Chinese government; only

a few consuls, in Japanese territory, joined it.[9] In no single

instance can a Nanking officeholder, compared with his Chungking

counterpart, be regarded (patriotism apart) as better-qualified or more

able than his rival. In an enterprise of this sort, it would seem likely

that Nanking should have the better man in some few positions. Diligent

and disinterested inquiry fails to reveal a single one. Finally, the

personnel is a mixture of Wang cliquists, politically obsolete

conservatives, careerist Japanophiles, colorless opportunists, and

actual criminals.

[Footnote 9: Ch'ên Lo died, and the only persons with any diplomatic

experience had, in the past, been only casually connected with the

Foreign Office.]

A Western newspaper man, well acquainted with the Nanking situation,

told the author that he estimated the regime as 5 per cent Japanophiles,

5 per cent upright men who worked with the enemy because of a sense of

public duty toward the Chinese people in the occupied areas, 20 per cent

opportunists, and 70 per cent low characters interested in thievery.

Nanking officials, to whom these estimates were communicated without

revelation of the source, felt the latter categories to be much too

high. Several of the more intelligent men in Nanking offered the

argument that if they did not share in the regime, unscrupulous elements

would deceive the Japanese and oppress the people; or they stated that

the Reorganized Government had brought back the flag, the constitution,

the titles, the law codes, and the political doctrines of the National

Government, so that occupied and unoccupied China had the same polity.

They disregarded the point that this abetted the enemy.

Thirdly, the government has nothing to do. The power of the Nanking

regime in no instance reaches beyond the Japanese patrols. No counties

are under Nanking control which are not also under Japanese control. The

Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no foreign affairs. The Ministry of

Finance collects some excises and disburses many salaries, as well as

limited amounts for the upkeep of some schools, law courts, minimal

public services, and state property, insofar as the Japanese have

returned any. (It is interesting to note that the officials at Nanking,

deploring the "Communist" tendencies of Chiang, live in commandeered

houses, and use the commandeering of private property as a form of

patronage for their supporters.) The Central Political Council has so

little to do that it draws up a budget and solemnly debates items of

less than U. S. $100.[10] The officials cannot ride far from the city

limits of Nanking, because of the guerrillas who operate all about. The

railroad runs only by daylight. The Nanking police are mostly unarmed,

except for clubs--an unprecedented condition for modern China!--and many

who carry rifles or pistols seem to have no cartridges.

[Footnote 10: See _The People's Tribune_ (Shanghai), XXIX, p. 130

_ff._, August 1940. This is the semi-official English organ of the

regime; each issue contains a selection of public documents. It is

edited by the volatile T'ang Leang-li. The other English-language

journal is _The Voice of China_, fortnightly, Nanking, edited by Mr.

L. K. Kentwell, a graduate of Oxford and Columbia Universities,

Hawaiian-born of British and Cantonese parentage. The journal is

spirited, and very anti-British.]

Fourthly, the Nanking government is an encouraging indication that the

modern Chinese have finally come to the point where five-power

republicanism is the norm. It is significant that the Nanking regime

practices an extreme purism of organization and nomenclature, conforming

precisely to antebellum practice.[11] The regime has changed the

theoretical structure of the National Government very little, but added

the Party ministries to the government cabinet. One further change has

consisted in the logically desirable transference of the Ministry of

Justice to the Executive _Yüan_ from the Judicial, thus eliminating the

anomaly of having both prosecuting and adjudicatory agencies under the

same control.[12] The minister, Li Shêng-wu, is a well-known scholar in

international law and an educational editor.[13]

[Footnote 11: Such a chart is found in _The People's Tribune_, XXIX

(March 1940), p. 214, together with a list of incumbents on the

following pages. The issue is headed by an editorial, "The National

Government Returns to Its Capital" and "Peace, Struggle, and Save

China" by Wang Ching-wei (_sic_). The official outline of the

government is to be found in [Reorganized Government], _K'ao-shih Yüan

Kung-pao_ (Public Gazette of the Examination _Yüan_), Nanking. Vol. I,

No. 2 (June 1940), following p. 80.]

[Footnote 12: [Reorganized Government], _Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng

Kung-pao_ (Public Gazette of the Ministry of Justice), Nanking, gives

a well-edited résumé of the work of the Ministry and its policy in

prosecutions.]

[Footnote 13: [_China Weekly Review_; J. B. Powell, editor], _Who's

Who in China, Fifth Edition_, Shanghai, [1937], p. 145. For further

information see the supplement on the pro-Japanese leaders in _Who's

Who in China, Supplement to Fifth Edition_, Shanghai, [1940]. This

presents a hall of notoriety for all the major Chinese leaders

affiliated with the enemy. This _Who's Who_ is regarded by the present

author as one of the most valuable sources on all Far Eastern

politics. It is engrossingly good reading and entertainment, the

pictures of the subjects being included in most instances. Behind

these simple and short biographies, there lies more drama than

Hollywood dare produce.]

Since the Japanese may be expected to foster the kind of Japanophile

government which would help them most, it is interesting that their

crusade against Sunyatsenism has turned to a quasi-Kuomintang structure

for aid. The attempt does not, as yet, seem to be working, but the

technique of the deception reveals the depth to which Kuomintang

principles and practices have penetrated in the past generation. The

Nanking incumbents make every effort to confuse their regime with the

National Government at Chungking, even to the extent of copying the

names of all minor offices, the forms of the stationery, and the

organization of semi-public cultural associations. Chinese fashion, they

confuse correct form and legitimacy. Given a long enough period, this

technique may succeed. Meanwhile, the failure of the earlier traitor

Governments, non-Nationalist in form, is a real indicium of the value of

the Sunyatsenist pattern.

Along with the bewildering _Doppelgänger_ effect which prevails in all

other matters, there are two Kuomintangs. The major, recognized

Kuomintang continues from Chungking. At Nanking Wang and his friends

have organized the "Orthodox Kuomintang." This can scarcely be thought

of as a Party fraction, so much has it dwindled. The overseas branches

have been lost, and the populace in its own cities is savagely

contemptuous. Wang Ch'ing-wei held a "Sixth Plenary Session of the

C.E.C. of the Kuomintang" on August 29, 1939, and the affair seems to

have been an uproarious farce, with all of Wang's friends bringing in

random acquaintances in order to make up a quorum.[14] Since then, the

vestigial party has been equipped with appropriate party organs, and is

preparing to share its hypothetical power with an equally _ad hoc_

Nanking People's Political Council. The Kuomintang leaders in Nanking,

as a part of their application to the Chungking pattern, have even

listed a considerable number of minor parties which are on their side of

the Japanese army. Persistent, specific inquiry in Nanking failed to

elicit the name of a single _bona fide_ minor party representative,

other than representatives of the _Hsin Min Hui_ (ex-Provisional), the

_Ta Min Hui_ (ex-Reformed), the Republicans (_Kung-ho Tang;_ Hankow;

merged with the Orthodox Kuomintang), and the Chinese Socialist Party,

which consists of the venerable Dr. Kiang Kang-hu. It is perhaps fair to

conclude that the Nanking regime is not a Kuomintang regime because a

sizable portion of the Kuomintang membership were weary of war, but

because some few Kuomintang leaders found no other way to power, and

because the Japanese had reluctantly decided that the simulacrum of the

Kuomintang was the minimum requirement of any Chinese government.

[Footnote 14: For an account of this see, "Wang's Farcical C.E.C.

Session," _China At War_ (Hong Kong), III, No. 6, p. 57; January

1940.]

Lastly, the lack of success of Wang Ch'ing-wei and his government is

proof of the emergence of a state in China. This is not the first time

that Wang has set up his own government. It is not even the first time

that Chinese have accepted foreign aid in such enterprises. Wang

thought, and presumably thinks, that he is playing the accepted game of

Chinese politics; he is likely to find that he has committed a treason

which is disastrously real to him. The non-support of his government is

a clear proof of the rising race-national awareness among China's common

millions.

