COMMENT.

Since the preceding pages were composed, and during an interim of

depression and disqualification, I heard with a delight and an

interest, that I might without hyperbole call medicinal, that the

contra-distinction of Understanding from Reason, for which during

twenty years I have been contending, _casting my bread upon the

waters_ with a perseverance, which in the existing state of the public

taste nothing but the deepest conviction of its importance could have

inspired--has been lately adopted and sanctioned by the present

distinguished Professor of Anatomy, in the Course of Lectures given by

him at the Royal College of Surgeons, on the zoological part of

Natural History; and, if I am rightly informed, in one of the eloquent

and impressive introductory Discourses.[99] In explaining the Nature

of Instinct, as deduced from the actions and tendencies of animals

successively presented to the observation of the comparative

physiologist in the ascending scale of organic life--or rather, I

should have said, in an attempt to determine that precise import of

the _term_, which is required by the facts[100]--the Professor

explained the nature of what I have elsewhere called the _adaptive

power_, that is, the faculty of adapting means to proximate ends. [N.

B. I mean here a _relative_ end--that which relatively to one thing is

an _end_, though relatively to some other it is in itself a _mean_. It

is to be regretted, that we have no single word to express those ends,

that are not _the_ end: for the distinction between those and an end

in the proper sense of the term is an important one.] The Professor, I

say, not only explained, first, the nature of the adaptive power _in

genere_, and, secondly, the distinct character of the _same_ power as

it exists _specifically_ and exclusively in the _human_ being, and

acquires the name of Understanding; but he did it in a way which gave

the whole sum and substance of my convictions, of all I had so long

wished, and so often, but with such imperfect success, attempted to

convey, free from all semblance of paradoxy, and from all occasion of

offence--_omnem offendiculi_[101] _ansam præcidens_. It is, indeed,

for the _fragmentary_ reader only that I have any scruple. In those who

have had the patience to accompany me so far on the up-hill road to manly

principles, I can have no reason to guard against that disposition to

hasty offence from anticipation of _consequences_,--that faithless and

loveless spirit of fear which plunged Galileo into a prison[102]--a

spirit most unworthy of an educated man, who ought to have learnt that

the mistakes of scientific men have never injured Christianity, while

every new truth discovered by them has either added to its evidence,

or prepared the mind for its reception.

_On Instinct in Connection with the Understanding._

It is evident, that the definition of a Genus or class is an

_adequate_ definition only of the lowest _species_ of that Genus: for

each higher species is distinguished from the lower by some additional

character, while the general definition includes only the characters

common to _all_ the species. Consequently it _describes_ the lowest

only. Now I distinguish a genus or _kind_ of Powers under the name of

Adaptive power, and give as its generic definition--the power of

selecting, and adapting means to proximate ends; and as an instance of

the lowest _species_ of this genus, I take the stomach of a

caterpillar. I ask myself, under what words I can generalize the

action of this organ; and I see, that it selects and adapts the

appropriate means (that is, the assimilable part of the vegetable

_congesta_) to the proximate end, that is, the growth or reproduction

of the insect's body. This we call VITAL POWER, or _vita propria_ of

the stomach; and this being the _lowest_ species, its definition is

the same with the definition of the _kind_.

Well! from the power of the stomach, I pass to the power exerted by

the whole animal. I trace it wandering from spot to spot, and plant to

plant, till it finds the appropriate vegetable; and again on this

chosen vegetable, I mark it seeking out and fixing on the part of the

plant, bark, leaf, or petal, suited to its nourishment: or (should the

animal have assumed the butterfly form), to the deposition of its

eggs, and the sustentation of the future _larva_. Here I see a power

of selecting and adapting means to proximate ends _according to

circumstances_: and this higher species of Adaptive Power we call

INSTINCT.

Lastly, I reflect on the facts narrated and described in the preceding

extracts from Hüber, and see a power of selecting and adapting the

proper means to the proximate ends, according to _varying_

circumstances. And what shall we call this yet higher species? We name

the former, Instinct: we must call this INSTINCTIVE INTELLIGENCE.

