CHAPTER VII

GENERAL RUNDLE'S MARCH TO SENEKAL

While Lord Roberts was moving from Bloemfontein, co-operative action was

being taken elsewhere. On the 2nd of May the Boers evacuated Thabanchu

and trekked towards the north, and on the following day General French,

leaving General Rundle in command, started to join Lord Roberts's main

scheme. Soon after General Brabant joined General Rundle's force.

On the 4th, General Rundle moved forward from Thabanchu, attacked the

enemy, captured their positions, and headed them eastward. There was

little hard fighting, the General's movements being mostly carried out

with so much celerity, and strategical and tactical skill, that the

enemy, seeing British forces apparently in strength everywhere, judged

it advisable to move from post to post rather than run the risk of being

mopped up.

On Friday, the 11th of May, Colonel Grenfell, with the 2nd Battalion of

Brabant's Horse, attacked the Boers at Ropin's Kop, but was overpowered

by the enemy and forced to retire, with several wounded. On the

following day, Saturday, he, however, drove the Boers out of their

position, and captured Newberry Mills at Leeuw River, thus depriving the

Dutchmen of an immense store of flour and grain which it had been their

ambition to seize. This smart piece of work was accomplished almost

without casualties. While these operations had been going forward, some

500 of the Yeomanry had occupied the northern slopes of Thaba Patacka, a

position whence they hoped to attack the Boers who might be slinking off

in the direction of Basutoland. General Boyes, on the west, was equally

active, to the dismay of the Boers, who, owing to General Rundle's

clever strategy, imagined the British held a front of over twenty miles.

On the 13th of May General Rundle advanced to Brand's Drift, twenty

miles to the north-east, taking prisoners and accepting the surrender of

many Free-staters, who were perished with cold and exposure, and

sickened by defeat. Meanwhile, General Brabant, performing like

operations, was slowly moving northwards. On the night of the 15th,

Ladybrand was occupied by a force of the Glamorganshire Yeomanry, and

thus the two Generals maintained possession, by magnificent strategic

moves, of the whole southern corner, which is practically the granary

of the Free State, gradually scaring away the enemy from the country

through which they passed. On the 24th, a simultaneous movement was

made, Brabant's Colonials marching to occupy Ficksburg, while General

Rundle with General Campbell's Brigade, followed by that of General

Boyes, proceeded towards Senekal.

During the march an unfortunate incident took place. On reaching

Mequaling's Nek, a rumour reached General Rundle that the Boers were in

retreat from Senekal, consequently on the next day, the 25th, Major

Dalbiac and Major Ashton, R.M.A. (Intelligence Officer to the Division),

were ordered to investigate the nature of the water supply, and to find

a camping ground in the neighbourhood of the town. Major Dalbiac and a

company, mainly composed of Middlesex Yeomanry, accompanied Major Ashton

as escort, and the party left at dawn and proceeded to Senekal. Here

they encountered apparently peaceful inhabitants, and were entirely

ignorant of the fact that the Boers had merely vacated the place for the

purpose of hiding themselves in a hilly coign of vantage, which

practically commanded the streets of the town. Major Ashton proceeded

with the inquiries he was deputed to make, and received from a citizen

the keys of the official buildings, which had been left by the

Landdrost, who with the postmaster and other responsible persons had

decamped. Then came the surrendering of arms, and while this was going

on, suddenly, without warning, a heavy fusillade was launched at the

Yeomanry who formed a group round Major Ashton. For a moment chaos

reigned; then all sprung to action. The Boers, delighted at their

surprise, blazed away fast and furious, while the two Majors, gathering

together their little band, made hurried arrangements. Major Ashton,

with some ten men, enclosed himself and promptly commenced firing on the

incoming enemy, while Major Dalbiac with a score of the Yeomanry,

dashingly galloped off in hope of taking the enemy in rear. But the

Boers were many and the unfortunate Yeomanry quite outnumbered. No

sooner had they wheeled round the hill, than rifles poured a withering

fire on them. Six horses dropped even as the men dismounted, and the

ground, open and quite devoid of cover, was strewn in one moment with

the slain and the suffering. Major Dalbiac almost instantaneously

dropped dead. He was shot through the neck, and four men shared his

fate. Lieutenant Hegan Kennard, wounded in the face, was in a desperate

plight, while nearly all who remained were injured. Some half-a-dozen

men had been sent back with the horses on the first outbreak of the

attack, and these only of the valorous band escaped. Meanwhile news of

the ambuscade had been carried to General Rundle, who instantly ordered

off the Wilts Yeomanry, 2nd Grenadiers, and 2nd East Yorks, with

artillery, to the succour of the unfortunate party. These arrived in

time to save Major Ashton. He had fortunately occupied the side of the

town towards which the British approached, and the Boers, at the first

sound of the guns which had been directed against the kopje where they

had ensconced themselves, made off with all possible speed. By the time

General Rundle had neared the town, it had resumed its pristine state of

innocence, and the inhabitants were preparing effective demonstrations

of loyalty. In the evening the remains of the unfortunate dead at the

foot of the hill were recovered, and it was found that Major Dalbiac's

body had been rifled by his dastardly opponents of every article of

value, and even the ribbons of his medals were missing. On the 26th,

General Rundle with the 8th Division entered the town and formally took

possession of it.

