"The Destruction of a False Ideal." Speech
delivered at the Albert Hall on the launching
of the New War Economy Campaign, October 22,
1917.
When the Indian troops first arrived in October, 1914, the
situation was of so drastic a nature that it was necessary to call
upon them at once to re-enforce the fighting front and help to stem
the great German thrust. Their fine fighting qualities, tenacity,
and endurance were well manifested during the first Battle of Ypres
before they had been able to completely reorganize after their
voyage from India.
LORD FRENCH, the First
Commander-in-Chief of
British forces on the
Western front.
The full story of the Palestine victory still remained to be told,
BUT WHEN THE RECORD OF THAT GLORIOUS CAMPAIGN WAS UNFOLDED, ACROSS
THE PAGE OF HISTORY WOULD BE WRIT LARGE THE NAME OF INDIA.
LORD CHELMSFORD, the
Governor-General of India,
on September 26, 1918.
As is usual in our history, we have triumphed after many sad
blunders and in the end we have defeated Turkey almost
single-handed, though our main forces have throughout the war been
engaged with another foe. In fact, IT IS TO INDIA THAT OUR RECENT
VICTORY IS DUE....
MAJOR GENERAL SIR
FREDERICK MAURICE in
_The New York Times_,
November 6, 1918.
The present Governor of the Punjab (his precise designation is
Lieutenant Governor), who is the most reactionary, self-complacent and
conceited of all the provincial rulers of India, has in the course of
his appeals for recruits for the present war said more than once that
the right of self-government carries with it the responsibility of
defending the country. The distinguished authors of the Report have also
remarked in one place that so long as the duty of defending India rests
on Great Britain, the British Parliament must control the Government of
India. Now let us see what the facts are.
(1) The first thing to be remembered in this connection is that during
the whole period of British rule in India, not a penny has been spent by
Great Britain for Indian defence. The defence of India has been well
provided for by Indian Revenues. On the other hand India has paid
millions in helping Great Britain not only in defending the Empire, but
in extending it.[1] Whatever protection has been afforded to India by
the British Navy--and that has by no means been small--has been more
than repaid by India's services to the Empire in China, Egypt, South
Africa and other parts of the world. As to the military forces of India,
they consist of two wings: (_a_) the British and (_b_) the Indian. The
pre-war Indian army consisted of 80,000 British and 160,000 Indians.
Indian public opinion has for decades been protesting against the denial
to Indians of officers' commissions in the Indian army, as also against
the strength of the British element therein. Every British unit of the
Indian army from the Field Marshal to the Tommy is paid for his services
by India. India pays for these services not only during the time they
form part of the Indian army but also for their training and equipment.
It pays all their leave, transfer and pension charges. It even pays for
whatever provision is made in England for their medical relief, etc. In
the line of the military and naval defence of India, Great Britain has
not done as much for India as she has done for the dominions and
self-governing colonies. Under the circumstances it is adding insult to
injury to insinuate that India has in any way shirked the duty of
providing for her defence. We will say nothing of India's services
during the war.
In the military defence of India, the contribution of the Punjab has
always been the greatest. If the British provinces are considered
singly, it will be found that the Punjab has been supplying the largest
number of units for the Indian army, not only in the ranks of the
fighters, but also in the ranks of auxiliaries. During this war, too,
the Punjab made the largest contribution of both combatants and
non-combatants. Yet, if we compare the civil status of the people of the
Punjab with that of other provinces, we will find that they have been
persistently denied equality of status with Bengal, Bombay and Madras.
