PHILONOUS. Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find you abroad so
early.
HYLAS. It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up
with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not
sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.
PHIL. It happened well, to let you see what innocent and agreeable
pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of the
day, or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those wild
but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers,
the gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless
beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties
too being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those meditations,
which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally
dispose us to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts: for you seemed
very intent on something.
HYL. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will permit
me to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any means deprive
myself of your company, for my thoughts always flow more easily in
conversation with a friend, than when I am alone: but my request is, that
you would suffer me to impart my reflexions to you.
PHIL. With all my heart, it is what I should have requested myself if
you had not prevented me.
HYL. I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages,
through an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar, or some
unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to believe nothing at
all, or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This however
might be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them
some consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief
lieth here; that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed
to have spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an
entire ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are
repugnant to plain and commonly received principles, they will be tempted
to entertain suspicions concerning the most important truths, which they
had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable.
PHIL. I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of the affected
doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of others. I am
even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have quitted
several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools for vulgar
opinions. And I give it you on my word; since this revolt from
metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I
find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily
comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle.
HYL. I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of you.
PHIL. Pray, what were those?
HYL. You were represented, in last night's conversation, as one who
maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind
of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as MATERIAL SUBSTANCE in
the world.
PHIL. That there is no such thing as what PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATERIAL
SUBSTANCE, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made to see anything
absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to
renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.
HYL. What I can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common
Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to believe there is
no such thing as MATTER?
PHIL. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold
there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, and maintain
more paradoxes and repugnances to Common Sense, than I who believe no
such thing?
HYL. You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole,
as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should ever be
obliged to give up my opinion in this point.
PHIL. Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which
upon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common Sense, and remote
from Scepticism?
HYL. With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes about
the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you
have to say.
PHIL. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a SCEPTIC?
HYL. I mean what all men mean--one that doubts of everything.
PHIL. He then who entertains no doubts concerning some particular
point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a sceptic.
HYL. I agree with you.
PHIL. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or
negative side of a question?
HYL. In neither; for whoever understands English cannot but know that
DOUBTING signifies a suspense between both.
PHIL. He then that denies any point, can no more be said to doubt of
it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance.
HYL. True.
PHIL. And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be esteemed
a sceptic than the other.
HYL. I acknowledge it.
PHIL. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce me A
SCEPTIC, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence of
Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in my denial,
as you in your affirmation.
HYL. Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my definition; but
every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on. I
said indeed that a SCEPTIC was one who doubted of everything; but I
should have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things.
PHIL. What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences?
But these you know are universal intellectual notions, and consequently
independent of Matter. The denial therefore of this doth not imply the
denying them.
HYL. I grant it. But are there no other things? What think you of
distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things,
or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not this sufficient to
denominate a man a SCEPTIC?
PHIL. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the
reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them;
since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest
SCEPTIC?
HYL. That is what I desire.
PHIL. What mean you by Sensible Things?
HYL. Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine
that I mean anything else?
PHIL. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your
notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask
you this farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses
which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be said to
be SENSIBLE which are perceived mediately, or not without the
intervention of others?
HYL. I do not sufficiently understand you.
PHIL. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters;
but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions
of God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible
things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt: but I would know
whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.
HYL. No, certainly: it were absurd to think GOD or VIRTUE sensible
things; though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by
sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary connexion.
PHIL. It seems then, that by SENSIBLE THINGS you mean those only
which can be perceived IMMEDIATELY by sense?
HYL. Right.
PHIL. Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the
sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently
conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that
cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of
seeing?
HYL. It doth.
PHIL. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be
said to hear the causes of those sounds?
HYL. You cannot.
PHIL. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I
cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its
heat or weight?
HYL. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for
all, that by SENSIBLE THINGS I mean those only which are perceived by
sense; and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not
perceive IMMEDIATELY: for they make no inferences. The deducing
therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which
alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.
