THE HOME RULE PLAN
The Home Rule Bill of 1912 is now before the country, both in the clear
and simple statement of the Prime Minister and in the test of the Bill
itself[37]. The Bill has already passed through the fire of one
Parliamentary debate, and secured one great majority of 94 in the House
of Commons.
What are the general outlines of this great measure? Its central
proposal is the creation of an Irish Parliament, responsible for the
administration of Irish affairs. That Parliament is to consist of a
Senate and a House of Commons, numbering respectively 40 and 164,
guided by an Irish Executive, chosen in the same manner as the British
Imperial Cabinet. Ireland, in other words, is to be governed by
responsible Parliamentary chiefs, commanding a majority in the Irish
House of Commons. In this honest recognition of facts and terms we have
an advance on the vagueness of former proposals. Otherwise, both this
Parliament and this Executive are to have the same liberty and are to
be restrained by almost precisely the same checks and safeguards, in
regard both to religious rights and Imperial sovereignty, as those
which existed in the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893. Ireland is to
retain at Westminster a representation of forty-two members.
What is to happen if the two Irish Chambers differ? According to the
Bill, the Senate is to be nominated, at first by the Imperial
Government, and afterwards by the Irish Parliament, and the members are
to sit by rotation for eight years. The Irish House of Commons, on the
other hand, is to be elected by the same constituencies as at present,
and the membership is to be distributed in proportion to the
population--an arrangement which will give Ulster fifty-nine
representatives.[38] It is clear that under those conditions a powerful
Irish Government remaining in office beyond a certain period would have
command of both Houses, as indeed happens at present under similar
conditions both in Canada and New Zealand.[39] But if one Party should
hold power for a prolonged period, and then give place to another, the
new Government will find itself, as Mr. Borden finds himself in Canada
at present, restrained from precipitate change by an Upper House
nominated by his predecessors.
What would happen in that case? To settle that problem, the Home Rule
Bill contains a clause[40] adopting the provisions of the South Africa
Act, enabling both Houses to hold a joint sitting, in which the
majority will prevail. As long as that provision holds, it matters very
little whether the Upper Chamber is nominated or is elected, as some
propose, by proportional representation. In either case, the Irish
House of Commons will be the real governing body, as indeed it must be
if the Irish Executive is to be properly responsible, and the new Irish
Constitution to work smoothly.
So much for the general provisions of the present Bill. The details as
to safe-guards and exclusions will be found in the full text of the
Bill contained in Appendix A, and I shall leave the question of finance
to the chapter specifically devoted to that subject.
Let us turn now to the chief arguments against the measure as set forth
in the recent debate, and as expressed with ability and power in a
pamphlet entitled "Against Home Rule," to which practically all the
chief leaders of the Unionist cause contribute articles[41]. Apart from
the Ulster case, dealt with in a previous chapter, the main argument
seems to be that the English people have not been sufficiently
consulted. "It is all so sudden," said the elderly lady when she
received a proposal from an elderly suitor who had been delaying his
passion for a score or so of years. The same painful outcry comes from
the Unionist Party twenty-seven years after the first beginning of the
discussions of Home Rule in this country.
One can imagine, indeed, that a foreign visitor, coming to this land in
ignorance of the past of English politics, would suppose that the Home
Rule controversy had now arisen for the first time. Attending Unionist
meetings, he would hear an immense amount of eloquence devoted to the
wrongs of the English people in being rushed into a premature decision,
and being asked to give judgment without proper trial. The Home Rulers
would be represented to him as men of rash and precipitate temper, who
wanted to bring about in a few months a change which would affect the
United Kingdom for centuries. And finally he would hear men thanking
God that there existed a House of Lords which, in spite of the
machinations of the Home Rulers, could still give the British public
two more years to ruminate over the question of Home Rule.
