Produced by Dianne Bean and David Widger
HISTORY OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND HIS TRIAL BY THE SENATE FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN OFFICE
1868
By Edmund G. Ross
Burt Franklin Research & Source Works Series #94
PREFACE.
Little is now known to the general public of the history of the attempt
to remove President Andrew Johnson in 1868, on his impeachment by the
House of Representatives and trial by the Senate for alleged high crimes
and misdemeanors in office, or of the causes that led to it. Yet it was
one of the most important and critical events, involving possibly the
gravest consequences, in the entire history of the country.
The constitutional power to impeach and remove the President had lain
dormant since the organization of the Government, and apparently had
never been thought of as a means for the satisfaction of political
enmities or for the punishment of alleged executive misdemeanors, even
in the many heated controversies between the President and Congress that
had theretofore arisen. Nor would any attempt at impeachment have been
made at that time but for the great numerical disparity then existing
between the respective representatives in Congress of the two political
parties of the country.
One-half the members of that Congress, both House and Senate, are now
dead, and with them have also gone substantially the same proportion
of the people at large, but many of the actors therein who have passed
away, lived long enough to see, and were candid enough to admit, that
the failure of the impeachment had brought no harm to the country, while
the general judgment practically of all has come to be that a grave and
threatening danger was thereby averted.
A new generation is now in control of public affairs and the destinies
of the Nation have fallen to new hands. New issues have developed and
will continue to develop from time to time; and new dangers will arise,
with increasing numbers and changing conditions, demanding in their turn
the same careful scrutiny, wisdom and patriotism in adjustment. But
the principles that underlie and constitute the basis of our political
organism, are and will remain the same; and will never cease to demand
constant vigilance for their perpetuation as the rock of safety upon
which our federative system is founded.
To those who in the study of the country's past seek a broader and
higher conception of the duties of American citizenship, the facts
pertaining to the controversy between the Executive and Congress as to
the restoration and preservation of the Union, set out in the following
pages, will be interesting and instructive. No one is better fitted than
the author of this volume to discuss the period of reconstruction
in which, as a member of the Federal senate, he played so potent and
patriotic a part, and it is a pleasure to find that he has discharged
his task with so much ability and care. But it is profoundly hoped that
no coming generation will be called upon to utilize the experiences
of the past in facing in their day, in field or forum, the dangers of
disruption and anarchy, mortal strife and desolation, between those of
one race, and blood, and nationality, that marked the history of America
thirty years ago.
DAVID B. HILL.
CHAPTER 1. -- THE PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION.
MR. LINCOLN'S PLAN
The close of the War of the Rebellion, in 1865, found the country
confronted by a civil problem quite as grave as the contest of arms that
had been composed. It was that of reconstruction, or the restoration of
the States lately in revolt, to their constitutional relations to the
Union.
The country had just emerged from a gigantic struggle of physical force
of four years duration between the two great Northern and Southern
sections. That struggle had been from its inception to its close, a
continuing exhibition, on both sides, of stubborn devotion to a cause,
and its annals had been crowned with illustrations of the grandest
race and personal courage the history of the world records. Out of a
population of thirty million people, four million men were under arms,
from first to last, and sums of money quite beyond the limit of ordinary
comprehension, were expended in its prosecution. There was bloodshed
without stint. Both sides to the conflict fought for an idea--on the one
side for so-called State Rights and local self-government--on the other
for national autonomy as the surest guaranty of all rights--personal,
local, and general.
The institution of negro slavery, the basis of the productive industries
of the States of the South, which had from the organization of the
Government been a source of friction between the slave-holding and
nonslave-holding sections, and was in fact the underlying and potent
cause of the war, went under in the strife and was by national edict
forever prohibited.
The struggle being ended by the exhaustion of the insurgents, two
conspicuous problems demanding immediate solution were developed: The
status of the now ex-slaves, or freedmen--and the methods to be adopted
for the rehabilitation of the revolted States, including the status of
the revolted States themselves. The sword had declared that they had
no constitutional power to withdraw from the Union, and the result
demonstrated that they had not the physical power--and therefore that
they were in the anomalous condition of States of though not States
technically in the Union--and hence properly subject to the jurisdiction
of the General Government, and bound by its judgment in any measures
to be instituted by it for their future restoration to their former
condition of co-equal States.
The now ex-slaves had been liberated, not with the consent of their
former owners, but by the power of the conqueror as a war measure, who
not unnaturally insisted upon the right to declare absolutely the future
status of these persons without consultation with or in any way by the
intervention of their late owners. The majority of the gentlemen in
Congress representing the Northern States demanded the instant and
complete enfranchisement of these persons, as the natural and logical
sequence of their enfreedment. The people of the late slave States, as
was to have been foreseen, and not without reason, objected--especially
where, as was the case in many localities, the late slaves largely
out-numbered the people of the white race: and it is apparent from
subsequent developments that they had the sympathy of President Lincoln,
at least so far as to refuse his sanction to the earlier action of
Congress relative to restoration.
To add to the gravity of the situation and of the problem of
reconstruction, the people of the States lately in rebellion were
disfranchised in a mass, regardless of the fact that many of them
refused to sanction the rebellion only so far as was necessary to their
personal safety.
