COMMENT.

No impartial person, competently acquainted with the history of the

Reformation, and the works of the earlier Protestant Divines, at home

and abroad, even to the close of Elizabeth's reign, will deny that the

doctrines of Calvin on Redemption and the natural state of fallen man,

are in all essential points the same as those of Luther, Zuinglius,

and the first Reformers collectively. These Doctrines have, however,

since the re-establishment of the Episcopal Church at the return of

Charles II., been as generally [72] exchanged for what is commonly

entitled Arminianism, but which, taken as a complete and explicit

Scheme of Belief, it would be both historically and theologically more

accurate to call _Grotianism_, or Christianity according to Grotius.

The change was not, we may readily believe, effected without a

struggle. In the Romish Church this latitudinarian system, patronized

by the Jesuits, was manfully resisted by Jansenius, Arnauld, and

Pascal; in our own Church by the Bishops Davenant, Sanderson, Hall,

and the Archbishops Usher and Leighton: and in the latter half of the

preceding Aphorism the reader has a _specimen_ of the _reasonings_ by

which Leighton strove to invalidate or counterpoise the _reasonings_

of the innovators.

Passages of this sort are, however, of rare occurrence in Leighton's

works. Happily for thousands, he was more usefully employed in making

his readers feel that the doctrines in question, _scripturally

treated, and taken as co-organized parts of a great organic whole_,

need no such reasonings. And better still would it have been, had he

left them altogether for those, who severally detaching the great

features of Revelation from the living context of Scripture, do by

that very act destroy their life and purpose. And then, like the eyes

of the Indian spider,[73] they become clouded microscopes, to

exaggerate and distort all the other parts and proportions.--No

offence then will be occasioned, I trust, by the frank avowal that I

have given to the preceding passage a place among the Spiritual

Aphorisms for the sake of the Comment: the following Remarks having

been the first marginal note I had pencilled on Leighton's pages, and

thus (remotely, at least) the occasion of the present work.

Leighton, I observed, throughout his inestimable work, avoids all

metaphysical views of Election, relatively to God, and confines

himself to the doctrine in its relation to Man: and in that sense too,

in which every Christian may judge of it who strives to be sincere

with his own heart. The following may, I think, be taken as a safe and

useful Rule in religious inquiries. Ideas, that derive their origin

and substance from the _Moral_ Being, and to the reception of which as

true _objectively_ (that is, as corresponding to a _reality_ out of

the human mind) we are determined by a _practical_ interest

exclusively, may not, like theoretical or speculative Positions, be

pressed onward into all their possible _logical_ consequences.[74] The

Law of Conscience, and not the Canons of discursive Reasoning, must

decide in such cases. At least, the latter have no validity, which the

single _veto_ of the former is not sufficient to nullify. The most

pious conclusion is here the most legitimate.

It is too seldom considered though most worthy of consideration, how

far even those Ideas or Theories of pure Speculation, that bear the

same name with the Objects of Religious Faith, are indeed the same.

Out of the principles necessarily presumed in all discursive thinking,

and which being, in the first place _universal_, and secondly,

antecedent to every particular exercise of the understanding, are

therefore referred to the reason, the human mind (wherever its powers

are sufficiently developed, and its attention strongly directed to

speculative or theoretical inquiries,) forms certain essences, to

which for its own purposes it gives a sort of notional _subsistence_.

Hence they are called _entia rationalia_: the conversion of which into

_entia realia_, or real objects, by aid of the imagination, has in all

times been the fruitful stock of empty theories, and mischievous

superstitions, of surreptitious premises and extravagant conclusions.

For as these substantiated notions were in many instances expressed by

the same terms, as the objects of religious Faith; as in most

instances they were applied, though deceptively, to the explanation of

real experiences; and lastly, from the gratifications, which the pride

and ambition of man received from the supposed extension of his

knowledge and insight; it was too easily forgotten or overlooked, that

the stablest and most indispensable of these notional beings were but

the necessary _forms_ of thinking, taken abstractedly: and that like

the breadthless lines, depthless surfaces, and perfect circles of

geometry, they subsist wholly and solely in and for the mind, that

contemplates them. Where the evidence of the senses fails us, and

beyond the precincts of sensible experience, there is no _reality_

attributable to any notion, but what is given to it by Revelation, or

the Law of Conscience, or the necessary interests of Morality.