The Punjab peasantry, which supplies the largest number of soldiers to
the army, is the most illiterate and ignorant of all the classes of
Indian population. Their economic and legal position may better be
studied in Mr. Thorborn's _The Punjab in Peace and in War_. The
Municipal and Local Boards of the province do not possess as much
independence as has been conceded in the other provinces. The judicial
administration of the province is as antiquated as it could possibly be
under British rule. Instead of a High Court we have still a Chief
court.[2] Captains and Majors and Colonels are still performing judicial
functions as magistrates and judges. The trial by jury in the cases of
Indians is unknown. Until lately the Punjab was stamped with the badge
of inferiority by being called a non-Regulation province. Even in this
report the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy have spoken of
it as a backward province. It will thus be seen that the contribution of
the Punjab to the military strength of the Empire has in no way
benefited her population in getting better opportunities for civil
progress or greater civil liberties. But recently the President of the
Punjab Provincial Conference uttered hard words against the Provincial
administration's policy of repression and coercion. He said that their
"cup of disappointment, discontent and misery, in the Punjab, at any
rate, was full to overflowing."
So much about the discharge of obligations for military defence carrying
with it the right of self-government. The Indians have no desire to
shirk their responsibility for the military defence of India; nor do
they want to balk their contribution to the Imperial defence. Their
demands in this respect may be thus summarised:
(1) That the Indian Army should be mainly officered by the
Indians.
(2) That as much as is possible of the arms and ammunition
equipment, and the military stores required for the Indian army be
produced in India.
(3) That the strength of the British element be considerably
reduced.
(4) That the nature of the Indian army, which is at present one of
hired soldiers, be converted into that of a National Militia with
a small standing army and a great reserve.
(5) That in order to do it, some kind of compulsory military
training be introduced. All young men between the ages of 17 and
21 may be required to undergo military training and put in at
least one year of military service.
(6) That as a preliminary step towards it the existing Arms Act be
repealed and, under proper safeguards, the people be allowed to
carry and possess arms in peace and war, so as to be familiar with
their use.
(7) That slowly and gradually, as funds can be spared from the
other demands more urgent and pressing, an Indian Navy be built.
Having explained the position of the Indian Nationalist in this matter,
we will now see what Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford say on this matter
in their report. In Paragraph 328 they state the "Indian wishes" and
point out that "for some years Indian politicians have been urging the
right of Indians in general to bear arms in defence of their country";
and that "we have everywhere met a general demand from the political
leaders for extended opportunities for military service," but that the
subject being more or less outside the scope of their enquiry and
"requirements of the future" being dependent "on the form of peace which
is attained," they "leave this question for consideration hereafter with
the note that it must be faced and settled."
In Paragraph 330 they deal with the question of "British Commissions for
Indians."
"The announcement of his Majesty's Government that 'the bar which
has hitherto prevented the admission of Indians to commissioned
rank in His Majesty's Army should be removed' has established the
principle that the Indian soldier can earn the King's commission
by his military conduct. It is not enough merely to assert a
principle. We must act on it. The services of the Indian army in
the war and the great increase in its numbers make it necessary
that a considerable number of commissions should now be given. The
appointments made so far have been few. Other methods of
appointment have not yet been decided on, but we are impressed
with the necessity of grappling with the problem. We also wish to
establish the principle that if an Indian is enlisted as a private
in a British unit of His Majesty's Army its commissioned ranks
also should be open to him."
The "other methods of appointment" that have been announced since the
report was signed are far from satisfactory. It has been said that the
responsibility for this niggardly policy in the matter of admitting
Indians to the Commissioned ranks of the army rests with the Home
Government and that the Indian Government's recommendations were much
more liberal. Now, as practical men, we fully realize that for some time
to come, at least until British suspicion of India's desire to get out
of the Empire is completely removed by the grant of responsible
government to India, India's military policy and the Indian army must be
controlled by the British executive. On that point all the parties in
India are agreed. But it is absolutely necessary that some steps be at
once taken to remove the stigma of military helplessness from India's
forehead. Let the British retain the control and the command, but let us
share the responsibility to some extent and let our young men be trained
for the future defence of their Motherland. To deprive them of all means
of doing that, to charge them with neglect of that paramount duty and
then to urge it as a disqualification of civil liberties, is hardly
fair.