The remains of Major Dalbiac and the four men of the Middlesex Yeomanry

who were killed in the unfortunate affair were buried with military

honours, the General and Staff attending the funeral. A patrol of the

Hants Yeomanry, while out scouting, got in touch with the enemy, and

escaped by what is called the skin of their teeth. Many had very narrow

escapes, and one man was killed. Sergeant-Major Foulkes, whose horse was

shot under him, was saved through the gallantry of Private Andrews, who

returned and bore off his dismounted comrade, while Captain Seely and

others behaved in like manner to ensure the safety of those left without

mounts.

GENERAL COLVILE AND THE HIGHLAND BRIGADE

Of the Highland Brigade since the tragedy of Majersfontein and the smart

fight at Koodoesberg little has been said. Their brilliant march and

action before Paardeberg, in which General MacDonald was wounded, served

to demonstrate the stuff of which they were made and to restore their

self-confidence and zest for battle. Lord Roberts's gracious speech,

delivered at the camp, recalling his pleasant association with the

Brigade in India, where "they had helped to make him," and saying that

as he had never campaigned without Highlanders, he "would not like to be

without them now," had done much to heal the sore which still rankled in

many breasts.

[Illustration: HAULING DOWN THE TRANSVAAL FLAG AT JOHANNESBURG

Photo by Lionel James]

On the 1st of May the 9th Division marched from Waterval, picked up the

Seaforths at the waterworks, and also the Highland Light Infantry from

Bloemfontein. The Division, of which the Highland Brigade, the

Seaforths, Black Watch, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and

Highland Light Infantry formed the infantry battalions, with the 5th

Battery Royal Field Artillery, two naval guns (4.7 calibre), and a

company of Engineers, was under the command of Major-General Sir H.

Colvile. The Highland Brigade was commanded by General MacDonald. The

Eastern Province Horse, a smart and sportsmanlike set of mounted men,

numbering about a hundred, also accompanied the force, and did valuable

service in scouting. Later on the force was joined by Lovat's Scouts,

but not till the advance was well under way. On the 4th the Brigade

bivouacked at Susanna Fountain after an animated tussle with the enemy,

who were finally routed by the gallantry of the Black Watch.

The Division reached Winburg, as we know, on the 6th, and remained in

possession till the 17th. Then, the Black Watch and the Argyll and

Sutherland Highlanders advanced, leaving behind them the Highland Light

Infantry and Seaforths in the town. On the following day the Zand River

was crossed. Ventersburg was entered without opposition, the way having

been previously swept by Lord Roberts's force which had arrived there on

the 10th. Here there was a brief halt--a much needed one--as the troops

had marched thirty-four miles in 18½ hours. On the 23rd they

proceeded towards Lindley, and were joined _en route_ by the remainder

of the divisional and brigade troops. On the 24th the troops reached a

point east of Bloemspruit, where they bivouacked, and the next day

brought them into the teeth of the enemy, who were hiding in a ridge at

Maquanstadt. From this point the Dutchmen were driven by the Seaforths,

who from thence proceeded to a peaked kopje which commanded the water

supply, a position which was at once vigorously contested by the Boers.

After a hard fight, in which one officer and three men were wounded, the

Seaforths succeeded in occupying the position. Here they were joined by

the Black Watch and the 5th Battery of the Royal Field Artillery, the

rest of the troops remaining behind at Hopefield till the 26th.

At Bloemberg, a horseshoe-shaped ridge near Koorspruit (an affluent of

the Valsche), the Boers were found strongly posted, and no sooner had

the Black Watch appeared than they were greeted by a crackling

cross-fire that sent them quickly to cover. Here they held the enemy

while a wide turning movement was made to the right. The inner side of

the horseshoe position was attacked by the Seaforths, while the outer

was assailed by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders under Major

Urmston, who deftly approached the stony eminence which concealed some

sixty of the enemy, and charged with such force and impetuosity that

presently the entire position was vacated, and the whole body of Boers,

some 1000 in number, were seen racing over the boulders with more than

their usual agility. The Bloemberg Ridge gained, it was promptly

occupied by Black Watch and Seaforths.

By midday the passage of the hill was accomplished, and by 4 P.M. the

troops had reached Lindley. The expedition had cost them two killed and

eleven wounded. The Highland Brigade crossed the Valsche River and

bivouacked north of the drift on the Heilbron Road. Still more

north--about two miles--went two companies of Argyll and Sutherland

Highlanders to ensconce themselves on a kopje which commanded the road

towards Heilbron.

On the afternoon of the 27th the advance was continued. The Highlanders

crossed the Rhenoster River at Mildraai, and on the following day, 28th,

moved still further forward till stopped by the presence of the enemy,

who barred the line of march on the north of Roodeport. The Highland

Light Infantry--the advanced guard--were deployed and sent to seize some

kraals about 1200 yards from the enemy's position, which sprayed itself

over about six miles of country. One company was detached to hold a hill

on the right front, supported by the Black Watch, while the Seaforths

attempted a turning movement to the left and the Argyll and Sutherland

Highlanders guarded the rear and both rear flanks from a point of

vantage on Spitzkop. The artillery blazed copiously for an hour, while

the Boers also made animated resistance, but after good sixty minutes of

assault the enemy gave way, and the Seaforths succeeded in getting round

the right flank, while the Highland Light Infantry and Black Watch

gained the centre of the now deserted ridge. But the Boers had only

scuttled to other ridges whence they could let loose Pandemonium with

increased vigour. Thus the Highlanders came in for murderous attention

in front, rear, and flank. Presently to their rescue went the invaluable

naval guns, snorting vengeance, and determining to show that, though the

Field Artillery became outranged and impotent, there was laudable

lyddite to save the situation. On this, and with startling velocity, the

Federals removed themselves, and they were stimulated in their departure

by long-range volleys from the Highland Light Infantry. While the

Dutchmen were speeding into the unknown, the Highlanders triumphant were

advancing to a position north of Marksfontein. Having crossed the drift

they bivouacked on the other side, while the ox transport moved up to

the shelter of their wing. The day's work was not without its pathetic

side, for thirty men and three officers were wounded, while two gallant

Highlanders were among the slain. The wounded officers were: Seaforth

Highlanders--Lieut.-Col. Hughes-Hallet, Lieut. Ratclyffe, and Lieut.