Here then we have three Powers of the same kind; Life, Instinct, and

instinctive Intelligence: the essential characters that define the

genus existing equally in all three. But in addition to these, I find

one other character common to the highest and lowest: namely, that the

purposes are all manifestly predetermined by the peculiar organization

of the animals; and though it may not be possible to discover any such

immediate dependency in all the actions, yet the actions being

determined by the purposes, the _result_ is equivalent: and both the

actions and the purposes are all in a necessitated reference to the

preservation and continuance of the particular animal or the progeny.

There is selection, but not _choice_: volition rather than will. The

possible _knowledge_ of a thing, or the desire to have that _thing_

representable by a distinct correspondent _thought_, does not, in the

animal, suffice to render the thing an _object_, or the ground of a

purpose. I select and adapt the proper means to the separation of a

stone from a rock, which I neither can, or desire to make use of, for

food, shelter, or ornament: because, perhaps, I wish to measure the

angles of its primary crystals, or, perhaps, for no better reason

than the apparent _difficulty_ of loosening the stone--_sit pro

ratione voluntas_--and thus make a motive out of the absence of all

motive, and a reason out of the arbitrary will to act without any

reason.

Now what is the conclusion from these premises? Evidently this: that

if I suppose the Adaptive Power in its highest _species_, or form of

Instinctive Intelligence, to co-exist with Reason, _Free_ will, and

Self-consciousness, it instantly becomes UNDERSTANDING: in other

words, that Understanding differs indeed from the noblest form of

Instinct, but not in itself or in its own essential properties, but in

consequence of its co-existence with far higher Powers of a diverse

kind in one and the same subject. INSTINCT in a rational, responsible,

and self-conscious Animal, is Understanding.

Such I apprehend to have been the Professor's view and Exposition of

Instinct--and in confirmation of its truth, I would merely request my

readers, from the numerous well-authenticated instances on record, to

recall some one of the extraordinary actions of dogs for the

preservation of their masters' lives, and even for the avenging of

their deaths. In these instances we have the third _species_ of the

Adaptive Power, in connexion with an apparently _moral_ end--with an

_end_ in the proper sense of the word. _Here_ the Adaptive Power

co-exists with a purpose apparently _voluntary_, and the action seems

neither pre-determined by the organization of the animal, nor in any

direct reference to his own preservation, or to the continuance of his

race. It is united with an imposing semblance of gratitude, fidelity,

and disinterested love. We not only _value_ the faithful brute: we

attribute _worth_ to him. This, I admit, is a problem, of which I have

no solution to offer. One of the wisest of uninspired men has not

hesitated to declare the dog a great mystery, on account of this

dawning of a _moral_ nature unaccompanied by any the least evidence of

_reason_, in whichever of the two senses we interpret the

word--whether as the _practical_ reason, that is, the power of

proposing an _ultimate_ end, the determinability of the Will by IDEAS;

or as the _sciential_ reason, that is, the faculty of concluding

universal and necessary truths from particular and contingent

appearances. But in a question respecting the possession of reason,

the absence of all truth is tantamount to a proof of the contrary. It

is, however, by no means equally clear to me, that the dog may not

possess an _analogon_ of WORDS, which I have elsewhere shown to be the

proper objects of the "faculty, judging according to sense."

But to return to my purpose: I intreat the reader to reflect on any

one fact of this kind, whether occurring in his own experience, or

selected from the numerous anecdotes of the dog preserved in the

writings of zoologists. I will then confidently appeal to him, whether

it is in his power not to consider the faculty displayed in these

actions as the same _in kind_ with the Understanding, however inferior

_in degree_.--Or should he even in these instances prefer calling it

_Instinct_, and this in _contra_-distinction from _Understanding_, I

call on him to point out the boundary between the two, the chasm or

partition-wall that divides or separates the one from the other. If he

can, he will have done what none before him have been able to do,

though many and eminent men have tried hard for it: and my recantation

shall be among the first trophies of his success. If he cannot, I must

infer that he is controlled by his dread of the _consequences_, by an

apprehension of some injury resulting to Religion or Morality from

this opinion; and I shall console myself with the hope, that in the

sequel of this work he will find proofs of the directly contrary

tendency.--Not only is this view of the Understanding, as differing in

_degree_ from Instinct and _in kind_ from Reason, innocent in its

possible influences on the religious character, but it is an

indispensable preliminary to the removal of the most formidable

obstacles to an intelligent Belief of the _peculiar_ doctrines of the

Gospel, of the _characteristic_ Articles of the Christian Faith, with

which the Advocates of the truth in Christ have to contend;--the evil

_heart_ of Unbelief alone excepted.