Take an instance:

It is the office, and, as it were, the instinct of Reason to bring a

unity into all our conceptions and several knowledges. On this all

system depends; and without this we could reflect connectedly neither

on nature nor our own minds. Now this is possible only on the

assumption or hypothesis of a ONE as the ground and cause of the

Universe, and which in all succession and through changes is the

subject neither of Time nor Change. The ONE must be contemplated as

Eternal and Immutable.

Well! the Idea, which is the basis of Religion, commanded by the

Conscience and required by Morality, contains the same truths, or at

least truths that can be expressed in no other terms; but this idea

presents itself to our mind with additional attributes, and these too

not formed by mere Abstraction and Negation--with the attributes of

Holiness, Providence, Love, Justice, and Mercy. It comprehends,

moreover, the independent (_extra-mundane_) existence and personality

of the supreme ONE, as our Creator, Lord, and Judge.

The hypothesis of a _one_ Ground and Principle of the Universe

(necessary as an _hypothesis_; but having only a _logical_ and

_conditional_ necessity) is thus raised into the Idea of the LIVING

GOD, the supreme Object of our Faith, Love, Fear, and Adoration.

Religion and Morality do indeed constrain us to declare him Eternal

and Immutable. But if from the Eternity of the Supreme Being a

Reasoner should deduce the impossibility of a Creation; or conclude

with Aristotle, that the Creation was co-eternal; or, like the latter

Platonists, should turn Creation into _Emanation_, and make the

universe proceed from Deity, as the Sunbeams from the Solar Orb;--or

if from the divine Immutability he should infer, that all prayer and

supplication must be vain and superstitious: then however evident and

logically necessary such conclusions may appear, it is scarcely worth

our while to examine, whether they are so or not. The positions

themselves _must_ be false. For were they true, the Idea would lose

the sole ground of its _reality_. It would be no longer the Idea

intended by the Believer in _his_ premise--in the premise, with which

alone Religion and Morality are concerned. The very subject of the

discussion would be changed. It would no longer be the God in whom we

_believe_; but a stoical FATE, or the superessential ONE of Plotinus,

to whom neither Intelligence, nor Self-consciousness, nor Life, nor

even _Being_ can be attributed; nor lastly, the world itself, the

indivisible one and only substance (_substantia una et unica_) of

Spinoza, of which all _phænomena_, all particular and individual

things, lives, minds, thoughts, and actions are but modifications.

Let the believer never be alarmed by objections wholly speculative,

however plausible on speculative grounds such objections may appear,

if he can but satisfy himself, that the _result_ is repugnant to the

dictates of conscience, and irreconcilable with the interests of

morality. For to baffle the objector we have only to demand of him, by

what right and under what authority he converts a thought into a

substance, or asserts the existence of a real somewhat corresponding

to a notion not derived from the experience of his senses. It will be

of no purpose for him to answer, that it is a _legitimate_ notion. The

_notion_ may have its mould in the understanding; but its realization

must be the work of the FANCY.

A reflecting reader will easily apply these remarks to the subject of

Election, one of the stumbling stones in the ordinary conceptions of

the Christian Faith, to which the infidel points in scorn, and which

far better men pass by in silent perplexity. Yet surely, from mistaken

conceptions of the doctrine, I suppose the person, with whom I am

arguing, already so far a believer, as to have convinced himself, both

that a state of enduring bliss is attainable under certain conditions;

and that these conditions consist in his compliance with the

directions given and rules prescribed in the Christian Scriptures.

These rules he likewise admits to be such, that, by the very law and

constitution of the human mind, a full and faithful compliance with

them cannot but have _consequences_, of some sort or other. But these

_consequences_ are moreover distinctly described, enumerated, and

promised in the same Scriptures, in which the conditions are recorded;

and though some of them may be apparent to God only, yet the greater

number of them are of such a nature that they cannot exist unknown to

the individual, in and for whom they exist. As little possible is it,

that he should find these consequences in himself, and not find in

them the sure marks and the safe pledges, that he is at the time in

the right road to the Life promised under these conditions. Now I dare

assert, that no such man, however fervent his charity, and however

deep his humility may be, can peruse the records of History with a

reflecting spirit, or look round the world with an observant eye, and

not find himself compelled to admit, that _all_ men are _not_ on the

right road. He cannot help judging, that even in Christian countries,

many, a fearful many! have not their faces turned toward it.