He would naturally gather from this that the proposal of Home Rule for
Ireland had come upon this country with entire freshness, and had never
before been discussed among rational men. Filled with this impression
he might perhaps be surprised if he obtained the chance of hearing the
"still, small voice" of truth through the clamour and the uproar, to
discover that this plan of Home Rule was not born yesterday, but no
less than twenty-five years ago. He would find that for a whole
generation every nook and cranny of this proposal has been meticulously
explored, and that there have been on this subject thousands, if not
millions, of speeches and leading articles, hundreds of books, and
dozens of Parliamentary debates. He would even learn from many
politicians that their chief difficulty was the utter boredom of their
constituents over a subject which has been worn down by argument to the
very threads.
But he would be more surprised than all to discover that this proposal
had already been considered in at least four General Elections--1886,
1892, and the two elections of 1910.[42] "It has been deliberately
rejected by the people on two occasions" would be the cry which he
would hear most commonly from his Tory friends, and he would find that
they referred to the elections of 1886 and 1895. Our friend the
foreigner would naturally be impressed by that argument. But what would
be his amazement to discover that his informants had forgotten to
enlighten him on the equally important fact that Home Rule had been
definitely accepted and approved by the British electorate, not in two,
but in three elections--the election of 1892 and the two elections of
1910? He would discover that on all these three occasions the subject
had been definitely placed before them, that on all three occasions the
electorate had definitely supported Home Rule, by majorities varying
from forty in 1892 to 124 in December, 1910. As to the other General
Elections, might not our foreigner reflect that if an electorate were
really to discover that its vote for the approval of a measure was
treated--as in 1892--with indifference, it might naturally weary of
well-doing?
Might he not even, if he were a shrewd man, suspect that that was the
very object and aim which his informants had in view?
But perhaps his surprise would reach its highest point when he
discovered that this Home Rule proposal, so far from appearing now for
the first time in a definite form, had actually twice before taken the
definite and statutory form of Home Rule Bills, both the specific and
considered proposals of Liberal Governments, both fully drafted and
laid before Parliament, and both still to be purchased at any
Government printers. The first of these Bills, the Bill of 1886, was,
indeed, rejected by the House of Commons on the second reading, and
never ran the gauntlet of full Parliamentary debate. But the second,
the Bill of 1893, occupied fully five months of Parliamentary time, and
was carried successfully by Mr. Gladstone through all its stages in the
House of Commons. It was amended on many points without the
interference of Government authority. It presents a full scheme of
self-government for Ireland, so clearly and minutely considered as to
provide an efficient and reasoned basis for the measure of 1912.
THE BILLS OF 1886 AND 1893
The aim of both these great measures--the Bills of 1886 and 1893--was
to give the Irish control of their own local affairs and to distinguish
as clearly as possible between those affairs and Imperial matters. The
method chosen in both Bills is to follow the Parnell scheme of
enumerating the subjects excluded from the legislative power of the
Irish Parliament. The excluding clause became considerably enlarged in
the Bill of 1893 as it was left by the House of Commons. The 1893 Bill
also contains a far more definite and stronger assertion of Imperial
authority, which is inserted twice--first in the Preamble, and then in
the second clause of the Bill.[43]
In both Bills there was a safeguarding clause as well as an excluding
clause. The safeguarding clause also grew considerably between 1886 and
1893. It is almost entirely directed to preventing the Irish
Legislature from establishing any new religious privileges, or
interfering with any existing religious rights. The clause, as it
emerged in 1893, not only forbade any new establishment or endowment of
religion, but seemed to leave the claims of all denominations precisely
as they stand at present.
This safeguarding clause reappears in the Bill of 1912, but it has been
shortened and redrafted by the Government. It contains very important
additional safeguards to prevent the adoption by the Irish civil power
of the principles contained in the recent Papal Decrees against mixed
marriages, and in regard to the right of Catholic clergy to claim
exclusion from the courts of justice. The Irish Parliament will be
debarred from acting on these decrees, and thus the whole agitation
against "Ne Temere" falls to the ground.
THE TWO CHAMBERS
The 1886 Bill established, as we have seen, an arrangement by which
Ireland should be governed by one legislative body consisting of two
orders, a first and a second. These orders were to deliberate and vote
together, except in regard to matters which should come directly under
the Home Rule Act, amendments of the Act, or Standing Orders in
pursuance of the Act. In such cases the first order possessed the right
of voting separately, and seemed to possess an absolute veto.