PHIL. This point then is agreed between us--That SENSIBLE THINGS ARE
THOSE ONLY WHICH ARE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED BY SENSE. You will farther
inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside
light, and colours, and figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by
the palate, anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by
the touch, more than tangible qualities.
HYL. We do not.
PHIL. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible
qualities, there remains nothing sensible?
HYL. I grant it.
PHIL. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many
sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?
HYL. Nothing else.
PHIL. HEAT then is a sensible thing?
HYL. Certainly.
PHIL. Doth the REALITY of sensible things consist in being perceived?
or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears
no relation to the mind?
HYL. To EXIST is one thing, and to be PERCEIVED is another.
PHIL. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask,
whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the
mind, and distinct from their being perceived?
HYL. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any
relation to, their being perceived.
PHIL. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without
the mind?
HYL. It must.
PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all
degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason why we should
attribute it to some, and deny it to others? And if there be, pray let me
know that reason.
HYL. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the
same exists in the object that occasions it.
PHIL. What! the greatest as well as the least?
HYL. _I_ tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both.
They are both perceived by sense; nay, the greater degree of heat is more
sensibly perceived; and consequently, if there is any difference,
we are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality
of a lesser degree.
PHIL. But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very
great pain?
HYL. No one can deny it.
PHIL. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure?
HYL. No, certainly.
PHIL. Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed
with sense and perception?
HYL. It is senseless without doubt.
PHIL. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?
HYL. By no means.
PHIL. Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since
you acknowledge this to be no small pain?
HYL. I grant it.
PHIL. What shall we say then of your external object; is it a material
Substance, or no?
HYL. It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in
it.
PHIL. How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in
a material substance? I desire you would clear this point.
HYL. Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a
pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from heat,
and the consequence or effect of it.
PHIL. Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple
uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations?
HYL. But one simple sensation.
PHIL. Is not the heat immediately perceived?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. And the pain?
HYL. True.
PHIL. Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same
time, and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea,
it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat
immediately perceived, and the pain; and, consequently, that the intense
heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of
pain.
HYL. It seems so.
PHIL. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a
vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure.
HYL. I cannot.
PHIL. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure
in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes,
smells? &c.
HYL. I do not find that I can.
PHIL. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing
distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense degree?
HYL. It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect a
very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it.
PHIL. What! are you then in that sceptical state of suspense, between
affirming and denying?
HYL. I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful
heat cannot exist without the mind.
PHIL. It hath not therefore according to you, any REAL being?
HYL. I own it.
PHIL. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature really
hot?
HYL. I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only say,
there is no such thing as an intense real heat.
PHIL. But, did you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally
real; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were more
undoubtedly real than the lesser?
HYL. True: but it was because I did not then consider the ground there
is for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it is
this: because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of
painful sensation; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being; it
follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving
corporeal substance. But this is no reason why we should deny heat in an
inferior degree to exist in such a substance.
PHIL. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which
exist only in the mind from those which exist without it?
HYL. That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist
unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in
the mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to
think the same of them.
PHIL. I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable
of pleasure, any more than of pain.
HYL. I did.
PHIL. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what
causes uneasiness, a pleasure?
HYL. What then?
PHIL. Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving
substance, or body.
HYL. So it seems.
PHIL. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not
painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance; may
we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any
degree of heat whatsoever?
HYL. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a
pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.
PHIL. _I_ do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is
a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it serves to
make good my conclusion.
HYL. I could rather call it an INDOLENCE. It seems to be nothing more
than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such a quality or
state as this may agree to an unthinking substance, I hope you will not
deny.
PHIL. If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle degree
of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise than by
appealing to your own sense. But what think you of cold?
HYL. The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain;
for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great uneasiness: it
cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a lesser degree of cold may,
as well as a lesser degree of heat.
PHIL. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to our own, we
perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded to have a moderate
degree of heat or warmth in them; and those, upon whose application we
feel a like degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them.
HYL. They must.
PHIL. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an
absurdity?
HYL. Without doubt it cannot.
