"267. The main fault for the clogging of the machine does not, we
think, lie altogether with its highly trained engineers. What is
chiefly wanted is some change of system in the directions of
simplicity and speed. _How does it happen that announcements are
made that arouse expectations only to defeat them?_ We know that
it is not from any intention of deluding the public. We suggest
that it is because the wheels move too slowly for the times; the
need for change is realized, but because an examination of details
would take too long, promises are made in general terms, which on
examination it becomes necessary so to qualify with reservations
as to disappoint anticipations, and even to lead to charges of
breach of faith. We suspect that a root-cause of some political
discontent lies in such delays. Now, so far as the provinces are
concerned, we believe that our proposals _for freeing them to a
great extent from the control of the Government of India and the
Secretary of State will improve matters. But the Government of
India are in the worst case_." [The italics are ours.]
These observations raise an apprehension in our mind that it is proposed
to add to the strength of the services under the Government of India.
We, for ourselves, do not see how it can be otherwise. With the steady
admission of the popular element into the Government of India the
activities of the latter are likely to increase rather than diminish;
the secretarial work of the different departments will expand rather
than contract. The question of questions is how to meet the increased
cost.
The remedy is the same as was suggested many years ago by Sir William
Hunter, the official historian of India. He said:
"If we are to give a really efficient administration to India, many
services must be paid for at lower rates even at present. For those
rates are regulated in the higher branches of the administration by the
cost of officers brought from England. You cannot work with imported
labor as cheaply as you can with native labor, and I regard the more
extended employment of the natives, not only as an act of justice, but
as a financial necessity. If we are to govern the Indian people
efficiently and cheaply, we must govern them by means of themselves, and
pay for the administration at the market rates for native labor."
Now, whatever may be said about the necessity of maintaining a strong
European element in the departments which require initiative, courage,
resourcefulness and all the other qualities of "leadership" they are
certainly not a _sine qua non_ for efficiency in secretarial work. We
can see no reason why, then, the different secretariats of the
Government of India cannot be manned mainly, if not exclusively, by
Indians. Their salaries need not be the same as those now paid to the
Europeans engaged in these departments. May we ask if there is any
country on earth where such high salaries are paid to the secretarial
heads of departments as in India? Secretaries to the Government of India
in the Army and Public works and Legislative departments receive 42,000
Rs. each ($14,000, or £2800 a year); Secretaries to the Government of
India in the Finance, Foreign, Home, Revenue, Agriculture, Commerce and
Industry and Education departments get Rs. 48,000 a year each ($16,000
or £3,200); Educational Commissioners from 30 to 36,000 Rs. ($10,000 to
$12,000).
These secretarial officers are not of Cabinet rank. Besides their
salaries they get various allowances, and the purchasing value of the
rupee in India is much higher than that of 33 cents in the United States
or of 16d. in the United Kingdom, the exchange equivalents of an Indian
rupee. The same remarks may be made about Provincial Secretariats. We do
not ignore the fact that a European who cuts himself away from his
country and people for the best part of his life cannot be expected to
give his time, energy and talents for the compensation he might accept
in his own country, nor that, if the best kind of European talent is
desired for India, the compensation must be sufficiently attractive to
tempt competent men to accept it. In Paragraphs 318 to 322, both
inclusive, the Secretary of India and the Viceroy have put forward a
forceful plea for improvement in the conditions of the European Services
by (_a_) increment in their salaries, (_b_) expediting promotions, and
(_c_) grant of additional allowances, and also by bettering the
prospects of pensions and leave. We are afraid the only way to obtain
the concurrence of Indian public opinion in this matter, if at all, is
by restricting the number of posts which _must_ be held by Europeans.
The _cadre_ of services to which the rule of percentage is to apply must
be reduced in strength, and if Europeans are required for posts outside
these they should be employed for short periods and from an open market.
For example, it seems inconceivable to us why professional men like
doctors, engineers and professors should be recruited for permanent
service. Nor is there any reason why the recruitment should be confined
to persons of British domicile. The Government of India must be run on
business principles. With the exception, perhaps, of the higher posts in
the I. C. S. and in the Army, all other offices should be filled by
taking the supply on the best available terms for short periods and from
open market. By reducing the number of higher posts to which the rule of
percentage should apply, the Government would be reducing the number of
Indian officers who could claim the same salary as is given to their
European colleagues. In our humble opinion, the latter claim is purely
sentimental, and the best interests of the country require that the
administration should be as economical as is compatible with efficiency.
The strength of the different permanent services should be reduced as
much as possible and the deficiency made up by the appointment of the
best persons available at the price which the administration may be
willing to pay, whether such persons be European, Indian or American.
Take the Indian Educational Service, for example. The members start with
a salary of 6000 Rs. a year ($2000 or £400) and rise to about 24,000 Rs.
a year ($8000 or £1600). In the United States, to the best of our
knowledge, few professors, if any, get a salary higher than $7000 or
21,000 Rs. a year. High-class graduates of Harvard, Yale and Columbia
start their tutorial careers at $2000 to $3000 a year, many at $1500 a
year. These men would refuse to go to India on a similar salary. On the
other hand, if a salary of $4000 to $10,000 were offered to a select
few, the services of _the men at the top_ might be had for a short
period. Surely, in the best interests of education, it is much better to
get first-class men on high salaries for short periods than permanently
to have third-class men beginning with smaller salaries and eventually
rising to high salaries and ensuring to themselves life long pensions.
What is true of the Educational Service is similarly, if not equally,
true of the Medical, the Engineering and other scientific services. At
the present time we have men in these technical services who received
their education about twenty or twenty-five years ago and whose
knowledge of their respective sciences is antiquated and rusty.
Apothecaries, absolutely innocent of any knowledge of modern surgery,
are often appointed to the post of Civil Surgeons. No sensible Indian
desires that the present incumbents should be interfered with, except
where it is possible to retire them under the terms of their service.
All engagements should be met honorably. What is needed is that in
future there should be a radical departure in the practice of appointing
non-Indians to responsible posts in India. We do not want to deprive
ourselves of the privilege of being guided in our work by European
talent, nor should we grudge them adequate compensation for their
services. What we object to is (1) racial discrimination; (2) excessive
power being vested in individual officers; (3) the employment of more
than a necessary number of persons of alien origin; (4) the crippling of
the country's resources by burdening its finances with unnecessary
pensions and leave allowances; (5) the continuance of men on service
lists long after their usefulness has disappeared; (6) the filling of
appointments by jobbery, as is now done in the so-called non-regulation
provinces. We, in the Punjab, have been "blessed" by the rule of several
generations of Smiths, Harrys and Jones. Those who failed to pass the I.
C. S. joined the _cadre_ by the back door and received the same
emoluments as those who entered it by competition. It is they who block
the avenues of promotions and not the sons of the soil.