"Sowing the Winter Wheat." Speech delivered
at Carnarvon, to a meeting of constituents,
after becoming Prime Minister, February 3,
1917.
Part II of the Report contains the scheme which Mr. Montagu and Lord
Chelmsford propose for the solution of the problem which they had set
themselves to solve in Part I. In giving their reasons for a new policy
they observe:
"_No further development (on old lines) is possible unless we are
going to give the people of India some responsibility for their
own government._ But no one can imagine that no further
development is necessary. _It is evident that the present
machinery of government no longer meets the needs of the time; it
works slowly and it produces irritation_; there is a widespread
demand on the part of educated Indian opinion for its alteration;
and the need for advance is recognised by official opinion also."
[Italics are ours.]
The new policy sketched by them is, in their judgment, "the logical
outcome of the past. Indians must be enabled, in so far as they attain
responsibility, to determine for themselves what they want done
"... such limitations on powers as we are now proposing are due
only to the obvious fact that time is necessary in order to train
both representatives and electorates for the work which we desire
them to undertake; and that we offer Indians opportunities at
short intervals to prove the progress they are making and to make
good their claim, not by the method of agitation but by positive
demonstration, to the further stages in self-government which we
have just indicated."
That is the only basis on which they maintain they can hope to see in
India "the growth of a conscious feeling of organic unity with the
Empire as a whole." With these and a few more prefatory remarks about
the educational problem and the attitude of the ryot and the enunciation
of the general principles on which their proposals are based they
proceed to formulate their scheme, starting first with the provinces.
I
The proposals relating to Provincial Government may be noticed under the
following heads:
(_a_) _Financial devolution_: It is proposed that henceforth there
should be a complete separation of the provincial finances from those of
the Government of India; that, reserving certain sources of revenue for
the Government of India, all others should be made over to the
Provincial Governments with the proviso that the first charge on all
Provincial revenues will be a contribution towards the maintenance of
the Government of India, considered necessary and demanded by the
latter. A certain amount of power to impose fresh taxes and to raise
loans is also conceded to the provincial Governments subject to the veto
of the Government of India.
(_b_) _Legislative devolution_: "It is our intention," say the authors
of the report, "to reserve to the Government of India a general
overriding power of legislation for the discharge of all functions which
it will have to perform. It should be enabled under this power to
intervene in any province for the protection and enforcement of the
interests for which it is responsible; to legislate on any provincial
matter in respect of which uniformity of legislation is desirable,
either for the whole of India or for any two or more provinces; and to
pass legislation which may be adopted either _simpliciter_ or with
modifications by any province which may wish to make use of it. We think
that the Government of India must be the sole judge of the propriety of
any legislation which it may undertake under any one of these
categories, and that its competence so to legislate should not be open
to challenge in the courts. Subject to these reservations we intend that
within the field which may be marked off for provincial legislative
control the sole legislative power shall rest with the provincial
legislatures." It is not proposed to put a statutory limitation on the
power of the Government of India to legislate for the provinces, but it
is hoped that "constitutional practice" will prevent the central
Government interfering in provincial matters unless the interests for
which the latter is responsible are directly affected.
(_c_) _Provincial Executive_: Article 220 gives the Governor the power
to appoint "one or two additional members of his Government as members
without portfolio for purposes of consultation and advice."
These, in substance, are the proposals of the Secretary of State and the
Government of India for the future government of the provinces into
which India is divided. Some of these latter and some other tracts are
expressly excluded from the operation of these recommendations. It will
be at once observed that this is neither autonomy nor home rule. It is a
kind of hybrid system with final powers of veto and control vested in
the Government of India. The provision as to Provincial Legislatures
make it still more complicated.
"Let us now explain how we contemplate in future that the
executive Governments of the provinces shall be constituted. As we
have seen, three provinces are now governed by a Governor and an
Executive Council of three members, of whom one is in practice an
Indian and two are usually appointed from the Indian Civil
Service, although the law says only that they must be qualified by
twelve years' service under the Crown in India. One province,
Bihar and Orissa, is administered by a Lieutenant-Governor with a
council of three constituted in the same way. The remaining five
provinces, that is to say, the three Lieutenant-Governorships of
the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma and the Chief
Commissionerships of the Central Provinces and Assam are under the
administration of a single official Head. We find throughout India
a very general desire for the extension of Council government....
Our first proposition, therefore, is that in all these provinces
singleheaded administration must cease and be replaced by
collective administration.
