BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (IV)
STRATEGY--TACTICS--GUNNERY
Von Spee’s mistakes we have seen in the course of my comment on the
narrative. They were broadly fourfold. Three arose from an inability to
realize from the very beginning the true character of the situation,
the fourth from want of resolution to fight an unequal action on the
only conditions in which any success was to be gained.
Von Spee’s initial blunder was approaching the Falkland Islands with
the whole of his force instead of making a _reconnaissance_ by a
single fast, light cruiser. It was obvious that he could gain nothing
by surprise. For it was beyond the power of the colony to extemporize
defence. It was equally obvious that he stood to lose everything if
he was himself surprised. And however improbable it might have seemed
to him that a force superior to his had reached the Falkland Islands
by this date, he should yet have realized that there was nothing
impossible in such a force being there very much earlier. For from the
North Sea to the Falkland Islands is only a little over 7,000 miles. He
might have credited the British Admiralty with a willingness to avenge
Cradock’s defeat and with ingenuity enough to arrange the most secret
coaling of any force that was sent out. When all allowances were made,
there should have been no difficulty in battle-cruisers reaching the
South Atlantic three weeks after they were despatched. Nor was there
any reason why the despatch should be delayed more than two weeks after
the news of the disaster.
If _Gneisenau_, instead of turning away when the tripod masts of the
battle-cruisers were seen, had persisted in the advance towards _Kent_;
had _Scharnhorst_ joined her at top speed, it is morally certain that
_Kent_ and _Macedonia_ would have been destroyed before either of the
battle-cruisers could come to their rescue. It would not have been
difficult to have found dead ground that the guns of _Canopus_ could
not reach, and from such a point to have subjected the battle-cruisers
to a most damaging succession of salvoes, as they emerged from the
narrow channel, before there was any possibility of their replying.
It was indeed possible that the motive power of each might have been
so injured that a pursuit by the battle-cruisers would have been
impossible. At the worst, Von Spee would have paid no higher price
than he ultimately paid, and he might have won an exchange entirely
beneficial to German arms. Certainly, an action fought in these
conditions would have given ample time for the light cruisers to make
their way into the winding and uncharted fjords of Patagonia. Here
_Dresden_ maintained herself for many weeks, and who knows but that the
others might have lasted longer still? Had it been possible for the
three to keep together they would have been formidable opponents for
any single cruiser in search of them. Had they scattered and been able
to maintain their coal supply, they could have held up British trade
for a considerable time.
Just as Von Spee missed this real opportunity, so, later on, he first
of all kept his light cruisers with him far too long, and then,
throughout the action, accepted battle far too much on Admiral
Sturdee’s conditions. But the initial mistake was the greatest.
BRITISH STRATEGY
The battle of the Falkland Islands was an event of enormous importance
and interest, and I propose to discuss a few of its more obvious
bearings. Let us first consider its immediate direct and indirect
effects upon the course of the war. The overseas naval situation at
the end of October, while not in the larger sense at all threatening
or dangerous, afforded nevertheless grounds for very great anxiety.
_Emden_ had made a series of sensational captures in the Bay of Bengal
and the Indian Ocean. _Karlsruhe_ was working havoc with the British
trade off the northeast corner of South America. The German China
squadron had evaded the Japanese and British and Allied fleets in
the East, and _Australia_ and her consorts had obtained no news of
its whereabouts when cruising between the Antipodes and the German
islands. A few British ships had been taken by _Dresden_ on her passage
down to the Straits of Magellan, and the public was entirely without
information which led them to suppose that either Von Spee or any of
the raiding cruisers were the subject of any effective pursuit. Though
the loss of ships by hostile cruisers was absurdly smaller than experts
had anticipated, it was quite large enough to disconcert and alarm
the public, who knew, after all, very little about the character of
those anticipations. Suddenly in the first week of November came two
thunderclaps. Admiral Cradock, with a preposterously weak force, had
been engaged and been defeated by the lost Von Spee. Of the four ships
composing his squadron, the armed liner _Otranto_ and the light cruiser
_Glasgow_ had escaped, but _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ had gone down,
lost with all hands. Then on November 3rd came the bombardment of
Lowestoft by certain German cruisers. It was the first attack of any
kind on the people of these islands, and it was hastily explained to
us by the Admiralty--and quite rightly--that the thing was without a
military objective or military importance, and as if to forestall naval
criticism, we were further told that it would not be allowed to disturb
any previously made Admiralty plans. We were asked to believe that it
was a mere piece of frightfulness.