It was insisted by the dominant element of the party in control of
Congress, that these States were dead as political entities, having
committed political suicide, and their people without rights or the
protection of law, as malcontents.
It is of record that Mr. Lincoln objected to this doctrine, and to all
propositions that contemplated the treatment of the late rebellious
States simply as conquered provinces and their people as having
forfeited all rights under a common government, and under the laws of
Nations entitled to no concessions, or even to consideration, in any
proposed measures of restoration. That he had no sympathy with that
theory is evidenced by the plan of restoration he attempted to establish
in Louisiana.
It was at this point that differences arose between Mr. Lincoln and his
party in Congress, which became more or less acute prior to his death
and continued between Congress and Mr. Johnson on his attempt to carry
out Mr. Lincoln's plans for restoration.
The cessation of hostilities in the field thus developed a
politico-economic problem which had never before confronted any
nation in such magnitude and gravity. The situation was at once novel,
unprecedented, and in more senses than one, alarming. Without its due
and timely solution there was danger of still farther disturbance of a
far different and more alarming character than that of arms but lately
ceased; and of a vastly more insidious and dangerous complexion. The war
had been fought in the open. The record of the more than two thousand
field and naval engagements that had marked its progress and the march
of the Union armies to success, were heralded day by day to every
household, and all could forecast its trend and its results. But the
controversy now developed was insidious--its influences, its weapons,
its designs, and its possible end, were in a measure hidden from the
public--public opinion was divided, and its results, for good or
ill, problematical. The wisest political sagacity and the broadest
statesmanship possible were needed, and in their application no time was
to be lost.
In his annual message to Congress, December 8th, 1863, Mr. Lincoln
had to a considerable extent outlined his plan of Reconstruction;
principally by a recital of what he had already done in that direction.
That part of his message pertinent to this connection is reproduced here
to illustrate the broad, humane, national and patriotic purpose that
actuated him, quite as well as his lack of sympathy with the extreme
partisan aims and methods that characterized the measures afterward
adopted by Congress in opposition to his well-known wishes and views,
and, also, as an important incident to the history of that controversy
and of the time, and its bearing upon the frictions that followed
between Congress and Mr. Lincoln's successor on that subject. Mr.
Lincoln said:
When Congress assembled a year ago the war had already lasted twenty
months, and there had been many conflicts on both land and sea, with
varying results. The rebellion had been pressed back into reduced
limits; yet the tone of public feeling and opinion, at home and abroad,
was not satisfactory. With other signs, the popular elections, then just
past, indicated uneasiness among ourselves, while, amid much that was
cold and menacing, the kindest words coming from Europe were uttered in
accents of pity that we were too blind to surrender a hopeless cause.
Our commerce was suffering greatly by a few armed vessels built upon
and furnished from foreign shores; and we were threatened with such
additions from the same quarter as would sweep our trade from the
sea and raise our blockade. We had failed to elicit from European
Governments anything hopeful upon this subject. The preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation, issued in September, was running its assigned
period to the beginning of the new year. A month later that final
proclamation came, including the announcement that colored men of
suitable condition would be received into the army service. The policy
of emancipation, and of employing black soldiers, gave to the future a
new aspect, about which hope and fear and doubt contended in uncertain
conflict. According to our political system, as a matter of civil
administration, the General Government had no lawful power to effect
emancipation in any State; and for a long time it had been hoped that
the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military
measure. It was all the while deemed possible that the necessity for it
might come, and that, if it should, the crisis of the contest would then
be presented. It came, and, as was anticipated, was followed by dark and
doubtful days. Eleven months have now passed, and we are permitted to
take another review. The rebel borders are pressed still further back,
and by the complete opening of the Mississippi the country dominated
by the rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical
communication between them. Tennessee and Arkansas have been
substantially cleared of insurgent control, and influential citizens in
each, owners of slaves and advocates of slavery at the beginning of
the rebellion, now declare openly for emancipation in their respective
States. Of those States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation,
Maryland and Missouri, neither of which three years ago would tolerate
any restraint upon the extension of slavery into the new Territories,
only dispute now as to the best mode of removing it within their own
limits.
Of those who were slaves at the beginning of the rebellion, full one
hundred thousand are now in the United States military service; about
one half of which number actually bear arms in the ranks; thus giving
the double advantage of taking so much labor from the insurgent cause,
and supplying the places which must otherwise be filled with so many
white men. So far as tested, it is difficult to say they are not as good
soldiers as any. No servile insurrection, or tendency to violence or
cruelty, has marked the measure of emancipation and arming the
blacks. Those measures have been discussed in foreign countries, and
contemporary with such discussion the tone of sentiment there is much
improved. At home the same measures have been fully discussed, and
supported, criticised, and denounced, and the annual elections following
are highly encouraging to those whose official duty it is to bear the
country through this great trial. Thus we have the new reckoning. The
crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past.
