"Causes and Aims of the War." Speech delivered
at Glasgow, on being presented with the freedom
of that city, June 29, 1917
We are told that the world is going to be reconstructed on entirely new
lines; that all nations, big or small, shall be allowed the right of
self-determination; that the weaker and backward peoples will no longer
be permitted to be exploited and dominated by the stronger and the more
advanced nations of the earth; and that justice will be done to all.
"What we seek," says President Wilson, "is the reign of law, based upon
the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of
mankind."
The Indian people also form a part of the world that needs
reconstructing. They constitute one-fifth of the human race, and inhabit
about two million square miles of very fertile and productive territory.
They have been a civilized people for thousands of years, though their
civilization is a bit different from that of the West. We advisedly say
"a bit different," because in fundamentals that civilization has the
same basic origin as that of Greece and Rome, the three peoples having
originally sprung from the same stock and their languages, also, being
of common descent. For the last 150 years, or (even) more, India has
been ruled by Great Britain. Her people have been denied any determining
voice in the management of their own affairs. For over thirty years or
more they have carried on an organized agitation for an autonomous form
of Government within the British Empire. This movement received almost
no response from the responsible statesmen of the Empire until late in
the war. In the meantime some of the leaders grew sullen and
downhearted, and, under the influence of bitter disappointment and
almost of despair, took to revolutionary forms. The bulk of the people,
however, have kept their balance and have never faltered in their faith
in peaceful methods. When the war broke out the people of India at once
realized the world significance of this titanic struggle and in no
uncertain voice declared their allegiance to the cause of the Allies.
Our masters, however, while gratefully accepting our economic
contributions and utilizing the standing Indian army, spurned our offers
for further military contributions. In the military development of the
Indians they saw a menace to their supremacy in India.
The Russian Revolution first, and then the entry of the United States
into the War, brought about a change in the point of view of the British
statesmen. For the first time they realized that they could not win the
war without the fullest coöperation of the people of India, both in the
military and the economic sense and that the fullest coöperation of the
United States also required as a condition precedent, quite a radical
revision of their war aims. President Wilson's political idealism, his
short, pithy and epigrammatic formulas compelled similar declarations by
Allied statesmen. The British statesmen, at the helm of affairs, found
it necessary to affirm their faith in President Wilson's principles and
formulas if they would not let the morale of their own people at home
suffer in comparison. In the meantime the situation in India was
becoming uncomfortable. The Nationalists and the Home Rulers insisted on
a clear and unequivocal declaration of policy on the lines of President
Wilson's principles. The British statesmen in charge of Indian affairs,
at Whitehall, were still temporizing when the report of the Royal
Commission on the causes of the Mesopotamia disaster burst out on the
half-dazed British mind like a bombshell. To the awakening caused by the
report and its disclosures a material contribution was made by the
outspoken, candid and clear-cut speech of a younger statesman, whose
knowledge of the working of the Indian Government could not be
questioned. When the Parliament, press and platform were all ablaze with
indignation and shame at the supposed incompetence of the Indian
Government, to whose inefficiency and culpable neglect of duty were
ascribed the series of disasters that ended with the surrender of a
British force at Kut-el-amara, Mr. Edwin Samuel Montagu, who had been an
Under Secretary for India under Lord Morley and was at the time of the
Mesopotamia disaster Minister of Munitions, came out with a strong and
emphatic condemnation of the system and the form of Government under
which the "myriads" of India lived and had their affairs managed. Mr.
Montagu's opinion of the machinery of the Indian Government was
expressed as follows:
"The machinery of Government in this country with its unwritten
constitution, and the machinery of Government in our Dominions has
proved itself sufficiently elastic, sufficiently capable of
modification, to turn a peace-pursuing instrument into a
war-making instrument. It is the Government of India alone which
does not seem capable of transformation, and I regard that as
based upon the fact that the machinery is statute-ridden
machinery. The Government of India is too wooden, too iron, too
inelastic, too antediluvian, to be any use for the modern purposes
we have in view. I do not believe that anybody could ever support
the Government of India from the point of view of modern
requirements. But it would do. Nothing serious had happened since
the Indian mutiny, the public was not interested in Indian
affairs, and it required a crisis to direct attention to the fact
that the Indian Government is an indefensible system of
Government."
Regarding the Indian Budget Debates in Parliament, he said:
"Does anybody remember the Indian Budget Debates before the War?