But it is not certain that this was the only motive of the adventure.
May it not have been done in the express hope that the British higher
command, face to face with a shocked and outraged public opinion,
would hesitate about diminishing those forces at home which were best
calculated to intercept and bring to action the fast vessels which
alone could be employed with any chance of safety on these bombarding
expeditions? Is it not more than possible that the German staff,
knowing the prospects of the rebellion in South Africa, was most
desperately anxious to give Von Spee an added chance of crossing the
Atlantic in security and lending the tremendous support of his squadron
to the German forces in South-West Africa, who, with this added
prestige, could be counted upon to attract all the disaffected South
African sentiment to its side? Were not these bombardments, in short,
undertaken solely to compel us to keep our stronger units concentrated?
Whether this was the German plan or not, let it stand to the credit of
the Fisher-Churchill _régime_ that no fear, either of public opinion
or as to the success of future raids, stood in the way of dealing
promptly with the Von Spee menace. It should undoubtedly have been
dealt with long before. It was a blunder that Jerram’s force was not
overwhelmingly superior to Von Spee’s; a blunder that he had not
been instructed to shadow him from the beginning. Cradock’s mission
ought never to have been permitted. But now that fate had exposed
these errors of policy, the right thing at last was done. Yet it must
have taken some nerve to do it. The British forces in the North Sea
had certainly been greatly strengthened since the outbreak of war.
_Agincourt_, _Erin_, _Canada_, _Benbow_, and certain lighter units
had joined the Grand Fleet. _Tiger_ was finished and commissioned as
part of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet under Sir David Beatty. This gave him
four battle-cruisers of a speed of twenty-eight knots and armed with
13.5 guns, in addition to the four of an older type--_New Zealand_,
_Indomitable_, _Invincible_, _Inflexible_. To take two of these and
send them after Von Spee reduced this force very considerably, but it
was probably thought that the addition of _Tiger_ left Sir David strong
enough for the main purpose. After victory had been won a month later,
rumours were prevalent that a third battle-cruiser had been despatched
westward as well, but this has never been confirmed. But on the main
point, namely, the vital importance of sending an adequate force for
the pursuit and capture of Von Spee, the strategical decision was
indisputably right.
Its value can be judged by the immediate results of the victory.
Between November 1st and December 8th it is almost true to say that
British trade with the west coast of South America was at a standstill.
On the east coast things were very little better. For if shippers
were still willing to send their ships to sea, it was only on the
receipt of greatly enhanced freights. Immediately after the victory
Valparaiso shipping put to sea as if no war was in existence, and all
Pacific and South Atlantic freight fell immediately to normal. Even
the escape of _Dresden_ did not qualify the universal sense of relief.
The repercussion in South Africa was equally prompt. The rebellion
in the Anglo-Dutch colonies had been put down. But to embark on the
conquest of German South-West Africa was a different thing altogether,
and certainly one that could not be attempted so long as there was the
least suspicion of insecurity in General Botha’s sea communications.
And while Von Spee was at large this insecurity was obvious. One of the
direct results then of the despatch of Admiral Sturdee to the South
Atlantic was to make the first military invasion of German territory
both possible and ultimately successful.
Apart from its immediate results in the way of relieving British trade
in South America and removing the last obstacle to active British
military policy in South Africa, the Falkland Islands engagement was
of enormous value not only in re-asserting the prestige of the British
Navy, but in giving fresh heart to all the Allies after the exhausting
struggles to defeat the German advances on the French capital and
Calais. It was especially the first definite proof the Alliance had
received that British sea-power was no vague and shadowy thing, but a
real force which, rightly and relentlessly employed, must ensure the
ultimate victory of Allied arms. These were its good sides.
