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WAR BOOKS
THE BATTLE OF THE RIVERS
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WAR BOOKS
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+HOW THE WAR BEGAN.+ By W. L. COURTNEY, LL.D., and J. M. KENNEDY.
+THE FLEETS AT WAR.+ By ARCHIBALD HURD.
+THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.+ By GEORGE HOOPER.
+THE CAMPAIGN ROUND LIÈGE.+ By J. M. KENNEDY.
+IN THE FIRING LINE.+ Battle Stories told by British Soldiers at the
Front. By A. ST. JOHN ADCOCK.
+GREAT BATTLES OF THE WORLD.+ By STEPHEN CRANE, Author of "The Red Badge
of Courage."
+BRITISH REGIMENTS AT THE FRONT.+ The glorious story of their Battle
Honours.
+THE RED CROSS IN WAR.+ By M. F. BILLINGTON.
+FORTY YEARS AFTER.+ The Story of the Franco-German War. By H. C. BAILEY.
With an introduction by W. L. COURTNEY, LL.D.
+A SCRAP OF PAPER.+ The Inner History of German Diplomacy. By E. J.
DILLON.
+HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR.+ A companion volume to "How the War Began,"
telling how the world faced Armageddon and how the British Army answered
the call to arms. By J. M. KENNEDY.
+AIR-CRAFT IN WAR+. By ERIC STUART BRUCE.
+HACKING THROUGH BELGIUM.+ By EDMUND DANE.
+FAMOUS FIGHTS OF INDIAN NATIVE REGIMENTS.+ By REGINALD HODDER.
+THE RETREAT TO PARIS.+ By ROGER INGPEN.
+THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE.+ By MARR MURRAY.
+THE SUBMARINE IN WAR.+ By C. W. DOMVILLE FIFE.
+MOTOR TRANSPORTS IN WAR.+ By HORACE WYATT.
+THE SLAV NATIONS.+
+FROM HELIGOLAND TO KEELING ISLAND.+ By ARCHIBALD HURD.
+WITH THE FRENCH EASTERN ARMY.+ By W. E. GREY.
+WITH THE ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORP.+ By E. C. VIVIAN.
+WITH THE SCOTTISH REGIMENTS AT THE FRONT.+ By E. C. VIVIAN.
+THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIAN POLAND.+ By P. C. STANDING.
+THE BATTLE OF THE RIVERS.+ By EDMUND DANE.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
THE BATTLE OF THE RIVERS
BY
EDMUND DANE
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXIV
PREFATORY NOTE
On a scale before unknown in Western Europe, and save for the coincident
operations in the Eastern theatre of war, unexampled in history, the
succession of events named the "Battle of the Rivers" presents
illustrations of strategy and tactics of absorbing interest. Apart even
from the spectacular aspects of this lurid and grandiose drama, full as
it is of strange and daring episodes, the problems it affords in the
science of war must appeal to every intelligent mind.
An endeavour is here made to state these problems in outline. In the
light they throw, events and episodes, which might otherwise appear
confused, will be found to fit into a clear sequence of causes and
consequences. The events and episodes themselves gain in grandeur as
their import and relationship are unfolded.
Since the story of the retreat from Mons has been told in another volume
of this series, it is only in the following pages dealt with so far as
its military bearings elucidate succeeding phases of the campaign.
The Battle of the Rivers
CHAPTER I
THE GERMAN PLANS
"About September 3," wrote Field Marshal Sir John French in his despatch
dated a fortnight later,[1] "the enemy appears to have changed his
plans, and to have determined to stop his advance south direct upon
Paris, for on September 4 air reconnaissances showed that his main
columns were moving in a south-easterly direction generally, east of a
line drawn through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq."
In that passage the British commander summarises an event which changed
the whole military aspect of the Great War and changed it not only in
the Western, but in the Eastern theatre of hostilities.
What were the German plans and why were they changed?