The first order of the legislative body created by the 1886 Bill
consisted of 103 members, of whom 75 were elected members and 28
peerage members. The elected members were to be chosen under a
restricted suffrage, and the peerage members were to be the
representative Irish Peers. The second order was to consist of 204
members, elected under the existing franchise.
All this was rather complicated and confusing, and was, perhaps
rightly, brushed aside by the framers of the 1893 Bill. They
constituted the Irish Legislature on the model of an ordinary Colonial
Parliament with two Chambers--a Legislative Assembly and a Legislative
Council. The Legislative Council was to consist of 48 members, elected
by large constituencies voting under a £20 property franchise. The
Legislative Assembly was to consist of 103 members, elected by the
existing constituencies under the existing franchise. In cases of
disagreement between the two Houses, it was proposed that, either after
a dissolution or after a period of two years, the Houses were to vote
together, and that the majority vote should decide the matter. Since
1893 that provision, in almost precisely the same form, has been
adopted by the Australian Commonwealth, and, in a more progressive
form, by, the South African Parliament.
In the Bill of 1912 these provisions of 1893 reappear, but in a broader
and more liberal form. The Irish Legislative Assembly and Legislative
Council--names which seem to give to Ireland a position of a
subordinate--have given way, as we have seen, to the frank and
generous titles of Senate and House of Commons, both forming the Irish
Parliament. The machinery for settling disagreements has come back from
its journey round the world refreshed by a new draft of democracy,
imbibed from the climates of Australia and South Africa. In cases of
differences between the Assemblies they will meet and decide by common
vote, without the necessity of a dissolution. That is a great and
important simplification, and for it the Irish have to thank the genius
of the founders of the South African Constitution.
IN OR OUT?
Every student of the Home Rule question knows that Mr. Gladstone
several times varied his proposals in regard to the Irish
representation at Westminster. The Irish Party were, from the
beginning, indifferent on the point; but it was quite clear that this
was a matter vitally affecting Imperial interests. The first proposal
grafted into the Bill of 1886 was that the Irish should cease to attend
at Westminster altogether. But, after seven years of consideration,
there grew up a general agreement that the entire absence of the Irish
Party at Westminster might create a series of difficult relations
between the Parliaments, and might even gradually lead to separation.
The first proposal of the Bill of 1893 was that the Irish members
should attend in slightly reduced numbers and vote at Westminster only
on Irish concerns. But this proposal--known as the "In and Out"
clause--found little favour in debate, and suffered severely at the
hands of Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Gladstone finally left the matter to the
judgment of the House of Commons, and--after a severe Parliamentary
crisis, in which the Government narrowly escaped destruction--it was
decided that 80 Irish members should sit in the British House of
Commons without any restriction of their power or authority.
In the Bill of 1912 the solution finally reached in 1893 is again
adopted, with one vital difference--that the Irish members to be
summoned to Westminster will be reduced not to 80, but to 42. Those
members will possess full Parliamentary powers, as indeed it is right
and necessary they should, as long as the Parliament at Westminster
continues to exercise such large powers over Ireland. But Mr. Asquith
threw out the suggestion that the British House of Commons should, by
its Standing Orders, arrange for a further delegation of Parliamentary
power to national groups. The House of Commons has already a Scotch
Committee, and to that might be added an English Committee and a Welsh
Committee. It would be a serious thing for the central body to
over-ride the opinions of these committees.
But Mr. Asquith also threw out an even more important hint as to the
future development of the Home Rule policy. It is clear that if the
Irish Home Rule Bill is simply the first stage in a process which will
lead to the creation of Home Rule Parliaments for local affairs in
Scotland, England and Wales, then such slight control as the 42 Irish
members may retain over British affairs will be only temporary. What,
then, is the present Parliamentary relationship between Irish Home Rule
and the Federal idea?
