CAPTURE OF H.I.G.M.S. “EMDEN”
On November 11, 1914, the Secretary of the Admiralty issued a statement
which, after referring to the self-internment of _Koenigsberg_ in the
Rufigi River, and the measures taken to keep her there, proceeded as
follows:
“Another large combined operation by fast cruisers, against the
_Emden_, has been for some time in progress. In this search, which
covered an immense area, the British cruisers have been aided by
French, Russian, and Japanese vessels working in harmony. His Majesty’s
Australian ships _Melbourne_ and _Sydney_ were also included in these
movements.
“On Monday morning news was received that the _Emden_, which had been
completely lost after her action with the _Jemchug_, had arrived at
Keeling, Cocos Island, and had landed an armed party to destroy the
wireless station and cut the cable.
“Here she was caught and forced to fight by His Majesty’s Australian
ship _Sydney_ (Captain John C. T. Glossop, R.N.). A sharp action took
place, in which the _Sydney_ suffered the loss of three killed and
fifteen wounded.
“The _Emden_ was driven ashore and burnt. Her losses in personnel are
reported as very heavy. All possible assistance is being given the
survivors by various ships which have been despatched to the scene.
“With the exception of the German squadron now off the coast of Chile,
the whole of the Pacific and Indian oceans are now clear of the enemy’s
warships.”
The material news was that _Emden_ had been caught and sunk. She was
one of Germany’s small fast cruisers, armed like the rest with 4.2
guns, and therefore no very formidable match for the ship that met and
encountered her. The work of her destruction, we afterwards learned,
had been done by Captain Glossop of _Sydney_, with a rapidity and
neatness unsurpassed in any naval engagement of the war before or,
indeed, since. But at the moment when the news came, the method of
the thing was of far less importance than the thing itself, for it is
no exaggeration to say that at the end of the first week of November
the spirits of the nation were at an exceedingly low ebb. There was a
marked uneasiness as to the naval position. The successes of the Fleet
had been achieved without fighting, and it looked as if, in the naval
war, we were not only watching, almost abjectly, for the initiative
of the enemy, but that we were unable to defeat that initiative when
it was taken. The public therefore forgot that 98 per cent. of our
trade was carrying on as before, that our sea communications with our
armies were under no threat, that the enemy’s battle force was keeping
completely within the security of its harbours. There had been but one
active demonstration of British naval strength--the affair of the Bight
of Heligoland. But a dropping fire of bad news had made our nerves
acutely sensitive. It was submarines people feared most. Writing at the
time, I summarized the general attitude of the public as it appeared to
me:
“Long before the war began the public had been prepared by an active
agitation to believe that the submarine had superseded all other forms
of naval force, so that when one cruiser after another was sent to
the bottom, almost within hail of the English coast, people really
began to believe that no ship could be safe, and that (under a form
of attack that was equally impossible to foresee, evade, or resist)
our vaunted strength in Dreadnoughts must in time dwindle altogether
away. Then there were not wanting circumstances that, superficially at
least, looked as if the Admiralty’s war plans and distribution of the
Fleet were not adequate to their purpose. In at least one conspicuous
instance, the resources of our enemy had been too great either for the
means or the measures of our admirals. War had not been declared more
than a day or two before the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ made their way
through the Mediterranean and escaped unengaged to the Dardanelles.
The public knew that we had two powerful squadrons of ships in these
waters, one overwhelmingly stronger than the German force; the other,
on almost every conceivable train of reasoning, at least a match for
it.[B] It seemed utterly humiliating that, with the French Fleet as
our allies, and with Germany having none, so important a unit as the
_Goeben_ should have got away scot-free. Then it was not long before we
heard of the depredations of the _Emden_, and of British ships being
chased and threatened in the North and South Atlantic by other German
cruisers.
[B] I should not say this now.
“Against all these things could be set more cheering incidents. Twice
the North Sea was swept from top to bottom by the British Fleet, the
first resulting in the sinking of three, if not four, cruisers and one
destroyer, and in the driving off, apparently hopelessly crippled, of
two other cruisers and a great number of smaller craft. The second
sweep seemed to show that the entire German Fleet had sought safety
in port. Then the _Carmania_ sank the _Cap Trafalgar_, and the
_Undaunted_, with a small flotilla of destroyers, ran down and sank
an equal flotilla of the enemy’s. But these were not sufficient to
outweigh the anxiety which the German submarine successes had caused
nor did they restore public confidence in the dispositions of the
Admiralty in distant seas, where there were still two powerful armed
cruisers, a large number of light cruisers, and an unknown number of
armed merchantmen still at large.