In part the plans were military, and in part political. These two
aspects, however, are so interwoven that it is necessary, in the first
place, briefly to sketch the political aspect in order that the military
aspect, which depended on the political, may be the better understood.
The political object was to reduce France to such powerlessness that she
must not only agree to any terms imposed, but remain for the future in a
state of vassalage to Germany. Further, the object was to extract from
France a war fine so colossal[2] that, if paid, it would furnish Germany
with the means of carrying on the war against Great Britain and Russia,
and, if not paid, or paid only in part, would offer a pretext for an
occupation of a large part of France by German troops, indefinite in
point of time, and, formalities apart, indistinguishable from
annexation. By means of that occupation great resources for carrying on
the war might, in any event, be drawn in kind from the French population
and from their territory, or drawn in cash in the form of local war
levies.
In a passage quoted by M. Edouard Simon,[3] the late Prince von Bismarck
once spoke of the difficulty he met with at the end of the war with
France in 1871, in restraining the cupidity of the then King of Prussia
and in "mixing the water of reflection with the wine of victory." There
was at the time, in Germany, much discussion as to the amount of the War
Fine. The staggering total of 15,000 millions of francs (600 million
pounds sterling) was freely asserted to be none too high. Fear of
possible war with Great Britain mainly kept within bounds this desire of
plunder, and led the Emperor William to accept, reluctantly, the 5,000
million francs afterwards paid.
There can be no doubt, however, that it became a settled opinion with
the Government, and also, even if to a less extent, a conviction with
the public of Germany that, enormous as it was, the levy upon France in
1871 was insufficient. That opinion was sharpened by the promptitude,
almost contemptuous, with which the French people discharged the demand,
and brought the German military occupation to an end.
The opinion that the War Fine of 1871 had been too small inspired the
political crisis of 1875, caused by a threatened renewal of the German
attack. The pretext then was that France was forming, with Austria and
Italy, a league designed to destroy the new German Empire. The true
cause of hostility was that France had begun to reorganise her army.
Intervention by the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg averted the
peril. The German Government found itself obliged to put off a further
draft upon "opulent France"[4] until a more convenient season.
This discovery that neither Great Britain nor Russia was willing to see
France become the milch cow of Germany dictated the policy which led
later to the Triple Alliance. Consistently from this time to the end of
his life the Emperor William I. assumed the part of guardian of the
peace of Europe. The Triple Alliance was _outwardly_ promoted by Germany
with that object.[5]
Meanwhile, every opportunity was taken to strengthen the German military
organisation. Only by possession of an invincible army could the German
Empire, it was contended, fulfil its peace-keeping mission.
This growth of military armaments imposed on Germany a heavy burden. Was
the burden borne merely for the sake of peace, or for the sake of the
original inspiration and policy?
Few acquainted with the character of the Germans will credit them with a
tendency to spend money out of sentiment. The answer, besides, has been
given by General von Bernhardi.[6] He has not hesitated to declare that
the object of these preparations was to ensure victory in the offensive
war made necessary by the growth of the German population, a growth
calling for a proportionate "political expansion."
Outside Germany the so-called revelations of General von Bernhardi took
many by surprise. That, however, was because, outside Germany, not many
know much of German history, and fewer still the history of modern
Prussia.
It was realised, when General von Bernhardi published his book, that the
original inspiration and policy had never been changed. On the contrary,
all the efforts and organisation of Prussia had been directed to the
realisation of that policy, and the only alteration was that, as
confidence in Prussia's offensive organisation grew, the policy had been
enlarged by sundry added ambitions until at length it became that
grotesque and Gothic political fabric known as Pan-Germanism.
"The military origin of the new German Empire," says M. Simon, "is of
vast importance; it gives that Empire its fundamental character; it
establishes its basis and its principle of existence. Empires derive
their vitality from the principle to which they owe their birth."
The fact is of vast importance because, just as the British Empire had
its origin in, and owes its character to, the embodiment of moral force
in self-government, so the German Empire had its origin in, and owes its
character to, the embodiment of material forces in armies, and existed,
as General von Bernhardi says, for the employment of that force as and
whenever favourable opportunity should present itself.