Looking now to the present, and future, and with reference to a
resumption of national authority within the States wherein that
authority has been suspended, I have thought fit to issue a
Proclamation, a copy of which is herewith transmitted. On examination
of this Proclamation it will appear, as is believed, that nothing is
attempted beyond what is amply justified by the Constitution. True, the
form of an oath is given, but no man is coerced to take it. The man
is only promised a pardon in case he voluntarily takes the oath. The
Constitution authorizes the Executive to grant or withhold the pardon
at his own absolute discretion, and this includes the power to grant on
terms, as is fully established by judicial and other authorities.
It is also proffered that, if in any of the States named a State
Government shall be, in the mode prescribed, set up, such Government
shall be recognized and guaranteed by the United States, and that under
it the State shall, on the constitutional conditions, be protected
against invasion and domestic violence. The constitutional obligation of
the United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican
form of government, and to protect the State, in the cases stated, is
explicit and full. But why tender the benefits of this provision only
to a State Government set up in this particular way? This section
contemplates a case wherein the element within a State favorable to a
republican government, in the Union, may be too feeble for an opposite
and hostile external to or even within the State; and such are precisely
the cases with which we are dealing.
Any attempt to guaranty and protect a revived State Government,
constituted in whole, or in preponderating part, from the very element
against whose hostility it is to be protected, is simply absurd. There
must be a test by which to separate the opposing elements, so as to
build only from the sound; and that test is a sufficiently liberal one
which accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his
former unsoundness.
But if it be proper to require, as a test of admission to the political
body, an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States,
and to the Union under it, why also to the laws and Proclamation in
regard to slavery? Those laws and Proclamations were enacted and put
forth for the purpose of aiding in the suppression of the rebellion.
To give them their fullest effect, there had to be a pledge--for their
maintenance. In my judgment they have aided, and will further aid, the
cause for which they were intended. To now abandon them would be not
only to relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an
astounding breach of faith. I may add at this point, that while I remain
in my present position, I shall not attempt to retract or modify the
Emancipation Proclamation; nor shall I return to slavery any person
who is free by the terms of the Proclamation, or by any of the acts of
Congress. For these and other reasons it is thought best that support
of these measures shall be included in the oath; and it is believed the
Executive may lawfully claim it in return for pardon and restoration
of forfeited rights, when he has clear constitutional power to withhold
altogether or grant upon terms which he shall deem wisest for the public
interest. It should be observed, also, that this part of the oath is
subject to the modifying and abrogating power of legislation and supreme
judicial decision.
The proposed acquiescence of the National Executive in any reasonable
temporary State arrangement for the freed people is made with the view
of possibly modifying the confusion and destitution which must, at
best, attend all classes by a total revolution of labor throughout whole
States. It is hoped that the already deeply afflicted people of
those States may be somewhat more ready to give up the cause of their
affliction, if, to this extent, this vital matter be left to themselves;
while no power of the National Executive to prevent an abuse is abridged
by the proposition.
The suggestion in the Proclamation as to maintaining the political
frame-work of those States on what is called reconstruction, is made in
the hope that it may do good without danger of harm. It will save labor
and avoid great confusion.
But why any proclamation on this subject? This question is beset with
the conflicting views that the step might be delayed too long or taken
too soon. In some States the elements for resumption seem ready for
action, but remain inactive apparently for want of a rallying point. Why
shall A. adopt the plan of B., rather than B. that of A.? And if A. and
B. should agree, how can they know but that the General Government here
will reject their plan? By the Proclamation a plan is presented which
may be accepted by them as a rallying point, and which they may be
assured in advance will not be rejected here. This may bring them to act
sooner than they otherwise would.
The objection to a premature presentation of a plan by the National
Executive consists in the danger of committals on points which could
be more safely left to further developments. Care has been taken to so
shape the document as to avoid embarrassment from this source. Saying
that, on certain terms, certain classes will be pardoned, with rights
restored, it is not said that other classes on other terms will never be
included. Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in
a specified way, it is not saying it will not be accepted in any other
way.
The movements, by State action, for emancipation in several of the
States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, are matters of
profound gratulation, and while I do not repeat in detail what I have
heretofore so earnestly urged upon this subject, my general views and
feelings remain unchanged, and I trust that Congress will omit no fair
opportunity of aiding these important steps to a great consummation.
In the midst of other cares, however important, we must not lose sight
of the fact that the war power is still our main reliance. To that power
alone can we look, for a time, to give confidence to the people in the
contested regions that the insurgent power will not again over-run them.
Until that confidence shall be established, little can be done anywhere
for what is called reconstruction. Hence our chiefest care must still
be directed to the Army and Navy, who have thus far borne their hardest
part nobly and well. And it may be esteemed fortunate that in giving the
greatest efficiency to these indispensable arms, we do also honorably
recognize the gallant men, from commander to sentinel, who compose them,
to whom, more than to others, the world must stand indebted for the home
of freedom disenthralled, regenerated, enlarged and perpetuated.
Abraham Lincoln. December 8, 1863.
The following is the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction referred
to in the foregoing Message, and further illustrates Mr. Lincoln's plan
for the restoration of the Union:
PROCLAMATION OF AMNESTY AND RECONSTRUCTION.
BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Whereas, in and by the Constitution of the United States, it is provided
that the President "shall have the power to grant reprieves and pardons
for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment;"
and
Whereas, a rebellion now exists whereby the loyal State governments of
several States have for a long time been subverted, and many persons
have committed, and are guilty of treason against the United States; and
Whereas, with reference to said rebellion and treason, laws have been
enacted by Congress, declaring forfeitures and confiscations of property
and liberation of slaves, all upon terms and conditions therein stated,
and also declaring that the President was thereby authorized at any
time thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have
participated in the existing rebellion, in any State or part thereof,
pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such times and on such
conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare; and
Whereas, the Congressional declaration for limited and conditional
pardon accords with well established judicial exposition of the
pardoning power; and
Whereas, with reference to said rebellion, the President of the United
States has issued several proclamations, with provisions in regard to
the liberation of slaves; and
Whereas, it is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged in said
rebellion to resume their allegiance to the United States, and to
reinaugurate loyal State Governments within and for their respective
States; therefore,
I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim,
declare, and make known to all persons who have, directly or by
implication, participated in the existing rebellion, except as
hereinafter excepted, that a full pardon is hereby granted to them and
each of them, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to
slaves and in property cases where rights of third parties shall have
intervened, and upon the condition that every such person shall take
and subscribe an oath, and thenceforward keep and maintain said
oath inviolate, and which oath shall be registered for permanent
preservation, and shall be of the tenor and effect following, to-wit:
I, ___ __ ___, do solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God, that I
will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution
of the United States, and the Union of the States thereunder; and that
I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all acts of
Congress passed during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves,
so long and so far as not repealed, modified or held void by Congress,
or by the decision of the Supreme Court; and that I will, in like
manner, abide by and faithfully support all proclamations of the
President made during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves,
so long and so far as not modified or declared void by decision of the
Supreme Court. So help me God.
The persons exempted from the benefits of the foregoing provisions are
all who are, or shall have been, civil or diplomatic officers or agents
of the so-called Confederate Government: all who have left judicial
stations under the United States to aid the rebellion; all who are or
shall have been military or naval officers of said so-called Confederate
Government above the rank of Colonel in the army or Lieutenant in the
Navy; all who have left seats in the United States Congress to aid
the rebellion; all who resigned commissions in the army or navy of
the United States and afterward aided the rebellion; and all who have
engaged in any way in treating colored persons, or white persons in
charge of such, otherwise than lawfully as prisoners of war, and which
persons may have been found in the United States service as soldiers,
seamen, or in any capacity.
And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that whenever, in
any of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee,
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina and North Carolina, a number
of persons, not less than one-tenth in number of the votes cast in such
State at the Presidential election of the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and sixty, each having taken the oath aforesaid and not
having since violated it, and being a qualified voter by the election
laws of the State existing immediately before the so-called act
of secession, and excluding all others, shall reestablish a State
government which shall be republican, and in no wise contravening said
oath, such shall be recognized as the true government of the State, and
the State shall receive thereunder the benefits of the constitutional
provision which declares that "the United States shall guarantee to
every state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall
protect each of them against invasion; and, on the application of the
legislature, or the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic violence."
And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known, that any provision
which may be adopted by such State government in relation to the freed
people of such State, which shall recognize and declare their permanent
freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent
as a temporary arrangement with their present condition as a laboring,
landless, and homeless class, will not be objected to by the National
Executive.
And it is suggested as not improper that, in constructing a loyal
State government in any State, the name of the State, the boundary, the
subdivisions, the constitution, and the general code of laws, as before
the rebellion, be maintained, subject only to the modifications made
necessary by the conditions hereinbefore stated, and such others, if
any, not contravening said conditions, and which may be deemed expedient
by those framing the new State government.
To avoid misunderstanding, it may be proper to say, that whether
members sent to Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats,
constitutionally rests exclusively with the respective houses, and
not to any extent with the Executive. And still further, that this
proclamation is intended to present to the people of the States wherein
the National authority has been suspended; and loyal State governments
have been subverted, a mode in and by which the National authority and
loyal State governments, may be re-established within said States, or,
in any of them; and while the mode presented is the best the Executive
can suggest, with his present impressions, it must not be understood
that no other possible mode would be acceptable.
Given under my hand at the City of Washington, the eighth day of
December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America,
the eighty-eighth.
[L. S.]
By the President: Abraham Lincoln. William H. Seward, Secretary of
State.
How the revolted States could be most successfully and expeditiously
restored to their constitutional relations to the Union on the cessation
of hostilities, was the momentous question of the hour, upon which there
were views and schemes as varied and antagonistic as were the mental
differences and political disagreements of those who felt called upon
to engage in the stupendous work. As history had recorded no similar
conditions, and therefore no demand for the solution of such a problem,
there were no examples or historic lights for the guidance of those upon
whom the task had fallen.