Stripped of the confusion and distortion which have surrounded the Wang

Ch'ing-wei secession, the rivalry between Wang and Chiang is not so very

different from Benedict Arnold's departure from the then dubious

American revolution. In this century we have revised our opinion of

Benedict Arnold upward--in part--and Wang Ch'ing-wei may, perhaps,

justly fit the same category. A gifted but maladroit and unhappy

political leader had brought his misfortunes to the Japanese. They,

_faute de mieux_, have accepted his aid. So far this has been

ineffectual. Most probably, only a very long lapse of time or the truly

catastrophic ruin of their opponents could place Wang and his group in

a position of autonomous importance and power. On the world scene Wang

stands halfway between Quisling and Pétain. A traitor to the emergent

Chinese state, he demonstrates the ancient Chinese capacity to

surrender, appease, and survive. Had he antagonists less formidable than

Chiang and the infuriated masses, his Reorganized Government might

secure actual power.

The Japanese finally recognized the Reorganized National Government of

Wang Ch'ing-wei on November 30, 1940, after many months of delay. _Art._

I provided for mutual recognition, but added the provision that the two

countries should "... at the same time take mutually helpful and

friendly measures, political, economic, cultural, and otherwise ..." and

in the future prohibit "... such measures and causes as are destructive

to the amity between the two countries in politics, diplomacy,

education, propaganda, trade and commerce, and other spheres." _Art._ II

was an anti-Communist agreement leaving Japanese forces in North China

indefinitely. _Art._ IV left the problem of Japanese evacuation to

separate annexes. _Art._ VI provides "Economic cooperation," with the

inescapable implications. By _Art._ VII Japan relinquishes

extraterritoriality (in the future), but obtains the opening of all

China to Japan.[15] These terms, which not only involve admission of

Chinese defeat, but preclude any possible attempt of China to restore

military, economic, or political independence, are the best that Japan

has to offer. When one considers that even these are merely legal,

whittled back to realism by protocols and annexes, and that they are

made with Japan's Chinese friends, Japan appears incapable of ending

the China incident. The Japanese do not know when to stop. Gauche in

power politics, they are undone by greediness and inexperience.

[Footnote 15: The full text of the treaty is to be found in China

Information Committee, _News Release_, December 2, 1940, together with

the Generalissimo's comment. For a brief account, clearly interpreted,

see Steiger, G. Nye, "Japan Makes Peace--with Wang," _Events_, Vol. 9,

No. 49 (January 1941), p. 60-2. The Generalissimo's comment on the

Nanking regime will also be found below, Appendix III (A), No. 7.]

The recognition is important only in that it assists Japan in escaping

responsibility for action taken by or through the Chinese affiliates,

while at the same time pinning Japan to the Chinese earth and committing

the Empire to indefinite continuation of hostilities. If the Japanese

achieved complete success in international power politics, there is a

possibility that the Reorganized Government might remain as the

functioning half-autonomous affiliate of Japan. Otherwise, Nanking can

be nothing more than an ornamental, occasionally useful auxiliary to the

Imperial Japanese Army, itself an uncomfortable Chinese government _pro

tem_. Having ultimate authority, the Army cannot yet escape or delegate

final responsibility.

CHAPTER VIII

EXTRA-POLITICAL FORCES

Government, wherever organized, is distinguished from other social

institutions by claims to universality of scope and competence, and

paramountcy of authority; the term _political_, on the basis of such a

distinction, refers to activities, occasionally individual but more

usually collective, involving access to the symbols of government; and

the term _governmental_ refers to the application of such symbols in

governmental sanctions and services. The process of government is

accordingly one wherein groups smaller than the totality of society seek

("politically") to obtain action in the name of the totality

("governmental"), for or against other groups according to shifting

interests. In the West this politico-governmental process has been

further characterized by ceremonial forms ("laws") and reinforced by

conceptions of amoral omnicompetence ("sovereignty").

The cellular socio-economic structure of old China, plus the Confucian

employment of ideological as opposed to governmental control, kept the

entire process of politics and government at a very low level of

intensity. Modern China, inheritor of an apolitical past, is still the

most pluralistic society in the world, and modern Chinese

government--despite recent gigantism--a frail legal superstructure above

a flood of extra-political power. Western societies depend upon their

states; the Chinese state depends upon a society which could, albeit

uncomfortably, dispense with states altogether.

This condition amounts in international politics, to both a strength and

a weakness. Chinese society suffers more political ruin with less social

disturbance than does any comparable society; the guerrillas, for

example, probably find government helpful when available, but regard it

as a luxury rather than a necessity. Chinese society is near to an

orderly anarchy; uniform conditioning from the past, or uniform present

opinion, takes the place of mass organization and totalitarian

government. The high death rate of traitors is probably not owing to

activity on the part of Chungking, but to the spontaneous action of

ordinary men; on one occasion a high pro-Japanese official was shot by

his own bodyguard while the two sat in a sedan on a busy street: the

bodyguard had experienced a revulsion of conscience. Fu Hsiao-ên, Wang

Ch'ing-wei's Mayor of Shanghai, was also killed by a member of his own

household. Spontaneous but uniform action applies not only to

sensational political matters; it appears in less dramatic but equally

important affairs, such as commercial rivalry, landlord-tenant

relationships, and the police power of the community and the family.

However, in a contest for power, while the Chinese lose little by

defeat, their counter-attacks are correspondingly more difficult. The

fluid autonomy of innumerable groups slows down the engines of formal

power. The political-governmental process is apt to be sluggish in

crises.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT

The society upon which the National Government of China, its Left

associates, and its Japanophile rivals rest is not a settled, stagnant

society. An extraordinary ferment has gripped China for more than a

century--arising from cadastral, agrarian, technological, economic,

fiscal, ideological, political, and governmental change. The Chinese

people have endured; they have also acted. Within a single century,

three blazing revolutions have swept China: the T'aip'ing Rebellion,

put down with Western aid after fifteen years of war; the Boxer

uprising, deflected into xenophobia by the Manchus; and the Great

Revolution, which succeeded in part. Between these, there have been

changes, bloody but of secondary magnitude: the Moslem rebellions; the

minor uprisings of Sun Yat-sen; the Republican Revolution; the 1919

movement; the _tuchün_ wars; the Communist communes, which failed

utterly in Shanghai and Canton; the Communist _jacqueries_, which

continued; and the present rip tide of resistance. None of these was

effectively mastered by organized government; each was exploited by one

government, and opposed by another. Unlike a Western state, wherein

government becomes the prime mobilizer during crises, Chinese society

shifts its incalculable forces, and governments leap forward to take

advantage of them.

This extensive, unorganized residue of opinion and power, outside the

reach of government, keeps any modern Chinese government in a peculiar

condition. Like a perpetual process of revolution, social changes demand

that a government exploit them, deflect them, or employ them--but not

launch or stop them. The Kuomintang has failed in its attempts to launch

favorable mass movements, and also failed to stop antagonistic ones. The

secret of the Chinese Communist power has lain in the skill of the Red

leaders, who utilized available movements. Hence the continued

development of Chinese government rests upon the wills, fancies,

interests, mob action, enthusiasm or dispiritedness of a people who in

their own communities do not read newspapers, listen to radios, or pay

much attention to the national state. Despite attempts to bring society

under the control of government, in order to make it possible to bring

government under the control of society (constitutionalism), the

decisive forces of modern Chinese life are outside the reach of

propaganda or control.

General opinion in China is not ascertainable, except through action. In

vital matters this action is apt to be either violent, or the equivalent

of violent: sit-down, general, or go-slow strikes; boycotts; universal

derision. The National Government possesses unprecedented amounts of

power by Chinese standards. By Western standards it is incredibly

obliging, casual, and unsystematic. The power which the Government, with

Chiang as leader, enjoys, arises from a support which it could not

compel, and which it cannot ensure by any means other than the pursuance

of support-arousing policies. The Kuomintang, the Communists, the

National Salvationists, the independent Left guerrilla leaders--these

agencies are not the organization of entire opinion groups, but the

spearheads of immeasurable forces. The modernization of government, both

administrative and constitutional, awaits the transformation of

materials around and under government. Greatest of these is popular

mentality. Ancillary are economic, organizational, educational and

cultural forces. Progress toward the omnicompetent state is slowed by

the fact that few Chinese wish to abandon the freedom of a pluralist

society for the efficient universality of legalism. They desire

modernization, but haggle at the price.