This then is a mere matter of fact. Now comes the question. Shall the

believer, who thus hopes on the appointed _grounds_ of hope, attribute

this distinction exclusively to his own resolves and strivings? or if

not exclusively, yet primarily and principally? Shall he refer the

first movements and preparations to his own Will and Understanding,

and bottom his claim to the promises on his own comparative

excellence? If not, if no man dare take this honour to himself, to

whom shall he assign it, if not to that Being in whom the promise

originated, and on whom its fulfilment depends? If he stop here, who

shall blame him? By what argument shall his reasoning be invalidated,

that might not be urged with equal force against any essential

difference between obedient and disobedient, Christian and worldling?

that would not imply that both _sorts_ alike are, in the sight of God,

the Sons of God by adoption? If he stop here, I say, who shall drive

him from his position? For thus far he is practically concerned--this

the Conscience requires, this the highest interests of Morality

demand. It is a question of facts, of the will and the deed, to argue

against which on the abstract notions and possibilities of the

speculative reason, is as unreasonable, as an attempt to decide a

question of colours by pure Geometry, or to unsettle the classes and

specific characters of Natural History by the Doctrine of Fluxions.

But if the self-examinant will abandon this position, and exchange the

safe circle of Religion and practical Reason for the shifting

sand-wastes and _mirages_ of Speculative Theology; if instead of

seeking after the _marks_ of Election in himself he undertakes to

determine the ground and origin, the possibility and mode of election

itself _in relation to God_;--in this case, and whether he does it for

the satisfaction of curiosity, or from the ambition of answering

those, who would call God himself to account, why and by what right

certain souls were born in Africa instead of England:--or why (seeing

that it is against all reason and goodness to choose a worse, when

being omnipotent He could have created a better) God did not create

beasts men, and men angels:--or why God created any men but with

fore-knowledge of their obedience, and left any occasion for

Election?--in this case, I say, we can only regret, that the inquirer

had not been better instructed in the nature, the bounds, the true

purposes and proper objects of his intellectual faculties, and that he

had not previously asked himself, by what appropriate sense, or organ

of knowledge, he hoped to secure an insight into a Nature which was

neither an object of his senses, nor a part of his self-consciousness;

and so leave him to ward off shadowy spears with the shadow of a

shield, and to retaliate the nonsense of blasphemy with the

_abracadabra_ of presumption. He that will fly without wings must fly

in his dreams: and till he awakes, will not find out, that to fly in a

dream is but to dream of flying.

Thus then the doctrine of Election is in itself a necessary inference

from an undeniable fact--necessary at least for all who hold that the

best of men are what they are through the grace of God. In relation to

the believer it is a _hope_, which if it spring out of Christian

principles, be examined by the tests and nourished by the means

prescribed in Scripture, will become a _lively_, an _assured_ hope,

but which cannot in this life pass into _knowledge_, much less

certainty of fore-knowledge. The contrary belief does indeed make the

article of Election both tool and parcel of a mad and mischievous

fanaticism. But with what force and clearness does not the Apostle

confute, disclaim, and prohibit the pretence, treating it as a

downright contradiction in terms! See Romans viii. 24.

But though I hold the doctrine handled as Leighton handles it (that is

practically, morally, _humanly_) rational, safe, and of essential

importance, I see many[75] reasons resulting from the peculiar

circumstances, under which St. Paul preached and wrote, why a discreet

minister of the Gospel should avoid the frequent use of the _term_,

and express the _meaning_ in other words perfectly equivalent and

equally Scriptural; lest in _saying_ truth he may convey error.

Had my purpose been confined to one particular tenet, an apology might

be required for so long a Comment. But the reader will, I trust, have

already perceived, that my object has been to establish a general rule

of interpretation and vindication applicable to _all_ doctrinal

tenets, and especially to the (so called) mysteries of the Christian

Faith: to provide a _Safety-lamp_ for religious inquirers. Now this I

find in the principle, that all Revealed Truths are to be judged of by

us, as far as they are possible subjects of human conception, or

grounds of practice, or in some way connected with our moral and

spiritual interests. In order to have a reason _for_ forming a

judgment on any given article, we must be sure that we possess a

reason, by and according to which a judgment may be formed. Now in

respect of all Truths, to which a _real_ independent existence is

assigned, and which yet are not contained in, or to be imagined under,

any form of space or time, it is strictly demonstrable, that the human

reason, considered abstractly, as the source of positive _science_ and

theoretical _insight_, is _not_ such a reason. At the utmost, it has

only a _negative_ voice. In other words, nothing can be allowed as

true for the human mind, which directly contradicts this reason. But

even here, before we admit the existence of any such contradiction, we

must be careful to ascertain, that there is no equivocation in play,

that two different subjects are not confounded under one and the same

word. A striking instance of this has been adduced in the difference

between the notional ONE of the Ontologists, and the idea of the

Living God.