It is apparent that Mr. Lincoln maintained the indestructibility of
the States and the indivisibility of the Union--that the resolutions of
secession were null and void, and that the States lately in rebellion
were never in fact but only in theory out of the Union--that they
retained inherently, though now dormant, their State autonomy and
constitutional rights as before their revolutionary acts, except as
to slavery, and that all their people had to do, to re-establish their
former status, as he declared to the Emperor of the French when that
potentate was about to recognize the Confederacy, was to resume their
duties as loyal, law-abiding citizens, and reorganize their State
Governments on a basis of loyalty to the Constitution and the Union. The
terms he proposed to formally offer them were first illustrated in the
case of Louisiana, early in 1863, and later in the foregoing Message
and Proclamation; and clearly indicated what was to be his policy and
process of reconstruction.
Messrs. Flanders and Hahn were admitted to the House of Representatives
as members from Louisiana agreeably to the President's views thus
outlined. They had been chosen at an election ordered by the Governor
of the State (Gov. Shepley), who had undoubtedly been permitted, if not
specially authorized by the President, to take this step, but they were
the last to be received from Louisiana under Mr. Lincoln's plan, as
the next Congress resolved to receive no more members from the seceded
States till joint action by the two Houses therefor should be had.
Prior to the election at which these gentlemen were chosen, Mr. Lincoln
addressed a characteristic note to Gov. Shepley, which was in effect
a warning that Federal officials not citizens of Louisiana must not
be chosen to represent the State in Congress, "We do not," said he,
referring to the South, "particularly need members of Congress from
those States to get along with legislation here. What we do want is the
conclusive evidence that respectable citizens of Louisiana are willing
to be members of Congress and to swear support to the Constitution, and
that other respectable citizens are willing to vote for them and send
them. To send a parcel of Northern men as Representatives, elected,
as would be understood, (and perhaps really so) at the point of the
bayonet, would be disgraceful and outrageous."
Mr. Lincoln would tolerate none of the "carpet-bagging" that afterwards
became so conspicuous and offensive under the Congressional plan of
Reconstruction.
These steps for reconstruction in Louisiana were followed by the
assembling of a convention to frame a new constitution for that State.
The convention was organized early in 1864, and its most important act
was the prompt incorporation of an antislavery clause in its organic
law. By a vote of 70 to 16 the convention declared slavery to be forever
abolished in the State. The new Constitution was adopted by the people
of the State on the 5th day of the ensuing September by a vote of 6,836
in its favor, to 1,566 against it. As the total vote of Louisiana in
1860 was 50,510, the new government had fulfilled the requirement of
the President's Proclamation. It was sustained by more than the required
one-tenth vote.
In a personal note of congratulation to Gov. Hahn, of Louisiana, the
President, speaking of the coming convention, suggested that "some of
the colored people be let in, as for instance, the very intelligent, and
especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks." "They would,"
said he, "probably help in some trying time in the future TO KEEP THE
JEWEL OF LIBERTY IN THE FAMILY OF FREEDOM."
This action in regard to Louisiana was accompanied, indeed in some
particulars preceded, by similar action in Arkansas. A Governor was
elected, an anti-slavery Constitution adopted, a State Government duly
installed, and Senators and Representatives in Congress elected, but
were refused admission by Congress. Mr. Sumner, when the credentials
of the Senators-elect were presented, foreshadowing the position to be
taken by the Republican leaders, offered a resolution declaring that
"a State pretending to secede from the Union, and battling against the
General Government to maintain that position, must be regarded as a
rebel State subject to military occupation and without representation
on this floor until it has been readmitted by a vote of both Houses of
Congress; and the Senate will decline to receive any such application
from any such rebel State until after such a vote by both Houses."
A few weeks later, on the 27th of June, 1864, this resolution was in
effect reported back to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, to which
it had been referred, and adopted by a vote of 27 to 6. The same action
was had in the House of Representatives on the application of the
Representatives-elect from Arkansas for admission to that body.
This was practically the declaration of a rupture between the President
and Congress on the question of Reconstruction. It was a rebuke to Mr.
Lincoln for having presumed to treat the seceded States as still in any
sense States of the Union. It was in effect a declaration that those
States had successfully seceded--that their elimination from the
Union was an accomplished fact--that the Union of the States had been
broken--and that the only method left for their return that would be
considered by Congress was as conquered and outlying provinces, not even
as Territories with the right of such to membership in the Union; and
should be governed accordingly until such time as Congress should see
fit (IF EVER, to use the language of Mr. Stevens in the House) to
devise and establish some form whereby they could be annexed to or
re-incorporated into the Union.
It was at this point--on the great question of Reconstruction, or more
properly of Restoration--that the disagreements originated between the
Executive and Congress which finally culminated in the impeachment of
Mr. Lincoln's successor; and that condition of strained relations was
measurably intensified when, on the following July 4th, a bill was
passed by Congress making provision for the reorganization and admission
of the revolted States on the extreme lines indicated by the above
action of Congress and containing the very extraordinary provision that
the President, AFTER OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS, shall recognize
the State Government so established. That measure was still another and
more marked rebuke by Congress to the President for having presumed to
initiate a system of restoration without its consultation and advice.
