ZEEBRÜGGE AND OSTEND
In the course of the night April 22-23, an attack was made on the
two Flemish bases, Ostend and Zeebrügge, with a view to blocking the
entrances of both by the familiar method of sinking old cement-filled
ships in the narrow fairway. At Ostend the block-ships were grounded
slightly off their course, and a few days later a second attempt was
made. The Zeebrügge block-ships got into their chosen billets and are
safely grounded there. The latter port, in spite of official denials,
was for many months made almost useless to the enemy, and it is
probably safe to assume that the value of Ostend, where _Vindictive_
lies across the fairway, is considerably diminished. Material results,
therefore, of high importance were achieved by this enterprise.
The operations are worth examining on three quite independent grounds.
First, what is the strategical value of their objective? How, that is
to say, would the naval activities of Great Britain and her Allies
gain by Zeebrügge and Ostend being, for some months at least out of
action? And, conversely, what would the enemy lose? Unless we are
satisfied that the gain must be substantial--apart altogether from the
moral effect--we should obviously have a difficulty in justifying, not
the losses in ships incurred, which were trivial and easily replaced,
but the losses in picked men, which were irreparable. Secondly, the
incident is clearly worth examining for its tactical interest. What
were the difficulties the vice-admiral in command had to overcome?
By what weapons, devices, and manœuvres did he attempt to effect his
purpose? Third, what was the moral effect?
STRATEGICAL OBJECT
There is now only one theatre of the war, and in this the issue of
civilization or barbarism must be decided by military action. The event
depends upon the capacity of the sea power of the Allies to deliver
in France all the fighting men and all the war material that Allied
ships can draw from Asia, from Australia, from South America, from the
United States, and from Canada, and then deliver either directly into
France, or first into British ports, and then from Britain into France.
To beat the German Army is ultimately a problem in sea communications.
The whole of these have to pass through the bottle-neck of the Western
end of the Atlantic lanes. Into an area south of Ireland and north
of Ushant, a hundred miles square, every ship that comes from the
Mediterranean, from the Cape, from Buenos Ayres, Rio, the West Indies,
or the Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic seaboard of America, must come.
Secondary only to this are the areas that feed ships into it, or
into which the ships that pass through it are dissipated on their
way to the several ports--the Mediterranean, the Bay of Biscay, the
English Channel, St. George’s Channel, the Irish Sea. It is in these,
when it is driven from the main funnel point of traffic, that the
submarine must do its work. The defeat of the submarine, when at
large, turns upon three factors: (1) the under-water offensive--that
is, mine-fields, that will tend to keep it within certain areas;
(2) the efficiency with which ships liable to attack are protected
by convoy; and (3) the skill and persistence with which submarines,
once on their hunting grounds, are in turn hunted. To maintain a
cross-Channel barrage, the enemy surface craft must be handicapped in
every possible way. The second and third factors of anti-submarine
war make heavy demands on material, on personnel, and on skill,
judgment, and organization. Here the decisive material factor is the
number of destroyers available for both forms of work. When it comes
to a close-quarters fight, no craft that has a speed of less than
thirty knots, that cannot maintain itself in any weather, that does
not possess a large cruising radius, can be of the first efficiency.
The larger petrol-driven submarine-chasers and the many special craft
which are built for various purposes in connection with the defensive
campaign, all have their field of utility. But for the final power to
rush swiftly on to a submarine if it is momentarily seen afloat, and
for covering the area into which it can submerge itself, while the
destroyer approaches with depth bombs, the destroyer, if only from its
superior speed, stands supreme as the enemy of the U-boat. From the
very earliest days of the submarine work it has, then, been axiomatic
that every measure which will put a larger number of destroyers at
our disposal should be taken at almost any cost. How does the work at
Zeebrügge and Ostend help us, both in this respect and in a mining
policy?
