REVIEW OF RESULTS
Had the fighting round Rheims and the fighting north of the Aisne no
result? Were these combats, vast as they were, merely drawn combats? By
no means. North of the Aisne the British gained the eastern end of the
ridge; round Rheims the French won all the eastern side of the theatre
of hills, with the exception of Nogent l'Abbesse, and also the eastern
side of the transverse gap. Those results were both decisive and
important.
They were decisive and important because they achieved strategical
purposes vital to the Allied campaign. Let us try to make that clear.
When after the defeat on the Marne the Germans took up their new line
from the north of the Aisne to the Argonne, their utmost energy and
resource were put forth to send into the fighting line from Germany
fresh reserve formations which would give their forces not only a
numerical but a military superiority.
But the effect and value of those fresh masses clearly depended on
their being employed at the decisive points. Where were those decisive
points?
The decisive points were first the extreme left of the Allied line,
where it turned round from the north of the Aisne to the Oise, and
secondly Verdun and along the eastern frontier.
Consider the effect had the Germans been able promptly to throw
_decisively_ superior forces against the Allies at those points. They
would have turned both flanks of the Allied line, they would have forced
a general retreat, and they would have been able once more to resume the
offensive, but this time probably with the fortified frontier in their
hands.
There can be no doubt that, broadly, that was their intention; and it
was plainly seen by General Joffre to be their intention, because
eastward from Rheims to the Argonne in their fortified line across the
highlands _the Germans remained from first to last upon the defensive_.
This, however, was the situation the Germans had to meet: between the
Aisne and the Oise a new and powerful French army under the command of
General de Castlenau; on the Aisne and round Rheims, a tremendous and
sustained onset by the 6th French, the British, and the 5th French army;
between Rheims and the Argonne, an offensive which pushed them
successively out of Suippes, and Souain, and therefore off the great
cross-roads; in the Argonne, an offensive which forced them back from
St. Menehould and beyond Varennes, and closed the defiles; round
Verdun, and in the Woeuvre, an onset which threatened to cut
communications with Metz.
Now the effect of these operations was, among other things, to restrict
the German means of movement and supply; and it was a consequence of
that restriction that even though there might be two or more millions of
men then ready in Germany to be sent forward, there were neither roads
nor railways enough to send them forward save after delay, nor roads or
railways enough to keep them supplied when they had been sent.
With the means at their disposal--those means were still great, though
not great enough--the German Government had to choose between various
alternatives. As to the choice they made, later events leave no doubt.
They sent forward troops enough to _defend_ their flank between the
Aisne and the Oise--it was all at the moment they could do; and they
employed the best and heaviest of their masses of reserves partly to
resist the British attack, but mainly to resist the 5th French army. At
this time they had to let the position in the Argonne, round Verdun, and
on the eastern frontier go; that is to say, they had there to remain for
the time being on the defensive.
The fighting north of the Aisne and round Rheims therefore crippled
their operations at what were, in truth, the decisive points--the Allied
flanks; and that was unavoidable, because unless the centre of their
line remained secure, operations on the flanks would be impracticable.
But these operations in the centre _used up their best troops_.
Conversely, of course, the same operations left General Joffre the more
free both to pursue his envelopment of the Germans on their flank
northwards from the Aisne towards the Belgian frontier, and to go on
with his seizures of positions round Verdun and on the eastern frontier,
seizures which pressed upon and embarrassed the German communications,
and consequently limited the total strength they could put into the
field.
It will be seen, therefore, that the fighting north of the Aisne and
round Rheims _was_ important and _was_ decisive.
The fact must not be lost sight of that the aim of the Germans was at
this time, if they could, to re-seize the initiative. Again the fact
ought to be kept in mind that the aim of the Allied strategy was not to
drive the German armies from France, but both to prevent them from
getting out of France and to destroy them as a military force. If we
know the governing motive on each side, we hold the key to the strategy
adopted. Here the governing motive of neither was a secret.
To show the effect of governing motive, let us in the first instance
follow the course of German strategy. We shall find that from the middle
of September, during the succeeding nine weeks--that is, until about
November 20--they made six great efforts, any one of which, had it
succeeded, would once more have given them the initiative in this
western campaign. The first was the effort to break the Allied line at
Rheims.
Foiled in their outflanking scheme by the inherent difficulties of the
situation, but not less by the powerful Allied attack north of the Aisne
and round Rheims, there can be no question that the German Headquarters
Staff decided that their best, most direct, and most decisive stroke
would be a counter-offensive made against Rheims with their utmost
force, and as the situation stood at the end of September, there can be
no question that they were right.
Had the effort succeeded both parts of the Allies' line must have been
forced into retreat and their communications severed. This success must
have changed the entire aspect of the western operations. For the Allies
it would have been a disaster of the first magnitude. If in this effort
the Germans sacrificed their best troops, it affords only another
illustration of the statement that they do not make such sacrifices
without what they consider good cause.
But the effort failed, and the German Headquarters Staff, at any rate,
must have realised that the failure and the cost of it had imperilled
the whole position of their armies in France. Matters of this kind have
not to be judged only by ground lost or won. The success or failure to
achieve objectives is the true test.
Meanwhile heavy forces of the Allies had been massed against the German
right flank. The next effort of the Germans consequently was to push
back those forces. They met the outflanking movement in the way such
movements can best be met--by trying to outflank the outflankers.
At this time the Allied forces on the flank extended from near Noyon on
the Oise northward to the Somme. The Germans promptly pushed westward in
force north of the Somme and across the outside edge of the Allied line
to the town of Albert and the heights commanding it.
With notable promptitude, however, the Allied line was extended across
the Somme to the north, and by the west of Arras, and the German
movement was held. Gradually, after days of obstinate fighting, the
enemy were battled out of Albert and then out of Arras; and the Allied
outflanking line was stretched up to Bethune and La Bassée.
Night and day, day and night, by railway, by motor-omnibus, on
motor-cars,[33] French troops during three whole weeks were rushed up
from the south and west of France. This movement towards the fighting
line had begun with the pursuit after the Battle of the Marne. It never
ceased. First the army of General de Castlenau appeared on the front.
Next came the army of General de Maudhuy. Territorials and marines from
the fleet were hurried into the service; divisions of cavalry spaced out
the line, and defended communications. In Germany as in France no
effort was spared. The issue was momentous. During these first weeks of
October the German Government put forth its supreme effort to stem and
to turn the adverse tide of war. Hitherto they had found their measures
baffled. Two new and powerful French armies had fastened on to the flank
of their position. Their own forces had come up just too late. The peril
was menacing and it was growing. They redoubled their energies.
Their decision was another supreme effort to outflank the outflankers.
With fresh masses of Reservists, sent westward at all possible speed,
they pushed behind a heavy screen of cavalry across the Aa and across
the Lys at Estaires and threatened the rear of the French troops holding
Bethune.
It is probably not realised that this was strategically the most
important offensive movement the Germans had made in the western theatre
of war since their advance upon Paris.
Yet that undoubtedly was the fact. Had the movement succeeded it must
not only have given them control of the north-east coast of France as
far probably as Havre, but it must have rolled up the Allied line as far
as Noyon. The whole original scheme of turning the Allies' left flank
would have been within realisation.
The movement did not succeed. It was met by a counter-move probably as
unexpected by the Germans as it was bold. The counter-move was the
transfer of the British army from the Aisne.
Recognising the decisive character of these operations, General Joffre
had entrusted the control of affairs on this part of the front to
General Foch, not only one of the ablest among the able soldiers whom
this war has shown the French Army to possess, but one of the most
brilliant authorities on the science of modern military tactics. As he
had met the situation magnificently at Sezanne, so now he met it with
equal resource under circumstances hardly less critical.
There were now three French armies on the German flank, and they fought
as they were led with a skill equal to their valour. Yet the necessity
remained for a great counter-stroke. In view of that necessity the idea
occurred to Sir John French to transfer the British army, a proposal to
which General Joffre at once agreed.
It is beyond the scope of this volume to enter into details of the new
great battle which, beginning with the arrival of the British troops,
culminated in the heroic defence of Ypres. Justice could not be done to
that great and memorable feat of arms in a brief summary.
Suffice it to say that here, on the great coalfield of northern France,
in a labyrinth of railway sidings and canals, villages and lanes, pit
heaps, and factories, the British troops, helped by the French cavalry,
after furious fighting, drove back the Germans from the Aa and the Lys
and took up a line continuing the outflanking positions from La Bassée
to Ypres in Belgium.
A third effort of the Germans to outflank the outflanking line was
directed across the Yser. This was the last attempt of the kind that
could be made. Its success was consequently vital, and its failure
equally disastrous. Again it illustrates the fact that the Germans
sacrifice neither money nor lives without good cause. The fighting on
the Yser was as deadly for the enemy as the fighting round Rheims.
Coincidently, however, with these movements were others of a different
kind. The official _communiqués_, covering the two kinds of movements as
the evidences of them appeared day by day, have naturally led to a
certain amount of mystification--not intentional, but inevitable from
the brevity and caution of these statements and the fact that they cover
separately only the operations of a few hours.
The movements of a different kind were those designed at one point or
another to drive a wedge or salient into the Allied front.
In the operations on the German flank between the Aisne and the Belgian
coast there have been two main efforts of that character. The first was
the attempt to split the Allied front at Roye and at Arras, and to break
up the line between those places; the second was the effort on an even
larger scale, and pursued with still greater determination, to split the
front at La Bassée and at Ypres, and to break up the line intervening.
It is no mere accident that this latter attempt followed immediately on
the failure to cross the Yser. _The attempt arose out of the necessity
of the situation._
On the Upper Meuse, by another great effort, the Germans had driven a
wedge into the French fortified frontier at St. Mihiel, and that wedge
appeared to some the prelude of a mysterious scheme. In fact, the
intention and the effect of it was to hold off the French advance along
the frontier of Lorraine and across the Vosges. Again it is the case of
a desperate man clinging to a railing.
We have, therefore, three great efforts to break the Allied front by
their wedge tactics, and three to outflank the Allied outflanking
development. None of these efforts succeeded.
What was the consequence? The consequence was that the German armies in
France and Belgium could neither advance nor retreat. They could not
advance because they are not strong enough. They could not retreat,
because retreat would mean their destruction.
The retreat of any army--and most of all the retreat of a huge mass
army--is not a simple matter. On the contrary, it is a most difficult
and complex operation in the most favourable circumstances. Here,
however, was not one mass army, but a line of mass armies, occupying a
front forming a right angle, and opposed on each arm of that right angle
by forces which had proved stronger than they. So situated, they could
only retreat with any chance of safety by falling directly back; but
either arm of the angle if it fell directly back must obstruct the
retreat of the other; and if they fell directly back each at the same
time, their movements must become exactly like those of the blades of a
pair of scissors as they are being closed. _A retreat under such
conditions is a military impossibility._
Not a few fantastic motives have been attributed to the Germans, more
particularly as regards the terrible struggle in West Flanders, but the
plain truth of the matter is that here stated.
Now if we turn to the strategy of the Allies, bearing their governing
motive in mind, we shall find that it rested primarily on the attack
launched against the German positions north of the Aisne and round
Rheims.
That attack wrecked the German scheme for resuming the offensive, and
was the most effective means of assuring that end. It is impossible
indeed not to recognise that the feat which reduced a force like the
German armies to immobility is a masterpiece of strategy wholly without
parallel in the annals of war. Whether we look at the breadth and
boldness of its conception, at the patience and command of organisation
with which it was carried out, at the grasp it displayed of the real
conditions governing the operations of modern mass armies, or at the
clear purpose and unswerving resolution with which it was followed, the
plan equally calls forth surprise and admiration.
From the military standpoint, victory or defeat is the answer to the
question: Which side has accomplished the purpose it had in view?
The German purpose of re-seizing the initiative was not accomplished.
The German scheme of turning either one or both flanks of the Allied
line was not accomplished. That is military failure.
From the beginning of October, when the struggle round Rheims was at its
height, the feature of the campaign broadly was that the weight of the
fighting passed progressively from the centre of the fighting front to
the wings--to West Flanders on the one side, and to the Argonne and the
Upper Meuse on the other. Progressively the Allied forces were placed
where it was intended they should be placed. They accomplished the
purpose which it was intended they should accomplish--that of keeping
the main military strength of Germany helpless while they wasted that
strength. That is military success.
To sum up. The Germans entered France with a force of more than a
million and a half of men. The like of such a military expedition the
world till then had never seen. The plan of it had been studied and
worked out in detail for years. On the preparations for it had been
bestowed a colossal labour. It appeared certain of success. It was
defeated by an exercise of military skill and resource which, however
regarded, must stand as one of the greatest records of mastery in the
art of war.
FOOTNOTE:
[33] Some 70,000 motor-cars and motor-omnibuses are said to have been
employed.
APPENDIX
Despatches of Field-Marshal Sir John French on the Battles of the Marne
and the Aisne, addressed to Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War.
I.
Sept. 17, 1914.
MY LORD--
In continuation of my despatch of Sept. 7, I have the honour to report
the further progress of the operations of the forces under my command
from Aug. 28.
On that evening the retirement of the force was followed closely by two
of the enemy's cavalry columns, moving south-east from St. Quentin.
The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the 3rd and
5th Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme General Gough, with the 3rd
Cavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlans of the Guard with considerable
loss.
General Chetwode, with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, encountered the eastern
column near Cérizy, moving south. The Brigade attacked and routed the
column, the leading German regiment suffering very severe casualties and
being almost broken up.
The 7th French Army Corps was now in course of being railed up from the
south to the east of Amiens. On the 29th it nearly completed its
detrainment, and the French 6th Army got into position on my left, its
right resting on Roye.
The 5th French Army was behind the line of the Oise between La Fère and
Guise.
The pursuit of the enemy was very vigorous; some five or six German
corps were on the Somme, facing the 5th Army on the Oise. At least two
corps were advancing towards my front, and were crossing the Somme east
and west of Ham. Three or four more German corps were opposing the 6th
French Army on my left.
This was the situation at one o'clock on the 29th, when I received a
visit from General Joffre at my headquarters.
I strongly represented my position to the French Commander-in-Chief, who
was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been. He told
me that he had directed the 5th French Army on the Oise to move forward
and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checking pursuit. He
also told me of the formation of the 6th French Army on my left flank,
composed of the 7th Army Corps, four reserve divisions, and Sordêt's
corps of cavalry.
I finally arranged with General Joffre to effect a further short
retirement towards the line Compiègne-Soissons, promising him, however,
to do my utmost to keep always within a day's march of him.
In pursuance of this arrangement the British forces retired to a
position a few miles north of the line Compiègne-Soissons on the 29th.
The right flank of the German army was now reaching a point which
appeared seriously to endanger my line of communications with Havre. I
had already evacuated Amiens, into which place a German reserve division
was reported to have moved.
Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish an
advance base at Le Mans. This operation was well carried out by the
Inspector-General of Communications.
In spite of a severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard 10th and Guard
Reserve Corps of the German army by the 1st and 3rd French Corps on the
right of the 5th Army, it was not part of General Joffre's plan to
pursue this advantage, and a general retirement on to the line of the
Marne was ordered, to which the French forces in the more eastern
theatre were directed to conform.
A new army (the 9th) has been formed from three corps in the south by
General Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the 5th
and left of the 4th Armies.
Whilst closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy on
at all points until a favourable situation was created from which to
assume the offensive, General Joffre found it necessary to modify from
day to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing
to the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the general
situation.
In conformity with the movements of the French forces, my retirement
continued practically from day to day. Although we were not severely
pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually.
On Sept. 1, when retiring from the thickly-wooded country to the south
of Compiègne, the 1st Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by some German
cavalry. They momentarily lost a horse artillery battery, and several
officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help, however, of
some detachments from the 3rd Corps operating on their left, they not
only recovered their own guns, but succeeded in capturing twelve of the
enemy's.
Similarly, to the eastward, the 1st Corps, retiring south, also got into
some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe rearguard
action ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the 4th Guards Brigade
suffered considerably.
On Sept. 3 the British forces were in position south of the Marne
between Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been requested by
General Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as possible,
and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the necessary
dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had been effected, I
was asked by the French Commander-in-Chief to continue my retirement to
a point some twelve miles in rear of the position I then occupied, with
a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. This retirement
was duly carried out. In the meantime the enemy had thrown bridges and
crossed the Marne in considerable force, and was threatening the Allies
all along the line of the British forces and the 5th and 9th French
armies. Consequently several small outpost actions took place.
On Saturday, Sept. 5, I met the French Commander-in-Chief at his
request, and he informed me of his intention to take the offensive
forthwith, as he considered conditions were very favourable to success.
General Joffre announced to me his intention of wheeling up the left
flank of the 6th Army, pivoting on the Marne, and directing it to move
on the Ourcq; cross and attack the flank of the 1st German Army, which
was then moving in a south-easterly direction east of that river.
He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my left resting
on the Marne and my right on the 5th Army--to fill the gap between that
army and the 6th. I was then to advance against the enemy in my front
and join in the general offensive movement.
These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, Sept. 6, at
sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened on a
front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the left
flank of the 6th French Army, through Lizy on the Marne, Mauperthuis,
which was about the British centre, Courteçon, which was the left of the
5th French Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of the 9th Army
under General Foch, and so along the front of the 9th, 4th, and 3rd
French Armies to a point north of the fortress of Verdun.
This battle, in so far as the 6th French Army, the British Army, the 5th
French Army, and the 9th French Army were concerned, may be said to have
concluded on the evening of Sept. 10, by which time the Germans had been
driven back to the line Soissons-Rheims, with a loss of thousands of
prisoners, many guns, and enormous masses of transport.
About Sept. 3 the enemy appears to have changed his plans and to have
determined to stop his advance south direct upon Paris, for on Sept. 4
air reconnaissances showed that his main columns were moving in a
south-easterly direction generally east of a line drawn through Nanteuil
and Lizy on the Ourcq.
On Sept. 5 several of these columns were observed to have crossed the
Marne; whilst German troops, which were observed moving south-east up
the left bank of the Ourcq on the 4th, were now reported to be halted
and facing that river. Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing
at Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château-Thierry, and Mezy.
Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging on
Montmirail, whilst before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were
located in the neighbourhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La
Ferté-Gaucher and Dagny.
I should conceive it to have been about noon on Sept. 6, after the
British forces had changed their front to the right and occupied the
line Jouy-Le Chatel-Faremoutiers-Villeneuve Le Comte, and the advance of
the 6th French Army north of the Marne towards the Ourcq became
apparent, that the enemy realised the powerful threat that was being
made against the flank of his columns moving south-east, and began the
great retreat which opened the battle above referred to.
On the evening of Sept. 6, therefore, the fronts and positions of the
opposing armies were, roughly, as follows:
ALLIES.
6th French Army.--Right on the Marne at Meux, left towards Betz.
British Forces.--On the line Dagny-Coulommiers-Maison.
5th French Army.--At Courtagon, right on Esternay.
Conneau's Cavalry Corps.--Between the right of the British and the left
of the French 5th Army.
GERMANS.
4th Reserve and 2nd Corps.--East of the Ourcq and facing that river.
9th Cavalry Division.--West of Crecy.
2nd Cavalry Division. North of Coulommiers.
4th Corps.--Rebais.
3rd and 7th Corps.--South-west of Montmirail.
All these troops constituted the 1st German Army, which was directed
against the French 6th Army on the Ourcq, and the British forces, and
the left of the 5th French Army south of the Marne.
The 2nd German Army (IX., X., X.R. and Guard) was moving against the
centre and right of the 5th French Army and the 9th French Army.
On Sept. 7 both the 5th and 6th French Armies were heavily engaged on
our flank. The 2nd and 4th Reserve German Corps on the Ourcq vigorously
opposed the advance of the French towards that river, but did not
prevent the 6th Army from gaining some headway, the Germans themselves
suffering serious losses. The French 5th Army threw the enemy back to
the line of the Petit Morin River, after inflicting severe losses upon
them, especially about Montceaux, which was carried at the point of the
bayonet.
The enemy retreated before our advance, covered by his 2nd and 9th and
Guard Cavalry Divisions, which suffered severely.
Our cavalry acted with great vigour, especially General De Lisle's
Brigade, with the 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars.
On Sept. 8 the enemy continued his retreat northward, and our army was
successfully engaged during the day with strong rearguards of all arms
on the Petit Morin River, thereby materially assisting the progress of
the French armies on our right and left, against whom the enemy was
making his greatest efforts. On both sides the enemy was thrown back
with very heavy loss. The First Army Corps encountered stubborn
resistance at La Trétoire (north of Rebais). The enemy occupied a
strong position with infantry and guns on the northern bank of the Petit
Morin River; they were dislodged with considerable loss. Several machine
guns and many prisoners were captured, and upwards of 200 German dead
were left on the ground.
The forcing of the Petit Morin at this point was much assisted by the
cavalry and the 1st Division, which crossed higher up the stream.
Later in the day a counter attack by the enemy was well repulsed by the
First Army Corps, a great many prisoners and some guns again falling
into our hands.
On this day (Sept. 8) the Second Army Corps encountered considerable
opposition, but drove back the enemy at all points with great loss,
making considerable captures.
The Third Army Corps also drove back considerable bodies of the enemy's
infantry and made some captures.
On Sept. 9 the First and Second Army Corps forced the passage of the
Marne and advanced some miles to the north of it. The Third Corps
encountered considerable opposition, as the bridge at La Ferté was
destroyed and the enemy held the town on the opposite bank in some
strength, and thence persistently obstructed the construction of a
bridge; so the passage was not effected until after nightfall.
During the day's pursuit the enemy suffered heavy loss in killed and
wounded, some hundreds of prisoners fell into our hands, and a battery
of eight machine guns was captured by the 2nd Division.
On this day the 6th French Army was heavily engaged west of the River
Ourc. The enemy had largely increased his force opposing them, and very
heavy fighting ensued, in which the French were successful throughout.
The left of the 5th French Army reached the neighbourhood of
Château-Thierry after the most severe fighting, having driven the enemy
completely north of the river with great loss.
The fighting of this army in the neighbourhood of Montmirail was very
severe.
The advance was resumed at daybreak on the 10th up to the line of the
Ourcq, opposed by strong rearguards of all arms. The 1st and 2nd Corps,
assisted by the Cavalry Division on the right, the 3rd and 5th Cavalry
Brigades on the left, drove the enemy northwards. Thirteen guns, seven
machine guns, about 2,000 prisoners, and quantities of transport fell
into our hands. The enemy left many dead on the field. On this day the
French 5th and 6th Armies had little opposition.
As the 1st and 2nd German Armies were now in full retreat, this evening
marks the end of the battle which practically commenced on the morning
of the 6th instant, and it is at this point in the operations that I am
concluding the present despatch.
Although I deeply regret to have had to report heavy losses in killed
and wounded throughout these operations, I do not think they have been
excessive in view of the magnitude of the great fight, the outlines of
which I have only been able very briefly to describe, and the
demoralisation and loss in killed and wounded which are known to have
been caused to the enemy by the vigour and severity of the pursuit.
In concluding this despatch I must call your lordship's special
attention to the fact that from Sunday, Aug. 23, up to the present date
(Sept. 17), from Mons back almost to the Seine, and from the Seine to
the Aisne, the Army under my command has been ceaselessly engaged
without one single day's halt or rest of any kind.
Since the date to which in this dispatch I have limited my report of the
operations, a great battle on the Aisne has been proceeding. A full
report of this battle will be made in an early further despatch.
It will, however, be of interest to say here that, in spite of a very
determined resistance on the part of the enemy, who is holding in
strength and great tenacity a position peculiarly favourable to defence,
the battle which commenced on the evening of the 12th inst. has, so far,
forced the enemy back from his first position, secured the passage of
the river, and inflicted great loss upon him, including the capture of
over 2,000 prisoners and several guns.--I have the honour to be, your
lordship's most obedient servant,
(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, the
British Forces in the Field.
II.
Oct. 8, 1914.
MY LORD--
I have the honour to report the operations in which the British forces
in France have been engaged since the evening of Sept. 10.
1. In the early morning of the 11th the further pursuit of the enemy was
commenced, and the three corps crossed the Ourcq practically unopposed,
the cavalry reaching the line of the Aisne River; the 3rd and 5th
Brigades south of Soissons, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th on the high ground at
Couvrelles and Cerseuil.
On the afternoon of the 12th from the opposition encountered by the 6th
French Army to the west of Soissons, by the 3rd Corps south-east of that
place, by the 2nd Corps south of Missy and Vailly, and certain
indications all along the line, I formed the opinion that the enemy had,
for the moment at any rate, arrested his retreat, and was preparing to
dispute the passage of the Aisne with some vigour.
South of Soissons the Germans were holding Mont de Paris against the
attack of the right of the French 6th Army when the 3rd Corps reached
the neighbourhood of Buzancy, south-east of that place. With the
assistance of the artillery of the 3rd Corps the French drove them back
across the river at Soissons, where they destroyed the bridges.
The heavy artillery fire which was visible for several miles in a
westerly direction in the valley of the Aisne showed that the 6th French
Army was meeting with strong opposition all along the line.
On this day the cavalry under General Allenby reached the neighbourhood
of Braine, and did good work in clearing the town and the high ground
beyond it of strong hostile detachments. The Queen's Bays are
particularly mentioned by the General as having assisted greatly in the
success of this operation. They were well supported by the 3rd Division,
which on this night bivouacked at Brenelle, south of the river.
The 5th Division approached Missy, but were unable to make headway.
The 1st Army Corps reached the neighbourhood of Vauxcéré without much
opposition.
In this manner the Battle of the Aisne commenced.
2. The Aisne Valley runs generally east and west, and consists of a
flat-bottomed depression of width varying from half a mile to two miles,
down which the river follows a winding course to the west at some points
near the southern slopes of the valley and at others near the northern.
The high ground both on the north and south of the river is
approximately 400 ft. above the bottom of the valley, and is very
similar in character, as are both slopes of the valley itself, which are
broken into numerous rounded spurs and re-entrants. The most prominent
of the former are the Chivre spur on the right bank and Sermoise spur on
the left. Near the latter place the general plateau on the south is
divided by a subsidiary valley of much the same character, down which
the small River Vesle flows to the main stream near Sermoise. The slopes
of the plateau overlooking the Aisne on the north and south are of
varying steepness, and are covered with numerous patches of wood, which
also stretch upwards and backwards over the edge on to the top of the
high ground. There are several villages and small towns dotted about in
the valley itself and along its sides, the chief of which is the town of
Soissons.
The Aisne is a sluggish stream of some 170 ft. in breadth, but, being 15
ft. deep in the centre, it is unfordable. Between Soissons on the west
and Villers on the east (the part of the river attacked and secured by
the British forces) there are eleven road bridges across it. On the
north bank a narrow-gauge railway runs from Soissons to Vailly, where it
crosses the river and continues eastward along the south bank. From
Soissons to Sermoise a double line of railway runs along the south bank,
turning at the latter place up the Vesle Valley towards Bazoches.
The position held by the enemy is a very strong one, either for a
delaying action or for a defensive battle. One of its chief military
characteristics is that from the high ground on neither side can the top
of the plateau on the other side be seen except for small stretches.
This is chiefly due to the woods on the edges of the slopes. Another
important point is that all the bridges are under either direct or
high-angle artillery fire.
The tract of country above described, which lies north of the Aisne, is
well adapted to concealment, and was so skilfully turned to account by
the enemy as to render it impossible to judge the real nature of his
opposition to our passage of the river, or to accurately gauge his
strength; but I have every reason to conclude that strong rearguards of
at least three army corps were holding the passages on the early morning
of the 13th.
3. On that morning I ordered the British Forces to advance and make good
the Aisne.
The 1st Corps and the cavalry advanced on the river. The First Division
was directed on Chanouille, viâ the canal bridge at Bourg, and the
Second Division on Courteçon and Presles, _viâ_ Pont-Arcy and on the
canal to the north of Braye, _viâ_ Chavonne. On the right the cavalry
and First Division met with slight opposition, and found a passage by
means of the canal which crosses the river by an aqueduct. The Division
was, therefore, able to press on, supported by the Cavalry Division on
its outer flank, driving back the enemy in front of it.
On the left the leading troops of the Second Division reached the river
by nine o'clock. The Fifth Infantry Brigade were only enabled to cross,
in single file and under considerable shell fire, by means of the broken
girder of the bridge which was not entirely submerged in the river. The
construction of a pontoon bridge was at once undertaken, and was
completed by five o'clock in the afternoon.
On the extreme left the 4th Guards Brigade met with severe opposition at
Chavonne, and it was only late in the afternoon that it was able to
establish a foothold on the northern bank of the river by ferrying one
battalion across in boats.
By nightfall the First Division occupied the area Moulins-Paissy-Geny,
with posts in the village of Vendresse.
The Second Division bivouacked as a whole on the southern bank of the
river, leaving only the Fifth Brigade on the north bank to establish a
bridge head.
The Second Corps found all the bridges in front of them destroyed,
except that of Condé, which was in possession of the enemy, and remained
so until the end of the battle.
In the approach to Missy, where the 5th Division eventually crossed,
there is some open ground which was swept by heavy fire from the
opposite bank. The 13th Brigade was, therefore, unable to advance; but
the 14th, which was directed to the east of Venizel at a less exposed
point, was rafted across, and by night established itself with its left
at St. Marguérite. They were followed by the 15th Brigade, and later on
both the 14th and 15th supported the 4th Division on their left in
repelling a heavy counter-attack on the Third Corps.
On the morning of the 13th the Third Corps found the enemy had
established himself in strength on the Vregny Plateau. The road bridge
at Venizel was repaired during the morning, and a reconnaissance was
made with a view to throwing a pontoon bridge at Soissons.
The 12th Infantry Brigade crossed at Venizel, and was assembled at Bucy
Le Long by one p.m., but the bridge was so far damaged that artillery
could only be manhandled across it. Meanwhile the construction of a
bridge was commenced close to the road bridge at Venizel.
At two p.m. the 12th Infantry Brigade attacked in the direction of
Chivres and Vregny with the object of securing the high ground east of
Chivres, as a necessary preliminary to a further advance northwards.
This attack made good progress, but at 5.30 p.m. the enemy's artillery
and machine-gun fire from the direction of Vregny became so severe that
no further advance could be made. The positions reached were held till
dark.
The pontoon bridge at Venizel was completed at 5.30 p.m., when the 10th
Infantry Brigade crossed the river and moved to Bucy Le Long.
The 19th Infantry Brigade moved to Billy-sur-Aisne, and before dark all
the artillery of the division had crossed the river, with the exception
of the heavy battery and one brigade of field artillery.
During the night the positions gained by the 12th Infantry Brigade to
the east of the stream running through Chivres were handed over to the
5th Division.
The section of the bridging train allotted to the Third Corps began to
arrive in the neighbourhood of Soissons late in the afternoon, when an
attempt to throw a heavy pontoon bridge at Soissons had to be abandoned,
owing to the fire of the enemy's heavy howitzers.
In the evening the enemy retired at all points and entrenched himself on
the high ground about two miles north of the river, along which runs the
Chemin-des-Dames. Detachments of infantry, however, strongly entrenched
in commanding points down slopes of the various spurs, were left in
front of all three corps, with powerful artillery in support of them.
During the night of the 13th and on the 14th and following days the
field companies were incessantly at work night and day. Eight pontoon
bridges and one foot bridge were thrown across the river under generally
very heavy artillery fire, which was incessantly kept up on to most of
the crossings after completion. Three of the road bridges, _i.e._,
Venizel, Missy, and Vailly, and the railway bridge east of Vailly were
temporarily repaired so as to take foot traffic, and the Villers Bridge
made fit to carry weights up to six tons.
Preparations were also made for the repair of the Missy, Vailly, and
Bourg Bridges, so as to take mechanical transport.
The weather was very wet and added to the difficulties by cutting up the
already indifferent approaches, entailing a large amount of work to
repair and improve.
The operations of the field companies during this most trying time are
worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Engineers.
4. On the evening of the 14th it was still impossible to decide whether
the enemy was only making a temporary halt, covered by rearguards, or
whether he intended to stand and defend the position.
With a view to clearing up the situation, I ordered a general advance.
The action of the 1st Corps on this day under the direction and command
of Sir Douglas Haig was of so skilful, bold, and decisive a character
that he gained positions which alone have enabled me to maintain my
position for more than three weeks of very severe fighting on the north
bank of the river.
The corps was directed to cross the line Moulins-Moussy by seven a.m.
On the right the General Officer Commanding the 1st Division directed
the 2nd Infantry Brigade (which was in billets and bivouacked about
Moulins), and the 25th Artillery Brigade (less one battery), under
General Bulfin, to move forward before daybreak, in order to protect the
advance of the division sent up the valley to Vendresse. An officers'
patrol sent out by this brigade reported a considerable force of the
enemy near the factory north of Troyon, and the Brigadier accordingly
directed two regiments (the King's Royal Rifles and the Royal Sussex
Regiment) to move at three a.m. The Northamptonshire Regiment was
ordered to move at four a.m. to occupy the spur east of Troyon. The
remaining regiment of the brigade (the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment)
moved at 5.30 a.m. to the village of Vendresse. The factory was found to
be held in considerable strength by the enemy, and the brigadier ordered
the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment to support the King's Royal Rifles
and the Sussex Regiment. Even with this support the force was unable to
make headway, and on the arrival of the 1st Brigade the Coldstream
Guards were moved up to support the right of the leading brigade (the
2nd), while the remainder of the 1st Brigade supported its left.
About noon the situation was, roughly, that the whole of these two
brigades were extended along a line running east and west, north of the
line Troyon and south of the Chemin-des-Dames. A party of the Loyal
North Lancashire Regiment had seized and were holding the factory. The
enemy held a line of entrenchments north and east of the factory in
considerable strength, and every effort to advance against this line was
driven back by heavy shell and machine-gun fire. The morning was wet,
and a heavy mist hung over the hills, so that the 25th Artillery Brigade
and the Divisional Artillery were unable to render effective support to
the advanced troops until about nine o'clock.
By ten o'clock the 3rd Infantry Brigade had reached a point one mile
south of Vendresse, and from there it was ordered to continue the line
of the 1st Brigade and to connect with and help the right of the 2nd
Division. A strong hostile column was found to be advancing, and by a
vigorous counter-stroke with two of his battalions the Brigadier checked
the advance of this column and relieved the pressure on the 2nd
Division. From this period until late in the afternoon the fighting
consisted of a series of attacks and counter-attacks. The
counter-strokes by the enemy were delivered at first with great vigour,
but later on they decreased in strength, and all were driven off with
heavy loss.
On the left the 6th Infantry Brigade had been ordered to cross the river
and to pass through the line held during the preceding night by the 5th
Infantry Brigade and occupy the Courteçon Ridge, whilst a detached
force, consisting of the 4th Guards Brigade and the 36th Brigade, Royal
Field Artillery, under Brigadier-General Perceval, were ordered to
proceed to a point east of the village of Ostel.
The 6th Infantry Brigade crossed the river at Pont-Arcy, moved up the
valley towards Braye, and at nine a.m. had reached the line Tilleul--La
Buvelle. On this line they came under heavy artillery and rifle fire,
and were unable to advance until supported by the 34th Brigade, Royal
Field Artillery, and the 44th Howitzer Brigade and the Heavy Artillery.
The 4th Guards Brigade crossed the river at ten a.m., and met with very
heavy opposition. It had to pass through dense woods; field artillery
support was difficult to obtain; but one section of the field battery
pushed up to and within the firing line. At one p.m. the left of the
brigade was south of the Ostel Ridge.
At this period of the action the enemy obtained a footing between the
First and Second Corps, and threatened to cut the communications of the
latter.
Sir Douglas Haig was very hardly pressed, and had no reserve in hand. I
placed the cavalry division at his disposal, part of which he skilfully
used to prolong and secure the left flank of the Guards Brigade. Some
heavy fighting ensued, which resulted in the enemy being driven back
with heavy loss.
About four o'clock the weakening of the counter-attacks by the enemy and
other indications tended to show that his resistance was decreasing, and
a general advance was ordered by the Army Corps Commander. Although
meeting with considerable opposition, and coming under very heavy
artillery and rifle fire, the position of the corps at the end of the
day's operations extended from the Chemin-des-Dames on the right,
through Chivy, to Le Cour de Soupir, with the 1st Cavalry Brigade
extending to the Chavonne--Soissons road.
On the right the corps was in close touch with the French Moroccan
troops of the 18th Corps, which were entrenched in echelon to its right
rear. During the night they entrenched this position.
Throughout the battle of the Aisne this advanced and commanding position
was maintained, and I cannot speak too highly of the valuable services
rendered by Sir Douglas Haig and the army corps under his command. Day
after day and night after night the enemy's infantry has been hurled
against him in violent counter-attack, which has never on any one
occasion succeeded, whilst the trenches all over his position have been
under continuous heavy artillery fire.
The operations of the First Corps on this day resulted in the capture of
several hundred prisoners, some field pieces, and machine guns.
The casualties were very severe, one brigade alone losing three of its
four colonels.
The 3rd Division commenced a further advance, and had nearly reached the
plateau of Aizy when they were driven back by a powerful counter-attack
supported by heavy artillery. The division, however, fell back in the
best order, and finally entrenched itself about a mile north of Vailly
Bridge, effectively covering the passage.
The 4th and 5th Divisions were unable to do more than maintain their
ground.
5. On the morning of the 15th, after close examination of the position,
it became clear to me that the enemy was making a determined stand, and
this view was confirmed by reports which reached me from the French
armies fighting on my right and left, which clearly showed that a
strongly entrenched line of defence was being taken up from the north of
Compiègne, eastward and south-eastward, along the whole valley of the
Aisne up to and beyond Rheims.
A few days previously the fortress of Maubeuge fell, and a considerable
quantity of siege artillery was brought down from that place to
strengthen the enemy's position in front of us.
During the 15th shells fell in our position which have been judged by
experts to be thrown by eight-inch siege guns with a range of 10,000
yards. Throughout the whole course of the battle our troops have
suffered very heavily from this fire, although its effect latterly was
largely mitigated by more efficient and thorough entrenching, the
necessity for which I impressed strongly upon army corps commanders. In
order to assist them in this work all villages within the area of our
occupation were searched for heavy entrenching tools, a large number of
which were collected.
In view of the peculiar formation of the ground on the north side of the
river between Missy and Soissons, and its extraordinary adaptability to
a force on the defensive, the 5th Division found it impossible to
maintain its position on the southern edge of the Chivres Plateau, as
the enemy in possession of the village of Vregny to the west was able to
bring a flank fire to bear upon it. The division had, therefore, to
retire to a line the left of which was at the village of Marguérite, and
thence ran by the north edge of Missy back to the river to the east of
that place.
With great skill and tenacity Sir Charles Fergusson maintained this
position throughout the whole battle, although his trenches were
necessarily on lower ground than that occupied by the enemy on the
southern edge of the plateau, which was only 400 yards away.
General Hamilton with the 3rd Division vigorously attacked to the north,
and regained all the ground he had lost on the 15th, which throughout
the battle had formed a most powerful and effective bridge head.
6. On the 16th the 6th Division came up into line.
It had been my intention to direct the First Corps to attack and seize
the enemy's position on the Chemin-des-Dames, supporting it with this
new reinforcement. I hoped from the position thus gained to bring
effective fire to bear across the front of the 3rd Division which, by
securing the advance of the latter, would also take the pressure off the
5th Division and the Third Corps.
But any further advance of the First Corps would have dangerously
exposed my right flank. And, further, I learned from the French
Commander-in-Chief that he was strongly reinforcing the 6th French Army
on my left, with the intention of bringing up the Allied left to attack
the enemy's flank, and thus compel his retirement. I therefore sent the
6th Division to join the Third Corps, with orders to keep it on the
south side of the river, as it might be available in general reserve.
On the 17th, 18th, and 19th the whole of our line was heavily
bombarded, and the First Corps was constantly and heavily engaged. On
the afternoon of the 17th the right flank of the 1st Division was
seriously threatened. A counter-attack was made by the Northamptonshire
Regiment in combination with the Queen's, and one battalion of the
Divisional Reserve was moved up in support. The Northamptonshire
Regiment, under cover of mist, crept up to within a hundred yards of the
enemy's trenches and charged with the bayonet, driving them out of the
trenches and up the hill. A very strong force of hostile infantry was
then disclosed on the crest line. This new line was enfiladed by part of
the Queen's and the King's Royal Rifles, which wheeled to their left on
the extreme right of our infantry line, and were supported by a squadron
of cavalry on their outer flank. The enemy's attack was ultimately
driven back with heavy loss.
On the 18th, during the night, the Gloucestershire Regiment advanced
from their position near Chivy, filled in the enemy's trenches and
captured two Maxim guns.
On the extreme right the Queen's were heavily attacked, but the enemy
was repulsed with great loss. About midnight the attack was renewed on
the 1st Division, supported by artillery fire, but was again repulsed.
Shortly after midnight an attack was made on the left of the 2nd
Division with considerable force, which was also thrown back.
At about one p.m. on the 19th the 2nd Division drove back a heavy
infantry attack strongly supported by artillery fire. At dusk the attack
was renewed and again repulsed.
On the 18th I discussed with the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Army
Corps and his Divisional Commanders the possibility of driving the enemy
out of Condé, which lay between his two divisions, and seizing the
bridge which has remained throughout in his possession.
As, however, I found that the bridge was closely commanded from all
points on the south side and that satisfactory arrangements were made
to prevent any issue from it by the enemy by day or night, I decided
that it was not necessary to incur the losses which an attack would
entail, as, in view of the position of the 2nd and 3rd Corps, the enemy
could make no use of Condé, and would be automatically forced out of it
by any advance which might become possible for us.
7. On this day information reached me from General Joffre that he had
found it necessary to make a new plan, and to attack and envelop the
German right flank.
It was now evident to me that the battle in which we had been engaged
since the 12th instant must last some days longer, until the effect of
this new flank movement could be felt, and a way opened to drive the
enemy from his positions.
It thus became essential to establish some system of regular relief in
the trenches, and I have used the infantry of the 6th Division for this
purpose with good results. The relieved brigades were brought back
alternately south of the river, and, with the artillery of the 6th
Division, formed a general reserve on which I could rely in case of
necessity.
The cavalry has rendered most efficient and ready help in the trenches,
and have done all they possibly could to lighten the arduous and trying
task which has of necessity fallen to the lot of the infantry.
On the evening of the 19th, and throughout the 20th, the enemy again
commenced to show considerable activity. On the former night a severe
counter-attack on the 3rd Division was repulsed with considerable loss,
and from early on Sunday morning various hostile attempts were made on
the trenches of the 1st Division. During the day the enemy suffered
another severe repulse in front of the 2nd Division, losing heavily in
the attempt. In the course of the afternoon the enemy made desperate
attempts against the trenches all along the front of the First Corps,
but with similar results.
After dark the enemy again attacked the 2nd Division, only to be again
driven back.
Our losses on these two days were considerable, but the number, as
obtained, of the enemy's killed and wounded vastly exceeded them.