Naturally Mr. Lincoln was not in a mood to meekly accept the rebuke
so marked and manifestly intended; and so the bill not having passed
Congress till within the ten days preceding its adjournment allowed
by the Constitution for its consideration by the President, and as
it proposed to undo the work he had done, he failed to return it to
Congress--"pocketed" it--and it therefore fell. He was not in a mood to
accept a Congressional rebuke. He had given careful study to the duties,
the responsibilities, and the limitations of the respective Departments
of, the Government, and was not willing that his judgment should be
revised, or his course censured, however indirectly, by any of its
co-ordinate branches.
Four days after the session had closed, he issued a Proclamation in
which he treated the bill merely as the expression of an opinion
by Congress as to the best plan of Reconstruction--"which plan," he
remarked, "it is now thought fit to lay before the people for their
consideration."
He further stated in this Proclamation that he had already presented one
plan of restoration, and that he was "unprepared by a formal approval of
this bill to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration,
and was unprepared to declare that the free State Constitutions and
Governments already adopted and installed in Louisiana and Arkansas,
shall be set aside and held for naught, thereby repelling and
discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same as to further
effort, and unprepared to declare a constitutional competency in
Congress to abolish slavery in the States, though sincerely hoping that
a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery in all the States might be
adopted."
While, with these objections, Mr. Lincoln could not approve the bill, he
concluded his Proclamation with these words:
"Nevertheless, I am fully satisfied with the plan of restoration
contained in the bill as one very proper for the loyal people of any
State choosing to adopt it, and I am and at all times shall be prepared
to give Executive aid and assistance to any such people as soon as
military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in
any such State and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned
to their obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States--in
which Military Governors will be appointed with directions to proceed
according to the bill."
"It must be frankly admitted," says Mr. Blaine in reciting this record
in his 'Thirty Years of Congress,' "that Mr. Lincoln's course was in some
of its respects extraordinary. It met with almost unanimous dissent on
the part of the Republican members, and violent criticism from the more
radical members of both Houses. * * * Fortunately, the Senators and
Representatives had returned to their States and Districts before the
Reconstruction Proclamation was issued, and found the people united and
enthusiastic in Mr. Lincoln's support."
In the last speech Mr. Lincoln ever made, (April 11th, 1865) referring
to the twelve thousand men who had organized the Louisiana Government,
(on the one-tenth basis) he said:
"If we now reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and
disperse them. We say to the white man, you are worthless, or worse.
We will neither help you or be helped by you. To the black man we say,
'this cup of liberty which these, your old masters hold to your lips,
we will dash from you, and leave you to the chances of gathering the
spilled and scattered contents IN SOME VAGUE AND UNDEFINED WHEN AND
WHERE AND HOW.' If this course, discouraging and paralyzing to both
white and black, has any tendency to bring Louisiana into proper
practical relations with the Union, I have so far been unable to
perceive it. If, on the contrary, they reorganize and sustain the new
Government of Louisiana, the converse of all this is made true. We
encourage the hearts and nerve the arms of twelve thousand men to adhere
to their work and argue for it, and proselyte for it, and fight for it,
and grow it, and ripen it to a complete success. The colored man, too,
in seeing all united for him, is inspired with vigilance and with
energy and daring to the same end. Grant that he desires the elective
franchise. HE WILL YET ATTAIN IT SOONER BY SAVING THE ALREADY ADVANCED
STEPS TOWARD IT THAN BY RUNNING BACK OVER THEM. Concede that the new
Government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the egg to the
fowl; we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than by smashing
it."
It is manifest that Mr. Lincoln intuitively foresaw the danger of a
great body of the people becoming accustomed to government by military
power, and sought to end it by the speediest practicable means. As he
expressed it, "We must begin and mould from disorganized and discordant
elements: nor is it a small additional embarrassment that we, the loyal
people, differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner, and measure of
reconstruction."
Louisiana was wholly in possession of the Union forces and under
loyal influence in 1863, and in his judgment the time had come for
reconstructive action in that state--not merely for the purpose of
strengthening and crystallizing the Union sentiment there, at a great
gate-way of commerce, that would become a conspicuous object-lesson to
foreign governments in behalf of more favorable influences abroad, but
also to the encouragement of Union men and the discouragement of the
rebellion in all the other revolted States. He had fortified his own
judgment, as he frankly declared, "by submitting the Louisiana plan in
advance to every member of the Cabinet, and every member approved it."
The steps taken in Louisiana were to be but a beginning. The nature of
subsequent proceedings on his part must be governed by the success of
this--that under then existing conditions it was inexpedient, in view
of further possible complications, to forecast further proceedings, and
especially to attempt to establish, at the outset, and under the chaotic
conditions of the time, a general system of reconstruction applicable to
all the States and to varying conditions. So the beginning was made in
Louisiana. It is manifest that the purpose of this immediate action was
two-fold--not only to restore Louisiana to the Union at the earliest
practicable day--but also to so far establish a process of general
restoration before Congress should reconvene at the coming December
session, that there would be no sufficient occasion or excuse for
interfering with his work by the application of the exasperating
conditions that had been foreshadowed by that body.
On this point Mr. Welles, his Secretary of the Navy, testifies that at
the close of a Cabinet meeting held immediately preceding Mr. Lincoln's
death, "Mr. Stanton made some remarks on the general condition of
affairs and the new phase and duties upon which we were about to enter.