[98] The philosopher, whom the Inquisition would have burnt alive as

an atheist, had not Leo X. and Cardinal Bembo decided that the work

might be formidable to those semi-pagan Christians who regarded

Revelation as a mere make-weight to their boasted Religion of Nature;

but contained nothing dangerous to the Catholic Church or offensive to

a true believer. [He was born in 1462, and died in 1525.--H. N. C.]

[99] A discourse by Prof. J. H. Green. This, "On Instinct," was

afterwards printed by Prof. Green with his 'Vital Dynamics,' 1840. We

give it as so published in the Appendix to the present edition;

though, of course, the "report," apparently verbal, on which

Coleridge's remarks of 1825 are founded, may have differed somewhat

from the Professor's text as published in 1840.--ED.

[100] The word, Instinct, brings together a number of facts into one

class by the assertion of a common ground, the nature of which ground

it determines _negatively_ only--that is, the word does not explain

_what_ this common ground is; but simply indicates that there _is_

such a ground, and that it is different in kind from that in which the

responsible and consciously voluntary actions of men originate. Thus,

in its true and primary import, Instinct stands in antithesis to

Reason; and the perplexity and contradictory statements into which so

many meritorious naturalists, and popular writers on natural history

(Priscilla Wakefield, Kirby, Spence, Hüber, and even Reimarus) have

fallen on this subject, arise wholly from their taking the word in

opposition to Understanding. I notice this, because I would not lose

any opportunity of impressing on the mind of my youthful readers the

important truth that language (as the embodied and articulated Spirit

of the Race, as the growth and emanation of a People, and not the work

of any individual wit or will) is often inadequate, sometimes

deficient, but never false or delusive. We have only to master the

true origin and original import of any native and abiding word, to

find in it, if not the _solution_ of the facts expressed by it, yet a

finger-mark pointing to the road on which this solution is to be

sought.

[101] _Neque quiquam addubito, quin ea candidis omnibus faciat satis.

Quid autem facias istis qui vel ob ingenii pertinaciam sibi satisfieri

nolint, vel stupidiores sint quam ut satisfactionem intelligant? Nam

quemadmodum Simonides dixit, Thessalos hebetiores esse quam ut possint

a se decipi, ita quosdam videas stupidiores quam ut placari queant.

Adhuc non mirum est invenire quod calumnietur qui nihil aliud quærit

nisi quod calumnietur._ (Erasmi Epist. ad Dorpium.) At all events, the

paragraph passing through the medium of my own prepossessions, if any

fault be found with it, the fault probably, and the blame certainly,

belongs to the reporter.

[102] And which (I may add) in a more enlightened age, and in a

Protestant country, impelled more than one German University to

anathematize Fr. Hoffman's discovery of carbonic acid gas, and of its

effects on animal life, as hostile to religion, and tending to

atheism! Three or four students at the university of Jena, in the

attempt to raise a spirit for the discovery of a supposed hidden

treasure, were strangled or poisoned by the fumes of the charcoal they

had been burning in a close garden-house of a vineyard near Jena,

while employed in their magic fumigations and charms. One only was

restored to life: and from his account of the noises and spectres

(_in_ his ears and eyes) as he was losing his senses, it was taken for

granted that _the bad spirit_ had destroyed them. Frederic Hoffman

admitted that it was a _very bad_ spirit that had _tempted_ them, the

Spirit of Avarice and Folly; and that a very _noxious_ Spirit (gas, or

_geist_,) was the immediate cause of their death. But he contended

that this latter spirit was the _spirit_ of charcoal, which would have

produced the same effect, had the young men been chaunting psalms

instead of incantations: and acquitted the devil of all _direct_

concern in the business. The Theological Faculty took the alarm: even

physicians pretended to be horror-stricken at Hoffman's audacity. The

controversy and its appendages embittered several years of this great

and good man's life.