“The whole thing culminated in a series of very disturbing events.
First it was announced that German mines had been laid north of
Ireland, and that the _Manchester Commerce_ had been sunk by striking
one. Were any of our waters safe for our own battle squadrons, if the
enemy could lay mines with impunity right under our noses? This was
swiftly followed by our hearing that the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ had
been sunk by the _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ off Coronel. Then came
the sinking of the _Hermes_ and the _Niger_, one in mid-Channel, the
other lying in the anchorage at Deal. And just when nervous people were
wondering whether the mine and submarine had really driven the English
Fleet off the sea, only to find that ports were not safe, there came
the startling news that a German squadron had appeared off Yarmouth....
To many it looked as if this was the last straw. We had sacrificed
four cruisers to patrol the neutral shipping in these waters, and
when, almost too late, it was discovered that our methods made them
too easy targets for submarines, we announced the closing of the North
Sea. The public undoubtedly understood by this that, if we closed the
North Sea to neutrals, we had closed it to the German Fleet also, and
the appearance of this squadron so soon after the announcement was
made, and its escape back to its own harbours without being cut off and
brought to action, made people ask if the closing of the North Sea had
not really meant that Great Britain had resigned its possession to the
enemy.”
It is difficult, this being the situation, to overrate how cheering was
the news of _Emden’s_ destruction.
If the Canadian naval contingent were the first of our Colonial
subjects to shed their blood in this war, then certainly the Australian
ship _Sydney_ was the first to assert Great Britain’s command over
distant seas, by the triumphant destruction of a ship that dared to
dispute it. We began our debt to the Colonies early.
Captain Glossop’s despatch was not published till January 1, but a good
many other accounts had been published before, and some have become
available since the action.
A very interesting letter from an officer of the _Sydney_ was printed
in _The Times_ of December 15. With this account was also published,
later on, a plan of the action which, with certain corrections which
I have reason to believe are required, is reproduced here. A second
account, by another officer in the _Sydney_, has been sent to me so
that it is possible to add some not uninteresting or unimportant
details to Captain Glossop’s story. But of all of the accounts Captain
Glossop’s is at once the most interesting and the most complete, and
I print it in full, because it is in every respect a model of what a
despatch should be.
“H.M.A.S. _Sydney_, at Colombo,
“15th November, 1914.
“Sir:--I have the honour to report that whilst on escort duty
with the Convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, H.M.A.S.
_Melbourne_, at 6:30 A.M., on Monday, 9th November, a wireless
message from Cocos was heard reporting that a foreign warship was
off the entrance. I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at
7:0 A.M. and proceed thither. I worked up to 20 knots, and at
9:15 A.M. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of
a ship, which proved to be H.I.G.M.S. _Emden_ coming out towards
me at a great rate. At 9:40 A.M. fire was opened, she firing the
first shot. I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the
advantage of my guns. Her fire was very accurate and rapid to
begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties
occurring in this ship almost immediately. First the foremost
funnel of her went, secondly the foremast, and she was badly
on fire aft, then the second funnel went, and lastly the third
funnel, and I saw she was making for the beach of North Keeling
Island, where she grounded at 11:20 A.M. I gave her two more
broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come
up during the action.
2. “Although I had guns on this merchant ship at odd times during
the action, I had not fired, and as she was making off fast I
pursued and overtook her at 12.10, firing a gun across her bows
and hoisting International Code Signal to stop, which she did.
I sent an armed boat and found her to be the S.S. _Buresk_,
a captured British collier, with 18 Chinese crew, 1 English
steward, 1 Norwegian cook, and a German Prize Crew of 3 Officers,
1 Warrant Officer and 12 men. The ship unfortunately was sinking,
the _Kingston_ knocked out and damaged to prevent repairing, so
I took all on board, fired 4 shells into her and returned to
_Emden_, passing men swimming in the water, for whom I left two
boats I was towing from _Buresk_.
3. “On arriving again off _Emden_ she still had her colours up
at mainmast head. I inquired by signal, International Code, ‘Will
you surrender?’ and received a reply in Morse, ‘What signal?
No signal books.’ I then made in Morse ‘Do you surrender?’ and
subsequently ‘Have you received my signal?’ to neither of which
did I get an answer. The German officers on board gave me to
understand that the Captain would never surrender, and therefore
though reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4:30 P.M., ceasing
at 4:35, as she showed white flags and hauled down her ensign by
sending a man aloft.