He alluded to the great solicitude which the President felt on this
subject, his frequent recurrence to the necessity of establishing civil
governments and preserving order in the rebel States. Like the rest of
the Cabinet, doubtless, he had given this subject much consideration,
and with a view of having something practical on which to base action,
he had drawn up a rough plan or ordinance which he had handed to the
President.
"The President said he proposed to bring forward that subject, although
he had not had time as yet to give much attention to the details of the
paper which the Secretary of War had given him only the day before; but
that it was substantially, in its general scope, the plan which we had
sometimes talked over in Cabinet meetings. We should probably make some
modifications, prescribe further details; there were some suggestions
which he should wish to make, and he desired all to bring their minds to
the question, for no greater or more important one could come before
us, or any future Cabinet. He thought it providential that, this great
rebellion was crushed just as Congress had adjourned, AND THERE WERE
NONE OF THE DISTURBING ELEMENTS OF THAT BODY TO HINDER AND EMBARRASS US.
If we were wise and discreet, we should reanimate, the States and get
their governments in successful operation, with order prevailing and the
Union reestablished, BEFORE CONGRESS CAME TOGETHER IN DECEMBER. This he
thought important. We could do better, accomplish more without than with
them. There were men in Congress who, if their motives were good, were
nevertheless impracticable, and who possessed feelings of hate and
vindictiveness in which he did not sympathize and could not participate.
Each House of Congress, he said, had the undoubted right to receive
or reject members, the Executive had no control in this matter. But
Congress had NOTHING TO DO WITH THE STATE GOVERNMENTS, which the
President could recognize, and under existing laws treat as other
States, give the same mail facilities, collect taxes, appoint judges,
marshals, collectors, etc., subject, of course, to confirmation. There
were men who objected to these views, BUT THEY WERE NOT HERE, AND WE
MUST MAKE HASTE TO DO OUR DUTY BEFORE THEY CAME HERE."
The subjugated States were in a condition that could not be safely
permitted to continue for any indefinite period. It would be
inconsistent with the purpose of the war, incongruous to the American
system and idea of government, and antagonistic to American political,
or even commercial or social autonomy. Naturally upon Mr. Lincoln would
fall largely the duty and responsibility of formulating and inaugurating
some method of restoration. With the abolition of slavery, the
most difficult of settlement of all the obstacles in the way of
reconstruction had been removed. Naturally, too, during the later months
of the war, when it became manifest that the end of the struggle was
near, the question of reconstruction and the methods whereby it could be
most naturally, speedily, and effectively accomplished, came uppermost
in his mind. A humane, just man, and a sincere, broad-brained, patriot
and far-seeing statesman, he instinctively rejected the many drastic
schemes which filled a large portion of the public press of the North
and afterwards characterized many of the suggestions of Congressional
action. With him the prime purpose of the war was the preservation of
the political, territorial and economic integrity of the Republic--in a
word, to restore the Union, without needless humiliation to the defeated
party, or the imposition of unnecessarily rigorous terms which could
but result in future frictions--without slavery--and yet with sufficient
safeguards against future disloyal association of the sections; and that
purpose had been approved by an overwhelming majority of the people in
his re-election in 1864.
In these purposes and methods Mr. Lincoln appears to have had the active
sympathy and co-operation of his entire Cabinet, more especially of Mr.
Stanton, his Secretary of War. Indeed, Mr. Stanton is understood, from
the record, to have been the joint author, with Mr. Lincoln, of the
plan of reconstruction agreed upon at the later meetings of the Cabinet
immediately prior to Mr. Lincoln's death. Mr. Stanton proposed to put
it in the form of a military order--Mr. Lincoln made an Executive order.
The plan was embodied in what afterwards became known as the "North
Carolina Proclamation," determined upon by Mr. Lincoln at his last
Cabinet meeting and promulgated by Mr. Johnson shortly after his
accession to the Presidency as Mr. Lincoln's successor, and is inserted
in a subsequent chapter.
Mr. Lincoln unquestionably comprehended the peculiar conditions under
which the Republican party had come to the control of the legislative
branch of the Government, and fully realized the incapacity of the
dominant element in that control for the delicate work of restoration
and reconstruction--leading a conquered and embittered people back
peacefully and successfully, without unnecessary friction, into
harmonious relations to the Union.
No such responsibility, no such herculean task, had ever before, in the
history of civilization, devolved upon any ruler or political party.
Mr. Lincoln seems to have realized the incapacity of party leaders
brought to the surface by the tumult and demoralization of the time,
whose only exploits and experiences were in the line of destruction and
who must approach the task with divided counsel, to cope successfully
with the delicate and responsible work of restoration the close of
the war had made imperative. He comprehended the incongruities which
characterized that great party better than its professed leaders, and
foresaw the futility of any effort on its part, at that time and in its
then temper, to the early establishment of any coherent or successful
method of restoration. Hence, unquestionably, his prompt action in that
behalf, and his failure to call the Congress into special session, to
the end that there should be no time unnecessarily consumed and lost
in the institution of some efficient form of civil government in the
returning States--some form that would have the sanction of intelligent
authority competent to restore and enforce public order, without the
dangers of delay and consequent disorder that must result, and did
afterwards result, from the protracted debates sure to follow and did
follow the sudden precipitation of the questions of reconstruction and
reconciliation upon a mass of Congressmen totally inexperienced in the
anomalous conditions of that time, or in the methods most needed for
their correction.
