DEFINITIONS
IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY,
PRECEDED BY
AN INQUIRY INTO THE RULES WHICH OUGHT TO GUIDE POLITICAL ECONOMISTS IN
THE DEFINITION AND USE OF THEIR TERMS;
WITH REMARKS
ON THE DEVIATION FROM THESE RULES IN THEIR WRITINGS.
BY THE
REV. T. R. MALTHUS, A.M., F.R.S., A.R.S.L.,
AND
_PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE EAST-INDIA COLLEGE,
HERTFORDSHIRE_.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.
MDCCCXXVII.
LONDON:
Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES,
Stamford-street.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTENTS.
PAGE
PREFACE vii
CHAPTER I.
Rules for the Definition and Application of Terms in Political
Economy 1
CHAPTER II.
On the Definition of Wealth by the French Economists 8
CHAPTER III.
On the Definition and Application of Terms by Adam Smith 10
CHAPTER IV.
Application of the term Utility by M. Say 19
CHAPTER V.
On the Definition and Application of Terms by Mr. Ricardo 23
CHAPTER VI.
On the Definition and Application of Terms by Mr. Mill, in his
“Elements of Political Economy.” 37
CHAPTER VII.
On the Definition and Application of Terms, by Mr. Macculloch, in
his “Principles of Political Economy.” 69
CHAPTER VIII.
On the Definition and Use of Terms by the Author of “A Critical
Dissertation on the Nature, Measure, and Causes of Value.” 125
CHAPTER IX.
Summary of the Reasons for Adopting the subjoined Definition of
the Measure of Value 203
CHAPTER X.
Definitions in Political Economy 234
CHAPTER XI.
Remarks on the Definitions 249
PREFACE.
The differences of opinion among political economists have of late been
a frequent subject of complaint; and it must be allowed, that one of the
principal causes of them may be traced to the different meanings in
which the same terms have been used by different writers.
The object of the present publication is, to draw attention to an
obstacle in the study of political economy, which has now increased to
no inconsiderable magnitude. But this could not be done merely by laying
down rules for the definition and application of terms, and defining
conformably to them. It was necessary to show the difficulties which had
resulted from an inattention to this subject, in some of the most
popular works on political economy; and this has naturally led to the
discussion of certain important principles and questions of
classification, which it would be most desirable to settle previously,
as the only foundation for a correct definition and application of
terms.
These are the reasons for the arrangement and mode of treating the
subject which has been adopted.
DEFINITIONS
IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY.
CHAPTER I.
RULES FOR THE DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OF TERMS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY.
In a mathematical definition, although the words in which it is
expressed may vary, the meaning which it is intended to convey is always
the same. Whether a _straight_ line be defined to be a line which lies
evenly between its extreme points, or the shortest line which can be
drawn between two points, there never can be a difference of opinion as
to the lines which are comprehended, and those which are not
comprehended, in the definition.
The case is not the same with the definitions in the less strict
sciences. The classifications in natural history, notwithstanding all
the pains which have been taken with them, are still such, that it is
sometimes difficult to say to which of two adjoining classes the
individuals on the confines of each ought to belong. It is still more
difficult, in the sciences of morals and politics, to use terms which
may not be understood differently by different persons, according to
their different habits and opinions. The terms virtue, morality, equity,
charity, are in every-day use; yet it is by no means universally agreed
what are the particular acts which ought to be classed under these
different heads.
The terms liberty, civil liberty, political liberty, constitutional
government, _&c._ _&c._, are frequently understood in a different sense
by different persons.
It has sometimes been said of political economy, that it approaches to
the strict science of mathematics. But I fear it must be acknowledged,
particularly since the great deviations which have lately taken place
from the definitions and doctrines of Adam Smith, that it approaches
more nearly to the sciences of morals and politics.
It does not seem yet to be agreed what ought to be considered as the
best definition of wealth, of capital, of productive labour, or of
value;—what is meant by real wages;—what is meant by labour;—what is
meant by profits;—in what sense the term ‘demand’ is to be
understood,[1] _&c._ _&c._
As a remedy for such differences, it has been suggested, that a new and
more perfect nomenclature should be introduced. But though the
inconveniences of a new nomenclature are much more than counterbalanced
by its obvious utility in such sciences as chemistry, botany, and some
others, where a great variety of objects, not in general use, must be
arranged and described so as best to enable us to remember their
characteristic distinctions; yet in such sciences as morals, politics,
and political economy, where the terms are comparatively few, and of
constant application in the daily concerns of life, it is impossible to
suppose that an entirely new nomenclature would be submitted to; and if
it were, it would not render the same service to these sciences, in
promoting their advancement, as the nomenclatures of Linnæus, Lavoisier,
and Cuvier, to the sciences to which they were respectively applied.
Under these circumstances, it may be desirable to consider what seem to
be the most obvious and natural rules for our guidance in defining and
applying the terms used in the science of political economy. The object
to be kept in view should evidently be such a definition and application
of these terms, as will enable us most clearly and conveniently to
explain the nature and causes of the wealth of nations; and the rules
chiefly to be attended to may, perhaps, be nearly included in the four
following:—
First. When we employ terms which are of daily occurrence in the common
conversation of educated persons, we should define and apply them, so as
to agree with the sense in which they are understood in this ordinary
use of them. This is the best and more desirable authority for the
meaning of words.
Secondly. When the sanction of this authority is not attainable, on
account of further distinctions being required, the next best authority
is that of some of the most celebrated writers in the science,
particularly if any one of them has, by common consent, been considered
as the principal founder of it. In this case, whether the term be a new
one, born with the science, or an old one used in a new sense, it will
not be strange to the generality of readers, nor liable to be often
misunderstood.
But it may be observed, that we shall not be able to improve the science
if we are thus to be bound down by past authority. This is
unquestionably true; and I should be by no means inclined to propose to
political economists “jurare in verba magistri,” whenever it can be
clearly made out that a change would be beneficial, and decidedly
contribute to the advancement of the science. But it must be allowed,
that in the less strict sciences there are few definitions to which some
plausible, nay, even real, objections are not to be made; and, if we
determine to have a new one in every case where the old one is not quite
complete, the chances are, that we shall subject the science to all the
very serious disadvantages of a frequent change of terms, without
finally accomplishing our object.
It is acknowledged, however, that a change may sometimes be necessary;
and when it is, the natural rules to be attended to seem to be,
Thirdly. That the alteration proposed should not only remove the
immediate objections which may have been made to the terms as before
applied, but should be shown to be free from other equal or greater
objections, and on the whole be obviously more _useful_ in facilitating
the explanation and improvement of the science. A change which is always
itself an evil, can alone be warranted by superior utility taken in the
most enlarged sense.
Fourthly. That any new definitions adopted should be consistent with
those which are allowed to remain, and that the same terms should always
be applied in the same sense, except where inveterate custom has
established different meanings of the same word; in which case the sense
in which the word is used, if not marked by the context, which it
generally is, should be particularly specified.
I cannot help thinking that these rules for the definitions in political
economy must be allowed to be obviously natural and proper, and that if
changes are made without attention to them, we must necessarily run a
great risk of impeding, instead of promoting, the progress of the
science.
Yet, although these rules appear to be so obvious and natural, as to
make one think it almost impossible that they should escape attention,
it must be acknowledged that they have been too often overlooked by
political economists; and it may tend to illustrate their use and
importance; and possibly excite a little more attention to them in
future; to notice some of the most striking deviations from them in the
works of writers of the highest reputation.