ELECTION TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SENATE
I
The result of the election of 1912 was inevitable from the moment Mr.
Roosevelt, in a pique because of his rejection by the Republican
National Convention, organized a third party and accepted the
presidential nomination upon its ticket. For the first time in many
years the Democrats awoke the morning following the election to find
themselves overwhelmingly triumphant, with Woodrow Wilson elected to the
presidency, the Democratic majority in the house greatly increased, and
the Republican majority in the senate swept away. But long before the
rank and file of the party had permitted the bonfires to smoulder, the
responsible leaders had sobered into a solemn realization of the gravity
of the duty they would assume after the inauguration. The party had won
by a minority vote, and the tenure of its power would depend upon the
sincerity with which it met its pre-election obligations. The first two
years of the Democratic administration would determine to a large extent
the verdict of the public. The program of reformatory and constructive
legislation promised in the platform and advocated by the leaders from
Mr. Wilson down during the campaign was extensive; and it was to assume
power, after years of opposition, with the suspicion, carefully fostered
by Republican speakers and papers for almost half a century, that it was
utterly lacking in the qualities of constructive statesmanship. More
disturbing to Democrats, however, it was to assume power with painful
memories of the schisms which had wrecked it during its brief tenure
between 1893 and 1895. The trouble then had developed from the fact that
the Democratic organization in the senate was under the domination of
men who were not in sympathy with the party platform. And the meager
majority in the Democratic senate served to accentuate the fear from
this quarter. From the house no fear was entertained. There Champ Clark
presided over a great majority, fresh from contact with the people. But
in the senate, with the Republicans voting together, the disaffection of
three Democrats on any measure would leave the Democratic party in a
minority. And the haunting fear of those possible three conjured up
visions of Hill, Brice and Smith.
It is not an exaggeration to say that when Woodrow Wilson took the oath
of office the fate of the Democratic party for at least a generation
rested with the small majority in the senate.
The sixty-third congress ushered into this body eleven new Democratic
senators, and among them were several men of unusual capacity. New
England, so recently hide-bound in its republicanism, sent Henry Hollis
of New Hampshire, a young man of constructive ability and progressive
principles. New Jersey contributed a second Democrat in William Hughes,
a radical, and an ardent supporter of the new president. Little Delaware
turned again to a distinguished Democratic family which had previously
been represented in the senate and sent Willard Saulsbury, who was known
to be in hearty sympathy with the Baltimore platform. From Kentucky
appeared the eloquent Ollie James, the idol of the progressives from
coast to coast, and from Illinois the equally eloquent and brilliant
James Hamilton Lewis, in whom equal confidence was felt. From Colorado,
Governor Shafroth, a veteran in the battles for reform; from Montana,
the scholarly, clear-thinking and progressive Thomas J. Walsh, destined
to become a pillar of strength to the cause he had always stood for;
from Mississippi, James K. Vardaman, who had been nominated over his
predecessor in the senate on the issue of progressivism; from Louisiana,
Joseph E. Ransdell, concerning whom no fears were entertained; and from
Kansas, William H. Thompson, uncompromisingly progressive.
Of the eleven new Democratic senators there was not one whose record and
principles did not harmonize with the program the party had promised the
people in the platform adopted at Baltimore. And
[Illustration: KERN ON HIS WAY TO THE CAPITOL]
the Democrats who had entered but two years before--men such as Kern,
O’Gorman, Lea, Williams, Ashurst, Pomerene, Reed, Myers and
Johnson--were looked to with equal assurance. These twenty men, all
fresh from the people and temperamentally progressive in their
principles, together with some of the older senators in point of
service, like Shively of Indiana and Stone of Missouri, were expected by
the rank and file to hold the Democratic senate true to the Democratic
platform, and to sustain the president in his program.
The short and last session of the sixty-second congress was unimportant
in regard to legislation and senators, especially on the Democratic
side, gave themselves up largely to personal and party politics. The
Republicans could only sit back and wait. To Democrats, and especially
they who had entered two years before, the future organization of the
senate was the matter of prime importance. The newly elected men who
were to be sworn in on March 4th came and went. Without exception they
entered heartily into the views of the militantly progressive element
that the logic of the situation called for a reorganization, with a new
leader and new rules that would make legislation more responsive to the
popular will. The congress had not been in session two days before the
determination had been reached to challenge the old regime in the coming
caucus by presenting a candidate in opposition to the re-election of
Senator Martin to the leadership. Even before the congress had convened
some of the leaders in the new movement had been in communication with
the newly elected senators and a day or two of canvassing among the
older members convinced them that a new leader could and should be
chosen.
In all of these preliminary maneuvers and conferences Senator Kern had
no part, and he was so occupied until after the holiday recess with the
trial of the Structural Iron Workers in the Federal Court at
Indianapolis that he had no time for seriously considering the
reorganization of the senate. He had been retained for the defense at a
time when there was no reason for assuming that the trial would stretch
out until December, but he was unable to make his closing argument until
after the congressional recess.