At these two ports our enemy was able to maintain a very considerable
destroyer force. Its activities were necessarily mainly confined to
work in darkness or in thick weather. But in such conditions its
efficiency was of a very high order. The public only heard of its
activities when it shelled some point of the coast of Kent, or raided
our trawlers or other patrols, and, in all conscience, it heard of
these activities often enough. Yet we were inclined to suppose them
unimportant because their material results were insignificant. The news
that a cross-Channel barrage was in course of establishment gave them a
new value. But their value to the enemy should not be measured by the
casualties they inflicted on our light craft, nor by their occasional
excursions into the murder of civilians on shore. It lay in the fact
that the enemy’s force permanently withdrew from the anti-submarine
campaign numerous destroyer leaders and destroyers which had to be
maintained at Dover to cope with it. From Zeebrügge to Emden--the
nearest German port--is, roughly, three hundred miles by sea, and it
does not need elaborate argument to show that if Zeebrügge and Ostend
are permanently out of action the problem of dealing with enemy craft
in the narrow seas is totally and entirely changed. With these gone,
the East Coast ports became the natural centres from which to command
the waters between Great Britain and Holland. They are fifty miles
nearer Emden than is Dunkirk. If any German destroyers got west and
south of Dunkirk, and the news of their presence were cabled to an
East Coast base, destroyers could get between the enemy and his ports
without difficulty. Thus, enemy surface craft, based upon German ports,
would practically be denied access to Flemish waters altogether, and
this by the East Coast and not by the Dover forces. In other words, the
Dover patrol forces would, by the closing of Ostend and Zeebrügge, be
set free for the highly important work of aiding in the anti-submarine
campaign--and there is certainly no naval need that is greater.
The strategical objective, therefore, which Admiral Keyes put before
himself in his expedition was, so far as he could, to set back the
enemy’s naval bases by no less than three hundred miles. Its importance
as setting free new forces, both for the direct attack on submarines,
and for saving the mine-layers from attack, cannot be exaggerated, for
it was a step--and a great step--forward in making sure of the sea
communications on which all depends. It must be conceded, then that the
results Admiral Keyes had in view amply justify a very considerable
expenditure both of material and men. Let us next ask ourselves what
kind of material he chose, and how he proposed to use his forces with
utmost economy and maximum tactical effect.
SIR ROGER KEYES’S TACTICS
The purposes of the expedition, as we have seen, were to block the exit
of the canal at Zeebrügge and the entrance of the small, narrow harbour
at Ostend with old cruisers filled with cement, the removal of which
would be an operation of a lengthy and tedious kind. Incidentally,
the plan was to effect the maximum destruction of war stores and
equipment at Zeebrügge and to sink as many as possible of the enemy
vessels found in either port, and finally, to inflict on the enemy the
maximum possible losses of personnel. By blocking the canal the value
of Zeebrügge was reduced from being an equipped base to being a mere
refuge. As there were two points of attack, the expedition naturally
resolved itself into two distinct, but simultaneous, undertakings. The
simpler, the less dangerous, the less ambitious, but, as the event
showed, the more difficult operation of the two, was the attempt to
block Ostend. The larger, more complex, and infinitely more perilous
undertaking, but because of its very complications, ultimately easier,
was the attempt at Zeebrügge. In its broad outlines, the scheme was to
get the ships as near as possible without detection, and then to trust
to a final rush to gain the desired position. Concealment up to the
last moment was to be secured by smoke screens. At Ostend the problem
was simply to run two or three ships into the entrance--that is, to get
them into position before the enemy’s artillery made it impossible to
manœuvre. If the Ostend attempt failed, it was largely because a sudden
change in the weather conditions robbed the smoke screens, which were
to hide the ships, of their value, so that the operation of placing
the block-ships accurately was made almost impossible. The operation
of blocking such entrances has, of course, long been familiar. The
exploit of Lieutenant Hobson in the Spanish-American War, is fresh in
the memories of all sailors. This failed through the steering gear of
the blocking-ship being destroyed by gunfire at the critical moment.
The Japanese attempted the same thing on a large scale at Port Arthur
but with anything but complete success. If the first Ostend effort,
then, fell short of finality, we have the experience of these earlier
precedents to explain and account for it.