THE NEW FEDERALISM
Since the year 1893 there has been a great change of feeling in regard
to the whole Home Rule question. The British Parliament has gone
through a great crisis in its procedure, and it has, for the moment,
accepted a temporary way out in the form of a drastic use of the
closure, applied by Mr. Balfour, under Standing Orders, to so vital a
matter as Supply. That violent remedy known as the "Compartment
Closure" is now almost automatically extended by both parties, under
the very thin veil of liberty left by a special resolution, to almost
every great measure that comes before the House of Commons.
This development of the British Parliamentary system has created a new
outlook on the Home Rule question. The case of Ireland still stands by
itself, with great grievances and strong historical claims behind it.
Home Rule for Ireland will always have a peculiar urgency, arising from
conditions of geographical position. But the passion for Irish liberty
is now mingled in the average British mind with the passion for the
liberty of the British House of Commons. It is recognised that unless
Ireland is freed the British Parliament will remain in chains.
This new attitude has widened the outlook of Home Rulers until Home
Rule has ceased to be a merely Irish question. Nothing was more
dramatic during the recent debates over the Insurance Bill than the
sudden wave of federal feeling in the House of Commons which compelled
the Government to grant a separate administrative insurance authority,
not merely to Ireland, but also to Scotland and Wales. Similarly with
Home Rule. What was in 1893 only a pale glimmer of foresight, is with
many, in the year 1912, a passionate conviction. It is that after Home
Rule has been given to Ireland it must be extended also to Scotland,
Wales, and possibly England.
Now it would be plainly useless to grant Home Rule to any of these
countries until there is a wider and deeper demand for it. The issue of
Home Rule for Ireland was definitely raised in both the elections of
1910, and when the people gave their votes they knew, and were
actually warned by Mr. Balfour himself, and by most of the other
Unionist chiefs, that the result would be the creation of a Home Rule
Parliament in Ireland. But it cannot be said that the same proposal was
so definitely and effectively put forward in regard to Scotland and
Wales. In both those countries there is a very widespread desire for
Home Rule. But there has not yet been any definite democratic vote on
that desire. It may be necessary, therefore, to delay the extension of
Home Rule to those countries. But the desire is sufficiently strong
both in Scotland and in Wales to justify the Government in so framing a
Home Rule Bill as to enable those other parts of the United Kingdom to
be brought under its provisions in due time. There is a strict analogy
for that proceeding in the North America Act of 1867, which created the
Dominion of Canada. That Act joined together three provinces at first,
but left the door open for other provinces to come in. They have since
come in, one by one--all except the island of Newfoundland--until the
great federation of States which we now know as the Canadian Dominion
has been gradually built up.[44]
What follows from all this? Surely that a Home Rule Bill for Ireland
must be so framed as to render it a possible basis of a federal
Constitution in the near future. But if the Irish members were entirely
excluded from the British Parliament, as in 1886, then we should be
turning our backs on Federalism. The only analogy to such a
Constitution would be that of Austria-Hungary, where two countries are
united in one Government, but work through two Parliaments. Lord Morley
tells us that Mr. Parnell was very anxious to imitate in the 1886 Bill
the ingenious machinery of "Delegations," by which the relations of the
Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments combine for common affairs.[45]
There is much to be said for that machinery in Austria-Hungary,
strongly binding together two countries which must otherwise have
inevitably drifted asunder. But Mr. Parnell was thinking only of
Ireland, and he was not a Federalist. We are thinking of the whole
United Kingdom, and many of us are Federalists. The machinery of
"Delegations" therefore would not suit our purpose.
What seems to be required ultimately at Westminster is a small
Parliament devoted to Imperial affairs--Imperial finance, Imperial
legislation, and Imperial administration--and leaving to subordinate
Parliaments the administration of local matters. Many are firmly
convinced that in that way the United Kingdom would become a more
successful and efficient country, with legislation better adapted to
the needs of its inhabitants, and with a mind more free for the
consideration of great Imperial affairs. This now seems to them the
only way to produce order out of the present constitutional chaos.