But if not the abstract or speculative reason, and yet a reason there

must be in order to a rational belief--then it must be the _practical_

reason of man, comprehending the Will, the Conscience, the Moral Being

with its inseparable Interests and Affections--that Reason, namely,

which is the Organ of _Wisdom_, and (as far as man is concerned) the

source of living and actual Truths.

From these premises we may further deduce, that every doctrine is to

be interpreted in reference to those, to whom it has been revealed, or

who have or have had the means of knowing or hearing the same. For

instance: the Doctrine that _there is no name under Heaven, by which a

man can be saved, but the name of Jesus_. If the word here rendered

_name_, may be understood (as it well may, and as in other texts it

must be) as meaning the Power, or originating Cause, I see no

objection on the part of the practical reason to our belief of the

declaration in its whole extent. It is true universally or not true at

all. If there be any redemptive Power not contained in the Power of

Jesus, then Jesus is not _the_ Redeemer: not the Redeemer of the

_World_, not the Jesus (_i.e._ Saviour) of man_kind_. But if with

Tertullian and Augustine we make the Text assert the condemnation and

misery of all who are not Christians by Baptism and explicit belief in

the Revelation of the New Covenant--then I say, the doctrine is true

_to all intents and purposes_. It is true, in every respect, in which

any practical, moral, or spiritual interest or end can be connected

with its truth. It is true in respect to every man who has had, or who

might have had, the Gospel preached to him. It is true and obligatory

for every Christian community and for every individual believer,

wherever the opportunity is afforded of spreading the _Light_ of the

Gospel, and making _known_ the name of the only Saviour and Redeemer.

For even though the uninformed Heathens should _not_ perish, the

_guilt_ of their perishing will attach to those who not only had no

certainty of their safety, but who are commanded to _act_ on the

supposition of the contrary. But if, on the other hand, a theological

dogmatist should attempt to persuade me, that this text was intended

to give us an historical knowledge of God's future actions and

dealings--and for the gratification of our curiosity to inform us,

that Socrates and Phocion, together with all the savages in the woods

and wilds of Africa and America, will be sent to keep company with the

devil and his angels in everlasting torments--I should remind him,

that the purpose of Scripture was to teach us our duty, not to enable

us to sit in judgment on the souls of our fellow creatures.

One other instance will, I trust, prevent all misconception of my

meaning. I am clearly convinced, that the scriptural and only true[76]

Idea of God will, in its development, be found to involve the Idea of

the Tri-unity. But I am likewise convinced, that previously to the

promulgation of the Gospel the doctrine had no claim on the faith of

mankind; though it might have been a legitimate contemplation for a

speculative philosopher, a theorem in metaphysics valid in the

Schools.

I form a certain notion in my mind, and say:--This is what _I_

understand by the term, God. From books and conversation I find, that

the learned generally connect the same notion with the same word. I

then apply the rules, laid down by the masters of logic, for the

involution and evolution of terms, and prove (to as many as agree with

me in my premises) that the notion, God, involves the notion, Trinity.

I now pass out of the Schools, and enter into discourse with some

friend or neighbour, unversed in the _formal_ sciences, unused to the

process of abstraction, neither Logician nor Metaphysician; but

sensible and single-minded, _an Israelite indeed_, trusting in _the

Lord God of his Fathers, even the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of

Jacob_. If I speak of God to _him_, what will _he_ understand me to be

speaking of? What does he mean, and suppose me to mean, by the word?

An accident or product of the reasoning faculty, or an abstraction

which the human mind forms by reflecting on its own thoughts and forms

of thinking? No. By God he understands me to mean an existing and

self-subsisting reality,[77] a real and personal Being--even the

_Person_, the I AM, who sent Moses to his forefathers in Egypt. Of the

actual existence of the divine Being he has the same historical

assurance as of theirs; confirmed indeed by the Book of Nature, as

soon and as far as that stronger and better light has taught him to

read and construe it--confirmed by it, I say, but not derived from it.