I have dealt with Ostend first because, after the preliminary
bombardment, nothing more could have been attempted than to force the
ships into the harbour entrance and sink them there. But at Zeebrügge a
far more intricate operation was possible. Zeebrügge is not a town. It
is just the sea exit of the Bruges Canal, with its railway connections,
round which a few streets of houses have clustered. The actual entrance
to the canal is flanked by two short sea walls, at the end of each of
which are guide lights. From these lights up the canal to the lock
gates is about half a mile. A large mole protects the sea channel to
the canal from being blocked by silted sand. The mole is connected
to the mainland by five hundred yards of pile viaduct. The mole is
nearly a mile long, built in a curve, a segment amounting to, perhaps,
one-sixth of a circle, the centre of which would be a quarter of a mile
east of the canal entrance, while its radius would be three-quarters
of a mile. It is a large and substantial stone structure, on which are
railway lines and a railway station, and has been turned to capital
military account by the enemy, who erected on it aircraft sheds and
military establishments of many kinds.
The general plan was to bombard the place for an hour by monitors and,
under cover of this fire, for the attacking squadron to advance to the
harbour mouth. Then, when the bombardment ceased, _Vindictive_ was to
run alongside the mole, disembark her own landing party and those from
_Iris_ and _Daffodil_, who were to overpower the enemy protecting the
guns and stores while the old submarines were run into the pile viaduct
to cut the mole off from the mainland, thus isolating it. Meanwhile,
other forces were to engage any enemy destroyers or submarines that
might be in the port. Finally, the block-ships were to be pushed right
up into the canal mouth and there sunk. The success of the latter part
of these operations turned upon the extent to which the enemy could be
made to believe that the attack on the mole was the chief objective.
To ensure success against the mole, several very ingenious devices
were brought into play. The main landing parties were placed in
_Vindictive_. This cruiser--which displaced about 5,600 tons, and
had a broadside of six 6-inch guns--was fitted, on the port side,
with “brows,” or landing gangways, that could be lowered on the mole
the moment she came alongside. All the vessels of the squadron were
equipped with fog- or smoke-making material, which would veil the force
from the enemy until he sent up his star shells and, in the artificial
light, would conceal the character, numbers, and composition of the
force as completely as possible. It seems that a shift of wind at the
critical moment--here, as at Ostend--robbed this plan of some of its
anticipated efficiency. At some point of the approach, then, apparently
just before _Vindictive_ rounded and got abreast of the lighthouse,
the presence of the invaders was detected, and they were saluted
first by salvoes of star shells and next by as hot a gunfire as can
be conceived. _Vindictive_ lost no time in replying. Her six 6-inch
guns--and no doubt her 12-pounders as well--swept the mole as long as
they could be fired, and, once alongside, the “brows”--only two out of
eighteen seem to have survived the heavy gunfire--were lowered, and
officers and men “boarded” the mole.
The earlier accounts stated that this landing was effected in spite
of the stoutest sort of hand-to-hand fighting, that the enemy was
overcome and driven back, and that the landing party then proceeded
to the destruction of the sheds and stores. The plans had included
the blowing-up of the pile viaduct, which connects the stone mole
with the mainland--by means of one or two old submarines charged with
explosives, and so virtually converted into giant torpedoes. These
did their work most effectively, and had the enemy been in occupation
of the mole, his force would have been isolated. But, as a fact, the
mole was not occupied, and the enemy relied upon machine- and gun-fire
organized from the shore end of the mole for making the landing
impossible. In spite of a withering fusillade, a considerable landing
party of marines and bluejackets got ashore, though Colonel Elliott and
Commander Halahan and great numbers of their men were killed in the
attempt. Those that got on the mole proceeded to destroy, as far as
possible, the sheds, stores, and guns, and then turned their attention
to the destroyers moored against its inner side.
Meantime, the only enemy destroyer that seems to have had steam up
tried to escape from harbour, and was either rammed or torpedoed and
instantly sunk. Others, less well prepared, were either boarded, after
the resistance of their crews had been overcome, and, it must be
presumed, sunk also. Others, again, were attacked by motor launches,
which preceded and helped clear a way for the block-ships. Whether
an attempt on the lock gates was made or even contemplated, we have
not been told; but the main purpose of the expedition, the sinking of
at least two out of the three old _Apollos_ in the right place, was
achieved with precision. The moment the block-ships were in place, the
purpose for which the mole was occupied was gained, and the order was
rightly given for an immediate retreat. The work had been done, and
there was no knowing what new resources the enemy could have brought to
bear had time been wasted. Many of the vessels, including _Vindictive_,
had been holed by 11-inch shells. But _Vindictive’s_ damages were
not of a serious kind, and the whole force was able to withdraw in
safety, with the exception of one destroyer and two motor launches.