PHIL. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at
the same time both cold and warm?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that
they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an
intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to
the other?
HYL. It will.
PHIL. Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is
really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to your
own concession, to believe an absurdity?
HYL. I confess it seems so.
PHIL. Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have
granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity.
HYL. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say, THERE IS
NO HEAT IN THE FIRE?
PHIL. To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two cases
exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?
HYL. We ought.
PHIL. When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the
fibres of your flesh?
HYL. It doth.
PHIL. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?
HYL. It doth not.
PHIL. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself
occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin; you should
not, conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensation
occasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire.
HYL. Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point, and
acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds.
But there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external
things.
PHIL. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that the case is
the same with regard to all other sensible qualities, and that they can
no more be supposed to exist without the mind, than heat and cold?
HYL. Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose; but that
is what I despair of seeing proved.
PHIL. Let us examine them in order. What think you of TASTES, do they
exist without the mind, or no?
HYL. Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet, or
wormwood bitter?
PHIL. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure
or pleasant sensation, or is it not?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain?
HYL. I grant it.
PHIL. If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal
substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness,
that is, Pleasure and pain, agree to them?
HYL. Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was delude time. You asked
whether heat and cold, sweetness at were not particular sorts of pleasure
and pain; to which simply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus
distinguished: those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pair
existing in the external objects. We must not therefore conclude
absolutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar,
but only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire
or sugar. What say you to this?
PHIL. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded
altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, THE
THINGS WE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE BY OUR SENSES. Whatever other qualities,
therefore, you speak of as distinct from these, I know nothing of them,
neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed,
pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive,
and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what
use can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a loss to
conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold,
sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by
the senses), do not exist without the mind?
HYL. I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up the cause as
to those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds oddly, to say
that sugar is not sweet.
PHIL. But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along with you:
that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered palate,
appear bitter. And, nothing can be plainer than that divers persons
perceive different tastes in the same food; since that which one man
delights in, another abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was
something really inherent in the food?
HYL. I acknowledge I know not how.
PHIL. In the next place, ODOURS are to be considered. And, with
regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath been said of
tastes doth not exactly agree to them? Are they not so many pleasing or
displeasing sensations?
HYL. They are.
PHIL. Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an
unperceiving thing?
HYL. I cannot.
PHIL. Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those brute
animals that feed on them out of choice, with the same smells which we
perceive in them?
HYL. By no means.
PHIL. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other
forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a perceiving
substance or mind?
HYL. I think so.
PHIL. Then as to SOUNDS, what must we think of them: are they
accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?
HYL. That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hence:
because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump sends
forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought the subject of sound.
PHIL. What reason is there for that, Hylas?
HYL. Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound
greater or lesser, according to the air's motion; but without some motion
in the air, we never hear any sound at all.
PHIL. And granting that we never hear a sound but when some motion is
produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can infer from thence, that
the sound itself is in the air.
HYL. It is this very motion in the external air that produces in the
mind the sensation of SOUND. For, striking on the drum of the ear, it
causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being communicated to
the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called
SOUND.
PHIL. What! is sound then a sensation?
HYL. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in
the mind.
PHIL. And can any sensation exist without the mind?
HYL. No, certainly.
PHIL. How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, if by
the AIR you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind?
HYL. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is
perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing)
between the sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without
us. The former, indeed, is a particular kind of sensation, but the latter
is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion the air.
PHIL. I thought I had already obviated that distinction, by answer I
gave when you were applying it in a like case before. But, to say no more
of that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion?
HYL. I am.
PHIL. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be
attributed to motion?
HYL. It may.
PHIL. It is then good sense to speak of MOTION as of a thing that is
LOUD, SWEET, ACUTE, or GRAVE.
HYL. _I_ see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not evident
those accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound, or SOUND in the
common acceptation of the word, but not to sound in the real and
philosophic sense; which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a
certain motion of the air?
PHIL. It seems then there are two sorts of sound--the one vulgar, or
that which is heard, the other philosophical and real?