The political inspiration and purpose being clear, how was that purpose,
as regards France, most readily and with fewest risks to be realised?
It was most readily to be realised by seizing Paris. As everybody is
aware, the Government of France is more centralised than that of any
other great State. Paris is the hub of the French roads and railways;
Paris is also the hub of French finance; Paris is at once the brain and
the heart of the country; the place to which all national taxes flow;
the seat from which all national direction and control proceed. It was
believed, therefore, that, Paris occupied, France would be stricken with
political paralysis. Resistance might be offered by the provinces, for
the area of France is roughly equal to the area of Germany, but the
resistance could never be more than ineffectual.
Such was the plan on its political side. What were its military
features?
A political plan of that character plainly called for a swift and, if
possible, crushing military offensive. Rapidity was one of the first
essentials. That affected materially the whole military side of the
scheme. It meant that to facilitate mobility and transport, the
equipment of the troops must be made as light as possible. Hence all the
usual apparatus of field hospitals and impedimenta for encampment must
be dispensed with. It meant that the force to be dispatched must be
powerful enough to bear down the _maximum_ of estimated opposition, and
ensure the seizure of Paris, without delay. It meant again that the
force must move by the shortest and most direct route.
If we bear in mind these three features--equipment cut down to give
mobility, strength to ensure an uninterrupted sweep, shortest route--we
shall find it the easier to grasp the nature of the operations which
have since taken place. The point to be kept in mind is that what the
military expedition contemplated was not only on an unusual scale, but
was of an altogether unusual, and in many respects novel, character.
The most serious military problem in front of the German Government was
the problem of route. The forces supposed to be strong enough Germany
had at her disposal. Within her power, too, was it to make them, so far
as meticulous preparation could do it, mobile. But command of the
shortest and most direct route she did not possess.
That route we know passes in part through the plain of northern Belgium,
and in part through the parallel valley of the Meuse to the points
where, on the Belgium frontier, there begin the great international
roads converging on Paris. All the way from Liége to Paris there are not
only these great paved highways, but lines of main trans-continental
railroads. The route, in short, presented every natural and artificial
facility needed to keep a vast army fully supplied.
Here it should be recalled that two things govern the movements of
armies. Hostile opposition is one; supplies are the other. In this
instance, the possible hostile opposition was estimated for. It remained
to ensure that neither the march of the great host, as a whole, nor the
advance of any part of it should at any time be held up by waiting for
the arrival of either foodstuffs, munitions, or reinforcements, but that
the thousand and one necessaries for such an army, still a complex list
even when everything omissible had been weeded out, should arrive, as,
when, and where wanted.
Little imagination need be exercised to perceive that to work out a
scheme like that on such a scale involves enormous labour. On the one
side were the arrangements for gathering these necessaries and placing
them in depots; on the other were the arrangements for issuing them,
sending them forward, and distributing them. Nothing short of years of
effort could connect such a mass of detail. If hopeless confusion was
not almost from the outset to ensue, the greatest care was called for to
make it certain that the mighty machination would move successfully.
A scheme of that kind suited the methodical genius of Germany, and there
can be no doubt that the years spent upon it had brought it to
perfection. It had been worked out to time table. Concurrently,
arrangements for the mobilisation of reserve troops had become almost
automatic. Every reservist in the German Army held instructions setting
out minutely what to do and where and when to report himself as soon as
the call came.
Now this elaborate plan had been drawn up on the assumption of an
invasion of France by the route through Belgium. That assumption formed
its basis. Not only so, but the extent to which the resources of Belgium
and North-east France might, by requisitioning, be drawn upon to relieve
transport and so promote rapidity, had been exactly estimated.