The first indication he had that the reorganization movement had again
been started and that his name was being considered in connection with
the leadership came in the form of a telegram from one of the leaders to
the effect that the former opposition to the old regime had “been
strengthened by recruits,” that these, with the new senators, would be
“sufficient to elect,” and asking for personal assurance of Kern’s
co-operation in the movement and of his willingness to accept the
chairmanship of the committee on Committees. It was characteristic of
Senator Kern that he wired the assurance of his co-operation in the
movement and gave no encouragement to the proposal to elect him to the
leadership. This telegram was sent just one week after the opening of
the short session.
On Sunday evening, the latter part of February, about thirty of the
fifty-one Democratic members of the senate met in conference at the home
of Senator Luke Lea on Massachusetts avenue to determine upon their
candidate for the leadership. At this meeting the qualifications of
several men were considered, and one by one all were eliminated until
only Senator Kern remained. No effort had been made to secure support
for him, nor was he present at the conference. Thus without even
expressing a desire for the position he was selected unanimously by the
conferees after a process of elimination.
Never before in the history of the senate had any member been called to
the leadership of the majority of that body after only two years of
service in it. There were many reasons entering into the selection. The
first qualification and the one of prime importance was that the leader
should be known nationally as a progressive in complete harmony with the
Baltimore platform and with the program of the incoming president. No
member of the senate met these requirements more fully. His entire life
politically was in harmony with the program, and he had been chairman
of the committee on Resolutions at the national convention.
In this qualification he did not stand alone. But there were other
requirements. With such a meager majority, when the disaffection of
three Democrats might wreck the party program and renew the disaster of
the second Cleveland administration, nothing was more essential than the
possession of infinite tact. This he was known to possess in a marked
degree. And along with tact, ineffable patience.
During the two years succeeding the inauguration the program of the
administration could have been hopelessly wrecked and the party
discredited as a constructive force through the impetuosity of a
hot-headed leader, or one unable to restrain his impatience or disgust.
Senator Joseph W. Bailey, one of the most brilliant senators in half a
century, once frankly admitted his unfitness for the leadership on that
account. The conditions called for a conciliator, and here personal
popularity was important. No one was more generally popular than Kern.
And along with his tact, patience and popularity, his reputation for
hard common sense and practicability operated to make his election more
feasible than that of any one else. And his forty years of unselfish
service to his party gave assurance that with him charged with
responsibility there would be no successful surprise attacks of the
opposition because of any slackening of vigilance.
The announcement that the conference had been held and Senator Kern
determined upon as the candidate of the “new deal” element practically
ended the contest. It was not a secret that President Wilson would be
entirely satisfied to risk his measures in the senate under his
leadership. Five days after the thirty senators met at the home of
Senator Lea the announcement was made that Senator Martin would not be a
candidate for re-election. And when the caucus met, on March 5th,
Senator Kern was unanimously elected.
In his first act as leader of the Democratic majority, the appointment
of the committee on Committees, popularly known as the Steering
committee, which is charged with the general formulation of the policies
and program, he gave evidence of the conciliatory tone his leadership
would assume. He might have packed the committee with radicals, but that
would have been a challenge, and his course throughout was to be one of
conciliation. Senator Martin was appointed along with Senator Clark of
Arkansas to represent the conservatives, but with Chamberlain, Owen,
O’Gorman, Hoke Smith, Lea and Thomas the committee was safely
progressive. The revolutionary nature of the selections, however,
appeared in the fact that of the nine members Kern, O’Gorman and Lea
had only been in the senate two years, Hoke Smith less than two years,
and Thomas had just taken his seat--five of the nine being new figures.
Thus from the first step the old, superannuated and unpopular rule of
seniority which in the days of the Aldrich domination a few men were
able to control legislation and to a large degree effect the usefulness
of members through committee assignments, was made the object of attack.
If the rule of “seniority” was not destroyed in 1913 it was so badly
shattered that it could easily have been given the finishing stroke.
In the appointment of the committees the tact of Senator Kern and his
co-workers on the committee was noted by the _Review of Reviews_. His
first purpose was to make the personnel of the important committees
safely progressive, and after that to come as nearly satisfying or
reconciling everybody as possible. This presented a seemingly impossible
puzzle. Men who under the old regime and methods would have stepped
without a struggle into coveted places found themselves compelled to
choose between important assignments instead of taking both. During the
time the committee was at work Senator Kern was pulled and hauled and
importuned by senators who threatened in some instances and sulked in
others. At times the task of organizing the senate for business without
creating animosities that would seriously disturb the unity essential
to Democratic achievement seemed hopeless. But Kern’s tact, persuasion
and hard common sense prevailed over all difficulties, and when the work
was completed every senator with one exception expressed satisfaction
with the arrangement. This one exception was Senator Bacon of Georgia,
who wished to hold two coveted places--the chairmanship of the committee
on Foreign Relations and the position of president pro tem. He was given
the more important chairmanship, and Senator Clark of Arkansas, an ultra
conservative, was made president pro tem. However, such was the tact and
kindliness of Senator Kern, who greatly admired the exceptional ability
of the venerable Georgian that the latter soon forgot his
disappointment.