Doig.

At this time the Duke of Cambridge's Yeomanry were to have met Sir H.

Colvile, but owing to their failing by an hour or so to join him on his

march up from Lindley they were surrounded, and on the 31st were

captured by the enemy. The tale of the disaster is told elsewhere. On

the 29th, the Division began to move gradually on in caterpillar

fashion, drawing up a back segment to propel the forward one, inch by

inch, or mile by mile. Mr. Blundell's description in the _Morning Post_

of the advance shows how risky and ingenuous a proceeding the movements

of baggage in face of the enemy may be. "The route lay over a series of

ridges and spruits and along a parallel line of hill on which the Boer

forces had taken up their position. The baggage, &c., was first

concentrated and taken over the spruit, with the Seaforths as right rear

flank guard and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders as rear guard. As

the baggage and transport advanced the Highland Light Infantry advanced,

and the battalions guarding flank and rear retired from their position

and followed the baggage across the drift, while small bodies of the

enemy hovered round the retiring rear at a respectful distance and

unable to do any serious damage."

Finally at 7 P.M. on the 29th, exactly to time ordered by the chief, the

General and his tired warriors marched into Heilbron, having covered

within eight days a distance of 126 miles, fighting "a swarm of hornets"

at intervals the whole way, and losing in the advance fifty-four wounded

and nine killed--a loss in comparison with the work done by no means

heavy. Mr. Blundell's description of the class of work and its reward so

happily hits off the nature of the movement, that the temptation to

quote him is irresistible. "To appreciate the humours of the military

situation in these regions, one would have to turn to the experiences of

one's schoolboy days with wasps' nests, when, after the capture of the

main position, the survivors take to guerilla warfare in the grass,

crawling up your trousers and dropping on your neck from unexpected

quarters, and inflicting damage to your temper and prestige out of all

proportion to the losses incurred or the advantage gained."

FROM BOSHOP TO KROONSTAD

Christiana, as we know, was occupied on the 16th of May by one of

General Hunter's brigades, while Lord Methuen moved his Division from

Boshop to Hoopstad, thus bringing his troops into the zone of the great

operations, and pursuing his march eastwards along the south bank of the

Vaal. (Hunter's Brigade afterwards removed to cover the repair of the

line along the Bechuanaland Railway towards Vryburg, and there for the

present we must leave them.)

[Illustration: HIGHLAND BRIGADE AT THE END OF A LONG FORCED MARCH.

(Photo by a British Officer.)]

From Boshop Methuen's force moved on in zigzag fashion, their

destination being Kroonstad. From Hoopstad to Bothaville they passed

over good roads, through picturesque country, followed for miles by the

graceful bends of the Vaal River--a ribbon of silver fringed with

willows. The weather was now growing more and more chilly, and after

sundown frost began to nip and biting winds to whistle through the

bones. Nights were spent in trying to gain warmth, and when dawn came

the sun was welcomed with thanksgiving. The infantry in these raw

mornings had the advantage of the cavalry, as they could work themselves

into a glow, but there were other occasions in which the mounted men had

their revenge, and could forge on ahead and secure, before the arrival

of the lagging pedestrians, all manner of tempting edibles--chickens,

ducks, sucking pigs, and the like, which happened to be at the farms.

These luxuries were greedily coveted, for, coming along from Boshop some

220 miles, diet had been limited to biscuits--hard, dry, and

irresponsive--and any variety in the monotonous fare was received with

unqualified rejoicing. Near Bothaville, as dawn broke, a curious episode

took place. In the distance was spied a tent--a species of farmyard

in the centre of the open veldt. Chickens and cattle and a trek waggon

fringed the strange mushroom-shaped domain. It being necessary to

discover the nature of the occupant of this shanty, one of the military

party approached and hallooed. No answer. He roared louder. Then from

the inner recess of the tent a burly voice bellowed--"You can't

commandeer me; I'm an Englishman. The first Dutchman that pokes his head

around here will look like a sieve when I've done with him." To this

warlike challenge the British soldier meekly replied--described himself

and his business--whereupon a change rapid as amusing came over the

scene. Out from the tent, "like a cork from a bottle," burst the inmate,

glad past speech, excited past effervescence--wife, children, came

rushing forth from their hiding-places, rapture writ in smiling letters

over every feature. The British were come--at last--at last! The valiant

couple were taken in charge, removed to Bothaville and protected, and

their long days of loyal suspense and tribulation were at an end. Then

on went the goodly multitude, through streets whose houses fluttered

with white, taking with them as they went their Boer prisoners, who,

sitting in their own carts, alternately shivered and snarled. At

Kroonstad--reached on the 27th of May--they pitched their camps, not in

the town itself but discreetly removed from the awful reminiscences of

dead horse and beast left by Boer and British armies in their last

tussle, and here they thought to take a brief rest before marching away

from rail and civilisation. But man proposed and the exigencies of the

situation disposed, and by the 1st of June we find Lord Methuen's troops

hastening off to the assistance of the 13th Battalion of Imperial

Yeomanry at Lindley. To understand the urgent necessity for this detour

we must return to Senekal.