Now by what right can I require this man (and of such men the great

majority of serious believers consisted, previously to the light of

the Gospel) to receive a _notion_ of mine, wholly alien from his

habits of thinking, because it may be logically deduced from another

notion, with which he was almost as little acquainted, and not at all

concerned? Grant for a moment, that the latter (that is, the notion,

with which I first set out) as soon as it is combined with the

assurance of a corresponding Reality becomes identical with the true

and effective Idea of God! Grant, that in thus _realizing_ the notion

I am warranted by Revelation, the Law of Conscience, and the interests

and necessities of my Moral Being! Yet by what authority, by what

inducement, am I entitled to attach the same reality to a second

notion, a notion drawn from a notion? It is evident, that if I have

the same right, it must be on the same grounds. Revelation must have

assured it, my Conscience required it--or in some way or other I must

have an _interest_ in this belief. It must _concern_ me, as a moral

and responsible Being. Now these grounds were first given in the

Redemption of Mankind by Christ, the Saviour and Mediator: and by the

utter incompatibility of these offices with a mere creature. On the

doctrine of Redemption depends the _Faith_, the _Duty_, of believing

in the Divinity of our Lord. And this again is the strongest Ground

for the reality of that Idea, in which alone this Divinity can be

received without breach of the faith in the unity of the Godhead. But

such is the Idea of the Trinity. Strong as the motives are that induce

me to defer the full discussion of this great Article of the Christian

creed, I cannot withstand the request of several divines, whose

situation and extensive services entitle them to the utmost deference,

that I should so far deviate from my first intention as at least to

indicate the point on which I stand, and to prevent the misconception

of my purpose: as if I held the doctrine of the Trinity for a truth

which Men could be called on to believe by mere force of reasoning,

independently of any positive _Revelation_. In short, it had been

reported in certain circles, that I considered this doctrine as a

demonstrable part of the Religion of Nature. Now though it might be

sufficient to say, that I regard the very phrase "_Revealed_ Religion"

as a pleonasm, inasmuch as a religion not revealed is, in my judgment,

no religion at all; I have no objection to announce more particularly

and distinctly what I do and what I do not maintain on this point:

provided that in the following paragraph, with this view inserted, the

reader will look for nothing more than a plain _statement_ of my

opinions. The grounds on which they rest, and the arguments by which

they are to be vindicated, are for another place.

I hold then, it is true, that all the (so called) demonstrations of a

God either prove too little, as that from the order and apparent

purpose in Nature; or too much, namely, that the World is itself God:

or they clandestinely involve the conclusion in the premises, passing

off the mere analysis or explication of an Assertion for the Proof of

it,--a species of logical legerdemain not unlike that of the jugglers

at a fair, who putting into their mouths what seems to be a walnut,

draw out a score yards of ribbon--as in the Postulate of a First

Cause. And lastly, in all these demonstrations the demonstrators

presuppose the Idea or Conception of a God without being able to

authenticate it, that is, to give an account whence they obtained it.

For it is clear, that the proof first mentioned and the most natural

and convincing of all (the Cosmological I mean, or that from the Order

in Nature) presupposes the Ontological--that is, the proof of a God

from the necessity and necessary _Objectivity_ of the Idea. _If_ the

latter can assure us of a God as an existing Reality, the former will

go far to prove his power, wisdom, and benevolence. All this I hold.

But I also hold, that this truth, the hardest to demonstrate, is the

one which of all others least needs to be demonstrated; that though

there may be no conclusive demonstrations of a good, wise, living, and

personal God, there are so many convincing reasons for it, within and

without--a grain of sand sufficing, and a whole universe at hand to

echo the decision!--that for every mind not devoid of all reason, and

desperately conscience-proof, the Truth which it is the least possible

to prove, it is little less than impossible not to believe! only

indeed just so much short of impossible, as to leave some room for the

will and the moral election, and thereby to keep it a truth of

Religion, and the possible subject of a Commandment.[80]

On this account I do not demand of a _Deist_, that he should adopt the

doctrine of the Trinity. For he might very well be justified in

replying, that he rejected the doctrine, _not_ because it could not be

_demonstrated_, nor yet on the score of any incomprehensibilities and

seeming contradictions that might be objected to it, as knowing that

these might be, and in fact had been, urged with equal force against a

personal God under any form capable of love and veneration; _but_

because he had not the same theoretical necessity, the same interests

and instincts of reason for the one hypothesis as for the other. It is

not enough, the Deist might justly say, that there is no cogent reason

why I should _not_ believe the Trinity; you must show me some cogent

reason why I _should_.

