THE ACTION OFF THE DOGGER BANK
The two bombardments of the early winter of 1914 have been variously
explained. They may have been meant to force us to keep our main forces
concentrated: or simply to cheer up the Germans and depress our people.
Both were organized so that the German squadron could start its race
for home within an hour of daybreak.
It is more difficult, however, to explain the events of January 28. The
precise point where Sir David Beatty encountered Admiral von Hipper’s
fleet has not been authoritatively made known, but it seems to have
been on the northeastern edge of the Dogger Bank. They were encountered
at seven o’clock in the morning. Von Hipper’s presence at this point
cannot, then, explain his being out on an expedition analogous to the
former two. And I have some difficulty in understanding exactly why he
took this risk. It is, of course, possible the Germans had had reports
to the effect that the North Sea was clear on the 27th. It may have
been so reported on several occasions, and it is possible that aircraft
had verified this fact, when the weather permitted of their employment
for this purpose. The Germans, who are fond of jumping to conclusions
on very insufficient premises, may have exaggerated the effect of their
submarine campaign on British dispositions. We know, for instance, that
the alarm undoubtedly felt by the public in September and October was
very greatly exaggerated in the German press. At any rate, immediately
after the battle of the Falkland Islands a good deal of rodomontade
appeared about the British being driven from the North Sea, and the
German seamen may have felt bound to act as if this rodomontade were
true. Or a much simpler explanation may suffice. Von Hipper may have
come out to look for the British ships and draw them into prepared
positions and to engage them on the German terms. The defeat of Von
Spee may have made a naval demonstration necessary.
Whatever the explanation of the Germans being where they were, it was
only by mere chance that they escaped annihilation. Had Sir David
Beatty--as it might well have happened--been to the east of them when
they were sighted, not a single German ship would ever have got home.
It was unlucky, too, that his squadron was temporarily deprived of the
services of the _Queen Mary_. A fourth ship of a speed superior to that
of _Lion_, _Tiger_, and _Princess Royal_, and armed like them with 13.5
guns might have made the whole difference in the conditions in which
the fight took place. Besides, _Queen Mary_ was much the best gunnery
ship in the Fleet. Once more, then, the Germans had quite exceptional
luck upon their side.
The moment Von Hipper’s scouting cruisers found themselves in contact
with Commodore Goodenough’s squadron the German battle-cruisers turned
and made straight for home at top speed. They had a fourteen-miles’
start--say, six miles beyond effective gun range--of the British
squadron, and Admiral Beatty settled down at once to a stern chase at
top speed. The chase began in earnest at 7:30, the Germans, fourteen
miles ahead, steering S.E., the British ships on a course parallel to
them, the German ships bearing about twenty degrees on the port bow.
In an hour and twenty minutes the range had been closed from 28,000
yards to 20,000. Von Hipper was evidently regulating the speed of
his squadron by that of the slowest ship, _Bluecher_. Admiral Beatty
disposed of his fleet in a line of bearing, so that there should be
a minimum of smoke interference, and the flagship opened fire with
single shots to test the range. In ten minutes her first hit was made
on the _Bluecher_ which was the last in the German line. _Tiger_ then
opened on the _Bluecher_, and _Lion_ shifted to No. 3, of which the
range was 18,000 yards. At a quarter past nine the enemy opened fire.
Soon after nine, _Princess Royal_ came into action, took on _Bluecher_,
while _Tiger_ took No. 3 and _Lion_ No. 1. When _New Zealand_ came
within range, _Bluecher_ was passed on to her. This was at about 9:35.
So early as a quarter to ten the _Bluecher_ showed signs of heavy
punishment, and the first and third ships of the enemy were both on
fire. _Lion_ was engaging the first ship, _Princess Royal_ the third,
_New Zealand_ the _Bluecher_, while _Tiger_ alternated between the
same target as the _Lion_ and No. 4. For some reason not explained the
second ship in the German line does not appear to have been engaged at
all. Just before this the Germans attempted a diversion by sending the
destroyers to attack. _Meteor_ (Captain Mead), with a division of the
British destroyers, was then sent ahead to drive off the enemy, and
this apparently was done with success. Shortly afterwards the enemy
destroyers got between the battle-cruisers and the British squadron
and raised huge volumes of smoke, so as to foul the range. Under cover
of this the enemy changed course to the northward. The battle-cruisers
then formed a new line of bearing, N.N.W., and were ordered to proceed
at their utmost speed. A second attempt of the enemy’s destroyers
to attack the British squadron was foiled by the fire of _Lion_ and
_Tiger_.
The chase continued on these lines more or less for the next hour, by
which time the _Bluecher_ had dropped very much astern and had hauled
away to the North. She was listing heavily, was burning fiercely, and
seemed to be defeated. Sir David Beatty thereupon ordered _Indomitable_
to finish her off, and one infers from this, the first mention of
_Indomitable_, that she had been unable to keep pace with _New
Zealand_, _Princess Royal_, _Tiger_, and _Lion_, and therefore would
not be able to assist in the pursuit of the enemy battle-cruisers.
The range by this time must have been very much reduced. If between
7:30 and 9:30 a gain of 10,000 yards, or 5,000 yards an hour, had been
made, between 9:30 and 10:45 a further gain of 6,250 yards should
have been possible, if the conditions had remained the same. But with
_Bluecher_ beaten, the German battle-cruisers could honourably think
of themselves alone. Unless their speed had been reduced by our fire,
while we ought to have gained, we should hardly have caught up so
much as in the first hour and a half. But there had, besides, been
two destroyer attacks threatened or made by the enemy, one apparently
at about twenty minutes to ten, and one at some time between then
and 10:40. It is highly probable that each of these attacks caused
the British squadron to change course, and we know that before 10:45
the stations had been altered. Each of these three things may have
prevented some gain. Still, on the analogy of what had happened in
the first two hours, we must suppose the range at this period to have
been at most about 13,000 yards. At six minutes to eleven the action
had reached the first rendezvous of the German submarines. They
were reported to and then seen by the Admiral on his starboard bow,
whereupon the squadron was turned to port to avoid them. Very few
minutes after this the _Lion_ was disabled.
[Illustration: The Dogger Bank Affair. Diagram to illustrate the
character of the engagement up to the disablement of _Lion_]
What happened from this point is not clear. We know that as Sir David
stopped he signalled to _Tiger_, _Princess Royal_, and _New Zealand_
to close on and attack the enemy. _Bluecher_ had been allotted to
the _Indomitable_ some twenty minutes before. The squadron passed
from Admiral Beatty’s command to that of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald
Moore. In a very few minutes it was, of course, out of sight of the
Vice-Admiral himself. Sir David called a destroyer alongside and
followed at the best pace he could and, soon after midday, found
the squadron returning after breaking off the pursuit some seventy
miles from Heligoland. _Bluecher_ had been destroyed, but the three
battle-cruisers had escaped. Of the determining factors in these
proceedings we know little. Such data as there are will be examined in
the next chapter.