[Illustration: OFFICERS OF THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS

Photo by Gregory & Co., London]

THE BATTLE OF BIDDULPH'S BERG (28TH AND 29TH OF MAY)

So soon as General Rundle entered Senekal--on the 26th of May--he

proceeded to make inquiries as to the whereabouts of General Colvile,

whom he believed to be at Lindley, some forty miles north-east of him.

It so happened that General Colvile had just vacated that place and

continued his march in the direction of Heilbron. No sooner was his back

turned than the Boers pounced on Lindley, and not only pounced, but

contrived to make themselves instantly aggressive. As ill luck would

have it, the Duke of Cambridge's Yeomanry under Colonel Spragge, who had

been sent from Kroonstad to join General Colvile's force, were caught by

the enemy a few miles short of their destination.

They were in the awkward position of having missed General Colvile and

lost a _pied-à-terre_ at Lindley.

In this dilemma a message was sent to General Rundle informing him of

the desperate quandary.

The General, instantly reviewing the critical state of affairs, devised

a strategical plan which, he thought, would serve--far off as he was--to

extricate the entangled forces who were demanding his assistance. He was

aware that a posse of Boers was within some six miles of him, circling

around towards Bethlehem in the east, and he conceived the scheme of

attacking these with such force and determination as to press them hard

and force them in their turn to appeal for help from the hordes that

were infesting Lindley to the annoyance and dismay of the not yet united

British forces who had prayed his aid. This device was masterly in the

extreme, as it, so to speak, forced the masses of the enemy to come

south in all haste, and thus saved risks of failure which might have

resulted from a long movement of infantry over a distance of about forty

miles. So, leaving General Boyes with three battalions in occupation of

Senekal, General Rundle, with a force consisting of 2nd Grenadier

Guards, 2nd Scots Guards, 2nd East Yorkshire, under General Campbell,

the 2nd West Kent Regiment, the 2nd and 79th Batteries Royal Field

Artillery, and the 4th and 7th Battalions of Imperial Yeomanry--marched

off towards the east over some miles of open country over which the tall

grass, bleached now by many days of scorching sun, waved thickly round

their knees. In the distance were three ominous hills--such hills as the

Dutchmen delight in--fronted by a lower eminence which was occupied by

the enemy. These espied the coming of the British, and promptly betook

themselves to their main position on two of the hills, Biddulph's Berg

and Tafel Berg. From these points of vantage they greeted the Kent and

Derbyshire Yeomanry, who had advanced to reconnoitre, with a storm of

bullets which at once laid low many a brave fellow. Still the Derbyshire

Yeomanry pursued their way, worked round the hill and dismounted and

proceeded to seek cover, where they were forced to remain till dark set

in, unable to stir lest the volleys of the enemy should find them out.

On the western side the Kent Yeomanry were hotly attacked, and many were

wounded. Meanwhile, from the foremost hill, whence the Boers had spied

out the coming of Rundle's force, the British now in possession,

commenced to fire upon the heights of the Biddulph's Berg; the artillery

too dropped shells in the direction of the enemy; and the sun went down

on the hostile forces, fighting vigorously so long as a ray of daylight

served to illumine the deadly operations. Then they bivouacked where

they were. At dawn the battle was resumed, and an effort was made to

turn the enemy's right flank. The Grenadiers under Colonel Lloyd moved

off to the west, supported by the Scots Guards, West Kent, and Imperial

Yeomanry, marching over miles of hard dried grass till within range of

the Boers' lair. But as usual the foe was invisible. It was imagined

that he had vacated the position in the night; but to be on the safe

side a cascade of shrapnel was poured over the steeps. Even this brusque

process of search was unavailing. Not a sign of life was visible, though

wounded Dutchmen must have lain in their hiding-places with stoical

calm. And now commenced the dangerous, the awe-striking feature of the

day. The grass, dried to chip, suddenly burst into a blaze. The

carelessness of some one had set it alight, and presently the gallant

Grenadiers found themselves fanned with the heat of an oven and forced

to move from their position. They were now ordered to face the Boer

hiding-place and attack it, while the 79th Battery behind them prepared

again to scour the hill. Then, following their usual tactics, the Boer

guns burst forth with loud and startling uproar, surprising the troops,

who had almost accepted the idea that the enemy had fled. There was no

doubt that he was "all there," with two guns and a "pom-pom," and meant

to make himself objectionable. Just as the Boer shell was dispersing the

amazed Yeomanry (who but a few moments before had been preparing the

pipe of peace in full security of the Dutchmen's supposed evacuation),

the grass again broke into flame, growing and leaping by bounds, so that

the best efforts to stay its progress were unavailing. Still, the

artillery duel, once commenced, continued briskly, briskly as the veldt

fire below, that, sweeping round the wounded as they fell, made a new

and awful panorama in the sufficiently horrific scene of war. The

British gunners worked their hardest to silence the Boer gun, and as

they proceeded, the great furnace of roaring, crackling grass gathered

and grew, and the volumes of smoke soon rendered the Boer position

invisible. During this time not a sound of musketry had been heard, only

the Boer gun had given tongue vociferously enough to tax all the

energies of the British gunners to silence it. Then came the order for

the Grenadiers to advance, and this, in spite of smoke and the violent

efforts of the Boer artillery, they did in right soldierly fashion,

making for the direction of the offensive weapon with splendid coolness

and precision. But no sooner had they neared to within some hundred

yards of the piece than they suddenly found themselves pelted at by the

hitherto inactive rifles of the foe. Thick and fast buzzed the bullets

of the Dutchmen, loud roared the guns as the shells burst and bellowed.