Three factors in particular are working upon and among the millions of

farmers and townsmen: mass education, rural reconstruction, and the

cooperative movement. Each not only takes immediate, beneficial effect,

but also transforms the political material of China. These forces, not

in any strict sense political, possess enormous political importance.

MASS EDUCATION

Literacy has risen very rapidly in modern China. Before the impact of

the West, becoming literate was in itself a career. By the time one

could read at all, one was a scholar, unless one learned the limited

quasi-shorthand of the merchants. Educational reforms came about as the

result of modern schools, particularly British and American Protestant

schools, and the action of the government. The fabric of Chinese society

had begun to change even before the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty. The

literary revolution led by Hu Shih after 1915, which popularized

_pai-hua_ (a written form of the Chinese spoken language) had extensive

repercussions, and made possible the rapid diffusion of ideographic

literacy. (Phonetization failed then, and later.) Almost every

government in China has attempted the diffusion of literacy. The popular

demand is intense.

The present status of literacy in China is revealed by official figures

from the Ministry of Education, which may err somewhat on the side of

optimism. These put the total population of China at 450 million

(Manchuria presumably remaining unmentioned), of which 90 million are

literate and 360 million illiterate. Such an estimate would give China

about the same absolute number of literates as the United States. The

remaining 360 million illiterates are broken down as follows: 40.05

million children below the age of six; 45 million aged six to twelve;

29.25 million aged twelve to fifteen; 79.43 million persons over

forty-five; and 1.57 million dumb, deaf, cripples, or insane. The adults

to be reached by the mass literacy movement amount therefore to 165

million; government estimates state that 46,348,469 illiterates were

educated since 1938, of whom 25.2 million were adults between fifteen

and forty-five, leaving roughly 140 million to be educated.[1]

[Footnote 1: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, April 1,

1940.]

The mass education program is supplementary to the education of

children, which is far from complete or even adequate. The literacy

imparted is of the most elementary kind; but in a civilized society such

as China this has immediate effect. The author never knew a Chinese who

could read and was not addicted to it; a common sight in Western China

is a knot of coolies deciphering a newspaper together. The intense

reverence for learning and scholarship makes the training welcome, and

the teachers who seek to teach the minimum of one thousand ideographs in

six weeks never lack pupils.

The program of the National Government was summarized by Ch'ên Li-fu,

the Minister of Education, speaking over the radio after the Mass

Education Conference of March 1940:

Accordingly, our first step is to wipe out illiteracy. In

this respect we proceed simultaneously with the

enlightenment of the masses of adult illiterates, both men

and women, and with the education of children in order to

put an end to illiteracy that may otherwise arise in the

future. At the National Conference on People's Education

held from the twelfth day to the sixteenth day of this month

in Chungking, the _five-year plan for the people's

education_, adopted by the Executive _Yüan_, was further

deliberated and promulgated. The proper enforcement of this

plan will help to convert at least one hundred and forty

million (140,000,000) adult illiterates into intelligent

citizens for China within the coming five years.

At present there are already 44 per cent of the entire

number of children of school age (from six to twelve) in

school; that is, nineteen million and eight hundred thousand

(19,800,000). By the enforcement of this plan, there should

be, during the first two years, at least one people's school

in every three _pao_. And each village should have a nucleus

school, according to the plan. In this way there should be

at least more than 260,000 people's schools for the 800,000

_pao_ of the entire nation at the end of the first two

years. Each people's school consists of three divisions or

classes, namely, the children's division, the men's

division, and the women's division. During the second two

years there should be at least one people's school in every

two _pao_. In the fifth and last year there should be at

least one people's school in each _pao_. That is to say, at

the end of the fifth year there should be at least 800,000

people's schools for the 800,000 _pao_ of the nation,

besides the 80,000 or more nucleus schools and the 200,000

schools of the same grades now already existent which can

be improved, to provide education for at least 90 per cent

of the entire number of children of school age. As a matter

of fact, certain provinces have already succeeded in

establishing one or even two people's schools in each _pao_.

Kwangsi Province, for instance, has at present one people's

school in each _pao_, while Fukien Province even has two

people's schools in each _pao_. The fulfillment of this

five-year plan needs at least $2,932,000,000 and 1,600,000

properly trained teachers.

Our vocational education aims at building a sound middle

cadre for the various professions and industrial

enterprises. There are training schools and short-time

classes for mechanics, electrical communications, metal

work, etc. Also, special classes are opened in more than ten

colleges and universities for advanced studies along such

lines.

Our attempt to universalize productive education may be

evidenced by the incorporation of productive education

courses into the middle school curriculum, besides

instituting organizations for the same in the various

vocational schools in order to facilitate the practice of

students along such lines.... In 1938, for example, only

53.0 per cent of the entire number of students who took part

in the examination studied science and engineering, but in

1939 it jumped to 59.4 per cent.[2]

[Footnote 2: The same, April 8, 1940. Minor changes in punctuation

have been introduced.]

This statement gives the official view, which is highly optimistic. In

terms of practical politics, however, the Generalissimo has given the

movement his cordial backing, and sees in it a preliminary to democracy.

Although final results might fall far short of the hopeful estimate, the

effect would still be considerable. Diffusion of literacy creates a

momentary satisfaction with the political system which makes literacy

possible, but the after-effect of literacy is to make men of any

nationality easier to govern well and harder to govern badly. A

government which diffuses literacy without advancing reforms is

sharpening weapons against itself. The National Government's

American-inspired trust in education as a panacea implies that Chiang

and his fellow leaders expect to remain popular, and do not contemplate

appeasement, reaction, or other unpopular measures.

RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

An even more interesting aspect of the mass-education movement is its

connection with rural reconstruction. In this field much is owed to Dr.

James Y. C. Yen, a graduate of Yale and Princeton who began his work

with the Chinese labor corps in France during the 1914-18 war. The

war-time work of the correlated mass education and rural reconstruction

movement was summarized by Dr. Yen himself:

The most hopeful factor in the whole China situation is that

her greatest and most valuable resource, the three hundred

and fifty million farmers, has not yet been tapped for the

upbuilding of the nation. The Chinese farmer has had a

measure of freedom and responsibility, of dignity and

independence. He is thrifty and industrious, intelligent and

an expert in intensive farming. A great number of our

national leaders are sons and daughters of our farmers. The

fathers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

were farmers.

These nearly three years of terrible war have proved beyond

doubt that our faith in the Chinese farmer has not been

misplaced. It has revealed his greatness. Our nation is

rediscovering the "forgotten man," the tiller of the soil.

Most of our soldiers come from the farm. To a remarkable

extent he has also financed the war. He is the real hero of

this war.

The Chinese Mass Education Movement was organized in 1923 to

explore the potentialities of the rural masses and find a

way of drawing out the best in them. Since the first

publication of the "thousand character test," it has been

estimated that some thirty million illiterate people have

been taught to read during the past five years.

Beginning with 1929 the point of emphasis of the Movement

shifted from extensive promotion of literacy to intensive

study of the life of the farmers in the rural districts. As

a living social laboratory in which to do our research and

to work out principles and techniques, we selected

Tinghsien, a district of four hundred thousand people,

one-thousandth of the total population of China, in Hopei

Province. This was the first time in our history that an

organized group of Chinese intellectuals went deliberately

to the country to live among the rural people to study their

life and find out how to develop their latent possibilities.

The Movement has evolved what is known as the "Tinghsien

Four-fold Reconstruction Education" including the cultural,

economic, health, and the political.

Several other experimental _hsien_,--Hengshan in Hunan,

Central China, and Hsintu in Szechwan, West China, were

established in cooperation with the provincial governments.

One of our special emphases in these experimental _hsien_

has been the reform of the _hsien_ government, i.e. the

local government.