It is evident, therefore, that the adoption of any other route must have
upset the whole proposal. In any other country the fact of the
Government devoting its energies over a long period of time to such a
scheme on such a footing would appear extraordinary, and the more
extraordinary since this, after all, was only part of a still larger
plan, worked out with the same minuteness, for waging a war on both
frontiers.
The fact, however, ceases to be extraordinary if we bear in mind that
the modern German Empire is essentially military and aggressive.
Obviously, the weak point of plans so elaborate is that they cannot
readily be changed. Neither even can they, save with difficulty, be
modified. Even in face, therefore, of a declaration of war by Great
Britain, the plan had to be adhered to. Unless it could be adhered to,
the invasion of France must be given up.
Bearing in mind the labour and cost of preparation, the hopes built upon
the success of the invasion, and the firm belief that the opposition to
be expected by Belgium could at most be but trifling, it ceases to be
surprising that, though there was every desire to put off that
complication, a war with Great Britain proved no deterrent.
Further, the construction by the French just within their Eastern
frontier of a chain of fortifications extremely difficult to force by
means of a frontal attack, and quite impossible to break if defended by
efficient field forces, manifestly suggested the plea of adopting the
shorter and more advantageous route on the ground of necessity. In
dealing with that plea it should not be forgotten that the State which
elects to take the offensive in war needs resources superior to those of
the State which elects to stand, to begin with, upon a policy of
defence. Those superior resources, save in total population, Germany, as
compared with France, did not possess. In adopting the offensive,
therefore, on account of its initial military advantages, Germany was
risking in this attack means needed for a prolonged struggle. It was
necessary in consequence for the attack to be so designed that it could
not only not fail, but should succeed rapidly enough to enable the
attacking State to recoup itself--and, possibly, with a profit.
The conditions of first rapidity, and second certainty, formed the
_political_ aspects of the plan, and they affected its military aspects
in regard to first numbers, secondly equipment, thirdly route.
But there were, if success was to be assured, still other conditions to
be fulfilled, and these conditions were _purely_ military. They were:--
(1) That in advancing the line of the invading armies must not
expose a flank, and by so doing risk delay through local or partial
defeat.
(2) That the invading armies must not lay bare their
communications. Risk to their communications would also involve
delay.
(3) That they must at no point incur the hazard of attacking a
defended position save in superior force. To do so would again risk
repulse and delay.
Did the plan drawn up by the German General Staff fulfil apparently all
the conditions, both political and military, and did it promise swift
success? It did.
The plan, in the first instance, covered the operations of eight
armies, acting in combination. These were the armies of General von
Emmich; General von Kluck; General von Bülow; General von Hausen;
Albert, Duke of Wurtemberg; the Crown Prince of Germany; the Crown
Prince of Bavaria; and General von Heeringen. Embodying first reserves,
they comprised twenty-eight army corps out of the forty-six which
Germany, on a war footing, could put immediately into the field.[7]
Having reached the French frontier from near the Belgian coast to
Belfort, the eight armies were to have advanced across France in
echelon. If you take a row of squares running across a chessboard from
corner to corner you have such squares for what is known in military
phraseology as echelon formation.
Almost invariably in a military scheme of that character the first body,
or "formation" as it is called, of the echelon is reinforced and made
stronger than the others, because, while such a line of formations is
both supple and strong, it becomes liable to be badly disorganised if
the leading body be broken. On the leading body is thrown the main work
of initiating the thrust. That leading body, too, must be powerful
enough to resist an attack in flank as well as in front.[8]
Advancing on this plan, these armies would present a line exposing, save
as regarded the first of them, no flank open to attack. Indeed, the
first object of the echelon is to render both a frontal and a flank
attack upon it difficult.
Had the plan succeeded as designed, we should have had this position of
affairs: the eight armies would have extended across France from Paris
to Verdun by the valley of the Marne, the great natural highway running
across France due east to the German frontier, and one having both
first-rate road and railway facilities. It was hoped that by the time
the first and strongest formation of this chain of armies had reached
Paris and had fastened round it, the sixth, seventh, and eighth armies
would, partly by attacking the fortified French frontier on the east,
but chiefly by enveloping it on the west, have gained possession of the
frontier defence works.