Upon that day the House was always empty. India did not matter,
and the Debates were left to people on the one side whom their
enemies sometimes called "bureaucrats," and on the other side to
people whom their enemies sometimes called "seditionists," until
it almost came to be disreputable to take part in Indian Debates.
It required a crisis of this kind to realise how important Indian
affairs were. After all, is the House of Commons to be blamed for
that? What was the Indian Budget Debate? It was a purely academic
discussion which had no effect whatever upon events in India,
conducted after the events that were being discussed, had taken
place."
He held that the salary of the Indian Secretary of State should be paid
from the British Treasury, and then there would be real debates:
"How can you defend the fact that the Secretaries of State for
India alone of all the occupants of the Front Bench, with the
possible exception of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
are not responsible to this House for their salaries, and do not
come here with their Estimates in order that the House of Commons
may express its opinion....
"What I am saying now is in the light of these revelations of this
inelasticity of Indian government. However much you could gloss
over those indefensible proceedings in the past, the time has now
come to alter them.
"The tone of those Debates is unreal, unsubstantial and
ineffective. If Estimates for India, like Estimates for the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Colonial Secretary
were to be discussed on the floor of the House of Commons, the
Debates on India would be as good as the Debates on foreign
affairs. After all, what is the difference? Has it even been
suggested to the people of Australia that they should pay the
salary of the Secretary of State for the Colony? Why should the
whole cost of that building in Charles Street, including the
building itself, be an item of the Indian taxpayer's burden rather
than of this House of Commons and the people of the country?"
Can and does the House of Commons control the India Office? Here is Mr.
Montagu's answer.
"It has been sometimes questioned whether a democracy can rule an
Empire. I say that in this instance the democracy has never had
the opportunity of trying. But even if the House of Commons were
to give orders to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State
is not his own master. In matters vitally affecting India, he can
be overruled by a majority of his Council. I may be told that the
cases are very rare in which the Council has differed from the
Secretary of State for India. I know one case anyhow, where it was
a very near thing, and where the action of the Council might
without remedy have involved the Government of India in a policy
out of harmony with the declared policy of the House of Commons
and the Cabinet. And these gentlemen are appointed for seven
years, and can only be controlled from the Houses of Parliament by
a resolution carried in both Houses calling on them for their
resignations. The whole system of the India Office is designed to
prevent control by the House of Commons for fear that there might
be too advanced a Secretary of State. I do not say that it is
possible to govern India through the intervention of the Secretary
of State with no expert advice, but what I do say is that in this
epoch now after the Mesopotamia Report, he must get his expert
advice in some other way than by this Council of men, great men
though, no doubt, they always are, who come home after lengthy
service in India to spend the first years of their retirement as
members of the Council of India.
"Does any Member of this House know much about procedure in the
India Office? I have been to the India Office and to other
offices. I tell this House that the statutory organization of the
India Office produces an apotheosis of circumlocution and red tape
beyond the dreams of any ordinary citizen."
His own idea of what should be done at that juncture was thus expressed:
"But whatever be the object of your rule in India, the universal
demand of those Indians whom I have met and corresponded with, is
that you should state it. Having stated it, you should give some
instalment to show that you are in real earnest, some beginning of
the new plan which you intend to pursue, that gives you the
opportunity of giving greater representative institutions in some
form or other to the people of India....
"But I am positive of this, that your great claim to continue the
illogical system of Government by which we have governed India in
the past is that it was efficient. It has been proved to be not
efficient. It has been proved to be not sufficiently elastic to
express the will of the Indian people; to make them into a warring
Nation as they wanted to be. The history of this War shows that
you can rely upon the loyalty of the Indian people to the British
Empire--if you ever before doubted it! If you want to use that
loyalty, you must take advantage of that love of country which is
a religion in India, and you must give them that bigger
opportunity of controlling their own destinies, not merely by
Councils which cannot act, but by control, by growing control, of
the Executive itself. Then in your next War--if we ever have
War--in your next crisis, through times of peace, you will have a
contented India, an India equipped to help. Believe me, Mr.
Speaker, it is not a question of expediency, it is not a question
of desirability. Unless you are prepared to remodel, in the light
of modern experience, this century-old and cumberous machine,
then, I believe, I verily believe, that you will lose your right
to control the destinies of the Indian Empire."