The Tinghsien Experiment with its "laboratory approach" to

social and political problems and with its _correlated_

program of rural reconstruction as demonstrated in the

district attracted attention from all over China and

inspired similar experiments in various parts of the

country. As a result the movement for rural reconstruction

gained great momentum in China.

Since the outbreak of hostilities the Mass Education

Movement has thrown itself unreservedly into the task of

assisting the Central and Provincial governments in

strengthening the nation's struggle against the enemy. It

was most gratifying that at this hour of China's supreme

struggle we have been able to help the government to

revitalize the _hsien_ government, to train civil service

personnel and to mobilize the farmers. Extensive application

of the new system as developed in the experimental _hsien_

was made to an entire province such as we did in Hunan--a

rich province with a population of thirty million.

In order to insure that the new political machinery should

function effectively a School of Public Administration to

train administrative and technical personnel from the

magistrate down to the village elders was established with

the senior members of our Movement taking full charge.

Altogether the School trained about 4,000 higher officials

for the local government and some 35,000 of the village

elders. Since Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek assumed

concurrently the governorship of Szechwan, a new system of

_hsien_ government (chiefly modelled after the experimental

_hsien_ of the country) with the object of releasing the

new life of the rural masses has been promulgated. Under his

order the same is taking place in neighboring provinces.

Unless serious and painstaking study of rural reconstruction

is made by scientists and scholars on the one hand, and

administrative and technical personnel are systematically

trained and imbued with a spirit of service to the rural

masses on the other, the movement for rural reconstruction

may dwindle away as so many other movements have done in the

past.

It is most heartening to state that Generalissimo Chiang

Kai-shek has given his public approval and backing to the

new National Institute of Rural Reconstruction which he

considers to be of fundamental importance to China's

post-war reconstruction. The inspiration of the Institute

has already helped to mould the principal rural

reconstruction groups in the country into one national

force. The rural reconstruction movement has achieved a

united front unparalleled in its history. Today it is a

great unifying force, an outstanding national platform upon

which all Chinese can agree. It will meet the needs of China

today and lay the foundation for the China of tomorrow.[3]

[Footnote 3: The same, May 6, 1940.]

This program possesses obvious merit. Lacking a foundation of dogma, it

requires no implementation through terrorism. The politically innocuous

character of the movement is attested by the frequent demands by

provincial officials for personnel from the Mass Education training

centers. Since the purpose is to improve the entire community without

revolutionizing its class structure, the enlightened landlords are as

favorable as the peasants themselves. Unfortunately, enlightened

landlords are not always prevalent. Despite the modesty of the program,

it finds stumbling blocks in actual corruption, extortion, and

illegality. Many _hsien_ are under local machines which permit wealthy

conservatives to evade tax payments, steal government funds, and repress

genuine farmer organization. The consequence has been that the movement

succeeds only when it has the immediate backing of a provincial or

central authority; its progress has been slow. Many critics, both

Chinese and Western, have become disgusted with the slowness of social

reform on the land, and despair of anything save reconstruction through

implicit class war.[4]

[Footnote 4: Research Staff of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific

Relations, _Agrarian China, Selected Source Materials from Chinese

Authors_, Shanghai, 1938. A more Leftist and even gloomier view is

taken by Chen Han-seng, _Landlord and Peasant in China_, New York,

1936, and the same author's _Industrial Capital and Chinese Peasants,

A Study of the Livelihood of Chinese Tobacco Cultivators_, Shanghai,

1939. Two general surveys of the Chinese economy are Condliffe, J. B.,

_China Today: Economic_, Boston, 1932, and Tawney, R. H., _Land and

Labour in China_, New York, 1932. A significant hypothesis of the

relations of economics, government, and culture in China is found in

Lattimore, Owen, _Inner Asian Frontiers of China_, New York, 1940, Ch.

III, esp. p. 39 _ff._; this rests in part upon Wittfogel, Karl August,

_Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas_, Leipzig, 1931, the leading

Marxian exposition of the subject.]

The present period of resistance and reconstruction opens a very

promising period in rural modernization. In the first place, war-time

stress puts great power in the Generalissimo's hands. Ubiquitous armies

can, on short notice, enforce orders from Chungking. The shift of troops

among provinces makes the central government an outside power now

physically present in tens of thousands of communities. Devolution of

watchfulness by the Commander-in-Chief and his staff results in slow but

irreversible accumulation of governmental authority.

Secondly, the proclamation of manifold programs has the effect,

obviously, of drawing attention to each of them. The Kuomintang, anxious

to retain its paramountcy, promotes new local government changes. These

face frustration by mass illiteracy. Mass education is impeded by local

economic injustices. The Whampoa and _Erh Ch'ên_ groups in the

Kuomintang, while they have landlord connections, are interested--even

assuming a strong economic-class interest--in the maintenance of

government. Action is appearing, slow and haphazard by Western

standards, but indisputably present. The minimum of good government in

China is a very low minimum, but it is rising in the face of the

Communist and Japanese pressure. One may be sure that the National

Government will not pass below that minimum if the state's existence is

in danger.

Thirdly, there is a very genuine boom condition in Western China. The

movement of the government to the West, and lightening of intolerable

but long-endured _tuchün_ exactions, would in itself have led to sudden

prosperity. To this are added more than twenty millions of new

population, a growing network of communications, a sharp but controlled

inflation. These further stimulate speculation and construction and

development. The most important factors in a new prosperity have been,

however, the reappearance of handicraft-type industry as a consequence

of blockade, and governmental advocacy of every conceivable development.

The author beheld, during the summer of 1940, conditions of prosperity

in Szechwan which he had not expected to find in China within the space

of one lifetime. Narcotics were eradicated. The working population was

commanding high wages, but suffering from high prices; the prices were

somewhat ahead of the wages, but not so far that social morale was

troubled. Skilled labor was in a superb bargaining position; chauffeurs,

electricians, good carpenters, etc. were in considerable demand. The

salaried classes were suffering at all levels, a factor which was

patently wholesome in stimulating working-class morale. The clerical

class, which had held itself aloof from manual labor with a persistence

which boded ill for China, was placed more nearly on a par with its

American equivalent. While poverty was still universal by Western

standards, the pathological squalor endemic to the coast was nowhere

visible.

THE CHINESE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVES

The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (_Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso

Hsieh-hui_) are an important and widely publicized outgrowth of the war,

and are perhaps the only feature of domestic Chinese affairs--outside of

the Communist area and the roads program--which is as well known beyond

China as within. The purpose of the cooperatives is to launch an

enormous program of decentralized industry throughout Free China, with

thirty thousand separate industrial cooperatives for the first major

goal. The purpose is to develop an industrial system which will keep

China autarkic for resistance and reconstruction; long-range, the

purpose is to circumvent impending evils of concentrated industrialism,

slums, megalopolitan crowding, extra-legal oppression. China might thus

proceed directly from a decentralized half-handicraft economy to the

decentralized power economy of the future. Four principles underlie the

program: sound technical design, cooperative organization, voluntary

self-discipline, and social welfare on the basis of Sun's _min

shêng_.[5]

[Footnote 5: Publicity release of Indusco, Inc., The American

Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, New York, January

1940 [1941]. This agency, exceedingly active in publicizing China's

cooperative progress, has released a great deal of up-to-date

information on the movement. The Western literature on the C.I.C. has

appeared mostly in popular sources, to which _The Bulletin of Far

Eastern Bibliography_ issued by the Committees on Far Eastern Studies

of the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C.,

serves as a useful guide. The writings of Edgar Snow are of special

value and vividness in treating this topic: articles in _Asia_,

various dates; "China's Blitzbuilder, Rewi Alley," _The Saturday

Evening Post_, Vol. 213, no. 32 (February 8, 1941); and his recent

_The Battle for Asia_, New York, 1941, which appeared as this work was

completed and sent to press. A convenient handbook is the anonymous

_The People Strike Back! or The Story of Chinese Industrial

Cooperatives_, Shanghai, (1939?).]