HYL. Even so.
PHIL. And the latter consists in motion?
HYL. I told you so before.
PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, the idea of
motion belongs? to the hearing?
HYL. No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.
PHIL. It should follow then, that, according to you, real sounds may
possibly be SEEN OR FELT, but never HEARD.
HYL. Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a jest of my
opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own, indeed, the
inferences you draw me into sound something oddly; but common language,
you know, is framed by, and for the use of the vulgar: we must not
therefore wonder if expressions adapted to exact philosophic notions seem
uncouth and out of the way.
PHIL. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained
no small point, since you make so light of departing from common phrases
and opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose
notions are widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the
general sense of the world. But, can you think it no more than a
philosophical paradox, to say that REAL SOUNDS ARE NEVER HEARD, and
that the idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there
nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?
HYL. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the concessions
already made, I had as well grant that sounds too have no real being
without the mind.
PHIL. And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge the same of
COLOURS.
HYL. Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can anything be
plainer than that we see them on the objects?
PHIL. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal Substances
existing without the mind?
HYL. They are.
PHIL. And have true and real colours inhering in them?
HYL. Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it.
PHIL. How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight?
HYL. There is not.
PHIL. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive
immediately?
HYL. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you,
we do not.
PHIL. Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more, whether there
is anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible
qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but I would now be
informed, whether you still persist in the same opinion.
HYL. I do.
PHIL. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or
made up of sensible qualities?
HYL. What a question that is! who ever thought it was?
PHIL. My reason for asking was, because in saying, EACH VISIBLE OBJECT
HATH THAT COLOUR WHICH WE SEE IN IT, you make visible objects to be
corporeal substances; which implies either that corporeal substances are
sensible qualities, or else that there is something besides sensible
qualities perceived by sight: but, as this point was formerly agreed
between us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear consequence,
that your CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE is nothing distinct from SENSIBLE
QUALITIES.
HYL. You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and
endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never persuade me
out of my senses. I clearly understand my own meaning.
PHIL. I wish you would make me understand it too. But, since you are
unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined, I shall
urge that point no farther. Only be pleased to let me know, whether the
same colours which we see exist in external bodies, or some other.
HYL. The very same.
PHIL. What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder
clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves any
other form than that of a dark mist or vapour?
HYL. I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really in the clouds
as they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent colours.
PHIL. APPARENT call you them? how shall we distinguish these apparent
colours from real?
HYL. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, appearing
only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.
PHIL. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are discovered
by the most near and exact survey.
HYL. Right.
PHIL. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a
microscope, or by the naked eye?
HYL. By a microscope, doubtless.
PHIL. But a microscope often discovers colours in an object different
from those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in case we had
microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no
object whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same colour
which it exhibits to the naked eye.
HYL. And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that
there are really and naturally no colours on objects: because by
artificial managements they may be altered, or made to vanish.
PHIL. I think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions,
that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as
those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and accurate
inspection which is afforded us by a microscope. Then' as to what you say
by way of prevention: I ask you whether the real and natural state
of an object is better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or
by one which is less sharp?
HYL. By the former without doubt.
PHIL. Is it not plain from DIOPTRICS that microscopes make the sight
more penetrating, and represent objects as they would appear to the eye
in case it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite sharpness?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. Consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought
that which best sets forth the real nature of the thing, or what it is in
itself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine and real
than those perceived otherwise.
HYL. I confess there is something in what you say.
PHIL. Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there
actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive those
things which by reason of their minuteness escape our sight. What think
you of those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses? must we
suppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be
imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving their bodies
from injuries, which appears in that of all other animals? And if it
hath, is it not evident they must see particles less than their own
bodies; which will present them with a far different view in each object
from that which strikes our senses? Even our own eyes do not always
represent objects to us after the same manner. In the jaundice every one
knows that all things seem yellow. Is it not therefore highly probable
those animals in whose eyes we discern a very different texture from that
of ours, and whose bodies abound with different humours, do not see the
same colours in every object that we do? From all which, should it not
seem to follow that all colours are equally apparent, and that none of
those which we perceive are really inherent in any outward object?