[Illustration: Plan of _Sydney_ and _Emden_ in action]
4. “I then left _Emden_ and returned and picked up the _Buresk’s_
two boats, rescuing 2 sailors (5:0 P.M.), who had been in the
water all day. I returned and sent in one boat to _Emden_, manned
by her own prize crew from _Buresk_, and 1 Officer, and stating
I would return to their assistance next morning. This I had to
do, as I was desirous to find out the condition of cables and
Wireless Station at Direction Island. On the passage over I was
again delayed by rescuing another sailor (6:30 P.M.), and by the
time I was again ready and approaching Direction Island it was
too late for the night.
5. “I lay on and off all night, and communicated with Direction
Island at 8:0 A.M., 10th November, to find that the _Emden’s_
party consisting of 3 Officers and 40 men, 1 launch and 2
cutters had seized and provisioned a 70-ton schooner (the
_Ayesha_), having 4 Maxims, with 2 belts to each. They left the
previous night at six o’clock. The Wireless Station was entirely
destroyed, 1 cable cut, 1 damaged, and 1 intact. I borrowed a
Doctor and 2 Assistants, and proceeded as fast as possible to
_Emden’s_ assistance.
6. “I sent an Officer on board to see the Captain, and in
view of the large number of prisoners and wounded and lack of
accommodation, etc., in this ship, and the absolute impossibility
of leaving them where they were, he agreed that if I received his
Officers and men and all wounded ‘then as for such time as they
remained in _Sydney_ they would cause no interference with ship
or fittings, and would be amenable to the ship’s discipline.’ I
therefore set to work at once to transship them--a most difficult
operation, and the ship being on the weather side of the Island
and the send alongside[C] very heavy. The conditions in the
_Emden_ were indescribable. I received the last from her at 5:0
P.M., then had to go round to the lee side to pick up 20 more men
who had managed to get ashore from the ship.
[C] _I. e._ the rise and fall of the sea.
7. “Darkness came on before this could be accomplished, and the ship
again stood off and on all night, resuming operations at 5:0 A.M. on
11th November, a cutter’s crew having to land with stretchers to bring
wounded round to embarking point. A German Officer, a Doctor, died
ashore the previous day. The ship in the meantime ran over to Direction
Island to return their Doctor and Assistants, send cables, and was back
again at 10:0 A.M., embarked the remainder of wounded and proceeded for
Colombo by 10:35 A.M., Wednesday, 11th November.
8. “Total casualties in _Sydney_: killed 3, severely wounded (since
dead) 1, severely wounded 4, wounded 4, slightly wounded 4. In the
_Emden_ I can only approximately state the killed at 7 Officers and 108
men from Captain’s statement. I had on board 11 Officers, 9 Warrant
Officers, and 191 men, of whom 3 Officers and 53 men were wounded, and
of this number 1 Officer and 3 men have since died of wounds.
9. “The damage to _Sydney’s_ hull and fittings was surprisingly small;
in all about 10 hits seem to have been made. The engine and boiler
rooms and funnels escaped entirely.
10. “I have great pleasure in stating that the behaviour of the ship’s
company was excellent in every way, and with such a large proportion of
young hands and people under training it is all the more gratifying.
The engines worked magnificently, and higher results than trials were
obtained, and I cannot speak too highly of the Medical Staff and
arrangements on subsequent trip, the ship being nothing but a hospital
of a most painful description!
“I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
JOHN C. T. GLOSSOP,
_Captain_.”
The first point of interest in this engagement is the rapidity with
which the gunfire on both sides became effective. _Emden_ made no
attempt to get away, and opened fire before _Sydney_ did, and at a
range of 10,500 yards. One account says “her first shots fell well
together for range, but very much spread out for line. They were all
within twenty yards of the ship.” Either the gun range-finders were
marvels of accuracy, or else they had great luck in picking up the
range so quickly. This account proceeds: “As soon as her first salvo
had fallen she began to fire very rapidly in salvoes, the rate of fire
being as high as ten rounds per gun per minute, and very accurate for
the first ten minutes.”
I draw the reader’s attention particularly to this phrase, because it
reproduces almost verbatim Commodore Tyrwhitt’s comment on the fire of
the German cruisers in his third action of the Heligoland affair. We
find the same phenomenon at the destruction of _Koenigsberg_, whose
guns both throughout the first and second day of that affair seem
to have had the exact range of the monitors. This testimony to the
accuracy of the enemy’s fire must be read in connection with Captain
Glossop’s statement, that in all about ten hits seem to have been made.
All accounts agree that no hits were made after the first ten minutes.
But if the rate of _Emden’s_ fire is correctly given, she must have
fired 500 rounds in this phase of the action. Ten hits to 500 rounds
gives 2 per cent. of hits only!