But the case is quite different with a Christian, who accepts the

Scriptures as the Word of God, yet refuses his assent to the plainest

declarations of these Scriptures, and explains away the most express

texts into metaphor and hyperbole, _because_ the literal and obvious

interpretation is (according to _his_ notions) absurd and contrary to

reason. _He_ is bound to show, that it is so in any sense, not equally

applicable to the texts asserting the Being, Infinity, and Personality

of God the Father, the Eternal and Omnipresent ONE, who _created_ the

Heaven and the Earth. And the more is he bound to do this, and the

greater is my right to demand it of him, because the doctrine of

Redemption from sin supplies the Christian with motives and reasons

for the divinity of the Redeemer far more _concerning_ and coercive

_subjectively_, that is, in the economy of his own soul, than are all

the inducements that can influence the Deist _objectively_, that is,

in the interpretation of Nature.

Do I then utterly exclude the speculative Reason from Theology? No! It

is its office and rightful privilege to determine on the _negative_

truth of whatever we are required to believe. The Doctrine must not

_contradict_ any universal principle: for this would be a Doctrine

that contradicted itself. Or Philosophy? No. It may be and has been

the servant and pioneer of Faith by convincing the mind, that a

doctrine is cogitable, that the soul can present the _Idea_ to itself;

and that _if_ we determine to contemplate, or _think_ of, the subject

at all, so and in no other form can this be effected. So far are both

logic and philosophy to be received and trusted. But the _duty_, and

in some cases and for some persons even the _right_, of thinking on

subjects beyond the bounds of sensible experience; the grounds of the

_real_ truth; the _life_, the _substance_, the _hope_, the _love_, in

one word, the _Faith_: these are Derivatives from the practical,

moral, and spiritual Nature and Being of Man.

[72] At a period, in which Doctors Marsh and Wordsworth have, by the

Zealous on one side, being charged with Popish principles on account

of their _Anti-bibliolatry_, and the sturdy adherents of the doctrines

common to Luther and Calvin, and the literal interpreters of the

Articles and Homilies, are, (I wish I could say, altogether without

any fault of their own) regarded by the Clergy generally as virtual

Schismatics, dividers _of_, though not _from_, the Church, it is

serving the cause of charity to assist in circulating the following

instructive passage from the Life of Bishop Hackett respecting the

dispute between the Augustinians, or Luthero-Calvinistic divines and

the Grotians of his age: in which Controversy (says his biographer)

he, Hackett, "was ever very moderate."

"But having been bred under Bishop Davenant and Dr. Ward in Cambridge,

he was addicted to their sentiments. Archbishop Usher would say, that

Davenant understood those controversies better than ever any man did

since St. Augustine. But he (Bishop Hackett) used to say, that he was

_sure_ he had _three_ excellent men of his mind in this controversy:

1. _Padre Paolo_ (Father Paul) whose letter is extant in Heinsius,

_anno_ 1604: 2. _Thomas Aquinas_: 3. St. Augustine. But besides and

above them all, he believed in his Conscience that St. Paul was of the

same mind likewise. Yet at the same time he would profess, that he

disliked no Arminians, but such as revile and defame every one who is

_not so_: and he would often commend Arminius himself for his

excellent wit and parts, but only tax his want of reading and

knowledge in Antiquity. And he ever held, it was the foolishest thing

in the world to say the Arminians were _Popishly_ inclined, when so

many Dominicians and Jansenists were rigid followers of Augustine in

these points: and no less foolish to say that the _Anti-Arminians_

were Puritans or Presbyterians, when _Ward_, and _Davenant_, and

Prideaux, and Brownrig, those stout champions for Episcopacy, were

decided Anti-Arminians; while Arminius himself was ever a

Presbyterian. Therefore he greatly commended the moderation of our

Church, which extended equal Communion to both."

[73] _Aranea prodigiosa._ See Baker's Microscopic Experiments.

[74] May not this Rule be expressed more intelligibly (to a

mathematician at least) thus:--Reasoning from _finite_ to _finite_, on

a basis of truth, also, reasoning from _infinite_ to _infinite_, on a

basis of truth, will always lead to truth, as intelligibly as the

basis on which such truths respectively rest.--While, reasoning from

_finite_ to _infinite_, or from _infinite_ to _finite_, will lead to

apparent absurdity, although the basis be true: and is not _such_

apparent absurdity, another expression for "truth unintelligible by a

_finite_ mind"?