One man after another dropped--was killed, maimed, mutilated--and there,

invisible, lay as he fell, a prey in his helplessness to the devouring

flames that were now leaping and crackling with an almost majestical

vehemence, rushing far and wide, like some vast, ravening, raging demon,

with a thousand fiery tongues panting forth volumes of blue-white breath

over the whole universe. And within this fearful area the perpetual

rattle and roll of musketry continued their fell work, while the

wounded, red with their gore, and redder with the scorching of the

flames, crept, and crawled and reeled to places of safety, or, woeful

truth, writhed where they fell, victims to the most horrible torture

that fiendish imagination has yet devised. Amid the stentorian rampage

none could hear their cries for aid, none could see their struggles for

release. Only now and then, when some succeeded in emerging from the

fiery chaos, could the appalled few who were beyond the vivid halo of

destruction realise the mighty horror that lay on the skirts of

Biddulph's Hill. But the battle raged on. The Yeomanry, under Colonel

Blair, were off in hot haste to attack and rout some Boers who were

endeavouring to make a flank attack, while the artillery, despite the

scene of carnage, battered the hills whence the Boers, safely hidden,

were pouring a horrible fusillade upon the persevering, dauntless

Grenadiers. These remained for hours returning the fire of the enemy, in

a position of unparalleled peril, until the order came to retire. This

movement was executed with splendid precision, but many were left upon

the field, and in the succouring of them deeds of heroism followed each

other with such rapidity that several glorious acts passed unwitnessed

and unsung. Lieutenant Quilter, with twenty men, volunteered to rescue

the helpless, and rushed into the flaming furnace without arms, and

under the relentless fire of the enemy. One after another of the

wretched sufferers were hauled off to safety by these gallant

deliverers, who, in full consciousness of the grim fate that must have

been theirs should they themselves have dropped, pursued their work with

almost amazing heroism. Colonel Lloyd received many injuries, and was

also much scorched, but continued to command his gallant Grenadiers till

further wounds made him helpless. He might again have been wounded where

he lay, but for the assistance of a young drummer (Harries), into whose

hand a bullet passed while he was tending his commanding officer.

While the battle was proceeding, General Rundle received a communication

from Lord Roberts ordering him to go to the assistance of General

Brabant, who also was in difficulties. It became necessary, therefore,

to effect the retirement. The manoeuvre had, however, produced the

desired effect, for the Boers had been somewhat hard hit, and had given

up their aggressive operations, leaving the neighbourhood of Lindley

open to our force. On Wednesday the 30th General Rundle was informed

that De Villiers, the Boer Commandant, was seriously wounded, and that

fifty Dutchmen had been killed, and many injured, whereupon a doctor and

champagne were sent to the late enemy; this in spite of the fact that

very early in the proceedings of Monday the Boers had commenced the

battle with their customary treacherous tricks. From an adjacent

homestead they had flown a white flag, taking care that directly the

scouts went forward to accept their surrender they should be pelted

liberally as a reward for their confidence. As a result, one of the

British party was wounded mortally, and another severely. Fortunately,

the next day (Tuesday) the ruffians received their deserts, for the

farmhouse was liberally pounded by the 2nd Battery of Artillery. Nor was

this the sole barbaric act of the day. A West Kent Yeoman, while

scouting, had passed a Dutch farmhouse, and was invited in to coffee,

being assured by the Dutchwoman, who desired to play the hostess, that

no Boers had been near the place for days. Happily the wary yeoman

refused, for he had no sooner turned to ride off than he was pelted with

bullets from a party of Boers who had immediately rushed from the

homestead to fire at him. His marvellous escape was merely due to the

nature of the ground round the farm, which afforded him cover.

Still General Rundle's sense of humanity overcame the instinct of

reprisal; for after the battle he offered shelter to the Boer wounded,

even promising to tend them without considering them prisoners of war.

In the engagement at Biddulph's Berg thirty of the British were killed

and 150 wounded. Among the wounded officers were:--Grenadier

Guards--Col. F. Lloyd, D.S.O., Capt. G. L. Bonham, Capt. C. E. Corkran,

Lieut. E. Seymour, Lieut. A. Murray. Scots Guards--Major F. W. Romilly

D.S.O. Royal Welsh Fusiliers--Captain R. S. Webber, A.D.C. to General

Rundle.

On Thursday, May 31st, the troops proceeded to Ficksburg to the

assistance of General Brabant, who had engaged the enemy near the Basuto

Border on the Tuesday, and was still fighting.

In spite of General Rundle's desperate fight, the 13th Battalion (Irish)

Imperial Yeomanry, on whose account the battle was undertaken, had a

most disastrous encounter with an overwhelming number of Boers near

Lindley on the 31st of May. This battalion, as we know, was attacked on

the way from Kroonstad to Lindley, and temporarily helped by the

operations near Senekal. Subsequently the party came upon a superior

force of Boers, and was forced to surrender.