It had one lamentable and disastrous consequence. _Emden_ was captured
before the battle-cruisers left their English port. _Karlsruhe_ was
never heard of again, and the rumours of her destruction seemed before
December to be well founded, so that after the victory of December
8th, beyond the fugitive _Dresden_ and two armed liners unaccounted
for, there was not a German ship in the world to threaten a single
British trade or territorial interest. For _Koenigsberg_, if she had
escaped the guns of the two ships that had attempted her destruction
in the mouth of the Rufigi, which was doubtful, was at any rate so
closely blockaded that her power for active mischief was clearly at an
end. German naval force was then limited to the High Seas Fleet, still
of course intact, but with apparently no wish to attempt an active,
and no power to make an effective, offensive. Of this force Sir John
Jellicoe seemed to have taken the measure. Four months of activity,
strenuous and anxious beyond description, had made our fleet bases
proof against submarine attack, so that the only offensive open to the
German fleet, that embodied in the policy of attrition, was no longer a
menace. The submarine attack on trade was unexpected. At a blow, then,
Whitehall, which for four months had been kept on tenterhooks by its
unpreparedness for cruiser or submarine warfare, suddenly found itself
without a naval care in the world.
But Mr. Churchill could not be idle, and the tempter planted in his
fertile brain the crazy conception that the unemployed and unemployable
fleet should add to his laurels, by repeating, on the Dardanelles
forts the performances of the German howitzers at Liège, Maubeuge,
and Antwerp. The failure of the Naval Brigade at Antwerp was to be
picturesquely avenged. In judging of the results of the Falkland
Islands battle then, we must set against its immediate and resounding
benefits the humiliating tragedy of Gallipoli.
THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE
The battle of the Falkland Islands, as we have seen, resolved itself
into three separate engagements, and two of these may be taken as
classic examples of the tactics of superior speed and armament,
unconfused by the long-distance torpedo. It was this theory of tactics
that held the field in England from 1904 or 1905, when the Dreadnought
policy was definitely adopted, until 1912 or 1913 when the effect in
naval action of the new torpedo, was first exhaustively analyzed. These
actions, then, taken in conjunction with the _Sydney_-_Emden_ fight,
stand entirely by themselves, and it is possible that very little naval
fighting will ever take place again under similar conditions.
At the Dogger Bank and off the Jutland Reef the torpedo was employed
to the fullest extent, with results that we shall see when we come to
consider these actions. We have of course, no direct statement that
no torpedoes were employed in the Falkland engagements. Indeed in a
modified way the torpedoes certainly had some influence. But there is
the whole world of difference between torpedoes fired singly from one
warship to another, and torpedoes used both in great quantities and by
light craft which, under the defensive properties of their speed, can
close to ranges sufficiently short to give the torpedo a reasonable
chance of hitting, or, by taking station ahead, can add the target’s
to the torpedo’s speed to increase its range. We shall be broadly
right then in treating these engagements as affairs of gunnery purely,
for the torpedo had seemingly no influence in the periods that were
decisive.
Briefly put, what were the tactics of Admiral Sturdee with the
battle-cruisers, and Captain Ellerton with _Cornwall_ and _Glasgow_ on
December 8th? Their business was to destroy an enemy far weaker than
themselves, one who had neither strength enough to fight victoriously
nor speed enough to fly successfully. Both followed the same plan.
They employed their superior speed, first to get near enough for their
heavier guns to be used with some effect, and then, whenever the enemy
tried to close, to get to a range at which his inferior pieces could
be expected to get a considerable percentage of hits, they manœuvred
to increase the range so as to keep the enemy at a permanent gunnery
disadvantage. As this long-range fire gradually told, the enemy’s
artillery became necessarily less and less effective, until he was
reduced to a condition in which he could be closed and finished off
without taking any risks at all. These tactics resulted in _Gneisenau_
and _Scharnhorst_ being destroyed by _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_, the
whole crews of both German ships being either killed or captured, while
the two battle-cruisers had three casualties only. _Invincible_ was
actually hit by twenty-two shells, _Inflexible_ by only three, and it
was the latter ship who had the only three men hit. _Cornwall_ received
eighteen direct hits and, like _Invincible_, had no casualties at all,
while _Glasgow_ had one man killed and five wounded.