The quick and resourceful mind of Premier Lloyd George at once grasped
the situation. He lost no time in deciding what was needed. Probably
over the head of his Tory colleagues, possibly with their consent, he
gave the Indian portfolio to Mr. Montagu, and told him quietly to set to
business. Mr. Montagu's first step was the announcement of August 20,
1917. On that date he made in the House of Commons the following
memorable statement:
"The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government
of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing
association of Indians in every branch of the administration and
the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view
to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India
as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that
substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as
possible, and that it is of the highest importance as a
preliminary to considering what these steps should be that there
should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in
authority at home and in India. His Majesty's Government have
accordingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, that I should
accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss
these matters with the Viceroy and the Government of India, to
consider with the Viceroy the views of local Governments, and to
receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and
others.
"I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by
successive stages. The British Government and the Government of
India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and
advancement of the Indian peoples, must be judges of the time and
measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the
co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of
service will thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is
found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of
responsibility.
"Ample opportunity will be afforded for public discussion of the
proposals which will be submitted in due course to Parliament."
It is obvious that the content of the second sentence of paragraph two
in the above announcement is in fundamental opposition to the right of
every nation to self-determination, a principle now admitted to be of
general application (including, according to the British Premier, even
the black races inhabiting the Colonies that were occupied by Germany
before the War, within its purview). The people of India are not on the
level of these races. Even if it be assumed that they are not yet in a
position to exercise that right, fully and properly, it is neither right
nor just to assume that they shall never be in that position even
hereafter. The qualifications implied in that sentence are, besides,
quite needless and superfluous. As long as India remains "an integral
part of the British Empire" she cannot draft a constitution which does
not meet with the approval of the British Parliament and the British
Sovereign. It is to be regretted that the British statesmen could not
rise equal to the spirit of the times and make an announcement free from
that spirit of autocratic bluster and racial swagger which was entirely
out of place at a time when they were making impassioned appeals
to Indian manhood to share the burdens of Empire by contributing
ungrudgingly in men and money for its defence. This attitude is
somewhat inconsistent with the statements in paragraph 179 of the
Montagu-Chelmsford Report, wherein, after referring to the natural
evolution of "the desire for self-determination," the distinguished
authors of the Report concede that "the demand that now meets us from
the educated classes of India is no more than the right and natural
outcome of the work of a hundred years."
In spite of this uncalled for reservation in the announcement, it is
perfectly true that "the announcement marks the end of one epoch and the
beginning of a new one." What makes the announcement "momentous,"
however, is not the language used, as even more high-sounding phrases
have been used before by eminent British statesmen of the position of
Warren Hastings, Macaulay, Munroe, Metcalf and others, but the fact that
the statement has been made by the Secretary of State for India, as
representing the Crown and the Cabinet who, in their turn, are the
constitutional representatives of the people of Great Britain and
Ireland. The statement is thus both morally and legally binding on the
British people, though it will not acquire that character so far as the
people of India are concerned, unless it is embodied in a Statute of
Parliament. Is it too much to hope that when that stage comes the second
sentence of the second paragraph might be omitted or so modified as to
remove the inconsistency pointed out above?
We have no doubt, however, that the language of the announcement
notwithstanding, the destiny of India remains ultimately in the hands of
the Indians themselves. It will be determined, favorably or unfavorably,
by the solidity of their public life, by the purity and idealism of the
Indian public men to be hereafter entrusted with the task of
administration, by the honesty and intensity of their endeavor to uplift
the masses, both intellectually and economically, by the extent to which
they reduce the religious and communal excuses that are being put forth
as reasons for half-hearted advance, and by the amount of political
unity they generate in the nation. The well known maxim that those who
will must by themselves be free, is as good today as ever. They will
have to do all this in order to persuade the British Parliament to
declare them fit for responsible Government. Once they show their
fitness by deeds and by actual conduct, no one can keep them in
leading-strings.
Coming back to the announcement itself, would it not be well to bear in
mind that what differentiates this announcement from the statutory
declarations of the Act of 1833 and the Royal proclamation of 1858 is
not the language used but the step or steps taken to ascertain Indian
opinion, to understand and interpret it in accordance with the spirit of
the times and the frankness and fairness with which the whole problem is
stated in the joint report of the two statesmen, who are the present
official heads of the Government of India. Nor can it be denied that the
announcement and the report have received the cordial appreciation of
the Indian leaders.
We, that is, the Indian Nationalists, have heretofore concerned
ourselves more with criticism of the British administration than with
the problem of construction, though our criticism has never been merely
destructive. We have always ended with constructive suggestions.