The _Cape Times_ gave its version of the affair:--

"The story was told by Corporal Marks, who, with Trooper Brian,

alone escaped capture. The force in question consisted of about

500 men, under the command of Colonel Spragge, and was

comprised of the Duke of Cambridge's Own and the Irish and

Belfast Yeomanry. The Duke's were 125 strong. With this force

was a convoy of waggons, while the scouts, of whom our

informant, Corporal Marks, was in command, numbered five.

"The little battalion left Kroonstad on May 25, under hurried

orders to reinforce General Colvile at Lindley without delay.

On their way they captured and disarmed a troop of sixteen

Boers whom they found in possession of a quantity of

ammunition. Taking their prisoners with them, they hurried on

at full speed, arriving at Lindley on Sunday, May 27, about

noon. As they entered the town a number of horsemen were seen

galloping out at the other end in the direction of Heilbron.

Much to their disappointment our men found that General Colvile

had left at daylight that day, after some severe fighting, for

Heilbron....

"On Wednesday night, after the gallant little band had been

fighting against enormous odds for three days, Colonel Spragge

decided to send one scout (C. Smith), in company of a Kaffir

guide, in search of General Rundle, who was supposed to be in

the neighbourhood of Senekal, with an urgent message for help.

Corporal Marks and Trooper Brian were instructed to leave at

the same time with a similar message for General Colvile. A

close Boer line had been drawn round the position of the

devoted garrison, and it was necessary to pierce the cordon to

reach Heilbron. The scouts left unarmed, and after a terrible

night of it, Marks and Brian got through the enemy's lines. The

night was bitterly cold, and the Boers had lighted camp fires,

which proved serviceable guides to the two men. They passed so

close to the pickets that they could hear them talking and

laughing perfectly distinctly. Taking a circuitous route, they

kept the Heilbron road some distance on their right, and by

rapid marching reached Colvile's camp at seven o'clock on

Thursday morning. The message was delivered to the General,

whose reply was that he could do nothing. Unhappily, Smith and

the Kaffir were captured by Boers, and Smith was shot on the

spot.

* * * * *

"The following is a copy of the despatch given to Corporal

Marks for delivery to Colonel Spragge:--

"'Your message received 7 A.M. I am eighteen miles from Lindley

and twenty-two from Heilbron, which latter place I hope to

reach to-morrow. The enemy are between me and you, and I cannot

send back supplies. If you cannot join me by road to Heilbron

you must retire on Kroonstad, living on the country, and if

necessary, abandoning your waggons.--(Signed) H. E. COLVILE,

Lieutenant-General.'

"General Colvile appears to have believed that the little force

could make a dash for it and cut their way through to

Kroonstad. In any case, he did not see his way to go to the

help of the men who had been marching to reinforce himself.

Knowing that this message could be of no possible service to

Colonel Spragge, and realising the urgency of the case,

Corporal Marks decided to take the responsibility of not

wasting time by returning to deliver this message, and he and

Brian made for Kroonstad as hard as their horses would gallop.

About eight miles north-east of the town they learned that Lord

Methuen was in the neighbourhood, and they reached his camp

about half-past four that afternoon (Thursday). Lord Methuen

immediately made preparations to relieve the plucky little

force in such hard straits at Lindley, and started the same

afternoon. He reached Lindley without opposition the same

night. But it was too late."

Another account said:--"The battalion, consisting of the Duke

of Cambridge's Own and three companies of Irish Yeomanry--under

500 in all--reached Kroonstad on Friday morning, May 22, after

a long forced march. A few hours after their arrival they

received an urgent message from General Colvile requiring them

to join him without delay at Lindley, and they started at 8

P.M. that same evening with one day's rations, reaching

Lindley, fifty miles distant, on the Sunday morning. When the

advanced guard reached the town they found it apparently

deserted, the only signs of British occupation being empty beef

and biscuit tins; and were informed that General Colvile had

left at daybreak. Almost immediately they were fired at from

behind walls and houses, and finding the place untenable

retreated about a mile outside the town, where Colonel Spragge

took up a good position on some kopjes, with a stream of water

and good shelter for the horses and waggons. This place they

defended, fighting by day and fortifying by night, till

Thursday, at 2 P.M., on slender rations, though surrounded by

greatly superior numbers. On Thursday morning the Boers were

largely reinforced, and also brought up cannon--three Krupps

and a 'pom-pom,'--when the shell-fire telling dreadfully at

short range, Colonel Spragge felt it would be madness to hold

out longer, and surrendered after losing more than

seventy-eight in killed and wounded out of his small

force--when all was over some of the unwounded were so

exhausted that they could hardly march into Lindley, where

their gallant enemies as well as the non-combatants gave them

the highest credit for the stand they had made in an almost

hopeless position. Next day Lord Methuen arrived after a

splendid forced march, and the wounded were set free."

In regard to the loss of the Duke of Cambridge's Yeomanry, there was a

good deal of criticism, and accounts dealing with the _raison d'être_ of

the disaster vary. Mr. Winston Churchill, in support of Sir H. Colvile,

declared that it was sent out with the absurdly inadequate escort by the

fiat of a higher authority, with the full knowledge that Heilbron was

surrounded by a force of Boers estimated at from 4000 to 5000 men. It

was also despatched without warning, being sent, or at any rate received

at Heilbron, so that it was impossible to operate from the latter place

to assist its passage, especially as it was actually captured almost

immediately after leaving Kroonstad, and fourteen miles from Heilbron.