Obviously an action could not be fought upon these lines unless time
and space sufficed in which to bring about the desired result. In point
of fact, when the disparity of force is considered, the time taken was
extraordinary. _Inflexible_ opened fire on the German cruisers at five
minutes to one, _Scharnhorst_ sank at seventeen minutes past four, and
_Gneisenau_ just after 6 o’clock. If we suppose only twelve 12-inch
guns to have been bearing throughout the action, we have one hundred
12-inch gun hours! There was time therefore--at a battle-practice rate
of fire--for both ships to have fired away their entire stocks of
ammunition at least dozens of times over. What they did, of course, was
to fire extremely deliberately when the target was within range and
the conditions suitable, and to cease fire altogether when they were
manœuvring.
In the _Cornwall_-_Glasgow_-_Leipzig_ action, fire was opened at about
4 o’clock, and it was not till about 7:8 that the enemy was beaten. An
hour afterwards he sent up signals of distress and surrendered. Here
there were eleven 6-inch guns in the two British broadsides, and five
4-inch, against a handful of 4.25. The disparity in force was perhaps
not quite so great as in the battle-cruiser action, but these things
are difficult to compare, and from all accounts 6-inch lyddite, once
the hitting begins, does not take long to put a light cruiser of the
_Leipzig_ class completely out of action.
Captain Allen’s action against _Nürnberg_ is in very sharp contrast to
this. He opened fire at 5 o’clock, some few minutes after the enemy
had attacked him. The range was about 11,000 yards, and for some time
no apparent damage was done. At 5:45, however, though _Nürnberg_
seemed still undamaged, the range was reduced by 4,000 yards, owing to
_Nürnberg’s_ sudden loss of speed. There then followed twenty minutes
of action at ranges between 6,000 and 3,000, and these sufficed to
finish the enemy off altogether. It may be objected to Captain Allen’s
tactics that he received twice as many hits as the _Cornwall_ and had
twelve men wounded and four killed. But as Admiral Sturdee points
out in his despatch these casualties were almost entirely caused by
a single chance shell that burst in a gun position, right amongst
the crew. No one in any of the very exposed positions--control tops,
rangefinder positions, etc.--was even touched. Too much, therefore,
must not be made of the casualties, for in this matter chance enters
too largely for safe deductions to be made. _Invincible_, for instance,
received twenty-two hits without a single casualty, _Inflexible_ three
hits and three casualties. _Cornwall_ and _Kent_ were sister ships,
and if the gun shields of _Kent_ were unable to protect one crew, any
one of the eighteen shells that hit _Cornwall_ might have done equal
damage to that suffered by _Kent_. The value, as it seems to me, of the
_Kent_-_Nürnberg_ example lies in this, that for all practical purposes
exactly the same result was obtained, at the same cost, in one hour--of
which twenty minutes was at almost point-blank range--in this action,
as was got by two ships in three hours in the _Leipzig_ action, and by
two battle-cruisers in five hours in the battle cruiser action.
It would be a mistake to assume that we see a new contrast in methods
in these engagements. _Kent_ certainly followed the Nelsonian
tradition. He closed with his enemy at top speed, and got not only
the full artillery value of his attack, by making hitting easier and
therefore more certain, but won what is hardly less valuable, the vast
moral advantage of giving his enemy no breathing time at all. There are
fifty parallels to this, of which Trafalgar is in fact only the supreme
example. Given a superior force of guns--obtained by Nelson by the
concentration of the whole of his fleet on the centre and rear of the
enemy--the tactical plan is to be found in the method of bringing these
guns to do their work in the shortest possible time.