Formally, the C.I.C. Headquarters is a social organization sponsored by

the Executive _Yüan_. H. H. K'ung, Minister of Finance and

Vice-President of the _Yüan_, is its Chairman. The Secretary-General

and Associate Secretary-General, Messrs. K. P. Liu and Hubert Liang, are

both American-returned students; the former once worked in the Ford

factories while studying at the University of Cincinnati and later was a

banker in Manchuria. The most inspiring force in the movement is Mr.

Rewi Alley, a New Zealander strongly interested in cooperatives and in

labor welfare, formerly factory inspector in the International

Settlement. Familiar, because of his Shanghai experiences and

famine-relief work, with the problems of economic organization in China,

he presented his plan to Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang through the

intervention of that extraordinarily popular British Ambassador, Sir

Archibald Clark-Kerr. The Chiangs were impressed with it, and the

Generalissimo gave it his support. A headquarters was established at

Hankow in August 1938, with the following five departments: _general_,

for secretarial and administrative housekeeping; _financial_,

administering funds for the headquarters and the cooperative units;

_organization_, in charge of planning and inauguration of cooperatives;

_technical_, devising simple industrial techniques; and _accounting_, an

independent agency of audit.[6] The Executive _Yüan_ has continued to

make administrative funds available; the central headquarters near

Chungking now has a staff of about seven hundred. Professor J. B. Tayler

of Yenching University, a noted economic expert, is consultant for staff

service.

[Footnote 6: "The Movement in Action," _New Defense, A Journal of the

30,000 Industrial Cooperatives Movement in China_ (Chungking) Vol. I,

no. 1 (April 1939), p. 5.]

As projected by Rewi Alley and his fellow-enthusiasts, the C.I.C. had to

adjust itself to three zones of China's war-time economy. A guerrilla

zone in and around the combat area, as well as behind the Japanese

lines, concentrated on the creation of immediate war-time necessities.

Some of these were in the form of direct medical and military supplies;

others, replacements of indispensable articles which otherwise would

have been procured from the enemy. The second zone, of light industry,

was within easy reach of Japanese air raids and espionage, and

consequently given to enterprises having light capital investment,

mobile, and readily concealed. The third, or inmost Chinese zone, being

best protected, was the proper area for the development of the heavier

industries, although even here no grandiose or heavily centralized works

are planned. The ultimate aim, peace-time as well as military, of the

C.I.C. is to distribute industry across the countryside, replacing the

once flourishing handicraft industries, and allowing Chinese society to

develop naturally and continuously.

The author attended a C.I.C. exhibit in Chungking which presented a

startling array of modern goods. Ford tools and auxiliary parts,

matches, lamps (electric, kerosene, and an improved wood-oil lamp which

equals kerosene), light electric appliances, lathes, machine-shop tools,

medical kits, Western shoes, toothpaste, canned foods, paper, printing

presses, books, and fountain pens--all were produced in areas which did

not even have the spinning wheel in some instances, and which until

recently imported all Western or modern goods from the coast or from

outside.

The organization and practical accomplishments of the C.I.C. are well

summarized in a recent article by K. P. Liu, Secretary-General:

INTRODUCTION: When it became clear that in order to continue

economic resistance against Japan China must at all costs

develop production in the rear of the fighting line, one of

the steps taken was the founding of the Chinese Industrial

Cooperatives by Dr. H. H. Kung.

The plan was to construct throughout China chains of small

industries which should use local materials to supply the

manufactured goods fundamentally necessary to the life of

the people.

Industrial cooperative societies are organized around about

60 depots over 16 provinces. An average depot of about 25

cooperatives is supervised and advised by a group of men

consisting of depotmaster, accountant, technician, and two

or three organizers.

For the coordination of work depots are divided among five

regions: the Northwest (NW), the Southeast (SE), the

Chuankang (Szechwan and Sikang) region (CK), the Southwest

(SW), and Yunnan (Y). Each is headed by regional

headquarters, which are responsible to the Central

Headquarters at Chungking which represents the C.I.C. on

general questions and negotiations, and decides, in

consultation with regional chiefs, on broad lines of policy.

The Central Headquarters also supplies the services of

traveling advisers on engineering, accounting, and

organization problems.

The staff of 700 is financed by Government funds, since the

C.I.C. has been named a social organization responsible to

the Executive Yüan. Further, the C.I.C. was given $5,000,000

by the Central Government to be used as loan capital for

cooperatives. More recently, negotiations with various banks

have made new large sums available, so that the amount which

can now be used for the capitalization of cooperatives is

near $30,000,000.

The above two sources of income provide no money for

education, research, evacuation of workers from occupied

areas, technical training, refugee work relief, medical

help, or capital loans in guerrilla regions. Necessary

auxiliary activities as these are provided for to a certain

extent by gifts from interested men and women in China and

abroad.... FORMING AN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE: When a depot

is first set up, the depotmaster advertises the objectives

of the C.I.C. by posters and speeches. But as soon as a few

workmen get to know about its activities there is no more

need to advertise. There are always plenty of workers who

will prefer the security and freedom of a cooperative to

unemployment or to working for a master.

The number of men needed to form a cooperative is at least

seven, but there is no upper limit. They first come to talk

things over with a C.I.C. organizer, present their plan for

setting up a factory or workshop, with proof of their

qualifications and a tentative budget showing how much loan

capital will be needed to start work. The organizer explains

to them the cooperative system of self-government, Chinese

cooperative law, and the C.I.C. Model Constitution. Then

they take some descriptive literature home, and discuss

among themselves whom they want as their officers.

Meanwhile, their plans are talked over by the depotmaster,

accountant, organizer, and engineer, and modifications

suggested. If, as often happens, it turns out that they are

only merchants anxious to get rich quick and not _bona fide_

workmen ready to work hard, the plans are rejected.

If all is satisfactory, a meeting is held for the election

of officers, determination of share capital, voting of

wages, and work begins as soon as the loan is put through.

At least one quarter of the subscribed share capital must be

paid up immediately, and the total loan--long-term and

short--cannot exceed 20 times the subscribed share

capital.... The actual ratio of share to loan capital

averages about 1 to 6.

INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION: Distribution of industry is shown

in the following condensed table:

Textiles 610 [cooperatives]

Engineering 49

Mining 118

Chemical 206

Pottery 69

Foodstuffs 83

Transport 4

Miscellaneous 395

-----

1,534

*/

There are no less than 114 types of cooperatives, and almost

every daily need of the people can be met.

Before any cooperative is organized, investigations are made

to ensure that (I) there are raw materials near at hand,

(II) there is skilled workmanship available, and (III) there

is a market for the finished product. Where these three do

not co-exist at one place, a compromise of the most

reasonable kind is effected if possible. Some examples--by

no means exhaustive--of the adaptation of types of industry

to meet local conditions are described as follows:

_Wool_ ... In the beginning of 1939 woolspinners of Chentu

were still using either the simple old whorl or the

handturned wheel. The volume of production was very small.

But during 1939 the C.I.C. embarked on a huge program of

blanket production for the army, and improved streamlined

treadle spinners were introduced, and thousands of men and

women taught the technique of using them. Blankets were made

at eight centers of west and northern China; everywhere

improved woolspinning and woolweaving machines and

techniques brought new productive power. During the winter

of 1939-40, 400,000 blankets were turned out, and another

million and a half will be made during the remainder of

1940.

The wool used by the blanket-making cooperatives comes from

the highlands of Chinghai, Kansu, Ningsia, and Shensi, and

now instead of being carried raw to Tientsin or Shanghai as

in the old days, it is being spun and woven near to the

source of supply. Improvements are constantly being

made--better machines, finer spinning, use of waterpower,

better carding and finishing--so that the whole project

works to raise the efficiency and living standard of the

local people.

_Cotton_. Wherever cotton is grown spinning and weaving

cooperatives are numerous, for clothing is one of the

fundamental needs of life....

_Grass Cloth_. Linen, or more correctly grass cloth, was

introduced into Szechwan from Kwangtung generations ago, and

now fine cloth is woven. Production thereof from ramie

thread was at its height 20 years ago, but since then the

craft has declined until recently, when the partial blockade

of the war made the industry profitable again....