The main French army must then have been driven westward from the valley
of the Marne, across the Aube, brought to a decisive battle in the
valley of the Seine, defeated, and, enclosed in a great arc by the
German armies extending round from the north and by the east to the
south of Paris, have been forced into surrender.
There is a common assumption that the German plan was designed to repeat
the manoeuvres which in the preceding war led to Sedan, and almost with
the same detail. That is rating the intelligence of the German General
Staff far too low. They could not but know that the details of one
campaign cannot be repeated in another against an opponent, who, aware
of the repetition, would be ready in advance against every move.
Naturally, they fostered the notion of an intended repetition. That
promoted their real design. The design itself, however, was based not
merely on the war of 1870-1, but on the invasion of 1814, which led to
the abdication of Napoleon, and the primary idea of it was to have _only
one main line of advance_.
The reason was that if an assailant takes two main lines of advance
simultaneously and has to advance along the valleys of rivers
converging to a point, as the Oise, the Marne, and the Seine converge
towards Paris, his advance may be effectively disputed by a much smaller
defending force than if he adopts only one line of advance, provided
always, of course, that he can safeguard his flanks and his
communications.
Bear in mind the calculation that the main French army would never in
any event be strong enough successfully to resist an invasion so
planned. Bear in mind, too, that an echelon formation is not only supple
and difficult to attack along its length on either side, but that it can
be stretched out or closed up like a concertina. To maintain a formation
of that kind with smaller bodies of troops is fairly easy. To maintain
it with the enormous masses forming the German armies would be
difficult. But the Germans were so confident of being able to compel the
French to conform to all the German movements, to stand, that is to say,
as the weaker side, always on the defensive, leaving the invaders a
practically unchallenged initiative, that they believed they could
co-ordinate all their movements with exactitude. This was taking a risk,
but they took it.
It is a mistake to suppose that they entered on the campaign with every
movement mapped out from start to finish. No plan of any campaign was
ever laid down on such lines, and none ever will be. The plan of a
campaign has to be built on broad ideas. Those ideas, by taking all the
essentials into consideration, the strategist seeks to convert into
realised events. In this instance, there can be very little doubt that
certain assumptions were treated as so probable as almost to be
certainties. The first was that such forces as France could mobilise in
the time would be mainly drafted to defend the fortified frontier. The
next was that such forces as could be massed in time along the boundary
of Belgium would be too weak seriously to impede the invasion. The third
was that in any subsequent attempt to transfer forces from the fortified
frontier to the Belgian boundary the French would be met and defeated by
the advancing echelon of German masses. The fourth was that such an
attempted transfer, followed by its defeat, would leave the fortified
frontier so readily seizable, that German armies advancing swiftly into
the valley of the Marne would fall upon these defeated French forces on
the flank and rear. Besides, that attempted transfer would be the very
thing that would promote the German design of envelopment.
If Paris could be reached by the strongest of the chain of armies in
eight days, then the mobilisation of the French reserves would still be
incomplete. Under the most favourable conditions, and even without the
disturbance of invasion, that mobilisation takes a fortnight. Given a
sudden and successful invasion with the resultant upset of
communications and the mobilisation could never be completed. All,
therefore, that the 1,680,000 men forming the invading hosts[9] would
have to encounter would be the effectives of the French regular forces,
less than half the number of the invaders.
When we speak of twenty-eight army corps moving in echelon,
approximately like so many squares placed diagonally corner to corner,
it is as well not to forget that such a chain of masses may assume quite
sinuous and snake-like variations and yet remain perfectly intact and
strong. For example, the head of the chain might be wound round and
pivot upon Paris, and the rest of the chain extended across France in
curves. This gigantic military boa-constrictor might therefore crush the
heart out of France, while the defenders of the country remained
helpless in its toils.