HYL. It should.
PHIL. The point will be past all doubt, if you consider that, in case
colours were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies,
they could admit of no alteration without some change wrought in the very
bodies themselves: but, is it not evident from what hath been said that,
upon the use of microscopes, upon a change happening in the burnouts of
the eye, or a variation of distance, without any manner of real
alteration in the thing itself, the colours of any object are
either changed, or totally disappear? Nay, all other circumstances
remaining the same, change but the situation of some objects, and they
shall present different colours to the eye. The same thing happens upon
viewing an object in various degrees of light. And what is more known
than that the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light
from what they do in the open day? Add to these the experiment of a prism
which, separating the heterogeneous rays of light, alters the colour of
any object, and will cause the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to
the naked eye. And now tell me whether you are still of opinion that
every body hath its true real colour inhering in it; and, if you think it
hath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain distance and
position of the object, what peculiar texture and formation of the eye,
what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true
colour, and distinguishing it from apparent ones.
HYL. I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all equally
apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering in
external bodies, but that it is altogether in the light. And what
confirms me in this opinion is, that in proportion to the light colours
are still more or less vivid; and if there be no light, then are there no
colours perceived. Besides, allowing there are colours on external
objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no external
body affects the mind, unless it acts first on our organs of sense. But
the only action of bodies is motion; and motion cannot be communicated
otherwise than by impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the
eye; nor consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the
soul. Whence it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous
substance, which, operating on the eye, occasions a perception of
colours: and such is light.
PHIL. Howl is light then a substance?
HYL. . I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but a thin fluid
substance, whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk motion, and
in various manners reflected from the different surfaces of outward
objects to the eyes, communicate different motions to the optic nerves;
which, being propagated to the brain, cause therein various impressions;
and these are attended with the sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c.
PHIL. It seems then the light doth no more than shake the optic nerves.
HYL. Nothing else.
PHIL. And consequent to each particular motion of the nerves, the mind
is affected with a sensation, which is some particular colour.
HYL. Right.
PHIL. And these sensations have no existence without the mind.
HYL. They have not.
PHIL. How then do you affirm that colours are in the light; since by
LIGHT you understand a corporeal substance external to the mind?
HYL. Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant cannot
exist without the mind. But in themselves they are only the motions and
configurations of certain insensible particles of matter.
PHIL. Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate
objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving substance.
HYL. That is what I say.
PHIL. Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible
qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind beside, you may
hold what you please with regard to those invisible ones of the
philosophers. It is not my business to dispute about THEM; only I would
advise you to bethink yourself, whether, considering the inquiry we are
upon, it be prudent for you to affirm--THE RED AND BLUE WHICH WE SEE ARE
NOT REAL COLOURS, BUT CERTAIN UNKNOWN MOTIONS AND FIGURES WHICH NO MAN
EVER DID OR CAN SEE ARE TRULY SO. Are not these shocking notions, and
are not they subject to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were
obliged to renounce before in the case of sounds?
HYL. I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to longer. Colours,
sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed SECONDARY QUALITIES, have
certainly no existence without the mind. But by this acknowledgment I
must not be supposed to derogate, the reality of Matter, or external
objects; seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who
nevertheless are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the
clearer understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities are by
philosophers divided into PRIMARY and SECONDARY. The former are
Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest; and these
they hold exist really in bodies. The latter are those above enumerated;
or, briefly, ALL SENSIBLE QUALITIES BESIDE THE PRIMARY; which they
assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the
mind. But all this, I doubt not, you are apprised of. For my part, I have
been a long time sensible there was such an opinion current among
philosophers, but was never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now.
PHIL. You are still then of opinion that EXTENSION and FIGURES are
inherent in external unthinking substances?
HYL. I am.
PHIL. But what if the same arguments which are brought against
Secondary Qualities will hold good against these also?
HYL. Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only in the
mind.