Henceforth, if the spirit of the announcement is translated into deeds
it will be our duty to coöperate actively in constructive thought. Not
that we refused coöperation in the past, but the conditions and the
terms on which we were asked to coöperate made it impossible for us to
make an effective response.
Several British critics of the Indian Nationalists have from time to
time charged them with lack of constructive ability. They ignore the
fact that political conditions in India were an effective bar to any
display of ability.
The first attempt at constitution making was made by the Congress in
1915, and as such was bound to be rather timid and half-hearted. The
situation since then has considerably improved and the discussions of
the last twelve months have enabled the Secretary for India and the
Viceroy to claim that, in certain respects, at least, their scheme is a
more effective step towards responsible Government than the scheme
promulgated jointly by the Congress and the Muslim League. How far that
claim can be substantiated remains to be seen. This much is, however,
clear: come what may, along with the rest of the world, India cannot go
back to the pre-war conditions of life. The high functionaries of the
British Government in India are also conscious of that fact, as one of
them, the present Lieutenant Governor of the United Provinces of Agra
and Oudh, a member of the Indian bureaucracy, remarked only recently in
a speech at Allahabad:
"Nothing will ever be the same," said Sir Harcourt Butler; "this much is
certain, that we shall have to shake up all our old ideals and begin
afresh ... we have crossed the watershed and are looking down on new
plains. The old oracles are dumb. The old shibboleths are no more heard.
Ideals, constitutions, rooted ideas are being shovelled away without
argument or comment or memorial.... Our administrative machine belongs
to another age. It is top-heavy. Its movements are cumbrous, slow,
deliberate. It rejoices in delay. It grew up when time was not the
object, when no one wanted change, when financial economy was the ruling
passion of Governments, imperial and provincial. Now there are the
stirrings of young national life, and economic springtime, a calling for
despatch, quick response, bold experiment. Secretariats with enormous
offices overhang the administration. An eminent ecclesiastic once told
me that Rome had, by centuries of experience, reduced delay to a
science; he used to think her mistress of postponement and
procrastination, but the Government of India beat Rome every time. Only
ecclesiatics could dare so to speak of the Government of India. I, for
one, will not lay audacious hands on the chariot of the sun."
Coming, as it does, from a member of the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy, this
statement means much more to the Indian people than even the words of
the British Premier. If this statement is not mere camouflage, but
represents a genuine change of heart on the part of the British
bureaucracy in India, then it is all the more inexplicable to us why the
new scheme of the Secretary for India and the Viceroy should breathe so
much distrust of the educated classes of India. Any way, we have nothing
but praise for the spirit of frankness and fairness which generally
characterizes the report. However we might disagree with the conclusions
arrived at, it is but right to acknowledge that the analysis of the
problem and its constituting elements is quite masterly and the attempt
to find a solution which will meet the needs of the situation _as
understood by them_ absolutely sincere and genuine. This fact makes it
all the more necessary that Indian Nationalists of all classes and all
shades of opinion should give their best thought to the consideration of
the problem in a spirit of construction and coöperation, as
distinguished from mere fault-finding. Nor should it be forgotten for a
moment that Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford were all the time, when
drawing their scheme, influenced by considerations of what, under the
circumstances, is practicable and likely to be accepted, not only in
India by the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy and the non-official European
community, but by the _conservative_ British opinion at home. It is the
latter we have to convince and win over before the scheme has a ghost of
a chance of being improved upon. When we say _conservative_ opinion we
include in that expression the Liberal and Labour Imperialists also. We
should never forget that it is hard to part with power, however
idealistic the individual vested with power may be, and it is still
harder to throw away the chances of profit which one (and those in whom
one is interested) have gained by efforts extending over a century and a
half, and in the exercise of which one sees no immediate danger. I am of
the opinion that hitherto Indian representation in England has been
extremely meagre, spasmodic and inadequate to the needs of the
situation. Outside England, India's voice has been altogether unheard.
We have so far displayed an almost unpardonable simplicity in failing to
recognise that the world is so situated these days that public opinion
in one country sometimes reacts quite effectively on public opinion in
another. It is our duty, therefore, to increase our representation in
England and to keep our case before the world with fresh energy and
renewed vigour, not in a spirit of carping denunciation of the British
Government of India, but with a desire to educate and enlist liberal and
right-minded opinion all over the world in our favor. In the following
pages an attempt is made to examine the Montagu-Chelmsford report in a
spirit of absolute candour and fairness, with practical suggestions for
the improvement of the scheme in the light of Indian and British
criticism thereupon.