On the contrary, Reason is the Power of Universal and necessary
Convictions, the Source and Substance of Truths above Sense, and
having their evidence in themselves. Its presence is always marked by
the _necessity_ of the position affirmed: this necessity being
_conditional_, when a truth of Reason is applied to Facts of
Experience, or to the rules and maxims of the Understanding; but
_absolute_, when the subject matter is itself the growth or offspring
of the Reason. Hence arises a distinction in the Reason itself,
derived from the different mode of applying it, and from the objects
to which it is directed: accordingly as we consider one and the same
gift, now as the ground of formal principles, and now as the origin of
_ideas_. Contemplated distinctively in reference to _formal_ (or
abstract) truth, it is the _speculative_ reason; but in reference to
_actual_ (or moral) truth, as the fountain of ideas, and the _light_
of the conscience, we name it the _practical_ reason. Whenever by
self-subjection to this universal light, the will of the individual,
the _particular_ will, has become a will of reason, the man is
regenerate: and reason is then the _spirit_ of the regenerated man,
whereby the person is capable of a quickening inter-communion with the
Divine Spirit. And herein consists the mystery of Redemption, that
this has been rendered possible for us. _And so it is written: the
first man Adam, was made a living soul, the last Adam a quickening
Spirit._ (1 Cor. xv. 45.) We need only compare the passages in the
writings of the Apostles Paul and John, concerning the _spirit_ and
spiritual Gifts, with those in the Proverbs and in the Wisdom of
Solomon respecting _reason_, to be convinced that the terms are
synonymous.[94] In this at once most comprehensive and most
appropriate acceptation of the word, reason is pre-eminently
spiritual, and a spirit, even _our_ spirit, through an effluence of
the same grace by which we are privileged to say Our Father!
On the other hand, the Judgments of the Understanding are binding only
in relation to the objects of our Senses, which we _reflect_ under the
forms of the Understanding. It is, as Leighton rightly defines it,
"the faculty judging according to sense." Hence we add the epithet
_human_, without tautology: and speak of the _human_ understanding, in
disjunction from that of beings higher or lower than man. But there
is, in this sense, no _human_ reason. There neither is nor can be but
one reason, one and the same: even the light that lighteth every man's
individual Understanding (_Discursus_), and thus maketh it a
reasonable understanding, _discourse of reason--one only_, yet
_manifold: it goeth through all understanding, and remaining in itself
regenerateth all other powers_. The same writer calls it likewise _an
influence from the Glory of the Almighty_, this being one of the names
of the Messiah, as the _Logos_, or co-eternal Filial Word. And most
noticeable for its coincidence is a fragment of Heraclitus, as I have
indeed already noticed elsewhere;--"To discourse rationally it behoves
us to derive strength from that which is common to all men: for all
human Understandings are nourished by the one DIVINE WORD."
Beasts, we have said, partake of understanding. If any man deny this,
there is a ready way of settling the question. Let him give a careful
perusal to Hüber's two small volumes, on bees and ants (especially the
latter), and to Kirby and Spence's Introduction to Entomology; and one
or other of two things must follow. He will either change his opinion
as irreconcilable with the facts; or he must deny the facts, which yet
I cannot suppose, inasmuch as the denial would be tantamount to the no
less extravagant than uncharitable assertion, that Hüber, and the
several eminent naturalists, French and English, Swiss, German, and
Italian, by whom Hüber's observations and experiments have been
repeated and confirmed, had all conspired to impose a series of
falsehoods and fairy-tales on the world. I see no way at least, by
which he can get out of this dilemma, but by over-leaping the admitted
rules and fences of all legitimate discussion, and either transferring
to the word, Understanding, the definition already appropriated to
Reason, or defining Understanding _in genere_ by the _specific_ and
_accessional_ perfections which the _human_ understanding derives from
its co-existence with reason and free-will in the same individual
person; in plainer words, from its being exercised by a self-conscious
and responsible creature. And, after all, the supporter of
Harrington's position would have a right to ask him, by what other
name he would designate the faculty in the instances referred to? If
it be not Understanding, what is it?
In no former part of this volume has the author felt the same anxiety
to obtain a patient attention. For he does not hesitate to avow, that
on his success in establishing the validity and importance of the
distinction between Reason and Understanding, he rests his hopes of
carrying the reader along with him through all that is to follow. Let
the student but clearly see and comprehend the diversity in the things
themselves, the expediency of a correspondent distinction and
appropriation of the _words_ will follow of itself. Turn back for a
moment to the Aphorism, and having re-perused the first paragraph of
this Comment thereon, regard the two following narratives as the
illustration. I do not say proof: for I take these from a multitude of
facts equally striking for the one only purpose of placing my
_meaning_ out of all doubt.
I. Hüber put a dozen bumble-bees under a bell-glass along with a comb
of about ten silken cocoons so unequal in height as not to be capable
of standing steadily. To remedy this two or three of the bumble-bees
got upon the comb, stretched themselves over its edge, and with their
heads downwards fixed their fore-feet on the table on which the comb
stood, and so with their hind-feet kept the comb from falling. When
these were weary, others took their places. In this constrained and
painful posture, fresh bees relieving their comrades at intervals, and
each working in its turn, did these affectionate little insects
support the comb for nearly three days: at the end of which they had
prepared sufficient wax to build pillars with. But these pillars
having accidentally got displaced, the bees had recourse again to the
same manœuvre till Hüber, pitying their hard case, &c.
II. "I shall at present describe the operations of a single ant that I
observed sufficiently long to satisfy my curiosity. One rainy day, I
observed a labourer digging the ground near the aperture which gave
entrance to the ant-hill. It placed in a heap the several fragments it
had scraped up, and formed them into small pellets, which it deposited
here and there upon the nest. It returned constantly to the same
place, and appeared to have a marked design, for it laboured with
ardour and perseverance. I remarked a slight furrow, excavated in the
ground in a straight line, representing the plan of a path or gallery.
The Labourer, the whole of whose movements fell under my immediate
observation, gave it greater depth and breadth, and cleared out its
borders: and I saw at length, in which I could not be deceived, that
it had the intention of establishing an avenue which was to lead from
one of the stories to the underground chambers. This path, which was
about two or three inches in length, and formed by a single ant, was
opened above and bordered on each side by a buttress of earth; its
concavity _en forme de gouttière_ was of the most perfect regularity,
for the architect had not left an atom too much. The work of this ant
was so well followed and understood, that I could almost to a
certainty guess its next proceeding, and the very fragment it was
about to remove. At the side of the opening where this path
terminated, was a second opening to which it was necessary to arrive
by some road. The same ant engaged in and executed alone this
undertaking. It furrowed out and opened another path, parallel to the
first, leaving between each a little wall of three or four lines in
height. Those ants who lay the foundation of a wall, chamber, or
gallery, from working separately, occasion now and then a want of
coincidence in the parts of the same or different objects. Such
examples are of no unfrequent occurrence, but they by no means
embarrass them. What follows proves that the workman, on discovering
his error, knew how to rectify it. A wall had been erected with the
view of sustaining a vaulted ceiling, still incomplete, that had been
projected from the wall of the opposite chamber. The workman who began
constructing it, had given it too little elevation to meet the
opposite partition upon which it was to rest. Had it been continued on
the original plan, it must infallibly have met the wall at about one
half of its height, and this it was necessary to avoid. This state of
things very forcibly claimed my attention, when one of the ants
arriving at the place, and visiting the works, appeared to be struck
by the difficulty which presented itself; but this it as soon
obviated, by taking down the ceiling and raising the wall upon which
it reposed. It then, in my presence, constructed a new ceiling with
the fragments of the former one."--_Hüber's Natural History of Ants_,
p. 38-41.
Now I assert, that the faculty manifested in the acts here narrated
does not differ _in kind_ from Understanding, and that it _does_ so
differ from Reason. What I conceive the former to be, physiologically
considered, will be shown hereafter. In this place I take the
understanding as it exists in _men_, and in exclusive reference to its
_intelligential_ functions; and it is in this sense of the word that I
am to prove the necessity of contra-distinguishing it from reason.
Premising then, that two or more subjects having the same essential
characters are said to fall under the same general definition, I lay
it down, as a self-evident truth,--(it is, in fact, an identical
proposition) that whatever subjects fall under one and the same
general definition are of one and the same kind: consequently, that
which does _not_ fall under this definition, must differ in kind from
each and all of those that _do_. Difference in degree does indeed
suppose sameness in kind; and difference in kind precludes distinction
from difference of degree. _Heterogenea non comparari, ergo nec
distingui, possunt._ The inattention to this rule gives rise to the
numerous sophisms comprised by Aristotle under the head of μεταβασισ
εις αλλο γενος, that is, transition into a new kind, or the falsely
applying to X what had been truly asserted of A, and might have been
true of X, had it differed from A in its degree only. The sophistry
consists in the omission to notice what not being noticed will be
supposed not to exist; and where the silence respecting the difference
in kind is tantamount to an assertion that the difference is merely in
degree. But the fraud is especially gross, where the heterogeneous
subject, thus clandestinely _slipt in_, is in its own nature
insusceptible of degree: such as, for instance, Certainty, or
Circularity, contrasted with Strength, or Magnitude.
To apply these remarks for our present purpose, we have only to
describe Understanding and Reason, each by its characteristic
qualities. The comparison will show the difference.