_Reflections Introductory to Aphorism X._

The most _momentous_ question a man can ask is, Have I a Saviour? And

yet as far as the individual querist is concerned, it is premature

and to no purpose, unless another question has been previously put and

answered, (alas! too generally put after the wounded conscience has

already given the answer!) namely, Have I any need of a Saviour? For

him who _needs_ none, (O bitter irony of the evil Spirit, whose

whispers the proud Soul takes for its own thoughts, and knows not how

the Tempter is scoffing the while!) there _is_ none, as long as he

feels no need. On the other hand, it is scarcely possible to have

answered this question in the affirmative, and not ask--first, _in

what_ the necessity consists? secondly, _whence_ it proceeded? and,

thirdly, how far the answer to this second question is or is not

contained in the answer to the first? I intreat the intelligent

reader, who has taken me as his temporary guide on the straight, but

yet, from the number of cross roads, difficult way of religious

Inquiry, to halt a moment, and consider the main points, that, in this

last division of my work, have been already offered for his

reflection. I have attempted then to fix the proper meaning of the

words, Nature and Spirit, the one being the _antithesis_ to the other:

so that the most general and _negative_ definition of Nature is,

Whatever is not Spirit; and _vice versâ_ of Spirit, That which is not

comprehended in Nature: or in the language of our elder divines, that

which transcends Nature. But nature is the term in which we comprehend

all things that are representable in the forms of time and space, and

subjected to the relations of cause and effect: and the cause of the

existence of which, therefore, is to be sought for perpetually in

something antecedent. The word itself expresses this in the strongest

manner possible: _Natura_, that which is _about to be_ born, that

which is always _becoming_. It follows, therefore, that whatever

originates its own acts, or in any sense contains in itself the cause

of its own state, must be _spiritual_, and consequently

_super-natural_: yet not on that account necessarily _miraculous_. And

such must the responsible WILL in us be, if it be at all.

A prior step had been to remove all misconceptions from the subject;

to show the reasonableness of a belief in the reality and real

influence of a universal and divine Spirit; the compatibility and

possible communion of such a Spirit with the Spiritual principle in

individuals; and the analogy offered by the most undeniable truths of

Natural Philosophy.[103]

These views of the Spirit, and of the Will as Spiritual, form the

ground-work of my scheme. Among the numerous corollaries or

appendents, the first that presented itself respects the question,

Whether there is any faculty in man by which a knowledge of spiritual

truths, or of any truths not abstracted from nature, is rendered

possible? and an Answer is attempted in the Comment on Aphorism VIII.

And here I beg leave to remark, that in this comment the only novelty,

and, if there be merit, the only merit is--that there being two very

different Meanings, and two different Words, I have here and in former

Works appropriated one meaning to one of the Words, and the other to

the other--instead of using the words indifferently and by haphazard:

a confusion, the ill effects of which in this instance are so great

and of such frequent occurrence in the works of our ablest

philosophers and divines, that I should select it before all others in

proof of Hobbes's Maxim:--that it is a short, downhill passage from

errors in words to errors in things. The difference of the Reason from

the Understanding, and the imperfection and limited sphere of the

latter, have been asserted by many both before and since Lord

Bacon;[104] but still the habit of using Reason and Understanding as

synonyms, acted as a disturbing force. Some it led into mysticism,

others it set on explaining away a clear difference _in kind_ into a

mere superiority in degree: and it partially eclipsed the truth for

all.

In close connexion with this, and therefore forming the Comment on the

Aphorism next following, is the subject of the legitimate exercise of

the Understanding and its limitation to Objects of Sense; with the

errors both of unbelief and of misbelief, which result from its

extension beyond the sphere of possible Experience. Wherever the forms

of reasoning appropriate only to the _natural_ world are applied to

_spiritual_ realities, it may be truly said, that the more strictly

logical the reasoning is in all its _parts_, the more irrational it is

as a _whole_.

To the reader thus armed and prepared, I now venture to present the so

called mysteries of Faith, that is, the peculiar tenets and especial

constituents of Christianity, or Religion in spirit and in truth. In

right order I must have commenced with the Articles of the Trinity and

Apostacy, including the question respecting the Origin of Evil, and

the Incarnation of the WORD. And could I have followed this order,

some difficulties that now press on me would have been obviated.--But

(as has already been explained) the limits of the present volume rendered

it alike impracticable and inexpedient; for the necessity of my argument

would have called forth certain hard though most true sayings, respecting

the hollowness and tricksy sophistry of the so called "Natural Theology,"