"In the case of the Yeomanry, the message giving notice of the change of

place, where it was to join the 9th Division from Ventersburg to

Lindley, was by error addressed to the 9th Brigade, and this was not

received by Sir H. Colvile till the 21st of June. The first intimation

of their position was given by a messenger to General Colvile's camp

when twenty miles out of Lindley from the Yeomanry, then five miles on

the other side on the Kroonstad road. The messenger asked for

reinforcement and supplies, but did not represent the situation as very

serious, as, in fact, at that time it was not. But at this juncture

General Colvile was surrounded by a large force of Boers on his flank

and rear, and short of supplies himself, and on a time march under

orders to reach Heilbron on the 29th. He therefore advised Colonel

Spragge to retire on the Kroonstad road, and authorised him, if

necessary, to abandon his baggage, &c."

Lord Methuen, who at the time was on the march to Kroonstad, was ordered

off, as we already know, to the rescue. Within half-an-hour he had

started, and by 10 A.M. on the 2nd of June he had accomplished

forty-four miles in twenty-five hours. But his expedition was of no

avail, for Spragge's Irishmen had been taken prisoners. Nevertheless

having arrived, Lord Methuen proceeded to attack the Boers with vigour,

and after five hours' continuous fighting, put some 3000 of them to

flight.

The official list of prisoners of war showed 22 officers and 863

non-commissioned officers and men.

Among the officers were the following:--

13th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry--Lieutenant-Colonel Spragge,

Lieutenant-Colonel Holland, Captain Robinson, Captain Humby,

Lieutenant Mitchell, Lieutenant Stannus, Lieutenant the Earl of

Leitrim, Lieutenant Rutledge, Lieutenant Montgomery, Lieutenant

Lane, Lieutenant Du Pré, Lieutenant Donnelly, Sergeant Wright,

Sergeant Woodhouse. Captain Keith had been killed in the affair

of the 29th, when Captain Sir J. Power was dangerously wounded,

and Captain the Earl of Longford, Lieutenants Stuart, Robin,

and Benson, were wounded together with Lieutenant Bertram of

the Eastern Province Horse (since dead).

The following officers were also wounded on June 1 and 2:--

3rd Battalion Imperial Yeomanry--Captain L. R. Rolleston,

Captain M. S. Dawsany, Lieutenant L. E. Starkey.

Soon after this time the 9th Division was split up, owing to the

necessity of detaching small forces. Generals Smith-Dorrien and

Bruce-Hamilton joined their forces with that of General Ian Hamilton,

while General MacDonald with the Highland Brigade acted as an

independent force, and General Sir H. Colvile returned to England.[8]

[Illustration: THEIR ORDEAL OF FIRE: THE GRENADIER GUARDS AT THE BATTLE

OF BIDDULPH'S BERG

Drawing by R. Caton Woodville]

FIGHTING ON THE WESTERN BORDER

Meanwhile Sir Charles Warren's troops, moving from Faberspruit, some

twelve miles from Douglas, had a nasty experience. The force consisted

of some four hundred Duke of Edinburgh's Volunteers, one and a half

companies of the 8th Regiment of Imperial Yeomanry, some of Paget's

Horse, twenty-five of Warren's Scouts, and some guns of the Royal

Canadian Artillery. During the night, a particularly dark one, the

Boers slunk up in two parties to the gardens of farmhouses near which

the yeomanry on the one hand, and Sir C. Warren's and the Duke of

Edinburgh Volunteers on the other, were quartered. In the dusk before

dawn, these suddenly blazed out on the British, who, like lightning, got

under arms. But in the shock and uproar of the first alarm the English

horses that had been kraaled burst through the kraal walls and

stampeded, thus making the scene of turmoil more intense. With the first

streak of daylight the whole British force poured shot and shell into

the gardens where the Boers had hidden themselves, and for a good hour

the troops were at work driving the invaders from the neighbourhood of

the camps. The Boers lost heavily, and a portion of the Yeomanry

suffered correspondingly while pressing forward to the support of the

pickets. Many of Paget's Horse were wounded, notably Lieutenant

Lethbridge, whose injury was dangerous, and of the Duke of Edinburgh

Volunteers three were killed and four wounded. Their gallant

Colonel--Colonel Spence--was shot dead while in act of giving orders.

Major Kelly, A.D.C. to Sir Charles Warren, was wounded; Lieutenant

Patton, A.D.C., was shot in the knee, and Lieutenant Huntingdon was

slightly injured. Many Boers were wounded and thirteen were killed, but

others contrived to gallop off scot free, as owing to the stampeding of

the horses it was impossible to follow them up. The total British

casualties were eighteen killed and about thirty wounded. The result of

the engagement had a decidedly beneficial effect upon the rebels, who

were at that time hesitating on which side of the fence to locate

themselves.

Colonel Adye had also surprised the enemy and gained a victory at Kheis

on the 27th--a victory which had the effect of defeating the plans of

the rebels who had assembled within some twenty miles of that place in

hope to effect a junction with others of their kind. The action was a

smart one, and many hundred head of stock and prisoners were captured,

but it was also costly, as Major J. A. Orr-Ewing, 5th Co. Imperial

Yeomanry, was killed; Captain L. H. Jones, 32 Co. Imperial Yeomanry;

Surg.-Capt. Dun, 5th Co.; Lieut. Venables, Nesbitt's Horse, were

wounded; and two gallant young officers, Captain Tindall, 1st Welsh

Regiment, and Lieutenant Matthews, 2nd Gloucester Regiment, both

succumbed to the severe injuries they had received.