The destroyer is known to have been sunk by gunfire. The successful
withdrawal of the expedition is conclusive evidence that the enemy was
demoralized.
For such close-quarters work Admiral Keyes, naturally enough, armed his
forces as for trench fighting. _Vindictive_ carried howitzers on her
forward and after decks, and her boarding parties were liberally armed
with grenades and flame-throwers as well as with rifles, bayonets,
and truncheons. Machine guns also seem to have been landed, so that
hand-to-hand fighting was prepared for in the full light of the most
recent war experience. The plan, it should be noted, was to have
included aeroplane co-operation to supplement, if not to assist, the
work of the monitors; but the change in the weather appears to have
interfered with this part of the programme, and may quite easily have
made any accurate work by the monitors impossible also.
It is, first of all, patent that the expedition was thoroughly thought
out in all its details, and therefore closely planned. An accurate
study of the enemy’s defences had been made, and suitable means of
avoiding his attack or overcoming his defences had been elaborately
worked out. It is equally clear that almost to the moment when the
attack was made, the weather conditions were those which the plan
contemplated as necessary to success, and that it was only the sudden,
unexpected change in the wind that threatened the Ostend part of the
operations with partial failure and made the Zeebrügge operations
more costly in life than they should otherwise have been. When it is
remembered that the approaches to Ostend and Zeebrügge are commanded
by very formidable batteries, armed with no less than 120 guns of the
largest calibre, and that the mole and the sides of the canal bristled
with quick-firing 12-pounders and larger pieces, it will be realized
that, to the enemy, any attempt actually to bring an unarmoured vessel,
with her cement-laden consorts, right up either to the mole or to
the actual mouth of the canal must have appeared an undertaking too
absurdly hare-brained for any one but a lunatic to have attempted. It
was just because Sir Roger Keyes had evaluated the enemy’s defences
with exactitude and had thought out and adopted, first, methods
of evading his vigilance and, next, manœuvres that would _for the
necessary period_ make his weapons useless, that it was possible not
only to make the attempt, but to realize the very high degree of
success that has apparently been won.
The essence of the matter, of course, was to take the enemy by
surprise. At first sight, it may appear a curious way of putting him
off his guard, that he should for an hour be bombarded by monitors and
aeroplanes. But the Vice-Admiral probably reasoned that this would
lead, as it often does, to the crews of the big guns taking shelter
underground until the attack is over. If the monitors were placed at
their usual great distance from ports, and were concealed by smoke or
fog screens, the enemy gunners would know that it was merely idle to
attempt to reply to their fire. If nothing was to be possible in the
way of response until daylight, the gun-layers were just as well in
their shell-proofs as anywhere. Under cover, then, of this long-range
bombardment, and concealing his squadron by the ingenious fog methods
invented by the late Commander Brock, Sir Roger Keyes made his way
within a very short distance of the veiled lights at the end of the
mole. It was at this point that the wind shifted and the presence of
the squadron was revealed to the enemy. There was a brief interval
before the big guns could be manned, and it was doubtless owing to this
that _Vindictive_ got alongside before more than one 11-inch shell had
struck her. Once under the shelter of the mole, she was safe from the
larger pieces, and only her upper works could be raked by the smaller
natures.
ATTACK ON THE MOLE
The policy of attacking the mole and making that appear to the enemy
the central affair, was a fine piece of tactics. The engagement which
developed there was in fact, a containing action, which left the
execution of the main objective to the other forces, and its purpose
was to prevent the enemy from interfering too much with them. Nelson,
it will be remembered, cut out a block of ships in the centre of the
enemy’s line at Trafalgar, occupying them so that their hands were
full, and preventing both them and the van from coming to the succour
of the rear. The main operation was the destruction of the rear by
Collingwood. Here it was _Vindictive_, her landing party, that played
the Nelson rôle while the Vice-Admiral, in _Warwick_, himself directed
the crucial operation, namely, the navigation of the block-ships to
their billets. The moment they were blown up and sunk the purpose of
the expedition was fulfilled, and _Vindictive’s_ siren recalled all
those from the mole who could get back to the ship. The actual fortunes
of the fight on the mole itself, while of thrilling human interest
owing to the extraordinary circumstances in which it was undertaken,
were of quite subsidiary importance. The primary object, it must be
borne in mind, was not the destruction of the mole forts, or of the
aeroplane shed, or of whatever military equipment was there, or even of
killing or capturing its garrison. These were only important in so far
as their partial realization was necessary to relieving the block-ships
from the danger of premature sinking.