What, then, are the lines that should be followed if we are to go
forward to that goal? An Imperial Parliament of that nature would
probably be a smaller assembly than the present House of Commons,
which is far too large for modern conditions. There is, therefore, good
ground for reducing the representation of Ireland to 42, or 38 less
than in 1893. That will clear the way for a future Imperial assembly of
between 300 and 400, it being understood that as each section of the
United Kingdom obtains its own Home Rule Parliament it will consent to
have its representation at Westminster reduced in proportion.
As long as the present system of Cabinet Government resting on
majorities exists--and it is the only conceivable system for a
completely self-governing democracy--it still seems, as it seemed to
the men of 1893, impossible to agree to any "in and out" arrangement.
Under such a plan the Government might possess a majority on Imperial
or English affairs, while it could be out-voted on Irish affairs.
Although such a situation might conceivably work for a time, it might
come to a sudden deadlock in a moment of emergency. It seems best,
therefore, that the 42 Irish members at Westminster should possess full
voting powers. If any Liberal dreads the prospect of having 42 Irish
members still possibly giving votes hostile to Liberal views--say, on
education--I would ask him to remember that the Liberal Party will not
have to mourn the loss of Irish votes still almost certain to be cast
in their favour on behalf of many democratic measures.
* * * * *
The prospect of this larger federal settlement opens a larger vision
than that of 1886 or 1893. Strangely enough, it is the same vision as
that sketched by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain in the daring speech which he
made on the second reading of the Home Rule Bill of 1886:--
"In my view the solution of this question should be sought in
some form of federation, which would really maintain the
Imperial unity, and which would, at the same time, conciliate
the desire for a national local government which is felt so
strongly in Ireland. I say I believe it is on this line, and
not on the line of our relations with our self-governing
Colonies, that it is possible to seek for and to find a
solution of this difficulty."[46]
* * * * *
FOOTNOTES:
[37] See Appendix A for the text of the 1912 Bill.
[38] It is proposed that the representation be divided as
follows:--Ulster, 59 members; Leinster, 41; Munster, 37; Connaught, 25;
The Universities, 2; making a total of 164.
[39] In Canada the Senators are selected for life. Since 1891 the New
Zealand Senators are selected for seven years only.
[40] See Appendix C.
[41] "Against Home Rule." London: Warne and Co., 1/-net.
[42] Home Rule was not properly debated in the General Election of
1895, which turned on other issues, and in the General Elections of
1900 and 1906 it was laid aside by common consent.
[43] See Appendix D.
[44] The 146th clause of the British North America Act (1867) reads as
follows:--
ADMISSION OF OTHER COLONIES.
"It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice of Her
Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, on Addresses from the Houses
of Parliament of Canada, and from the Houses of the respective
Legislatures of the Colonies or Provinces of Newfoundland, Prince
Edward Island, and British Columbia, to admit those Colonies or
Provinces, or any of them, into the Union, and on Address from the
Houses of Parliament of Canada to admit Ruperts Land and the North
Western Territory, or either of them, into the Union, on such terms and
conditions in each case as are in the Addresses expressed, and as the
Queen thinks fit to approve, subject to the provisions of this Act: and
the provisions of any Order in Council in that behalf shall have effect
as if they had been enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland."
[45] For a description of this machinery see Chap. IX., "Home Rule in
the World," p. 121.
[46] April 9th, 1886.
HOME RULE DIFFICULTIES
ULSTER
"Violent measures have been threatened. I think the best
compliment I can pay to those who have threatened us is to take
no notice whatever of the threats, but to treat them as
momentary ebullitions, which will pass away with the fears from
which they spring, and at the same time to adopt on our part
every reasonable measure for disarming those fears."
* * * * *
"Sir, I cannot allow it to be said that a Protestant minority
in Ulster or elsewhere is to rule the question for Ireland. I
am aware of no constitutional doctrine on which such a
conclusion could be adopted or justified. But I think that the
Protestant minority should have its wishes considered to the
utmost practicable extent in any form which they may assume."
GLADSTONE (1893).