Such in brief was the daring and ambitious scheme conceived and worked
out by the German General Headquarters Staff, and worked out in the most
minute detail.
It will be seen from this summary that so far as its broad military
features are concerned, the plan promised an almost certainly successful
enterprise. There were concealed in its calculations, nevertheless,
fatal flaws. What they were will appear in the course of the present
narrative. Meanwhile it is necessary to add that possible opposition
from Belgium had not been overlooked; nor the possibility, consequent
upon that opposition, of intervention by Great Britain. From the
military standpoint, however, it was never calculated that any British
military force would be able to land either in France or in Belgium
promptly enough to save the French army from disaster. In any event,
such a force would be, from its limited numbers, comparatively
unimportant.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Despatch from Sir John French to Earl Kitchener of September 17th,
1914. For the text of this see Appendix.
[2] The contemplated fine has been alleged to be 4,000 millions
sterling, coupled with the formal cession of all North Eastern France.
This statement was circulated by Reuter's correspondent at Paris on what
was asserted to be high diplomatic authority. Such a sum sounds
incredible, though as a _pretext_ it might possibly have been put
forward.
[3] Simon: _The Emperor William and his Reign._
[4] This phrase is that of General F. von Bernhardi.
[5] After the Berlin Congress in 1878, Prince Gortschakov mooted the
idea of an alliance between Russia and France. In 1879 Bismarck, in view
of such a development, concluded the alliance between Germany and
Austria. Italy joined this alliance in 1883, but on a purely defensive
footing. The account given of the Triple Alliance by Prince Bernhard von
Bülow, ex-Imperial Chancellor, is that it was designed to safeguard the
Continental interests of the three Powers, leaving each free to pursue
its extra-Continental interests. From 1815 to 1878 the three absolutist
Powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, had aimed at dominating the
politics of the Continent by their entente. For many years, however,
German influence in Russia has been giving way before French influence.
This is one of the most important facts of modern European history. The
Triple Alliance was undoubtedly designed to counteract its effect.
Germany, with ambitions in Asia Minor, backed up Austria, with ambitions
in the Balkans. Both sets of ambitions were opposed to the interests of
Russia. Russia's desertion of the absolutist entente for the existing
entente with the liberal Powers of the West has been due nevertheless as
much to the growth of constitutionalism as to diplomacy. The entente
with Great Britain and France is popular. On the other hand, the entente
with Germany and Austria was unpopular. The view here taken that one of
the real aims of the Triple Alliance was the furtherance of Prussia's
designs against France is the view consistent with the course of
Prussian policy. For Prince von Bülow's explanations, see his _Imperial
Germany_.
[6] F. von Bernhardi: _The Next War:_ see Introduction.
[7] Of the remaining corps, five were posted along the frontier of East
Prussia to watch the Russians. The rest were held chiefly at Mainz,
Coblentz, and Breslau as an initial reserve.
The now definitely ascertained facts regarding the military strength of
Germany appear to be these:--
25 corps and one division of the
active army mustering 1,530,000 men
21 corps of Landwehr mustering 1,260,000 men
---------
Total 2,790,000 men
In addition, there were raised 12 corps of Ersatz Reserve, and there
were also the Landsturm and the Volunteers, whose numerical strength is
uncertain. These troops, however, were not embodied until later in the
campaign.
[8] The leading army, that of General von Kluck, consisted of 6 corps;
and the second army, that of General von Bülow, of 4 corps. The others
were formed each of 3 corps, making an original total of 28 corps.
Following the disaster at Liége, however, the army of General von Emmich
was divided up, and the view here taken, which appears to be most
consistent with the known facts, is that it was, after being re-formed,
employed to reinforce the armies of Generals von Kluck and von Bülow.
That would make the strength of the German force, which marched through
northern Belgium, 780,000 men.
[9] A German army corps is made up, with first reserves, embodied on
mobilisation, to 60,000 men. Twenty-eight army corps, therefore,
represent a total of 1,680,000 of all arms.