_Goldwashing_. Placer gold exists along every river in West

China and in many parts of South China too. Even in

Chungking one may see needy coolies scraping up and washing

riverside mud for its tiny precious content.

The gold is easily available by simple methods, though

certain difficulties have hitherto prevented its extraction

on a larger scale. But now every grain is an asset to China

in economic warfare, and so many goldwashing cooperatives

have been organized. In the whole country there are 66

cooperatives, most of which are in the Han valley.... Now

the cooperatives ... are self-supporting and produce 60 to

70 oz. of gold a day.

_Coal and Iron_. Throughout the hinterland of China new

sources of coal and iron are being needed continually by

newly transplanted industry. Szechwan has good coal,

widespread, but rather thin in seam....

At the same time plans for the construction of blast

furnaces have been worked out by C.I.C. engineers, and only

wait for adequate financing. It is planned first to set up

in South Shensi at a point within easy distance of coal and

iron supplies a coke-making and a smelting plant, the total

capitalization being $105,000.

_Alcohol._ A first experimental plant for the production of

96 per cent pure alcohol has been running nearly a year with

a maximum output of 350 gallons a day. Since the cost of

such a plant is comparatively small, and available supplies

of grain make the cost of alcohol much less than that of

gasoline, other plants have been set up. There are now six

in operation and greater production in the future is

envisaged. The sites of alcohol plants are naturally at key

positions on the highway, where good supplies of coarse

grain meet with the traffic line.

_Prime Movers._ In many cooperatives one may see a quaint

mixture of old and new, where big flywheels are turned by

human labor to maintain the spin of lathes, carding

machines, and the like. This is a useful temporary

expedient, possible where labor is cheap. Animal power is

also used.

But C.I.C. engineers are not satisfied with this state of

affairs; they are always on the lookout for new sources of

power. So charcoal-or gasoline-burning internal combustion

engines are commonly employed.

But most popular are waterwheels, and in every part of China

will be found old wheels adapted for modern uses--driving

textile machinery, turning lathes, grinding flour--undershot

or overshot, single or in series. Gradually the wheels are

being made of better materials and more efficient. Iron

wheels are constructed at present weighing about one ton, at

a cost of $3,000, and generating over 30 H.P.

In the plains waterpower is rarely available, but in the

foothills of Tibet, the Tsingling Shan, or in the rough

country of southern China this cheapest of all forms of

power will come more and more into its own as C.I.C. machine

shops construct improved waterwheels.

ACCOUNTING: During the past two years the C.I.C. staff has

tackled the question of modern accounting wholeheartedly in

every depot, and training classes in cost accounting have

been given for cooperative accountants who only know old

style Chinese bookkeeping. C.I.C. trained accountants have

been allocated to cooperatives--for big cooperatives one

accountant is employed by each society, for small, one

accountant serves two or three. Emphasis has been placed on

the presentation of monthly balance sheets and yearly

closing of accounts with profit sharing.

Profits are divided among the members once--or in rare cases

twice--a year. The usual method of division, all claims

including interest on loans and shares having first been

paid, is as follows:

Reserves 20 per cent

Emergency Fund 10 per cent

Bonus to Officers of Society 10 per cent

Common Good Fund 10 per cent

Divided among Members 50 per cent

*/

The division accords with Chinese Law. The bonus to officers

is usually made to include gifts to apprentices and hired

workers such as cooks, and the Common Good Fund is used for

education, medical welfare, and other social service. The

division among members is made in strict proportion to wage

and time worked.

Local conditions and various industries differ so much that

no wage-policy has at present been applied. In general it

may be said that wages in cooperatives--fixed by the members

themselves--are about the same as those in private factories

of the district. The products in general sell at prevailing

rates, though in some cases the prices have been lowered and

profiteering prevented by the action of the cooperatives.

COOPERATIVE FEDERATIONS: Wherever the societies have passed

the first short period of infantile dependence on the C.I.C.

they have been associated into federations, sometimes

according to trade, but more often and more wholesomely,

according to districts. The most important immediate

function of the federation is to open a supply and marketing

agency, which by its centralization, specialization, and

greater supply of circulating capital is able to relieve the

cooperatives of most of their problems of buying and

selling....

TRAINING: Training of organizers is of vital importance, for

it is they who will succeed or fail in giving to the workers

true conceptions of cooperation, industry, and business, and

in inculcating efficient methods and habits. Classes for

organizers have consequently been held in every region.

Training of cooperative chairmen in their duties is also

undertaken. They "learn by doing,"--how to conduct meetings,

business principles, cooperative law, history of

cooperation, scope and significance of industrial

cooperation in China.... The most usual training is by

weekly night classes and meetings. There is also constant

informal training by the organizers, who devote about one

day a week to each cooperative, and work with the members on

the solution of immediate problems by the application of

cooperative principles. Popular education of workers will be

described later.

Another important aspect of training is technical. In no

case is a society organized until the technical ability of

the members is adequate for making a successful business.

So, with refugees and unskilled peasants it is usually

necessary to give preliminary training--mainly in textiles.

Wherever there is textile work, training classes have been

held in spinning and weaving....

SOCIAL WELFARE WORK: No statistics have been compiled about

the social contribution of the C.I.C. to the communities

around its depot. The work varies according to local needs

and opportunities, and according to available resources in

funds and manpower....

OUTLOOK: After the war there will undoubtedly come a period

of readjustment, when the renewed influx of machinery and

machine-finished goods will demand a shift of emphasis--for

instance handspinning cannot survive indefinitely, no matter

how essential it is at present. It is to be expected that at

that period the C.I.C. will continue to use in some

industries methods now employed, but that in others there

will be a transition to rationalization and mechanization.

With a soundly integrated network of skilled workmen,

experienced engineers, and bankers' confidence, the C.I.C.

will be able to make this transition without severe

dislocation.

The C.I.C. is essentially a non-political organization; its

functions are all technical, and its staff is composed of

experts in various lines--cooperative methods, accounting,

engineering. Success does not depend on political position

or power, but on the simple and essential condition that

this type of industry produces efficiently the goods that

China needs. The C.I.C. objective is just Dr. Sun Yat-sen's

Third Principle--People's Livelihood--practically expressed.

The success of cooperative movements in other parts of the

world--their ability to weather economic crises and

depressions--has been due to the solidarity that comes when

the motive force in industry and commerce is not the profit

of a few but the livelihood of many. In the same way the

C.I.C. can become a permanent force for national stability

and strength.[7]

[Footnote 7: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, July 15,

1940. The article and tables have been somewhat abridged. The

cooperatives spread so rapidly that figures are often obsolete before

they are tabulated.]

The Model Constitution for an Industrial Cooperative[8] establishes

safeguards to keep the cooperatives from becoming profiteering

sweatshops. Bankrupts, drug addicts, persons incapable of working, and

persons already members of a unit are forbidden to join a unit being

formed (_Art._ 7). No member may subscribe more than 20 per cent of the

share capital of a single society (_Art._ 9). A general annual meeting,

with the quorum set at one-half, and action requiring the majority of a

quorum, is the highest authority in a unit (_Art._ 19). This meeting

elects a board of directors and a separate board of supervisors (_Arts._

22 and 23). Sweeping disqualifications keep members from mixing personal

or outside interests and cooperative matters (_Art._ 32). The design of

the unit constitution is such that each unit is an authentic, autonomous

cooperative, governed well or badly in accordance with the abilities and

needs of its members, and is not a mere fraction of state capitalism.

[Footnote 8: "Model Constitution for Chinese Cooperative Societies,

Revised July 7th, 1940," The China Information Committee, _News

Release_, July 15, 1940.]

The C.I.C. taps a level of Chinese society hitherto largely

unused[9]--the family, guild, village, and volunteer-society devices of

the peasantry and townsmen who lived beneath the lowest limits of the

scholastic bureaucracy. The Communists act as the inheritors to

temporarily fanatical peasant rebellions; the National Government and

Kuomintang, to ascendant mandarinates; the C.I.C. brings into play the

rich experience of the Chinese with collective action. The resources of

the social power so mobilized cannot easily be estimated, but general

success would reshape much of Chinese society.