In making the committee assignments the rule of seniority was set aside
without compunction when it seemed necessary to making the senate
progressive. There was no disposition to punish the ultra-conservatives
or to humiliate them in any way. Because he was, at the time, looked
upon as holding high protective views, there was a clamor among the
radical tariff reformers against permitting Senator Simmonds, the
ranking Democratic member of the Finance committee, to serve as its
chairman. He was appointed chairman, but with Stone of Missouri,
Williams of Mississippi, Johnson of Maine, Shively of Indiana, Gore of
Oklahoma, Smith of Georgia, Thomas of Colorado, James of Kentucky and
Hughes of New Jersey--all progressives and low-tariff men--upon the
committee with him.
A new committee on Banking and Currency was created with Senator Owens
as chairman and composed of men holding progressive views on currency
legislation. This committee, instantly recognized as significant in view
of the president’s campaign advocacy of currency reform, was to stand
sponsor for the Federal Reserve system, conceded to be the greatest
piece of constructive legislation in half a century.
Another new committee was created to handle Woman’s Suffrage
legislation, and the liberal attitude of the new senate leaders toward
the woman’s movement was shown in the appointment of Senator Thomas, an
ardent advocate of suffrage to the chairmanship, and the friendly
attitude of the majority of the senators composing it. This within
itself indicated a radical change in the spirit of the senate, which had
always before been prone to make short shift of bills and resolutions
dealing with the suffrage question.
The election of Senator Kern as caucus chairman was the first sign that
a new senate had been created; the announcement of the committee
assignments was second, and this attracted wide attention and much
discussion in the press. _The Literary Digest_ found that “the
reorganization of the senate has been accomplished in a way paralleling
the overturn of Cannonism in the house by the practical abolition of the
seniority rule in making up committees.” _The Brooklyn Eagle_, _The
Washington Times_ and _The Washington Herald_ made the point that the
senate had really become the more radical of the two branches of the
congress. _The Springfield Republican_ and _The Providence Journal_
commended “the throwing off of the customary control of a perpetual
succession based on seniority of service.” And Senator Kern in giving to
the press his own interpretation of the action of the steering committee
said it was the intention to make the senate “Democratic not only in
name but in practical results.”
That, however, did not conclude the Democratization of the senate, for
new rules were adopted which deprived chairmen of the arbitrary control
over legislation which had been their portion during the long period of
Aldrich-Hale rule. These rules provided that a majority of the committee
might call the committee together at any time for the consideration of
any pending bill; that a majority of the majority members might name
sub-committees to consider pending measures and report to the full
committee; and that a majority of the majority members might name
members to confer with the house conferees on any bill on which the two
houses might disagree. Strangely enough the adoption of these
significant new rules which struck at the root of the evils of the old
system failed to make much of an impression upon the press, which for
the most part, passed them by without comment. _The Review of Reviews_,
however, caught the significance and said that “even more significant
than the personal changes which bring a new set of men into control of a
body so recently managed by the extreme conservatives of both parties
are the changes in the rules.”
The system thus displaced had long been recognized among progressives
familiar with its mode of operation as sinister in the extreme. The
chairman of a committee could indefinitely postpone action on any bill
which did not appeal to him by refusing to call the committee together
for its consideration.
If he did finally call the committee he had the autocratic power to name
a sub-committee for its consideration packed with its enemies, who could
be depended upon to bring in an unfavorable report. More sinister still,
perhaps, was his power to select the conferees in the case of a
disagreement between the two houses because the measure as passed by the
senate could be radically altered in conference and completely changed
from the form in which it left the senate and could only be rejected or
accepted without amendment on its resubmission to the senate.
The new senate really deprived the chairman of a committee of any real
power in excess of that of any of his colleagues on the committee and
reduced him to the harmless status of a presiding officer.
Thus the election of Senator Kern to the leadership of the majority at
the beginning of the first Wilson administration, with all that followed
in keeping with the meaning of that selection, marked a revolutionary
change in the United States senate, broke down the fetish of the
seniority rule, smashed superannuated precedents and traditions, made
difficult if not impossible the domination of the body by a small
coterie of men entrenched in powerful chairmanships, and did more toward
the democratization of the senate than had been done in half a century.
And, what was more remarkable, it was all done with such tact and
fairness that within a week the Democratic majority, small as it was,
presented to the opposition a solid front prepared to make good the
progressive pledges of the Baltimore platform and the pre-election
speeches of President Wilson. How faithfully and effectively and
unselfishly Senator Kern did his work during the four years of his
leadership and especially during the first two years which were crowded
as never before in history with vitally important constructive
legislation will be discussed later in a single chapter.