Sir Charles Warren, after his engagement, marched without opposition

from Faberspruit to Campbell, which was reached on the 5th of June.

FOOTNOTES:

[8] While dealing with the matter it is due to General Colvile to repeat

the statement made by himself at the end of the year to a representative

of Reuter's Agency:--

"I am accused of being chiefly responsible for the surrender of the

Yeomanry at Lindley. In my opinion the primary cause of this surrender

was the insufficient information given by the headquarters staff to

Colonel Spragge and myself. Had I been informed of Lord Roberts's

intentions and of the intended movements of Colonel Spragge, who was in

command of the Yeomanry, and had Colonel Spragge been made acquainted

with the orders I received from Lord Roberts, this disaster would never

have happened. The following details will make it clear that the loss of

the Yeomanry was primarily due to bad staff work. On May 20 I received a

telegram from the chief of the staff ordering me to concentrate my

troops, consisting of the Highland Brigade, the Eastern Province Horse,

a field battery, and two naval guns, at Ventersburg on May 23, to leave

that town on the 24th and to march to Heilbron, _via_ Lindley, arriving

at Lindley on May 26, and at Heilbron on the 29th. I was informed that I

should be joined at Ventersburg by the 13th Imperial Yeomanry and

Lovat's Scouts.

"On arrival at Ventersburg, finding that neither the Yeomanry nor the

Scouts were there, I informed the chief of the staff by telegraph, but

received no answer from him at the time, though his reply was handed to

me more than a month later, among a bundle of undelivered telegrams.

This telegram was worded as follows: 'May 24. Yeomanry are so late they

cannot catch you at Ventersburg. You must march without them. They will

join you later _via_ Kroonstad.' As I did not receive the telegram till

the march was over it did not affect my action, but had I received it at

the time its wording would have led me to suppose that the Yeomanry

would join me at Heilbron, as was actually the case with Lovat's Scouts.

At this time Lord Roberts's army was disposed roughly as follows:

General Hunter's Division on the Kimberley-Mafeking Railway, Lord

Methuen on the Vaal River, headquarters and General Pole-Carew's

Division on the Bloemfontein-Johannesburg Railway, General Ian

Hamilton's column at Heilbron, and General Rundle and Brabant to the

south-east of me. It was, therefore, extended across the Free State, and

I assumed that Lord Roberts intended to advance in this formation,

sweeping all before him till he got within striking distance of the

Vaal, thus forcing the enemy to extend, and that he would then select

one point for forcing the passage of the river. I also supposed that

Heilbron, which is the head of a short line of railway, would be the

supply depot for the columns to the east, as Winburg had been.

"My very definite orders, and the fact that I was not to move till the

last possible moment, which necessitated my averaging seventeen miles a

day, strengthened the assumption that I was taking part in a combined

movement, in which great exactitude in conforming to the time table is,

of course, of the utmost importance. In a telegram which Lord Roberts

had sent to General Hamilton a short time before on a similar occasion

he had impressed on him the importance of columns arriving

simultaneously. As I had been officially informed that General Hamilton

was in occupation of Heilbron, I assumed that my orders to be there on

the 29th indicated that that was the day on which he would be required

to take part in the general advance, and that any delay on my part would

either retard the advance and upset the Commander-in-Chief's

calculations, or that by leaving Heilbron unoccupied I should hand over

an important supply depot to the enemy. I have thus explained why in no

circumstances should I have felt myself justified in disobeying Lord

Roberts's orders, which I simply carried out from first to last. I now

proceed to recite the circumstances in which I became acquainted with

Colonel Spragge's difficulties, and the action I took.

"I left Ventersburg on May 24 as ordered, and on the 26th, after a fight

outside Lindley, entered it, finding that the place had been vacated by

us, a fact of which no notification had been given me, though I had been

informed of our occupation of it. Marching at daylight on the following

morning we crossed the Rhenoster River just before sunset, having been

engaged the greater part of the day, and on the morning of the 28th I

received the following message: 'Colonel Spragge to General Colvile.

Found no one in Lindley but Boers. Have five hundred men, but only one

day's food. Have stopped three miles back on Kroonstad road. I want help

to get out without great loss.--B. Spragge, Lieutenant-Colonel, May 27,

1900.' I asked the orderly who Colonel Spragge was, and on hearing from

him that he was the officer commanding the Yeomanry I learned for the

first time that these troops were following me. The statement, which I

have seen several times repeated in the papers, that I had urged the

Yeomanry to hurry after me, is absolutely untrue. I have reason to

believe that this baseless newspaper report has obtained credence in

some high official quarters. I have already expressed my views of the

necessity of being at Heilbron at the time ordered, and as it is a

recognised rule of war that the lesser must be sacrificed to the greater

interest, I should in any circumstances have considered it my duty to

push on even had I been sure that such action would have entailed the

loss of the Yeomanry. But in this case I had two additional reasons for

doing so. First, that, as Colonel Spragge had succeeded in retiring

three miles on the Kroonstad road I was convinced that he would have no

difficulty in making good his retreat, though possibly with loss, as the

colonel himself had said; secondly, that I had then only two days' more

food for my force, and had I fought my way back I should not only have

reduced the Highland Brigade to the verge of starvation, but should

certainly have had insufficient supplies to take me back to Heilbron."

South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 5 (of 8) From the Disaster at Koorn Spruit to Lord Roberts's Entry into Pretoria · 第 8 / 10 章