[Footnote 9: Nevertheless, the rural cooperative movement must be

counted in as having made some beginnings, despite the obstacles it

has faced. More than seventy thousand credit and marketing

cooperatives were in service last year. (The same, April 22, 1940.)]

In fitting the C.I.C. to the general Chinese scene, however, it is

important to compare the movement with some of the New Deal reforms in

the United States, such as T.V.A. (Tennessee Valley Authority). Though

these are important, neither the American nor the Chinese enterprises

proclaim social revolution or charter Utopias. The reforms of President

Roosevelt have had incalculable effect; no one knows what would have

happened without them. Nevertheless, it is excessive to suggest that the

existence of the United States as a political society depends upon these

reforms. Similarly, the continuation of the National Government of China

does not rest on the C.I.C., or on any other single institution alone.

The C.I.C. extends patterns of cooperation and farm-factory balance

already tried in Europe, and also approached by such diverse agencies as

the Soviet state and collective farms, and Mr. Henry Ford's

worker-garden plans. Hitherto the Chinese cooperative workers have had a

closer contact with Dearborn, Michigan, than with Moscow, R.S.F.S.R. The

endeavor is a serious and important one. It supplements and develops the

facilities--themselves very extensive--which are under full

state-capitalist or private control. But Free China's markets, while

they contain C.I.C.-made goods, are mostly filled with private or

government products. A private Chinese business system which has

survived thirty years of domestic war does not obsolesce

instantaneously. The cooperative movement is, largely because of the

integrity, enthusiasm, and tirelessness of Mr. Alley, the nearest thing

to a realization of _min shêng_ which China has yet seen; but the Right

still plans for a China with vast state-capitalist and state-subsidized

private industries, along with an all-pervading flow of _laissez-faire_

commerce. The Marxians look on sympathetically but contemptuously.

UNORGANIZED PRESSURE

The long one-party rule of the Kuomintang, now relaxed but not

disestablished, has habituated the Chinese to the use of completely

non-political groups--families and their connections; economic

associations of various kinds; religious agencies--for political

leverage. There are relatively few groups which possess clear public

purposes and at the same time maintain unofficial status. Indeed, the

stamp of quasi-official approval is so highly prized that many groups

which seem to have no affiliation with the government are discovered to

seek affiliation or to have acquired it roundabout.

Among the private or quasi-private groups which take most effect may be

mentioned, however, the People's Foreign Relations Association, the

League of Nations Union, and the China Branch of the International Peace

Campaign. The first of these publishes the useful quarterly, _The China

Herald_. The Campaign, which was launched as a world-wide

center-and-left drive for peace, was under respected European

leadership, and was favored by a large labor bloc in England. In the

United States it was associated in the minds of some people with the

Stalinist fellow-travellers--the elements who sat in the councils of the

temporarily-joined forces of anti-Fascism and pro-Stalinism, who

organized the American League for Peace and Democracy (a Popular Front

movement), the American Friends of the Chinese People, and who dominated

groups such as the American Youth Congress. In China, contrariwise, the

International Peace Campaign, fitting in with purposes of government and

people, seemed to offer a world-wide sympathy for China's

anti-aggression activities. The China Branch was among the most

effective organizations in the Campaign. It developed vitality in

diffusing peace propaganda--that is, for peace after the war. There was

no trace of defeatism, sabotage of national defense, or obstruction to

defensive war. With the outbreak of the European war, the I.P.C.

disappeared almost altogether from the Western scene, but continues in

China. Finally, the China League of Nations Union publishes _The China

Forum_, and carries on an educational campaign.

Christian activities have been extended and activized by war. Never

before have the missions had as many opportunities for social and

national service in China. Their schools are filled; their hospitals,

crowded; their cause, related to America, to peace, and to a sane long

view, is welcomed. The Chinese Y.M.C.A. has met the shock of war with

extensive participation in relief, particularly among students and

soldiers. Medical aid, tragically inadequate but infinitely better than

nothing at all, is coming into China. The curtailment of mission

activities in occupied China makes exploitation of the Christian field

in the West even more desirable from the viewpoint of the Western

churches. A recent work, by two Christians born in China, one American

and the other Chinese, describes this situation clearly and

significantly: _China Rediscovers Her West_.[10]

[Footnote 10: Wu Yi-fang and Price, Frank W., editors; New York,

1940.]

The other side of extra-political pressure comes in the form of class

and regional interests. The phenomena of lobbying and special favor are

less evident in Chungking than in previous governments of China. Special

groups representing industries, areas, or vested interests do appear,

but are apt to work through casual, untraceable patterns of personal

relationships. There is no Chinese C.I.O., nor A. F. of L., but there is

also no National Association of Manufacturers. The politics of economics

gains by diffusion and absence of protest what it loses in sensitivity

and explicitness. An economic group which feels itself outraged takes a

long time to develop group consciousness; hence, it is less apt to feel

outraged, and the generality of the people, the public, is often better

off. There are undoubtedly scurrilous, politically vile, selfish

advantages being taken in West China today; but the net outcome is

counterbalanced by concrete improvement in the condition of the people

as a whole, and the unquestionable morale of the leading and

administrative classes.

Every government, where and however it may operate, has a double set of

barriers which form its corridor of further existence: on the left it

must meet the minimal needs of the governed, satisfy their physical and

moral appetites sufficiently to keep itself from being ignored or

overthrown; on the right it must compensate the persons who govern, and

do so well enough to retain personnel adequate to government. The

Marxians stress the former element; the Paretians, the latter. Both are

visible in China. Had the exigencies of reform, social change, and

military activity proved too sharp, too violent, too profitless, the

personnel trained by experience and fitted by temperament to government

might have gone over to Japan. The low caliber of Wang Ch'ing-wei and

his clique is testimony to the _élan_ of the West Chinese leaders.

Chungking has ample reserves of administrative talent, military

intelligence, and political acumen upon which to draw.

The last part of the picture is the most important: the _lao-pai-hsing_,

the Old Hundred Names, the common people of China. They are the ultimate

arbiters of this war, and of all future wars in East Asia: to this

degree they are a superlative force in the world. Hundreds of millions

strong, adept, flexible, trained in a culture which has flowed under

(but not through) literacy for centuries, hard-working, patient, and

physiologically sound, they are perhaps the greatest unified human

group. Upon their anger against Japan depends the future of that Empire;

if the _lao-pai-hsing_ are determined to resist, Chiang could go,

Chungking fall, the government scatter, the Communists collapse, and

there would yet be war--restless, bitter, implacable, with the ferocity

of a sane man employing violence as a last defense against violence not

sane. Leaders exist aplenty in that sea of men, waiting for circumstance

to cast them forth. Intelligence, information, cunning, power, and

patience are all at hand.

The difference between a strange half-industrial modern Chinese

Republic, striding toward the twenty-first century with seven-league

boots of progress, and a Chinese chaos stinking with vice and disease

under Japanese rule--this difference lies within the decision of the

common people. The war has roused the workers, peasants, and petty

townsmen. The Japanese bombers have carried ubiquitous messages of

alarm. The Western world gasped when across the dusty plains of North

China there rolled the tidal wave of Boxerism; but the _I Ho Ch'üan_ of

yesteryear is a passing fad in contrast to the bitterness and resolution

of today's common people. There is no defeat in most of the faces in

Shanghai, no surrender in the eyes of men who live, and must keep on

living, surrounded by enemy vainglory. The traitors are marked by their

own behavior; they bear the stigmata of a surrender to vice. Yet even

they cannot be trusted by Japan. One who has visited the sources and the

mouths of the rivers, who has seen the free Yangtze pouring out of Tibet

and the captive Yangtze ripple past the grey flanks of Imperial Japanese

destroyers, can testify that the Chinese people are not beaten now. If

they are ever going to be beaten, it will take a bigger force than

Japan to do it--a morally greater, technically surer, politically wiser

force.