This is a matter of real capital importance and of very great
interest, for it is, I think, not difficult to realize that, had
similar circumstances existed at Ostend--had it been possible, that is
to say, to occupy the defenders and distract their attention on some
perfectly irrelevant engagement--the requisite time would have been
given to those in command of the block-ships to make sure of getting
them into the right position. As things were, they were threatened by
the fate which made Hobson’s attempt at Santiago a failure. With the
whole gun-power of Ostend concentrated upon the blocking-ships, there
was not a minute to be wasted. But with the enemy’s fire drawn there
would have been the leisure which alone could make precision possible.
MORAL EFFECT
The attack on Zeebrügge and the two successive attacks on Ostend,
carefully planned and boldly and resolutely carried out, achieved a
very high measure of success. It was natural enough, on the first
receipt of the news, that we should all have been carried away by
our wonder and admiration at the astonishing heroism that made it
possible to carry through so intricate a series of operations, when
every soul engaged was seemingly aware of the desperate character
of the enterprise, when no one could have expected to return alive,
when the enemy’s means seemed ample, not only for the killing of
everyone engaged, but for the immediate frustration of every object
that they had in view, and so made most of the astounding gallantry
and daring of all concerned. For over four years now we have had a
constant recurrence of such feats of courage, and repetition does not
lessen their power to intoxicate us with an overwhelming admiration of
those who are the heroes of these great adventures. But we should be
misconceiving the significance of these events if we were to measure
their importance either by the ordered daring of those engaged, or by
their successful execution, or by their immediate military results,
great and far-reaching as these were.
The thing was more important as affording conclusive evidence that
the British Navy, as inspired and directed from headquarters, had now
abandoned the purely defensive rôle assigned to it by ten years of
pre-war, and three and a half years of war, administration. It meant
that the Fleet had escaped from those counsels of timorous--because
unimaginative and ignorant--caution, which had checked its ardour
and limited its activities since August, 1914. The effect may be
incalculable. The doctrine that every operation which involved the risk
of losing men or ships must necessarily be too hazardous to undertake,
was thus shown to be no longer the loadstone of Whitehall’s policy. The
Navy was at last set free to act on an older and a better tradition.
It is indeed on this tradition that on almost every occasion the Navy
has, in fact, acted when it got a chance. When _Swift_ and _Broke_
tackled three times their number of enemy last year, and _Botha_ and
_Morris_ six times their number this year, the gallant captains of
these gallant vessels did not wait to ask if the position of their
ships was “critical” or otherwise; but, with an insight into the true
defensive value of attack--which, seemingly, it is the privilege only
of the most valorous to possess--went straight for their enemies,
fought overwhelming odds at close quarters, and came out as victorious
as a rightly reasoned calculation would have shown to be probable.
Similarly, on May 31, 1916, Sir David Beatty, when his force of
battle-cruisers, by the loss of _Indefatigable_ and _Queen Mary_,
had been reduced below that of the enemy, persisted in his attack
upon Von Hipper and, by demoralizing the enemy’s fire, provided most
effectively for the safety of his own ships. Losses did not make him
retreat then, nor, when Scheer came upon the scene with the whole High
Seas Fleet, did he withdraw from the action--his speed would have made
this easy--though the odds were heavy against him. He kept, on the
contrary, the whole German Fleet in play, drawing them dexterously to
the north, where contact with the Grand Fleet would be inevitable. And,
when the contact was made, his last effort to break up the German line
was to close from the 14,000 yards, a range he had prudently maintained
during the previous two hours, to 8,000, where his guns would be more
certainly effective, realizing perfectly that no loss of ships in his
own squadron would signify, if only the entire destruction of the
German Fleet were made possible by such a sacrifice. It would not be
difficult to give scores of incidents in which individual admirals and
captains have shown the old spirit under new conditions.