The explanation, both of the Rufigi monitors and of _Sydney’s_
comparative immunity, is undoubtedly the extreme range at which each
action was fought. At such ranges a gun of so small a calibre as the
4.2 would have to be raised to a very high elevation. The projectiles,
therefore, would fall very steeply towards the target. In conditions
like these salvoes may fall just short and just over, and even straddle
the boat fired at, without a single hit being made.
But of the excellence of the _Emden’s_ shooting and of her control of
fire--so long as the fire was controlled--there can be no shadow of
doubt whatever. It was obvious that if the battleships were equally
good, the German Fleet would prove a serious foe. We must certainly
esteem it one of the fortunate chances of this war that when Germany
was building her Fleet, her naval authorities were convinced that all
fighting would be at short range. Their calculation was that at short
range a rapid and accurate fire of smaller pieces should prove just as
effective as the slower fire of larger pieces. Her cruisers therefore
were armed with 4.2’s when ours were being armed with 6-inch, and her
battleships with 11-inch guns when ours were being fitted with 12-inch
and 13.5’s. In the case of battleships and battle-cruisers, the German
constructors had their eye upon a further advantage in the adoption of
lighter pieces. The weight saved could be put, and in fact was put,
into a more thorough armoured protection. Von Müller, the captain of
_Emden_, when he was congratulated, after the capture, on the gallant
fight put up, was at first seemingly offended. “He seemed taken aback
and said ‘No,’ and went away, but presently he came to me and said,
‘Thank you very much for saying that, but I was not satisfied; we
should have done better. You were very lucky in shooting away my voice
pipes in the beginning.’” But if the Germans lost their voice pipes,
_Sydney_ lost her rangefinder in the opening salvoes. The German fire
control had not survived the derangement of its communications. It
was not possible to extemporize anything to take their place. We do
not hear that the accuracy of _Sydney’s_ fire lost anything when the
rangefinder went.
Both ships appeared, in this action, to have employed, or at least to
have attempted to employ, their torpedoes. In an interview with Von
Müller reported from Colombo, he is said to have explained that his
intention in closing _Sydney_ at the opening of the engagement was not
to lessen the range so as to bring the ballistics of his guns to an
equality with ours, but to get _Sydney_ within torpedo range. _Sydney_
seems certainly to have fired a torpedo rather less than half-way
through the action when the range was at its shortest. But as in the
Heligoland affair, so here, the difficulties in getting a hit were
insuperable. That _Emden_ did not fire a torpedo at the same time is
explained by the fact that the action had not proceeded twenty minutes
before not only was her steering gear wrecked, so that she had to steer
by her screws, but her submerged torpedo flat also was put out of
action.
All accounts of the action agree upon the excellent conduct of the men
and boys on board _Sydney_. A letter published in _The Times_ gives
us many evidences of this. “The hottest part of the action for us was
the first half-hour. We opened fire from our port guns to begin with.
I was standing just behind No. 1 port, and the gun-layer (Atkins, 1st
class Petty Officer) said, ‘Shall I load, sir?’ I was surprised, but
deadly keen there should be no ‘flap,’ so said, ‘No, don’t load till
you get the order.’ Next he said, ‘_Emden’s_ fired, sir.’ So I said
‘All right, load, but don’t bring the gun to the ready.’ I found out
afterwards that the order to load had been received by the other guns
ten minutes before, and my anti-‘flap’ precautions, though they did
not the slightest harm, were thrown away on Atkins, who was as cool as
a cucumber throughout the action.” It was the boys’ quarters on board
that suffered most from _Emden’s_ fire. The same writer says:
“Our hits were not very serious. We were ‘hulled’ in about three
places. The shell that exploded in the boys’ mess deck, apart from
ruining the poor little beggars’ clothes, provided a magnificent stock
of trophies. For two or three days they kept finding fresh pieces.”
They were probably consoled for the lost wardrobe by this treasure of
souvenirs.
“There are lots of redeeming points in the whole show. Best of all was
to see the gun’s crew fighting their guns quite unconcerned. When we
were last in Sydney we took on board three boys from the training ship
_Tingira_, who had volunteered. The captain said, ‘I don’t really want
them, but as they are keen I’ll take them.’ Now the action was only a
week or two afterwards, but the two out of the three who were directly
under my notice were perfectly splendid. One little slip of a boy did
not turn a hair, and worked splendidly. The other boy, a very sturdy
youngster, carried projectiles from the hoist to his gun throughout the
action without so much as thinking of cover. I do think for two boys
absolutely new to their work they were splendid.”[D]
[D] The (slightly modified) plan of this action is reproduced
by the kind permission of the Editor of the _Times_.