The Chinese people know they are unconquered. They do not know it with

their minds, despite hopeful calculations in terms of years and yen and

reserves of oil. They do not even know it with a conscious assumption of

faith, a fanatical determination to die for the new state. They know it

just as men have always known the simplest things of life--things so

simple that they may trouble the psychologist or elude the philosopher,

and never even enter the vocabulary of political science. The Chinese

sense of victory is like a reminiscent fragrance, a half-heard but

poignant sound, a flash of inexpressible but profound meaning out of

everyman's irrecoverable past. This omnipresent sense of victory and

freedom may be twisted. Weak and cunning men rationalize this sense of

victory into self-deceiving subterfuges of boring from within; they

accept Japanese salaries while promising themselves sometime, always

tomorrow, to subvert Japan; but even they lack no assurance of ultimate

Chinese victory.

The winning of that victory lies on the sweating backs of men--in

paddy-fields, on flaring highways, on flagstone pathways across a world,

or behind the adobe and lattice walls of China's workshops. The war has

conjured up an awareness of power. No one asks the _lao-pai-hsing_ what

they want; no ballots, no polls can reach them. But no people can hold

such overt power and be unconscious of their own strength. China has

awakened.

[Illustration: _Dr. Sun Yat-sen_]

CHAPTER IX

SUN YAT-SEN AND CHIANG K'AI-SHEK

The two highest offices in the Kuomintang are _Tsung-li_ (Leader) and

_Tsung-ts'ai_ (Chief). These are occupied by Sun Yat-sen as Leader and

Chiang K'ai-shek as Chief. Sun Yat-sen, though he died on March 12,

1925, holds the higher office in perpetuity. So vast is his legacy to

modern China that it exceeds full enumeration: founder of the effective

revolutionary movement and Party, first practical republican, political

organizer of the modern and overseas Chinese, first President of the

Republic, and therefore officially acknowledged State Founder, a drafter

of the national plan of modernization, author of the accepted ideology

(_San Min Chu I_), initiator of the Nationalist-Communist entente and of

the consequent Great Revolution, promulgator of the Outline of National

Reconstruction, and posthumous patron of the National Government. Keenly

and devotedly an advocate of democracy, Sun Yat-sen established by

practical example the principle of charismatic leadership. He most

certainly left a mantle. This is now, after years of struggle, draped

about the shoulders of Chiang K'ai-shek, although Wang Ch'ing-wei

retains a few threads torn from the hem.

Sun Yat-sen was a leader in the sense that the great religious and

philosophical figures have been leaders. He is not to be compared to

Alexander, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, or Hitler, but to Confucius, Gautama

Buddha, or Mohammed. Like the spiritual leaders he blended profound

humility and complete assurance. He knew that he was the savior of

China, and knew it long before anyone else did. He did not rely on

rising to power within a party, as did Lenin, or within a state, as did

Hitler. He created his own Party and his own state. Had he not

succeeded, he would have been labelled a maniac; so would most of the

other major figures of human history, had they failed. His success,

whatever its future fortune, is already so immense that it makes his

sense of leadership seem modest. And within the limits of success, he

was very modest; throughout life Sun remained more open-minded, ready to

consult, deferential to the opinions of others, and more willing to

yield power for the sake of harmony than the majority of his compeers.

This duality has troubled some of his biographers. As late as 1939 an

anonymous Englishman published an attack on Sun, which, missing the

history of six decades, failed to note that Sun had lived, had

succeeded, and had died objectively justified in his conception of

himself.

Sun's example, unconsciously at variance with his teachings, has left a

strong Caesarian strain in practical Chinese politics. Without Sun

Yat-sen in the background, it is altogether impossible to understand the

role played by Chiang, or to resolve the contradiction between a state

pledged to democracy and a leader over-loaded with power. No group in

China, except the officials of Manchoukuo, disavows Sun Yat-sen: the

Japanophiles, the Nationalists, and the Communists all claim to execute

his will.

SUN YAT-SEN

Sun Yat-sen was born in Kwangtung Province, near the Portuguese city of

Macao. Although he was uncertain of the date, the National Government

has found it to be November 12, 1866. Both his provincial and class

background had effect on his later life. The Cantonese are among the

most turbulent of Chinese, living at the southern edge of China and

speaking a dialect far different from the majority of the country.

Active, rebellious, enterprising, the Cantonese were disposed to change.

Sun's use of their tongue and knowledge of their customs gave him an

audience which both suffered and profited by its distinctness. Sun's

family was certainly not of the gentry class, and yet not so utterly

poor that it lacked all profitable connections. Otherwise his

potentialities might have been thwarted by ruinous poverty, disease, or

early death.

In adolescence, Sun felt the stings and urges of resentment driving him

to reform and revolution. He had kin who were involved in the T'aip'ing

Rebellion (1850-65), the vast peasant uprising which, under Christian

collectivist leadership by the Messianic Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, swept North

to the Yangtze and drowned in a sea of blood less than two years before

Sun's birth. He thus had direct knowledge not merely of Chinese revolt

against the alien Manchu empire, but he knew of the revolutionary

technique of a religious leader. The effect of this presumptive

knowledge has never been explored; it would explain a great deal in

Sun's career--much of the sharp enthusiasm, the use of ecstatic slogans,

the emphasis on will, his demands for faith in himself--if one could

know that he followed the instance of a Chinese Joseph Smith or Brigham

Young, not that of a Chinese Mazzini or Marx. The other important

feature about his early life was Western education.[1]

[Footnote 1: _Sun Yat-sen_ is the Cantonese pronunciation of _Sun

I-hsien_, just as _Chiang K'ai-shek_ is that of _Chiang Chieh-shih_.

Both men first acquired their world reputations under this

pronunciation, which has become standard in English. According to

Chinese custom, one's given name is used only by one's elders;

consequently Sun Yat-sen has been referred to, by his grateful

followers, by his "courtesy name" Wên, which is the name by which one

refers to one's elder. In addition, he is referred to by another

special name which he took for conspiratorial work, Chung-shan

(allusive to an ancient hero), or by his title--as _Tsung-li_ or _Sun

Tsung-li_, much as we refer to President Wilson rather than to Woodrow

Wilson. Sun was known most widely in life as Sun Wên; Chiang is most

commonly mentioned as Chiang Chung-chêng. The question of names is

extensively discussed in the biographies of the two leaders, cited

below.]

Western training gave him a channel upward which the Confucian system

had denied a hundred generations of his predecessors. Patriots, rebels,

reformers--these have been sown by temperament and fortune across the

centuries of Chinese social existence, but such potential heroes have

been ploughed out or crippled by the language and the examinations. No

man could command power--save in its transient forms: banditry,

conspiracy, commerce--without mastering the Confucian canon. Once the

intricate scholarship of the past gripped him, the complex, beautiful,

archaic language of the mandarinate stopped up his mouth for plain

utterance. He was isolated from the people. Sun escaped this by the use

of the English language and the command of Western science. He was par

excellence the great counter-ideologue, whose self-confidence and

command of men rested upon foundations beyond the ken of his

adversaries. Judge Linebarger wrote, on the basis of what Sun told him:

Like a soldier who after long study and practice has at

length mastered the manual of arms so as to have complete

confidence in his weapons, Sun now began to feel at last a

confidence in his ability to show others the path of his new

wisdom, for, while thus enjoying a steady advance under

English tutelage in the ways of the foreigner, he was by no

means neglecting his study of Chinese politics, even in the

pressure of college work. He knew now that he would have to

lead out in the Great Reform. At Hong Kong, Macao, and

Canton he had college intimates, and these he sought out as

often as his college course would permit.[2]

[Footnote 2: Linebarger, Paul [M. W.], _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese

Republic_, New York and London, 1925, p. 176; this is the authorized

life of Sun Yat-sen, written much as he wished it. The standard

critical biography is Sharman, Lyon, _Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its

Meaning_, New York, 1934. Sun Yat-sen also wrote a number of short

autobiographies, some of which are deliberately inexact. Western

language material on Sun is surveyed in an annotated bibliography

appended to the present author's _The Political Doctrines of Sun

Yat-sen_, Baltimore, 1937, p. 265 _ff._ A work which has since