"Religion of Nature," "Light of Nature," and the like, which a brief

exposition could not save from innocent misconceptions, much less protect

against plausible misinterpretation.--And yet both Reason and

Experience have convinced me, that in the greater number of our ALOGI,

who feed on the husks of Christianity, the disbelief of the Trinity,

the Divinity of Christ included, has its origin and support in the

assumed self-evidence of this Natural Theology, and in their ignorance

of the insurmountable difficulties which (on the same mode of

reasoning) press upon the fundamental articles of their own Remnant of

a Creed. But arguments, which would prove the falsehood of a known

truth, must themselves be false, and can prove the falsehood of no

other position in _eodem genere_.

This _hint_ I have thrown out as a _spark_ that may perhaps fall where

it will kindle. And worthily might the wisest of men make inquisition

into the three momentous points here spoken of, for the purposes of

speculative insight, and for the formation of enlarged and systematic

views of the destination of man, and the dispensation of God. But the

_practical_ Inquirer (I speak not of those who inquire for the

gratification of curiosity, and still less of those who labour as

students only to shine as disputants; but of one, who seeks the truth,

because he feels the want of it,) the practical Inquirer, I say, hath

already placed his foot on the rock, if he have satisfied himself that

whoever needs not a Redeemer is more than human. Remove for him the

difficulties and objections, that oppose or perplex his belief of a

crucified Saviour; convince him of the reality of sin, which is

impossible without a knowledge of its true nature and inevitable

consequences; and then satisfy him as to the _fact_ historically, and

as to the truth spiritually, of a redemption therefrom by Christ; do

this for him, and there is little fear that he will permit either

logical quirks or metaphysical puzzles to contravene the plain dictate

of his common sense, that the Sinless One that redeemed mankind from

sin, must have been more than man; and that He who brought Light and

Immortality into the world, could not in his own nature have been an

inheritor of Death and Darkness. It is morally impossible that a man with

these convictions should suffer the objection of Incomprehensibility

(and this on a subject of _Faith_) to overbalance the manifest

absurdity and contradiction in the notion of a mediator between God

and the human race, at the same infinite distance from God as the race

for whom he mediates.

The origin of evil, meanwhile, is a question interesting only to the

metaphysician, and in a system of moral and religious philosophy. The

man of sober mind, who seeks for truths that possess a moral and

practical interest, is content to be _certain_, first, that evil must

have had a beginning, since otherwise it must either be God, or a

co-eternal and co-equal rival of God; both impious notions, and the

latter foolish to boot:--secondly, that it could not originate in God;

for if so, it would be at once evil and not evil, or God would be at

once God (that is, infinite Goodness) and not God--both alike

impossible positions. Instead therefore of troubling himself with this

barren controversy, he more profitably turns his inquiries to _that_

evil which most concerns himself, and of which he _may_ find the

origin.

The entire Scheme of _necessary_ Faith may be reduced to two

heads;--first, the object and occasion, and, secondly, the fact and

effect,--of our redemption by Christ: and to this view does the order

of the following Comments correspond. I have begun with ORIGINAL SIN,

and proceeded in the following Aphorism to the doctrine of Redemption.

The Comments on the remaining Aphorisms are all subsidiary to these,

or written in the hope of making the minor tenets of general belief be

believed in a spirit worthy of these. They are, in short, intended to

supply a febrifuge against aguish scruples and horrors, the hectic of

the soul;--and "for servile and thrall-like fear to substitute that

adoptive and cheerful boldness, which our new alliance with God

requires of us as Christians." (_Milton._) NOT the Origin of Evil, NOT

the _Chronology_ of Sin, or the chronicles of the original Sinner; but

Sin originant, underived from without, and no passive link in the

adamantine chain of Effects, each of which is in its turn an

_instrument_ of Causation, but no one of them a Cause;--NOT with Sin

_inflicted_, which would be a Calamity;--NOT with Sin (that is, an

evil tendency) _implanted_, for which let the planter be responsible;

but I begin with _Original_ Sin. And for this purpose I have selected

the Aphorism from the ablest and most formidable antagonist of this

doctrine, Bishop JEREMY TAYLOR, and from the most eloquent work of

this most eloquent of divines.[106] Had I said, of men, Cicero would

forgive me, and Demosthenes nod assent![107]

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