"In determining the structure of the Executive we have to bear in
mind the duties with which it will be charged. We start with the
two postulates; the complete responsibility for the government
cannot be given immediately without inviting a breakdown, and that
some responsibility must be given at once if our scheme is to have
any value. We have defined responsibility as consisting primarily
in amenability to constituents, and in the second place in
amenability to an assembly. We do not believe that there is any
way of satisfying these governing conditions other than by making
a division of the functions of the Government, between those which
may be made over to popular control and those which for the
present must remain in official hands.... We may call these the
'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects respectively. It then
follows that for the management of these two categories there must
be some form of executive body, with a legislative organ in
harmony with it....
* * * * *
"We propose therefore that in each province the executive
Government should consist of two parts. One part would comprise
the head of the province and an executive council of two members.
In all provinces the head of the Government would be known as
Governor.... One of the two Executive Councillors would in
practice be a European qualified by long official experience, and
the other would be an Indian. It has been urged that the latter
should be an elected member of the provincial legislative council.
It is unreasonable that choice should be so limited. It should be
open to the Governor to recommend whom he wishes.... The Governor
in council would have charge of the reserved subjects. The other
part of the government would consist of one member or more than
one member, according to the number and importance of the
transferred subjects, chosen by the Governor from the elected
members of the Legislative council. They would be known as
ministers. They would be members of the executive Government but
not members of the Executive Council; they would be appointed for
the life-time of the legislative council, and if reelected to that
body would be re-eligible for appointment as members of the
Executive. As we have said, they would not hold office at the will
of the legislature but at that of their constituents.
"The portfolios dealing with the transferred subjects would be
committed to the ministers, and on these subjects the ministers
together with the Governor would form the administration. On such
subjects their decision would be final, subject only to the
Governor's advice and control. We do not contemplate that from the
outset the Governor should occupy the position of a purely
constitutional Governor who is bound to accept the decisions of
his ministers."
(_d_) _Provincial Legislatures_: "We propose there shall be in each
province an enlarged legislative council, differing in size and
composition from province to province, with a substantial elected
majority, elected by direct election on a broad franchise, with such
communal and special representation as may be necessary."
The questions of franchise and special and communal representation have
been entrusted to a special committee the report of which is shortly
expected. The same committee will also decide how many official members
there will be on each Legislative Council. It is provided that the
Governor shall be the President of the Council and will have the power
to nominate a Vice-president from the official members. As to the effect
of resolutions it is said that "we do not propose that resolutions,
whether on reserved or transferred subjects should be binding."
The classification of the reserved and transferred subjects was also
left to a special committee which has since concluded its labours and
whose report is awaited with interest.
_Legislation on reserved subjects_:
"For the purpose of enabling the provincial Government to get
through its legislation on reserved subjects, we propose that the
head of the Government should have power to certify that a Bill
dealing with a reserved subject is a measure 'essential to the
discharge of his responsibility for the peace or tranquillity of
the province or of any part thereof, or for the discharge of his
responsibility for the reserved subjects.'... The Bill will be
read and its general principles discussed in the full legislative
council. It will at this stage be open to the council by a
majority vote to request the Governor to refer to the Government
of India, whose decision on the point shall be final, on the
question whether the certified Bill deals with a reserved subject.
If no such reference is made, or if the Government of India decide
that the certificate has been properly given, the Bill will then
be automatically referred to a Grand Committee of the council. Its
composition should reproduce as nearly as possible the proportion
of the various elements in the larger body ... the grand committee
in every council should be constituted so as to comprise from 40
to 50 per cent. of its strength. It should be chosen for each
Bill, partly by election by ballot, and partly by nomination. The
Governor should have power to nominate a bare majority exclusive
of himself. Of the members so nominated not more than two-thirds
should be officials, and the elected element should be elected _ad
hoc_ by the elected members of the council on the system of the
transferable vote."
"On reference to the grand committee, the Bill will be debated by
that body in the ordinary course, if necessary referred to a
select committee, to which body we think that the grand committee
should have power to appoint any member of the legislative council
whether a member of the grand committee or not. The select
committee will, as at present, have power to take evidence. Then,
after being debated in the grand committee and modified as may be
determined, the Bill will be reported to the whole council. The
council will have the right to discuss the Bill again generally,
but will not be able to reject it, or to amend it except on the
motion of a member of the executive council. The Governor will
then appoint a time limit within which the Bill may be debated in
the council, and on its expiry it will pass automatically. But
during such discussion the council will have the right to pass a
resolution recording any objection which refers to the principle
or details of the measure (but not, of course, to the certificate
of its character), and any such resolution will accompany the Act
when, after being signed by the Governor, it is submitted to the
Governor General and the Secretary of State."