That Mr. Lincoln contemplated the ultimate and not remote
enfranchisement of the late slaves, is manifest from his suggestion to
Gov. Hahn, of Louisiana, hereinbefore quoted in connection with the
then approaching Convention for the re-establishment of State Government
there, and again still more manifest from his last public utterance on
April 11, 1865, deprecating the rejection by Congress of his plan for
the restoration of Louisiana, in which, he said, speaking of that action
by Congress rejecting the Louisiana bill: "Grant that the colored male
desires the elective franchise. He will attain it sooner by saving the
already advanced steps towards it than by running back over them."
It is also apparent in the light of the succeeding history of that time
and of that question, that if Mr. Lincoln's views had been seconded
by Congress, the enfranchisement of the negro would have been, though
delayed, as certain of accomplishment, and of a vastly higher and more
satisfactory plane--and the country saved the years of friction and
disgraceful public disorder that characterized the enforcement of the
Congressional plan afterwards adopted.
As to the success of Mr. Lincoln's plans, had they been sanctioned, or
even had they not been repudiated by Congress, Mr. Blaine, in his
book, asserts that Mr. Lincoln, "By his four years of considerate and
successful administration, by his patient and positive trust in the
ultimate triumph of the Union, realized at last as he stood upon the
edge of the grave--he had acquired so complete an ascendancy over
the public, control in the loyal states, that ANY POLICY MATURED AND
ANNOUNCED BY HIM WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY A VAST MAJORITY OF HIS
COUNTRYMEN."
It was indicative of the sagacious foresight of Mr. Lincoln that he did
not call the Congress into special session at the close of the war, as
would have been natural and usual, before attempting the establishment
of any method for the restoration of the revolted States. The fact that
he did not do so, but was making preparations to proceed immediately
in that work on his own lines and in accordance with his own ideas, and
with the hearty accord of his entire Cabinet, of itself affords proof
that he was apprehensive of obstruction from the same element of his
party that subsequently arose in opposition to Mr. Johnson on that
question, and that he preferred to put his plans into operation before
the assembling of Congress in the next regular winter session, in order
that he might be able then to show palpable results, and induce Congress
to accept and follow up a humane, peaceful and satisfactory system of
reconstruction. Mr. Lincoln undoubtedly hoped thus to avoid unnecessary
friction. Having the quite unlimited confidence of the great mass of the
people of the country, of both parties and on both sides of the line of
hostilities, there seem to be excellent reasons for believing that
he would have succeeded, and that the extraordinary and exasperating
differences and local turmoils that followed the drastic measures which
were afterward adopted by Congress over the President's vetoes, would
have been in a very large degree avoided, and THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO
IMPEACHMENT--either of Mr. Lincoln had he lived, or of Mr. Johnson after
him.
It was the misfortune of the time, and of the occasion, which determined
Mr. Lincoln to institute a plan of restoration during the interim
of Congress, that the Republican party, then in absolute control of
Congress, was in no sense equipped for such a work. Its first and great
mission had been the destruction of slavery. Though not phrased in
formal fashion, that was the logic of its creation and existence. It was
brought into being purely as an anti-slavery party, illustrated in the
fact that its membership included every pronounced anti-slavery man,
known as abolitionists, in the United States. All its energies, during
all its life up to the close of the war had been bent to that end. It
had been born and bred to the work of destruction. It came to destroy
slavery, and its forces had been nurtured, to the last day of the war,
in pulling down--in fact, did not then wholly cease.
The work of restoration--the rebuilding of fallen States--had now come.
The Republican party approached that work in the hot blood of war and
the elation of victory--a condition illy fitting the demands of exalted
statesmanship so essential to perfect political effort.
Never had nation or party thrust upon it a more delicate duty or graver
responsibility. It was that of leading a conquered people to build a
new civilization wholly different from the one in ruins. It was first
to reconcile two races totally different from each other, so far as
possible to move in harmony in supplanting servile by free labor, and
the slave by a free American citizen. The transition was sudden, and the
elements antagonistic in race, culture, self-governing power--indeed, in
all the qualities which characterize a free people.
There was a wide margin for honest differences between statesmen
of experience. A universal sentiment could not obtain. The accepted
political leaders of the time were illy equipped to meet the issue--much
less those who had been brought to prominence, and too often to control,
in the hot blood of war and the frictions of the time, when intemperate
denunciation and a free use of the epithets of "rebel," and "traitor,"
had become a ready passport to public honors. It was a time when the
admonition to make haste slowly was of profound significance. A peril
greater than any other the civil war had developed, overhung the nation.
Greater than ever the demand for courage in conciliation--for divesting
the issues of all mere partyism, and the yielding of something by the
extremes, both of conservatism and radicalism.