[75] For example: at the date of St. Paul's Epistles, the (Roman)

world may be resembled to a mass in the furnace in the first moment of

fusion, here a speck and there a spot of the melted metal shining pure

and brilliant amid the scum and dross. To have received the _name_ of

Christian was a privilege, a high and distinguished favour. No wonder

therefore, that in St. Paul's writings the words, elect, and election,

often, nay, most often, mean the same as _eccalumeni, ecclesia_, that

is, those who have been _called out_ of the world: and it is a

dangerous perversion of the Apostle's word to interpret it in the

sense, in which it was used by our Lord, viz. in _opposition to the

called_. (Many are _called_ but few _chosen_.) In St. Paul's sense and

at that time the believers collectively formed a small and select

number; and every Christian real or nominal, was one of the Elect. Add

too, that this ambiguity is increased by the accidental circumstance,

that the _kyriak, Ædes Dominicæ_, Lord's House, _kirk_; and

_ecclesia_, the sum total of the _eccalumeni, evocati, called out_;

are both rendered by the same word Church.

[76] Or (I may add) _any_ Idea which does not either identify the

Creator with the Creaton; or else represent the Supreme Being as a

mere impersonal Law or _ordo ordinans_, differing from the Law of

Gravitation only by its _universality_.

[77] I have elsewhere remarked on the assistance which those that

labour after distinct conceptions would receive from the

re-introduction of the terms _objective_, and _subjective_,

_objective_ and _subjective reality_, and the like, as substitutes for

_real_ and _notional_, and to the exclusion of the false antithesis

between _real_ and _ideal_. For the Student in that noblest of the

sciences, the _scire teipsum_, the advantage would be especially

great.[78] The few sentences that follow, in illustration of the terms

here advocated, will not, I trust, be a waste of the reader's time.

The celebrated Euler having demonstrated certain properties of arches,

adds: "All experience is in contradiction to this; but this is no

reason for doubting its truth." The words _sound_ paradoxical; but

mean no more than this--that the mathematical properties of figure and

space are not less certainly the properties of figure and space

because they can never be perfectly realized in wood, stone, or iron.

Now this assertion of Euler's might be expressed at once, briefly and

simply, by saying, that the properties in question were _subjectively_

true, though not objectively--or that the mathematical arch possessed

a _subjective reality_ though incapable of being realized

_objectively_.

In like manner if I had to express my conviction, that space was not

itself a _thing_, but a _mode_ or _form_ of perceiving, or the inward

ground and condition in the percipient, in consequence of which things

are seen as outward and co-existing, I convey this at once by the

words, space is _subjective_, or space is real in and for the

_subject_ alone.

If I am asked, Why not say in and for the _mind_, which every one

would understand? I reply: we know indeed, that all minds are

Subjects; but are by no means certain, that all subjects are minds.

For a mind is a subject that knows itself, or a subject that is its

own object. The inward principle of Growth and individual Form in

every seed and plant is a _subject_, and without any exertion of

poetic privilege poets may speak of the _soul_ of the flower. But the

man would be a dreamer, who otherwise than poetically should speak of

roses and lilies as _self-conscious_ subjects. Lastly, by the

assistance of the terms, Object and Subject, thus used as

correspondent opposites, or as negative and positive in physics (for

example, negative and positive electricity) we may arrive at the

distinct import and proper use of the strangely misused word, idea.

And as the forms of logic are all borrowed from geometry

(_Ratiocinatio discursiva formas suas sive canonas recipit ab

intuitu_) I may be permitted to elucidate my present meaning. Every

line may be, and by the ancient Geometricians _was_, considered as a

point _produced_, the two extremes being its poles, while the point

itself remains in, or is at least represented by, the midpoint, the

indifference of the two poles or correlative opposites. Logically

applied, the two extremes or poles are named Thesis and Antithesis:

thus in the line

I

T-----------------------A

we have T = Thesis, A = Antithesis, and I = Punctum Indifferens sive

_amphotericum_, which latter is to be conceived as _both_ in as far as

it may be _either_ of the two former. Observe: not both at the same

time in the same relation; for this would be the _identity_ of T and

A, not the _indifference_:--but so, that relatively to A, I is equal

to T, and relatively to T it becomes = A. For the purposes of the

universal _Noetic_, in which we require terms of most comprehension

and least specific import, might not the Noetic Pentad be,--

1. Prothesis.

2. Thesis. 4. Mesothesis. 3. Antithesis.

5. Synthesis.

Prothesis.