_Provincial Budget_: "... the provincial budget should be framed
by the executive Government as a whole. The first charge on
provincial revenues will be the contribution to the Government of
India; and after that the supply for the reserved subjects will
have priority. The allocation of supply for the transferred
subjects will be decided by the ministers. If the revenue is
insufficient for their needs, the question of new taxation will be
decided by the Governor and the ministers. We are bound to
recognise that in time new taxation will be necessary, for no
conceivable economies can finance the new developments which are
to be anticipated. The budget will then be laid before the council
which will discuss it and vote by resolution upon the allotments.
If the legislative council rejects or modifies the proposed
allotment for reserved subjects, the Governor should have power to
insist on the whole or any part of the allotment originally
provided, if for reasons to be stated he certifies its necessity
in the terms which we have already suggested. We are emphatically
of opinion that the Governor in Council must be empowered to
obtain the supply which he declares to be necessary for the
discharge of his responsibilities. Except in so far as the
Governor exercises this power the budget would be altered in
accordance with the resolutions carried in council."
_Modification of the Scheme by the Government of India._ "After
five years' time from the first meeting of the reformed councils
we suggest that the Government of India should hear applications
from either the provincial Government or the provincial council
for the modification of the reserved and transferred lists of the
province; and that, after considering the evidence laid before
them, they should recommend for the approval of the Secretary of
State the transfer of such further subjects to the transferred
list as they think desirable. On the other hand, if it should be
made plain to them that certain functions have been seriously
maladministered, it will be open to them, with the sanction of the
Secretary of State, to retransfer subjects from the transferred to
the reserved list, or to place restrictions for the future on the
minister's powers in respect of certain transferred subjects....
But it is also desirable to complete the responsibility of the
ministers for the transferred subjects. This should come in one of
two ways, either at the initiative of the council if it desires
and is prepared to exercise greater control over the ministers, or
at the discretion of the Government of India, which may wish to
make this change as a condition of the grant of new, or of the
maintainance of existing, powers. We propose, therefore, that the
Government of India may, when hearing such applications, direct
that the ministers' salaries, instead of any longer being treated
as a reserved subject, and, therefore, protected in the last
resort by the Governor's order from interference should be
specifically voted each year by the legislative council; or,
failing such direction by the Government of India, it should be
open to the councils at that time or subsequently to demand by
resolution that such ministers' salaries should be so voted, and
the Government of India should thereupon give effect to such
request."
_Periodic commissions_: ... Ten years after the first meeting of
the new councils established under the Statute a commission should
be appointed to review the position. Criticism has been expressed
in the past of the composition of Royal Commissions, and it is our
intention that the commission which we suggest should be regarded
as authoritative and should derive its authority from Parliament
itself. The names of the commissioners, therefore, should be
submitted by the Secretary of State to both Houses of Parliament
for approval by resolution. The commissioners' mandate should be
to consider whether by the end of the term of the legislature then
in existence it would be possible to establish complete
responsible government in any province or provinces, or how far it
would be possible to approximate it in others; to advise on the
continued reservation of any departments for the transfer of which
to popular control it has been proved to their satisfaction that
the time had not yet come; to recommend the retransfer of other
matters to the control of the Governor in Council if serious
maladministration were established; and to make any
recommendations for the working of responsible government or the
improvement of the constitutional machinery which experience of
the systems in operation may show to be desirable....
"There are several other important matters, germane in greater or
less degree to our main purpose, which the commission should
review. They should investigate the progress made in admitting
Indians into the higher ranks of the public service. They should
examine the apportionment of the financial burden of India with a
view to adjusting it more fairly between the provinces. The
commission should also examine the development of education among
the people and the progress and working of local self-governing
bodies. Lastly the commission should consider the working of the
franchise and the constitution of electorates, including the
important matter of the retention of communal representation.
Indeed, we regard the development of a broad franchise as the arch
on which the edifice of self-government must be raised; for we
have no intention that our reforms should result merely in the
transfer of powers from a bureaucracy to an oligarchy...."
"In proposing the appointment of a commission ten years after the
new Act takes effect we wish to guard against possible
misunderstanding. We would not be taken as implying that there can
be established by that time complete responsible government in the
provinces. In many of the provinces no such consummation can
follow in the time named. The pace will be everywhere unequal,
though progress in one province will always stimulate progress
elsewhere; but undue expectations might be aroused, if we
indicated any opinion as to the degree of approximation to
complete self-government that might be reached even in one or two
of the most advanced provinces. The reasons that make complete
responsibility at present impossible are likely to continue
operative in some degree even after a decade."