We can find many exact parallels to Admiral Sturdee’s tactics in the
war of 1812, for the Americans employed them against us with the
utmost success on several occasions. Indeed, it was these victories
that led first to a practical revival of gunnery skill--brought about
with such effect by Broke--and later to Sir Howard Douglas’s effort to
create a scientific study of gunnery in the British Navy. It is now
nearly a hundred years since his historic work on naval gunnery was
published. His father had been one of Howe’s captains and had invented
an important improvement in naval guns. The son entered the Artillery,
and his education, no less than his family tradition, made him both an
interested observer and a very competent critic of the naval gunnery
of the period. He had, in his own words, witnessed “the triumphant and
undisputed domination of the British marine,” after the victories of
Nelson had swept continental fleets from the sea, and then, seven years
after Trafalgar, he had seen this triumphant navy utterly humiliated by
the Americans in the war of 1812. He analyzed the causes both of the
triumph and the humiliation, and was, perhaps, the first to lay down
the most important of all maxims of naval doctrine--then and still also
the most neglected.
He pointed out how, in the later years of the Republic, practical
gunnery amongst French seamen was so wretched that strongly manned
ships were seen “employing batteries of twenty or thirty guns against
our vessels without more effect than might easily have been produced by
one or two well-directed pieces. Indeed in some cases, heavy frigates
used powerful batteries against our vessels for a considerable time
without producing any effect at all.” Thus, the victories of the
Nelsonian era were made possible because of the great disparity between
the two forces in gunnery skill, and it was this disparity that made
it possible to adopt the tactics by which the victors got their great
successes. Victory was won by superior skill and tactics founded upon
its employment. And in the hour of victory we forgot its conditioning
cause.
“We became,” says Douglas, “too confident by being feebly opposed, and
then slack in warlike exercises, by not being opposed at all. And,
lastly, in many cases inexpert for want of even drill practice. And
herein consisted the great disadvantage in which, without suspecting
it, we entered, with too great confidence, into a war with a marine
much more expert than that of any of our European enemies. Comparative
views of warlike skill, as well as of bulk and force ... are necessary
to correct analysis of naval actions.”
In the course of his work he made a very detailed analysis of the
actions between the _Macedonian_ and the _United States_, the
_Guerriere_ and the _Constitution_, the _Shannon_ and the _Chesapeake_,
and the _Java_ and the _Constitution_. In the three instances in which
the Americans were victorious, they owed success to no superiority in
the handling of their ships, but to a combination of longer-range guns
and a much higher accomplishment in marksmanship and tactics designed
to keep outside the range of British effective fire. In none of the
three cases could any criticism be based upon the bravery of any of the
British officers and crews. All were, in fact, honourably acquitted by
court martial. But it was obvious in each case that had the gunnery
skill been equal, while the difference in armament might ultimately
have been decisive, the enemy would have had to pay very dearly indeed
for victory. In each case, in point of fact, the victor’s losses were
trivial. Amongst these, the action between _Shannon_ and _Chesapeake_
stands out just as the _Kent_ and _Nürnberg_ action stands out in
the Falkland Islands. Broke, in the first very few minutes of the
engagement, established a complete fire ascendancy over _Chesapeake_,
and had he chosen, could have hauled off and pounded her into
submission without risking the life of a single one of his men. But, as
in the first instance, he had relied upon close action, trusting with
perfect confidence to the skill and marksmanship of his well-trained
crew, so after he had got _Chesapeake_ out of control, he chose the
quickest path to victory. He ran straight alongside and boarded her
without a moment’s delay. As at Trafalgar, so here we see the British
commander pre-occupied with one thought only--to bring the enemy to
action as soon as possible and to finish the business quickly and
decisively. So long as this is ensured, there is no thought of losses
nor any hesitation in risking the ship.