PHIL. Is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you
perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the
figure and extension which they see and feel?
HYL. Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.
PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed upon all
animals for their preservation and well-being in life? or were they given
to men alone for this end?
HYL. I make no question but they have the same use in all other
animals.
PHIL. If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to
perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable of harming
them?
HYL. Certainly.
PHIL. A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things
equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension;
though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best
as so many visible points?
HYL. I cannot deny it.
PHIL. And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger?
HYL. They will.
PHIL. Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another
extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain?
HYL. All this I grant.
PHIL. Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of
different dimensions?
HYL. That were absurd to imagine.
PHIL. But, from what you have laid down it follows that both the
extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite itself, as
likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true
extension of the mite's foot; that is to say, by your own principles you
are led into an absurdity.
HYL. There seems to be some difficulty in the point.
PHIL. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property
of any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself?
HYL. I have.
PHIL. But, as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible
extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater
than another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is
not really inherent in the object?
HYL. I own I am at a loss what to think.
PHIL. Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will venture to
think as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the
rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold
was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the
other?
HYL. It was.
PHIL. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no
extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem
little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the other,
great, uneven, and regular?
HYL. The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen?
PHIL. You may at any time make the experiment, by looking with one eye
bare, and with the other through a microscope.
HYL. I know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath to give up
EXTENSION, I see so many odd consequences following upon such a
concession.
PHIL. Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I hope you will
stick at nothing for its oddness. But, on the other hand, should it not
seem very odd, if the general reasoning which includes all other
sensible qualities did not also include extension? If it be allowed that
no idea, nor anything like an idea, can exist in an unperceiving
substance, then surely it follows that no figure, or mode of extension,
which we can either perceive, or imagine, or have any idea of, can be
really inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there
must be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from
extension to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension. Be the sensible quality
what it will--figure, or sound, or colour, it seems alike impossible it
should subsist in that which doth not perceive it.
HYL. I give up the point for the present, reserving still a right to
retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false step in
my progress to it.
PHIL. That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and extension being
despatched, we proceed next to MOTION. Can a real motion in any
external body be at the same time very swift and very slow?
HYL. It cannot.
PHIL. Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to
the time it takes up in describing any given space? Thus a body that
describes a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would in
case it described only a mile in three hours.
HYL. I agree with you.
PHIL. And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as
fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some spirit of
another kind?
HYL. I own it.
PHIL. Consequently the same body may to another seem to perform its
motion over any space in half the time that it doth to you. And the same
reasoning will hold as to any other proportion: that is to say, according
to your principles (since the motions perceived are both really in the
object) it is possible one and the same body shall be really moved the
same way at once, both very swift and very slow. How is this consistent
either with common sense, or with what you just now granted?
HYL. I have nothing to say to it.
PHIL. Then as for SOLIDITY; either you do not mean any sensible
quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry: or if you do, it
must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the other are
plainly relative to our senses: it being evident that what seems hard to
one animal may appear soft to another, who hath greater force and
firmness of limbs. Nor is it less plain that the resistance I feel is not
in the body.
HYL. I own the very SENSATION of resistance, which is all you
immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the CAUSE of that
sensation is.
PHIL. But the causes of our sensations are not things immediately
perceived, and therefore are not sensible. This point I thought had been
already determined.
HYL. I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little
embarrassed: I know not how to quit my old notions.
PHIL. To help you out, do but consider that if EXTENSION be once
acknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the same must
necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and gravity; since they all
evidently suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire
particularly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you have
denied them all to have any real existence.
HYL. I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those
philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence should
yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no difference between them,
how can this be accounted for?
PHIL. It is not my business to account for every opinion of the
philosophers. But, among other reasons which may be assigned for this, it
seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former
than the latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have
something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of
extension, figure, and motion affect us with. And, it being too visibly
absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance,
men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the
Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there is
something in this, if you recollect the difference you made between an
intense and more moderate degree of heat; allowing the one a real
existence, while you denied it to the other. But, after all, there is no
rational ground for that distinction; for, surely an indifferent
sensation is as truly a SENSATION as one more pleasing or
painful; and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to
exist in an unthinking subject.