But, save only for the crazy attack on the Dardanelles forts--and
this is hardly a precedent we should rejoice to see followed--we
have looked in vain for any sign of naval initiative from Whitehall.
The explanation lies in the fact that we had no staff for planning
operations, nor the right men in power for judging whether any
proposed undertaking was based on a right calculation of the value of
the available means of offence and defence. The events, therefore of
the night of the 22nd and the early hours of the 23rd were of quite
extraordinary importance, for they marked an undertaking needing long
and elaborate preparation, and one which could not have been brought
to a successful issue had it not enjoyed from its first inception the
enthusiastic support of the Admiralty. But this is not all. Not only
was this an Admiralty-supported undertaking, it was one that, unlike
the Gallipoli adventure, was carried through on right staff principles.
There was a definite, well-thought-out plan--careful preparation for
every step in the right selection of men and means for its execution.
I think it is right to put this forward as the most important aspect
of a significant, stirring, and successful enterprise. It is the most
important because the news meant so very much more than that Zeebrügge
was blocked, that Ostend was crippled, and that an expedition--at first
sight perilous beyond conception--had been carried through with losses
altogether disproportionate, either to its dangers or to the results
achieved. The news meant that a new direction either had been, or
certainly can, and therefore must, now be given to our naval policy. In
the spring of 1917 sceptics were asking if the Army could win the war
before the Navy lost it. Why, they said, if our land forces can force a
way through what we were told were impregnable fortifications, should
the greatest sea force in the world be impotent against an enemy who
slinks behind his forts with his surface craft, while devastating our
sea communications with his submarines? Is naval ingenuity, they asked,
so crippled that we can neither protect our trade against the submarine
at sea, nor block the enemy’s ports so that the submarine can never
get to sea? The critics replied that all was well with the Navy, but
that all was sadly wrong with its official chiefs. The reorganization
of the Admiralty was immediately followed by the adoption of the
convoy principle--and submarine losses were reduced to half. This
long-advocated measure, the recently inaugurated barrage at Dover, and
now the events of the morning of April 23, have justified the critics
and the changes in method and men which they urged. Zeebrügge had been
in the enemy’s hands since September, 1914, and it took us three and
a half years, not to discover a man capable of attacking it, but in
developing an Admiralty capable of picking the man and giving him the
right support before the attack could be made. If a similar spirit had
actuated a properly constituted Admiralty all these years, what might
not the Navy have accomplished?
In the previous year the emancipation of the Navy had gone forward
apace. And not the least significant of the stages in the process
were first the appointment of Admiral Sir Roger Keyes to be head of
the Planning Division at the Admiralty, next his removal from the
Admiralty to Dover, next the inauguration of the Channel barrage, and
finally his surprising and masterly stroke at the Flemish ports. The
enumeration of these stages is worth making, for they mark the genesis
of the plan we have seen achieved. It was, if I am correctly informed,
quite understood when Admiral Keyes went to Dover that his mission was
temporary. If he was sent to do the things which he has done, and now
that he has done them is taken back to Whitehall, then it might seem
as if we might look forward to an aggressive policy at sea more worthy
of the superb force which we possess, and more consonant with its
glorious heritage than anything which we have witnessed in the past.
And if Sir Roger cannot be spared from his new command, so auspiciously
inaugurated, then we must trust that some other of equal brains
and spirit has already taken or will take his place. Zeebrügge and
Ostend, then, will figure in naval history, not only as the names of
achievements unique and splendid in themselves, but more famous as the
harbingers of still greater things to come.
END
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THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS
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Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
quotation marks retained.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
Text within some diagrams has been enlarged to improve readability.
Empty space in some diagrams has been removed to allow those diagrams
to be enlarged for improved readability.
Page 163: Closing quotation mark added at the end of “voice pipes in
the beginning.’”
Page 262: Opening quotation mark removed at “Mr. Churchill’s speech”.
End of Project Gutenberg's The British Navy in Battle, by Arthur H. Pollen