Why was there any other tactical conception? It arose, as we have just
seen, in the war of 1812 and was spontaneously reproduced in 1905,
and in both cases it was the product of a new skill in long-range
gunnery. In 1812 there was the choice in armament, long range and short
range that existed in 1905, but with this striking difference. The
long-range gun of a century ago might be an eighteen or twenty-four
pounder, but it was far heavier for the weight of shell it used than
the short-range carronade. There was therefore a distinct temptation
to arm ships with a lighter gun that would be more effective at close
range, and the mistake was not discovered till the greater skill of
the American ships made it clear that the long gun, in a ship rightly
handled, could prevent the short-range gun from coming into action at
all. But in our own day the pride of length of reach goes with the
heavier projectile. Not that the 12-inch guns of _Inflexible_ and
_Invincible_ literally outranged the 8.2’s of Von Spee, for the Germans
have always mounted their guns, as we have seen, so that they can be
elevated far more greatly than our own. It is quite possible therefore,
that, speaking literally, Von Spee’s 8.2’s, as they were mounted, might
have outranged Sir Doveton Sturdee’s 12-inch. But at the extreme
range of the 12-inch, it would be almost impossible for the 8.2’s to
hit on account of the extremely steep angle at which the shot falls,
and, consequently, the high accuracy in range knowledge required and
the improbability of the gun shooting with perfect precision at such
extreme distances. But both in 1812 and now, the basic idea behind
seeking for a long-range decision is defensive. Captain Glossop opened
up the range when _Emden_ closed him and got the advantage of his
heavy artillery. Admiral Sturdee kept the range as long as possible to
save his ships from being hit. Captain Ellerton did his best to keep
_Cornwall_ and _Glasgow_ out of _Leipzig’s_ reach. In all these cases
there was a very obvious argument in favour of defensive tactics.
_Sydney_, _Glasgow_ and _Cornwall_, _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_
were all at very great distances from dockyards and possibilities of
repairs. The two battle-cruisers were a considerable percentage of
our total Dreadnought force. It was not a question of risking their
destruction; it might at any moment be vital for them to be immediately
ready for action. If possible, even the shortest period devoted to
repairs and docking should be avoided. These considerations do not
excuse defensive tactics; they may be said to have imposed them. But
this should not blind us to the fact that they were defensive.
And this leads to another interesting question. Von Müller in _Emden_
began the action by trying to close _Sydney_. Von Spee turned at right
angles at one o’clock to shorten the range. _Nürnberg_ finally turned
round to bring her broadside to bear on _Kent_, but she was too late.
_Leipzig_ never turned at all. In no case did the German commanders
persist in seeking a short-range action. Cradock apparently did nothing
to close Von Spee at Coronel. What would have happened if Von Spee and
Von Müller had stuck to their resolution to close? In all these cases,
as we have seen, the weaker side accepted the stranger’s conditions.
But it was not necessary that it should have been so. A resolute effort
to close at full speed would no doubt throw a broadside of guns out of
action, just as flight did. But would the stronger ships have run away
had the weaker persisted in attacking? If they had held their course,
there would have been a very considerable change of range, in itself a
defensive element favouring the weaker ship. We can take it for granted
that no effort to close would ultimately have saved the weaker ship in
any case. But--and this seems to me to be the vital point--would not
his chance of seriously damaging the stronger have been far higher? And
is not this the one thing that should preoccupy the weaker force when
compelled to engage?
Finally, two entirely new elements in naval fighting in our own time
distinguish it from the fighting of the early days of last century.
With ships dependent upon wind, if the chance of engaging was lost, it
might never recur.
In all Nelson’s letters, memoranda, and sayings, he is haunted by the
vital importance of swift decision and rapid and resolute action. The
whole spirit behind the Trafalgar Memorandum is impatience of delay.
When the Allied Fleet was seen, there was no time wasted in securing
symmetrical formations or order. The Fleet was roughly grouped as
Nelson intended it should be, and the only preliminary of action was
not a race to get into station but a race to get to grips with the
enemy. The cult of the close action was thus a direct outcome of the
haunting uncertainty as to whether the fighting ship would be able
to move or not. This has all been changed by steam. Admiral Sturdee,
for instance, at 10:20, 11:15, and 12:20 knew perfectly well that he
could have the Germans in his grip and finish the thing off in five
minutes whenever he liked. If he played with them as a cat plays with
a mouse, it was because he knew that he had time on his side. But time
will not always be on the side of what is for the moment the stronger
force. The enemy may be heading for protection or may be expecting
reinforcements, or the light may suddenly fail altogether. In spite of
steam, therefore, the desirability of a quick decision is really as
paramount in modern conditions as in the old days. So that, had the
problem of action never been complicated by the long-range torpedo, we
ought, as soon as we began the cultivation of long-range gunnery, to
have realized that it was useless to limit our skill to conditions in
which the target ship and the firing ship were keeping steady courses.