HYL. It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere
heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension. Now,
though it be acknowledged that GREAT and SMALL, consisting merely in
the relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own
bodies, do not really inhere in the substances themselves; yet nothing
obliges us to hold the same with regard to ABSOLUTE EXTENSION, which is
something abstracted from GREAT and SMALL, from this or that
particular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion; SWIFT and
SLOW are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own
minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of motion
exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted
from them doth not.
PHIL. Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of
extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of
swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each?
HYL. I think so.
PHIL. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties,
are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call
them.
HYL. They are.
PHIL. That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in
general.
HYL. Let it be so.
PHIL. But it is a universally received maxim that EVERYTHING WHICH
EXISTS IS PARTICULAR. How then can motion in general, or extension in
general, exist in any corporeal substance?
HYL. I will take time to solve your difficulty.
PHIL. But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you
can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am
content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your
thoughts a distinct ABSTRACT IDEA of motion or extension, divested of
all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and
square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I
will then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be
unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no
notion of.
HYL. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.
PHIL. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the
ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term
SECONDARY?
HYL. What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by
themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the
mathematicians treat of them?
PHIL. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general
propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any
other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of them abstractedly.
But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word MOTION
by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? or,
because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any
mention of GREAT or SMALL, or any other sensible mode or quality,
that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without
any particular size or figure, or sensible quality, should be
distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of
quantity, without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended
with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when
laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you
will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension.
HYL. But what say you to PURE INTELLECT? May not abstracted ideas be
framed by that faculty?
PHIL. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot
frame them by the help of PURE INTELLECT; whatsoever faculty you
understand by those words. Besides, not to inquire into the nature of
pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as VIRTUE, REASON, GOD,
or the like, thus much seems manifest--that sensible things are only to
be perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures,
therefore, and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not
belong to pure intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you
can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of
size, or even from other sensible qualities.
HYL. Let me think a little--I do not find that I can.
PHIL. And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature
which implies a repugnancy in its conception?
HYL. By no means.
PHIL. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite
the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth
it not follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist
likewise?
HYL. It should seem so.
PHIL. Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as
conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther
application of force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will trust
your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them
appear as being in the same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or
figure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?
HYL. You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if there be
no secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, that all
sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind.
But, my fear is that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or
overlooked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time to think.
PHIL. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please in
reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty to recover any
slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted which makes
for your first opinion.
HYL. One great oversight I take to be this--that I did not sufficiently
distinguish the OBJECT from the SENSATION. Now, though this latter
may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the
former cannot.
PHIL. What object do you mean? the object of the senses?
HYL. The same.
PHIL. It is then immediately perceived?
HYL. Right.
PHIL. Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately
perceived and a sensation.
HYL. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides
which, there is something perceived; and this I call the OBJECT. For
example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of
perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.
PHIL. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?
HYL. The same.
PHIL. And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension?
HYL. Nothing.
PHIL. What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent
with the extension; is it not?
HYL. That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without
the mind, in some unthinking substance.
PHIL. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest.
Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your
mind or mine; but, that any immediate object of the senses,--that is, any
idea, or combination of ideas--should exist in an unthinking substance,
or exterior to ALL minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor
can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that
the red and yellow were on the tulip you SAW, since you do not pretend
to SEE that unthinking substance.
HYL. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from
the subject.
PHIL. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to
your distinction between SENSATION and OBJECT; if I take you right,
you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the
mind, the other not.
HYL. True.
PHIL. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking
thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may?
HYL. That is my meaning.
PHIL. So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it
were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?
HYL. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a
perception.
PHIL. When is the mind said to be active?
HYL. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.
PHIL. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an
act of the will?
HYL. It cannot.
PHIL. The mind therefore is to be accounted ACTIVE in its perceptions
so far forth as VOLITION is included in them?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the
motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in
applying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling?