THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
Why, then, if it was so necessary and the object of it so important, was
the move begun by General von Kluck on September 3 a false move?
It was a false move because he ought to have stood against the forces
opposed to him. The defeat of those forces was necessary before the
attack against Sezanne could be successful. Conversely, his own defeat
involved failure of the great enterprise.
Instead, however, of facing and continuing his offensive against the
forces opposed to him, he turned towards Sezanne. By doing that he
exposed his flank to the Allied counter-stroke.
This blunder can only be attributed to the combined influences of,
firstly, hurry; secondly, bad information as to the strength and
positions of the Allied forces; thirdly, the false impression formed
from reports of victories unaccompanied by exact statements as to
losses; and fourthly, and perhaps of most consequence, the failure of
the Crown Prince of Germany in the Argonne.
General von Kluck doubtless acted upon imperative orders. His
incomplete information and the false impression his advance had created
probably also led him to accept those orders without protest. But it
should not be forgotten that the Commander primarily responsible for the
blunder, and for the disasters it involved, was the Crown Prince of
Germany.
Primarily the Crown Prince of Germany was responsible, but not wholly.
In the responsibility General von Kluck had no small share. He was
misled. When the British force arrived at Creil General Joffre resolved
upon and carried out a masterly and remarkable piece of strategy. The
British army was withdrawn from the extreme left of the Allied line on
the north-east of Paris, and transferred to the south-east, and its
former place taken by the 6th French army. This move, carried out with
both secrecy and rapidity, was designed to give General von Kluck the
impression that the British troops had been withdrawn from the front.
That the ruse succeeded is now clear. So far from being withdrawn, the
British army was brought up by reinforcements to the strength of three
army corps. Leaving out of account a force of that strength, the
calculations of the German Commander were fatally wrong.
Let us now see what generally were the movements of the German and of
the Allied forces between September 3 and September 6 when the Battle of
the Marne began.
Leaving two army corps, the 2nd and the 4th Reserve corps, on the Ourcq
to cover his flank and rear, General von Kluck struck south-east across
the Marne with the 3rd, 4th, and 7th corps. The main body crossed the
river at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and took the main route to Sezanne.
Others crossed higher up between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and
Château-Thierry. For this purpose they threw bridges across the river.
The Marne is deep and for 120 miles of its course navigable.
These movements were covered and screened by the 2nd division of
cavalry, which advanced towards Coulommiers, and the 9th division, which
pushed on to the west of Crecy. Both places are south of the Marne and
east of Paris.
Writing of these events at the time, Mr. W. T. Massey, special
correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_, observed that:--
The beginning of the alteration of German plans was noticeable at
Creil. Hidden by a thick screen of troops from the army in the
field, but observed by aerial squadrons, the enemy were seen to be
on the move. Ground won at Senlis was given up, and the German
troops, which at that point were nearer Paris than any other men of
the Kaiser's army, were marched to the rear. Only the commandants
in the field can say whether the movement was expected, but it is
the fact that immediately the enemy began their strategic movement
British and French dispositions were changed.
The movement _was_ expected. Indeed, as we have seen, the whole strategy
of the campaign on the French side had been designed to bring it about.
The Germans must have observed that their new intentions had been
noticed, but they steadily pursued their policy. Their right was
withdrawn from before Beauvais, and that pretty cathedral town has
now been relieved of the danger of Teuton invasion. The shuttered
houses are safe, temporarily at any rate.
The ponderous machine did not turn at right angles with any
rapidity. Its movements were slow, but they were not uncertain, and
the change was made just where it was anticipated the driving wedge
would meet with least resistance.
In the main the German right is a tired army. It is a great
fighting force still. The advance has been rapid, and some big
tasks have been accomplished. But the men have learnt many things
which have surprised them. They thought they were invincible, that
they could sweep away opposition like a tidal wave. Instead of a
progress as easy as modern warfare would allow, their way has had
to be fought step by step at a staggering sacrifice, and in place
of an army which took the field full of confidence in the speedy
ending of the war and taught that nothing could prevent a triumph
for German arms, you have an army thoroughly disillusioned.
In this connection the service of the British Flying Corps proved
invaluable. Covering though they did a vast area, and carefully as they
were screened by ordinary military precautions, the movements of the
Germans were watched and notified in detail. Upon this, as far as the
dispositions of the Allied forces were concerned, everything depended,
and no one knew that better than General Joffre. On September 9 he
acknowledged it in a message to the British headquarters:--
Please express most particularly to Marshal French my thanks for
services rendered on every day by the English Flying Corps. The
precision, exactitude, and regularity of the news brought in by its
members are evidence of their perfect organisation, and also of the
perfect training of pilots and observers.
Farther east the army of General von Bülow (the 9th, 10th, 10th Reserve
corps, and the Army corps of the Prussian Guard), advancing from
Soissons through Château-Thierry, and crossing the Marne at that place
as well as at points higher up towards Epernay, was following the main
road to Montmirail on the Petit Morin.
The army of General von Hausen (the 11th, 12th, and 19th corps),
advancing from Rheims, had crossed the Marne at Epernay and at other
points towards Chalons, and was following the road towards Sezanne by
way of Champaubert.
The army of Duke Albert, having passed the Marne above Chalons, was
moving along the roads to Sommesous.
The army of the Crown Prince of Germany was endeavouring to move from
St. Menehould to Vitry-le-François, also on the Marne.
On the side of the Allies,
General Maunoury, with the 6th French army, advanced from Paris upon the
Ourcq. The right of this army rested on Meaux on the Marne.
General French with the British army, pivoting on its left, formed a
new front extending south-east to north-west from Jouey, through Le
Chatel and Faremoutiers, to Villeneuve-le-Comte.
General Conneau with the French cavalry was on the British right,
between Coulommiers and La Ferté Gaucher.
General Desperey with the 5th French army held the line from Courtagon
to Esternay, barring the roads from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Montmirail
to Sezanne.
General Foch, with headquarters at La Fère Champenoise, barred with his
army the roads from Epernay and Chalons.
General de Langle, holding Vitry-le-François, barred the approaches to
that place and to Sommesous.
General Serrail, with the French army operating in the Argonne, held
Revigny. His line extended north-east across the Argonne to Verdun, and
was linked up with the positions held by the French army base on that
fortress.
General Pau held the line on the east of the fortified frontier.
Some observations on these dispositions of the Allies will elucidate
their tactical intention.
The position of the Allied armies formed a great bow, with the western
end of it bent sharply inwards.
The _weight_ of the Allied forces was massed round that western bend
against the now exposed flank of von Kluck's army. Here lay the most
vulnerable point of the German line.
The tactical scheme of the Allied Commander-in-Chief was simple--a great
military merit. He aimed first at defeating the German right led by
Generals von Kluck and von Bülow. Having by that uncovered the flank of
General von Hausen's army, his intention was to attack it also in both
front and flank and defeat it. The same tactic was to be repeated with
each of the other German armies in succession.
For that purpose the allied armies were not posted directly on the front
of the German armies, but between them. Consequently the left of one
German army and the right of another was attacked by the same French
army. In that way two German Generals would have to resist an attack
directed by one French General, and every German General would have to
resist two independent French attacks. Hence, too, if a German army was
forced back the French could at once double round the flank of the
German army next in the line if that army was still standing its ground.
Choice of the battle ground and command of the roads leading to it
ensured that this would happen. As a fact, it did.
Finally, all the way behind the French line ran the great road leading
across the plateaux from Paris to the fortified frontier. This, with
railway communication, gave the needed facilities for the movement of
reserves and the transport of munitions and food supplies.
Now let us glance at the tactical scheme on the German side.
The fact that General von Kluck had left two out of the five corps
forming his army on the Ourcq, and was covering his movement to the
south of the Marne with his cavalry, proves that he did not, as was
supposed, intend to lose contact with Paris. His scheme was to establish
an echelon of troops from the Ourcq to La Ferté Gaucher on the great
eastern road, believing that to be meanwhile a quite sufficient defence.
With the rest of his force he was to join with von Bülow and von Hausen
in smashing through the French position at Sezanne. Against that
position there was to be the overwhelming concentration of ten army
corps.
To assist the stroke against Sezanne there was a concurrent intention to
break the French line at Vitry-le-François. The French line between
Sezanne and Vitry-le-François would then be swept away.
Assuming the success of these operations, the German forces would be
echeloned south-east from the Ourcq across the valley of the Marne and
the plateau south of it to Troyes on the Aube. The Germans would then be
in a position to attack in flank the French retreating from the
frontier, and ready, when these French troops fell back, pursued by the
armies of the Crown Princes of Germany and Bavaria and by von
Heeringen's army of the Vosges, to join in the great sweep along the
valley of the Seine and round to the south of Paris. By this time,
remember, the long lines of communication through Belgium would have
ceased to be vital.
It was a bold scheme.
There are, however, other factors to be taken into account besides
tactical plans.
Not less a surprise than the apparently sudden change in the German
movements had been, during the preceding week or more, the seemingly
hardly less precipitate falling back of the French upon the Marne. All
the world believed that the French were "on the run," and all the world
thought they would keep on running. Day by day during that exciting time
the inhabitants of the valley of the Marne witnessed column after column
of their defenders apparently in full retreat. The marching qualities of
the French are, as everybody knows, remarkable. They showed the enemy a
clean pair of heels. Few could understand it.
Then came the Germans, hot on the scent, confident that the French could
never withstand them. From over the highlands by every road they poured
into the peaceful Marne valley like a destroying flood. In front of them
swept a multitude of fugitives.
"Champagne," wrote a special correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_, "is
now overrun with fugitive villagers from the neighbourhood of Rethel,
Laon, and Soissons. It is painful to see these unfortunate people
hurrying away with a few household goods on carts, or with bundles, and
walking along the country roads in regular ragged processions, not
knowing whither they are going. Château-Thierry and all the beautiful
country of the Marne is by this time in the hands of the Germans. When I
last drove through the place a few weeks ago, and lunched with a few
amiable French officers at the best hotel in the place, "L'Eléphant,"
Château-Thierry was teeming with cattle and army horses requisitioned
for the campaign. Four times I passed through it, and each time the
great assemblage of horses, trucks, and army material had increased,
although the horses and cattle were driven away each day, and fresh ones
were led in from the great pastoral country round about. Little did I
think then that the Germans would now be bivouacking on the great market
place and stacking their rifles on the banks of the Marne."
It was by just this over-confidence in themselves that General Joffre
had intended the enemy should be misled. He had foreseen that the
Germans would come on in a hurry. On the other hand, the French retreat
had apparently been precipitous because it was essential to make ready
for the rebound. The retreat had rendered the French troops, still
unbeaten, only the more dangerous. Describing the effect from his own
observation, Mr. Massey wrote:--
The French eastern army has been on the move for days, and if the
Germans were not in such strong force they would be in grave
danger. The French have made such a strenuous effort to cope with
the new condition of things that one of their infantry brigades
marched continuously for three days, the men never resting for more
than an hour at a time.
One who has seen only the Allied armies may be a bad judge, and
less able to form an opinion than an armchair critic, who sums up
the possibilities with the aid of maps and the knowledge of past
achievements of German forces. But there is one guide which the
stay-at-home strategist cannot possibly have, and that is the
spirit of the Allied soldiery. I have seen far more of the French
than of the English troops in this campaign, but anyone who has
talked to the soldier must be infected with his cheery optimism.
His faith in his country and in the power of the army is
stupendous, his patriotism is unquestionable, his confidence grows
as the enemy approaches. With a smile he accepts the news of the
German march southwards, and tells you nothing could be better; the
further the line penetrates the more remote is the chance that it
will continue unbroken. He will not believe that the German advance
would have got so far if it had not been the plan of General Joffre
to lure the enemy forwards, and so to weaken his line. The French
soldier to-day is more confident of victory than ever.
These things, which a soldier can appreciate at their proper value,
explain why the dash of the French troops has rivalled their
attitude in the previous part of the campaign. Reinforced by great
battalions, stiffened by reserves composed mainly of men with a
stake in the country, and fighting for all they hold most dear--for
France, for hearth, and home--they have offered a magnificent,
resolute front to the machine-like advance.
General Joffre, therefore, had handled his machine with skill. He had
used it for his design without impairing its spirit. On the contrary, he
had stiffened its "form." And on the eve of the great encounter on which
the fortunes of the campaign, and the future of France alike hung, he
issued to the troops his now famous Order:--
At the moment, when a battle on which the welfare of the country
depends is about to begin, I feel it incumbent upon me to remind
you all that this is no longer the time to look behind. All our
efforts must be directed towards attacking and driving back the
enemy. An army which can no longer advance must at all costs keep
the ground it has won and allow itself to be killed on the spot
rather than give way. In the present circumstances no faltering can
be tolerated.
That the Germans on their side equally realised how momentous was the
impending battle is shown by their Army Order. A copy of it was, after
the battle, found in a house at Vitry-le-François, which for a time had
been used as a headquarters of the 8th German army corps. In the haste
of flight the document was left behind. Signed by Lieut.-General Tulff
von Tscheppe und Wendenbach, commandant of the 8th corps, and dated
September 7, it ran:--
The object of our long and arduous marches has been achieved. The
principal French troops have been forced to accept battle after
having been continually forced back. The great decision is
undoubtedly at hand.
To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of the German army, as
well as of all that of our army corps, is bound to be engaged all
along the line from Paris to Verdun.
To save the welfare and honour of Germany I expect every officer
and man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fights of the last few
days, to do his duty unswervingly, and to the last breath.
Everything depends on the result of to-morrow.
This, then, was the spirit in which, on both sides, the mightiest clash
of arms until then known to history was entered upon. Across France the
battle front stretched for 150 miles. The fight raged, too, for another
forty miles along the frontier, for coincidently with the main conflict
from Paris to Verdun, the Germans made yet another great effort to break
upon the frontier from the east. Fourteen great armies took part in the
battle. They numbered altogether more than two millions of men. Taking
the two great hosts each as a whole, the numbers were not very unequal.
True, the Germans had but six armies as against the eight on the side of
the Allies. The German armies, however, were larger. Their strength
ranged from 160,000 to 180,000 men as against, on the side of the
Allies, an average strength of 120,000.[14]
During nearly six days there was, along that far extended battle line,
the flash and thunder of more than 7,000 guns. Shells rose and burst
like flights of warring meteorites. Masses of infantry moved to the
attack. Incessant rifle fire accompanied the bolder bass of the
artillery. In and through woods, across fields, in and round blazing
villages and burning farms and chateaux they fought; an incessant
movement to and fro, amid an unceasing roar--the rage of nations locked
in deadly embrace. There were bayonet fights on a vast scale; there were
charges by clouds of horsemen; there were furious and murderous combats
for points of vantage; there was the capture and recapture of towns; the
rush of fire-spitting automobiles below, and the flight of bomb-dropping
aeroplanes above. There was the hurried movement of troops and the wild
gallop of batteries of guns along the roads. There was, too, the
ever-changing kaleidoscope of the masses of transport. Along the great
road from Paris to Germany a spectator might have travelled from sunrise
to sunset during the whole week of battle, and yet still have found
himself in the midst of this seemingly unbounded fury of a world at war.
FOOTNOTE:
[14] The following may be taken as the _approximate_ strength of the
armies engaged, allowing on the one hand for war wastage, and on the
other for a filling up from reserves, which on the part of the Allies
had been completed:--
GERMANS.
General von Kluck's Army (5 corps,
Prussians) 245,000
2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions 23,000
General von Bülow's Army (4 corps,
Prussians) 180,000
Cavalry of the Prussian Guard 6,000
General von Hausen's Army (3 corps,
Saxons) 165,000
Duke Albert's Army (3 corps,
Wurtembergers) 150,000
Crown Prince of Germany's Army (3
corps, Prussians) 175,000
Crown Prince of Bavaria's Army (3
corps, Bavarians) 160,000
---------
Approximate total 1,104,000
ALLIES.
General Maunoury's Army (3 corps
and reserves) 140,000
General French's Army (3 corps) 110,000
British Cavalry Divisions 8,000
General Conneau's Cavalry 23,000
General Desperey's Army (3 corps
and reserves) 150,000
General Foch's Army (3 corps) 120,000
General de Langle's Army (3 corps
and reserves) 150,000
General Serrail's Army (3 corps) 120,000
General Pau's Army (3 corps and
reserves) 140,000
---------
Approximate total 961,000
Grand approximate total of combatants 2,065,000
Approximate guns and mortars, Germans 3,610
Approximate guns and mortars, Allies 3,680
Total 7,290
The Allies were superior in field-guns, but had fewer howitzers,
especially of the heavy type, and the aggregate _weight_ of the German
artillery was on the whole greater. The estimate given of the number of
combatants is rather below than above the actual.