As the troops of the First Army Corps were much exhausted by this
continual fighting, I reinforced Sir Douglas Haig with a brigade from
the reserve, and called upon the 1st Cavalry Division to assist them.
On the night of the 21st another violent counter-attack was repulsed by
the 3rd Division, the enemy losing heavily.
On the 23rd the four six-inch howitzer batteries, which I had asked to
be sent from home, arrived. Two batteries were handed over to the Second
Corps and two to the First Corps. They were brought into action on the
24th with very good results.
Our experiences in this campaign seem to point to the employment of more
heavy guns of a larger calibre in great battles which last for several
days, during which time powerful entrenching work on both sides can be
carried out.
These batteries were used with considerable effect on the 24th and the
following days.
8. On the 23rd the action of General de Castelnau's army on the Allied
left developed considerably, and apparently withdrew considerable forces
of the enemy away from the centre and east. I am not aware whether it
was due to this cause or not, but until the 26th it appeared as though
the enemy's opposition in our front was weakening. On that day, however,
a very marked renewal of activity commenced. A constant and vigorous
artillery bombardment was maintained all day, and the Germans in front
of the 1st Division were observed to be "sapping" up to our lines and
trying to establish new trenches. Renewed counter-attacks were delivered
and beaten off during the course of the day, and in the afternoon a
well-timed attack by the 1st Division stopped the enemy's entrenching
work.
During the night of 27th-28th the enemy again made the most determined
attempts to capture the trenches of the 1st Division, but without the
slightest success.
Similar attacks were reported during these three days all along the
line of the Allied front, and it is certain that the enemy then made one
last great effort to establish ascendancy. He was, however, unsuccessful
everywhere, and is reported to have suffered heavy losses. The same
futile attempts were made all along our front up to the evening of the
28th, when they died away, and have not since been renewed.
On former occasions I have brought to your lordship's notice the
valuable services performed during this campaign by the Royal Artillery.
Throughout the Battle of the Aisne they have displayed the same skill,
endurance, and tenacity, and I deeply appreciate the work they have
done.
Sir David Henderson and the Royal Flying Corps under his command have
again proved their incalculable value. Great strides have been made in
the development of the use of aircraft in the tactical sphere by
establishing effective communication between aircraft and units in
action.
It is difficult to describe adequately and accurately the great strain
to which officers and men were subjected almost every hour of the day
and night throughout this battle.
I have described above the severe character of the artillery fire which
was directed from morning till night, not only upon the trenches, but
over the whole surface of the ground occupied by our forces. It was not
until a few days before the position was evacuated that the heavy guns
were removed and the fire slackened. Attack and counter-attack occurred
at all hours of the night and day throughout the whole position,
demanding extreme vigilance, and permitting only a minimum of rest.
The fact that between Sept. 12 to the date of this despatch the total
numbers of killed, wounded, and missing reached the figures amounting to
561 officers, 12,980 men, proves the severity of the struggle.
The tax on the endurance of the troops was further increased by the
heavy rain and cold which prevailed for some ten or twelve days of this
trying time.
The battle of the Aisne has once more demonstrated the splendid spirit,
gallantry, and devotion which animates the officers and men of his
Majesty's Forces.
With reference to the last paragraph of my despatch of Sept. 7, I append
the names of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men brought
forward for special mention by Army Corps commanders and heads of
departments for services rendered from the commencement of the campaign
up to the present date.
I entirely agree with these recommendations and beg to submit them for
your lordship's consideration.
I further wish to bring forward the names of the following officers who
have rendered valuable service: General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and
Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig (commanding First and Second Corps
respectively) I have already mentioned in the present and former
despatches for particularly marked and distinguished service in critical
situations.
Since the commencement of the campaign they have carried out all my
orders and instructions with the utmost ability.
Lieutenant-General W. P. Pulteney took over the command of the Third
Corps just before the commencement of the battle of the Marne.
Throughout the subsequent operations he showed himself to be a most
capable commander in the field, and has rendered very valuable services.
Major-General E. H. H. Allenby and Major-General H. de la P. Gough have
proved themselves to be cavalry leaders of a high order, and I am deeply
indebted to them. The undoubted moral superiority which our cavalry has
obtained over that of the enemy has been due to the skill with which
they have turned to the best account the qualities inherent in the
splendid troops they command.
In my despatch of Sept. 7 I mentioned the name of Brigadier-General Sir
David Henderson and his valuable work in command of the Royal Flying
Corps, and I have once more to express my deep appreciation of the help
he has since rendered me.
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray has continued to render me
invaluable help as Chief of the Staff, and in his arduous and
responsible duties he has been ably assisted by Major-General Henry
Wilson, Sub-Chief.
Lieutenant-General Sir Nevil Macready and Lieutenant-General Sir William
Robertson have continued to perform excellent service as
Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General respectively.
The Director of Army Signals, Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Fowler, has
materially assisted the operations by the skill and energy which he has
displayed in the working of the important department over which he
presides.
My Military Secretary, Brigadier-General the Hon. W. Lambton, has
performed his arduous and difficult duties with much zeal and great
efficiency.
I am anxious also to bring to your lordship's notice the following names
of officers of my Personal Staff, who throughout these arduous
operations have shown untiring zeal and energy in the performance of
their duties:--
AIDES-DE-CAMP.
Lieut.-Colonel Stanley Barry.
Lieut.-Colonel Lord Brooke.
Major Fitzgerald Watt.
EXTRA AIDE-DE-CAMP.
Captain the Hon. F. E. Guest.
PRIVATE SECRETARY.
Lieut.-Colonel Brindsley Fitzgerald.
Major his Royal Highness Prince Arthur of Connaught, K.G., joined my
staff as Aide-de-Camp on Sept. 14.
His Royal Highness's intimate knowledge of languages enabled me to
employ him with great advantage on confidential missions of some
importance, and his services have proved of considerable value.
I cannot close this despatch without informing your lordship of the
valuable services rendered by the chief of the French Military Mission
at my headquarters, Colonel Victor Huguet, of the French Artillery. He
has displayed tact and judgment of a high order in many difficult
situations, and has rendered conspicuous service to the Allied cause.--I
have the honour to be, your lordship's most obedient servant,
(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, the British
Army in the Field.
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY R. CLAY AND SONS, LTD.,
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