Sum.

Thesis. Methosesis. Antithesis.

Res. Agere. Ago, Patior.

Synthesis.

Agens.

1. Verb Substantive = Prothesis, as expressing the _identity_ or

coinherence of Act and Being.

2. Substantive = Thesis, expressing Being. 3. Verb = Antithesis,

expressing, Act. 4. Infinite = Mesothesis, as being either Substantive

or Verb, or both at once, only in different relations. 5. Participle =

Synthesis. Thus in Chemistry Sulphuretted Hydrogen is an Acid

relatively to the more powerful Alkalis, and an Alkali relatively to a

powerful Acid. Yet one other remark, and I pass to the question. In

order to render the constructions of pure Mathematics applicable to

Philosophy, the Pythagoreans, I imagine, represented the Line as

_generated_, or, as it were, radiated, by a Point not contained in the

Line but independent, and (in the language of that School)

transcendent to all production, which it caused but did not partake

in. _Facit, non patitur._ This was the _punctum invisible, et

presuppositum_: and in this way the Pythagoreans guarded against the

error of Pantheism, into which the later schools fell. The assumption

of this Point I call the logical PROTHESIS. We have now therefore four

Relations of Thought expressed: 1. Prothesis, or the Identity of T and

A, which is neither, because in it, as the transcendent of both, both

are contained and exist as one. Taken _absolutely_, this finds its

application in the Supreme Being alone, the Pythagorean TETRACTYS; the

INEFFABLE NAME, to which no Image can be attached; the Point, which

has no (real) Opposite or Counter-point. But _relatively_ taken and

inadequately, the germinal power of every seed[79] might be

generalized under the relation of Identity. 2. Thesis, or position. 3.

Antithesis, or Opposition. 4. Indifference. To which when we add the

Synthesis or Composition, in its several forms of Equilibrium, as in

quiescent Electricity; of Neutralization, as of Oxygen and Hydrogen in

water; and of Predominance, as of Hydrogen and Carbon with Hydrogen,

predominant, in pure alcohol; or of Carbon and Hydrogen, with the

comparative predominance of the Carbon, in Oil; we complete the five

most general Forms or Preconceptions of Constructive Logic.

And now for the answer to the question. What is an IDEA, if it mean

neither an Impression on the Senses, nor a definite Conception, nor an

abstract Notion? (And if it does mean either of these, the word is

superfluous: and while it remains undetermined which of these is meant

by the word, or whether it is not _which you please_, it is worse than

superfluous. See the 'Statesman's Manual,' Appendix _ad finem_.) But

supposing the word to have a meaning of its own, what does it

mean?--What is an IDEA?--In answer to this I commence with the

absolutely Real as the PROTHESIS; the _subjectively_ Real as the

THESIS; the _objectively_ Real as the ANTITHESIS: and I affirm, that

Idea is the INDIFFERENCE of the two--so namely, that if it be

conceived as in the Subject, the Idea is an Object, and possesses

Objective Truth; but if in an Object, it is then a Subject and is

necessarily thought of as exercising the powers of a Subject. Thus an

IDEA conceived as subsisting in an Object becomes a LAW; and a Law

contemplated _subjectively_ (in a mind) is an Idea.

[78] See the 'Selection from Mr. Coleridge's Literary Correspondence'

in _Blackwood's Magazine_, 1821, Letter II.--ED.

[79] See Comment on Moral and Religious Aphorism VI., p. 40.--ED.

[80] In a letter to a friend on the mathematical atheists of the

French Revolution, La Lande and others, or rather on a young man of

distinguished abilities, but an avowed and proselyting partizan of

their tenets, I concluded with these words: "The man who will believe

nothing but by force of demonstrative evidence (even though it is

strictly demonstrable that the demonstrability required would

countervene all the purposes of the truth in question, all that render

the belief of the same desirable or obligatory) is not in a state of

mind to be reasoned with on any subject. But if he further denies the

_fact_ of the Law of Conscience, and the essential difference between

right and wrong, I confess, he puzzles me. I cannot without gross

inconsistency appeal to his Conscience and Moral Sense, or I should

admonish him that, as an honest man, he ought to _advertize_ himself,

with a _Cavete omnes! Scelus sum._ And as an honest man myself, I dare

not advise him on prudential grounds to keep his opinions secret, lest

I should make myself his accomplice, and _be helping him on with a

wrap-rascal_."