A further argument against closing the range in modern conditions has
been put forward. Just as the change from sails to steam has helped the
tactician of to-day, so the altered relation of the destructive power
of the weapon and the resisting power of the ship has operated to his
disadvantage. _Lion_, for instance, in the Dogger Bank affair, was
knocked out by a chance shot that killed no men and did no vital injury
to the ship at all. But it cut the feed pipes of an engine, and in two
minutes the ship was disabled and for the purposes of that action,
useless. Only small damage could be done to sailing ships by a shot
amongst the masts and rigging. And when to a single shot there is added
the risk of a torpedo, it must be admitted that the arguments against
closing are stronger to-day than they were.
A POINT IN NAVAL ETHICS
The conduct of Cradock and his captains at Coronel, of Von Müller in
_Emden_, and of the captains of _Gneisenau_, _Leipzig_, and _Nürnberg_,
raises an interesting point in the ethics of war. Captain Glossop, it
will be remembered, after driving _Emden_ on to the rocks at Direction
Island, had to return towards Keeling Island to look for the _Emden’s_
tender. When he came back with certain prisoners on board, he appealed
to Von Müller to surrender. No reply was given, and the prisoners on
board the _Sydney_ informed Captain Glossop that no surrender would be
made. It therefore became necessary to open fire again. This brought
about the hauling down of the German flag. _Gneisenau_ had lost 600
killed out of a crew of eight or nine hundred when, at 8:40, she
hauled down her flag. _Leipzig_ and _Nürnberg_ were in a similar case.
_Bluecher_ was similarly defeated long before she was sunk. Both _Good
Hope_ and _Monmouth_ were apparently out of action within five minutes
of action beginning. Now in each instance it is obvious that fighting
was carried on, and that therefore men were sacrificed, long after
the ship was hopelessly beaten. But in many cases not only was the
fighting carried on, so to speak, gratuitously, but the ship herself
scuttled, thus ensuring the drowning of several wounded men and risking
the drowning of a very large number of unwounded. In all, taking the
_Emden_, _Gneisenau_, _Nürnberg_, _Leipzig_, and _Bluecher_ together,
it is not improbable that over 1,000 lives were thus thrown away to
no immediately military purpose. The alternative was to surrender
the ship. Why is it taken for granted that no ship, however fairly
defeated in action, however hopeless further resistance, may not quite
honourably yield herself a prize to the enemy? It is an entirely new
doctrine, unknown in an age surely not inferior in naval skill, in
military spirit, or in chivalrous feeling. Does it date from the howl
of execration that went up in Russia when, after the flower of the
Russian fleet had been defeated at Tsushima, Nebogatoff surrendered his
archaic craft to the overwhelming force of the victors?
So far as I know it was in that war that the great break with the old
tradition was made. The old tradition, of course, was that a ship that
had fought till it could fight no longer could be surrendered to a
victorious enemy without shame. The records of the wars of a century
ago abound in courts-martial on officers who in these circumstances had
yielded a beaten ship, and they were always honourably acquitted, when
it was shown that all that was possible had been done. It was evidently
thought to be mere inhumanity to condemn a crew that had fought bravely
to death by fire or drowning. Not that there are not grim stories that
tell of a sterner resolution, like that of Grenville in the _Revenge_.
But on the whole the navy that had done more fighting than any
other, and in the period of its existence when its fighting was most
continuous, took what is at once a rational and a Christian view of
these situations. Now it seems that war at sea dooms those who have
fought unfalteringly to finish the business, when they can fight
no longer, by a savage self-immolation. It is the only alternative
to allowing the enemy the glory of a capture. Is this, after all,
an intolerable humiliation? To find it so is a break with the old
tradition and is not an innovation for the better. It sets up a pagan
standard, and it is not the paganism of the stoic, but the unfeeling
barbarism of the Choctaw.